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Chapter 1
Introduction
Some Leaders are Born Women.1 
1.1 OPENING THE STORY
Many years ago, looking down at a New York Times freshly dropped on my doorstep, 
I was struck by a front-page photo chronicling a gathering of world leaders.  In a 
sea of suits and ties, the female sex was glaringly absent, even to a young woman 
who was more interested in the arts and entertainment section than the political 
machinations of the day.  That photo has remained with me over the years, and in 
many respects its composition has shifted little.  From black-and-white newspaper 
photo to digital download, the absence of gender equality remains a constant in the 
political picture.  
Other sectors have fared better at incorporating women throughout their ranks. 
While parity may still be the exception, women are making significant gains as 
professionals, business leaders, academics, entrepreneurs, and athletes.  The field of 
politics, however, remains stubbornly slow to change, with women’s representation 
in this arena lagging far behind despite decades of concerted effort to increase 
numbers. In 1960, Sirivamo Bandaranaike became the world’s first female elected 
head of government when she assumed the position of premier minister in Sri Lanka 
(formerly known as Ceylon). Almost 60 years later, 11 women are elected heads 
of state and/or government out of 193 countries in the world.2   Progress?  While 
not disputing that 11 is better than 1, at the current rate of expansion the reality of 
closing the parity gap between men and women holding the highest office in the 
land remains a visionary exercise in patience.
One question academics and experts have attempted to answer over the years is – 
Why does women’s political representation matter? This question does not lend itself to 
1 Attributed to Geraldine A. Ferraro, the first female vice-presidential candidate to represent a major political 
party in the United States.  In 1984 she ran with Walter Mondale as the Democratic nominee.
2 Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in Politics,” 2017. (www.ipu.org).
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an easy answer. Intuitively it seems self-evident: Of course you need women leaders. 
But, the “why” surrounding women’s political representation remains multi-faceted. 
During a June 2012 focus group in Nairobi, I asked a group of Kenya’s leading gender 
experts why having women in government mattered.  The response was indignation 
at the question, even anger.  But as I pushed for a specific answer it became apparent 
that participants’ rationale behind the need for female representation was quite 
different.  For some it was a matter of justice.  Simply put, it was blatantly unfair 
for men to monopolize political representation: “In the same way as a nation we 
are different, I think we all need to be at the table,” noted one participant.  Others 
cited positive role models for future generations as the main impetus.  Still others 
believed that only women could, or would, push for a “woman’s agenda.”  Another 
focus group participant stated, “Women need to ensure that the gender equality 
issues are on top of every agenda and that they’re moving forward with them.”3
An equally strong contingent argued that the focus should not be increasing the 
percentage of women in Parliament, but focusing more attention on electing the 
“right women.”  Their position stressed that substantive representation – electing 
women who could and would act for women – was more important than gaining 
numbers.  One of Kenya’s most respected and long-standing female politicians is 
Martha Karua.  Principled, tough, and a trained litigator with a talent for debate, 
I was told repeatedly that she strikes fear into the hearts of male politicians.  For 
things to change “we just need a few more Martha Karua’s,” was a phrase I heard 
throughout focus groups and individual interviews.  In line with this group’s 
thinking, rather than looking towards neighboring Rwanda and its globally high 
percentage of women parliamentarians, Kenya should be looking to replicate more 
Martha Karua’s.
Finally, because women’s participation in Kenya has traditionally been so low, some 
argued heatedly: “Just get women elected, don’t worry about quality.  Quality has 
never been a criterion for electing men!  Get women elected now and then we’ll 
worry about performance later.”4
As with the practical example in Kenya, the academic justification for why women 
should be represented in political life remains varied: fairness, equality, more 
3  Three focus groups were held in Nairobi, Kenya, between May and June 2012 to discuss women’s political 
leadership in the country.  The different groups were comprised of: 1) NGO leaders, 2) gender experts, and 3) 
representatives from the international donor community.  The discussions took place following the adoption of a 
new Constitution in 2010 mandating that no more than two-thirds of all elected and appointed positions could be 
held by any one gender.  Given the lack of women in Kenyan politics, this equated to a one-third quota mandate for 
women across all of government and the security sector.     
4  Echoed by a member of the “gender experts” focus group conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 2012 to discuss 
the state of women’s political leadership in the country.  
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gender-friendly policies, positive role models, etc.  Despite these differences of 
opinion regarding the underpinning rationale, however, there is growing consensus 
that women’s continued under-representation in the formal political arena should 
be challenged.  As Phillips noted in her classic work:  “Though the overall statistics 
on women in politics continue to tell their dreary tale of under-representation, this under-
representation is now widely regarded as a problem.” 5
Many individuals and organizations have attempted to capture the extent of the 
problem – women’s political under-representation – during the past decades using 
a variety of tools.  This chapter presents a brief overview of prominent actions and 
research that have led to the wide-spread use of composite indicators to measure the 
ongoing gender inequality in politics and, specifically, the emergence of legislative 
representation as a core measure of women’s political advancement.  While the 
legislative area is no longer used exclusively to measure progress, a short review of 
this indicator’s historical emergence allows us to better understand its continuing 
significance in tracking political gender inequality.
The second section of this chapter discusses the research value of this academic 
work, including a brief introduction to a measurement approach designed to capture 
women’s descriptive representation in formal politics.  The third, and final section, 
presents an overview of all eight chapters contained in this book.
1.2 THE EVOLUTION OF CURRENT POLITICAL GENDER MEASURES
1.2.1 The Rise of Composite Indicators and Indexes
The ability to accurately measure such an abstract idea – typically labeled women’s 
political “power” or “empowerment” – remains an ongoing challenge.6  The volume 
and quality of data that can now be disaggregated by sex is not only increasing, 
but also becoming more accessible to the public.   One significant challenge of this 
informational influx is determining how to capture, distill, and present dozens or 
hundreds of indicators and data points in a meaningful and understandable format. 
5  Phillips, Anne. The Politics of Presence. Oxford University Press, 1995.
6  Current, popular gender measurement tools use a variety of approaches to capture the concept of women’s 
presence in the political space.  The most common definitions that indexes claim to measure are women’s political 
“power” or “empowerment.”  Throughout this work various authors and experts use these terms as conceptual 
dimensions that they are measuring.  The tool that I propose in this research, however, narrows the definition 
of women in the political space.  It focuses discreetly on measuring descriptive representation across a variety 
of elected and appointed roles deemed to have decision-making authority inherent in the positions themselves. 
Rather than political power or empowerment, I limit myself to measuring “women’s access to positions of decision-
making authority in the political space.” 
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Increasingly, policy makers and development practitioners are turning to composite 
indicators to combine large amounts of data into a single measure that can capture 
complex ideas.  The unitary score resulting from the index – rather than a wide 
variety of disparate indicators – also creates a simplified way to conduct country-
to-country comparisons at the individual, regional, or global level.  Typically, in 
creating a composite index, select indicators are chosen from a variety of domains 
based on a theoretical argument.  The indicators may be quantitative, qualitative, or 
a mix of both, as appropriate.  The indicator data is then drawn into an index using a 
described methodology with the different domains averaged into one score.
Building on Michela Nardo’s work for the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development, there are a number of arguments both for and against the use of 
composite indicators.7  Turning first to the “pro” side argument, advocates contend 
that a well-constructed index can simplify complex concepts into easily understood 
information.  One composite indicator allows for a wide variety of data to be pulled 
into a manageable stream of information.  This information can, in turn, be presented 
in a simplified format.  As a result, composite indicators are easier to interpret 
(rather than attempting to draw conclusions from a plethora of separate indicators).8 
This might be especially important when trying to appeal to a wide lay audience. 
Rather than requiring the reader to cull through a long list of separate indicators, 
and attempt to intuit a picture from the information, a composite index combines 
the data points into information that can be more easily grasped, especially for those 
lacking in-depth expertise in that specific area.  
For policy-makers and practitioners, a composite index provides quantitative data 
that can be used as a basis for making decisions, measuring progress over time, and 
designing interventions or programs.  A composite indicator that measures various 
countries across a region, or even across the globe, can be easily used to benchmark 
performance.  In this way, government officials, non-government organizations, 
multi-lateral donors, and advocates have a consistent way of judging progress both 
at the country level as well as how individual countries fare in relation to their 
neighbors or the world.
In turning to the “con” side of the argument, while acknowledging that the beauty of 
a composite indicator may rest with its ability to simplify complex phenomena into 
easily understood concepts, this is where danger also lies.  A sloppily constructed 
index, or lack of understanding about the underlying data sets, may lead to 
7  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005.
8  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, and Stefano Tarantola. “Tools for Composite Indicators 
Building.” European Commission, Ispra, 2005.
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confusion about what is, or is not, being measured.  In turn, this can make decision-
making based on flawed data, or a flawed understanding of the data, difficult or 
even counterproductive.9  
The construction process of a composite indicator can also lead to misinterpretation 
or simplification of the problem being measured.  Indexes use multiple indicators, 
which are then typically distilled into a single score against which progress is 
benchmarked or compared.  This one aggregate score, however, can mask underlying 
problems.  A below-average score in one area can be counterbalanced by an above-
average score in another domain.  Yet both domains may be required in order to 
make progress against the concept being measured.  
Rather than taking a critical look at the lowest-scoring components of the index, 
countries tend to focus on their overall rating.  As a result, a positively increasing 
score – which leads to claims that the situation is improving – may divert attention 
away from problematic indicators that could hinder future progress.  Because strong 
country performance in one area can “mask” low performance in another, the final 
composite score may not reveal the full extent of challenges to be addressed.  Unless 
the stakeholder is willing to take the time and effort to pull apart the data, this can 
make it difficult to identify specific intervention opportunities.  Finally, there is 
often a significant lag time in the collection of data and construction of a composite 
indicator, leading to a mismatch of results and on-the-ground reality. This may be 
especially true for those composite indicators that are not conducted on an annual 
basis, when years may pass between measurement efforts.
Weaknesses aside, the use of composite indicators has been steadily rising.  The most 
recent count by the United Nations Development Program in 2008 highlighted 178 
separate composite indexes varying in range from the Happiness Index to Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers.10  One area of composite indexes that has seen 
significant growth during the past decade is that of measuring aspects of gender 
inequality.
9  Schüler, Dana. “The Uses and Misuses of the Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Empowerment 
Measure: A Review of the Literature.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 161–81.
10  Bandura, Romina. “A Survey of Composite Indices Measuring Country Performance: 2008 Update.” Office of 
Development Studies, New York: United Nations Development Program, 2008.
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1.2.2 The Growth of Gender Composite Indicators and Indexes
Kersti Yllö, in 1984, was the first to develop and use a  gender composite index to 
measure the concept of what she referred to as women’s social status.  Her Status of 
Women Index analyzed how structural gender inequality affected domestic violence 
against women in the United States.11  Since Yllö, other social scientists have followed 
her trend in developing gender composite indexes.  In 1988 Sugarman and Straus 
published their Gender Equality Index, again focused on the United States.  In their 
work they attempt to more accurately define the “status of women”  by making 
a theoretical distinction between “gender attainment” – defined as the extent to 
which women have achieved “society valued status” such as education, economic 
resources, physical and mental health, etc., – and “gender equality” – whether 
women have as much education, earning power, and life expectancy in relation to 
men.12  The purpose behind their construction of the Gender Equality Index was not 
to measure gains women were making, but to “measure the attainments of women 
relative to men.”13 
The need for improved and more global gender composite indexes received a 
significant boost in 1995 with the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing.  As 
a result of the conference, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action was produced 
and signed by governments around the world.  In its own words:  “The Platform for 
Action establishes a set of actions that should lead to fundamental change.”14  The 
document called on governments to ensure women’s full participation – on a basis 
of equality – in every aspect of society.  This call for government action included the 
responsibility to coordinate, monitor, and assess progress on women’s advancement 
in each country.   The need to track progress highlighted the gap in data availability 
on women’s status.  Serious efforts at measuring gender equality required new, and 
better, measurement tools.
In 1995 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) launched the Gender 
Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), with the aim 
of including a gender dimension in its annual Human Development Index.  There have 
been numerous criticisms over the years about what the GDI and GEM measured, 
11  Yllö, Kersti. “The Status of Women, Marital Equality, and Violence against Wives a Contextual Analysis.” Journal 
of Family Issues 5, no. 3 (1984): 307-320.
12  Sugarman, David B., and Murray A. Straus. “Indicators of Gender Equality for American States and Regions.” 
Social Indicators Research 20, no. 3 (1988): 229–70.
13  Ibid.
14  According to its Mission Statement, the Beijing Platform for Action aims to remove obstacles to women’s active 
participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and 
political decision-making.  Full text of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action can be found at:  http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform.
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or did not measure.15  Due to a lack of understanding about what each was capable 
of doing, both indices were considered marginally effective as policy tools.16 Yet 
each was important, despite their problems and misuses, as the GEM and GDI 
represent early attempts to aggregate multiple indicators into a common gender 
score comparable on a regular basis, across multiple countries.17  Their introduction 
spurred other efforts to construct a more reliable index with gender-differentiated 
data.18
The establishment of other global initiatives, such as the Millennium Development 
Goals in 2000, reinforced the need for gender-disaggregated data across all countries.19 
Goal number three was specifically devoted to promoting gender equality and 
empowering women, although many other targets aimed at highlighting gender 
inequalities were found throughout all eight Millennium Development Goals.20 
While many countries did not achieve the 2015 targets, the goals were able to 
establish a more collective, global vision for measuring gender equality.
From 2000 onward there has been a plethora of new gender indexes designed that 
aim to fill gaps in data.  While indicators and methodologies are different, publication 
frequency is inconsistent, and theoretical underpinnings vary, each attempts to 
measure in some way the progress of the world’s women.
1.2.3 The Rise of Critical Mass Theory
As the utility of quantifying women’s presence in social and political life has taken 
root through the use of international instruments, it is useful to understand where 
the global community has focused its measurement attention.   In particular, for 
the purpose of this research, I am most concerned with the political arena, where 
women’s equitable share of representation has been very slow to materialize.
To speak of representation, one must begin with Hanna Pitkin.  In her detailed 
analysis she clearly articulates what it means to “represent,” including by whom 
15  Klasen, Stephan. “UNDP’s Gender-Related Measures: Some Conceptual Problems and Possible Solutions.” 
Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 243–74. Dijkstra, Geske. “Towards a Fresh Start in Measuring 
Gender Equality: A Contribution to the Debate.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 275–83.
16  Schüler, Dana. “The Uses and Misuses of the Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Empowerment 
Measure: A Review of the Literature.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 161–81.
17  UNDP replaced the GEM and GDI with the Gender Inequality Index in 2010. 
18  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
19  A self-stated objective of the Millennium Development Goals was to improve the monitoring of commitments 
made to women during the 1990s through, for example, the Beijing Declaration, as well as other global agreements. 
20  “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2015. 
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and for whom.21  Of particular relevance, Pitkin expounds on what it means to 
have a “representative government.”  While she does not detail what percentage 
of minority or opposition views are needed for a government to be considered as 
“representative,” she does make the important theoretical argument that diversity 
is a core component of representation.  A representative government, by Pitkin’s 
definition, underscores the need for a number of minority or opposition views to be 
officially active in government.
She further delves into the types of representation these minorities may encumber, 
including descriptive representation, which she generally defines as not acting for 
others, but standing for them.  I am a woman and my legislative representative 
is a woman.  Within the legislative realm, descriptive representation may be seen 
as “compositional similarity between representatives and represented.”22  The 
legislature, therefore, becomes a reflection for the whole of society.  
While academics such as Pitkin helped further the theoretical and collective 
understanding of what modern representation should look like, the pressure for 
achieving that greater diversity of representation was given impetus with the 1979 
passage of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW).  The convention called for women’s empowerment and 
full participation in society.  It explicitly included “participation in the decision-making 
process and access to power.”23  CEDAW helped lay the basis for a global framework, 
accepted by the majority of countries, outlining the importance of women’s political 
participation and the need to measure progress against this articulated goal.
Following CEDAW’s adoption, the term “temporary special measures” enters into 
wider use.  While the term was used in previous UN documents, CEDAW attempted 
to more clearly define the term, while at the same time delinking it from the concept 
of discrimination.  
Article 4, paragraph 1:  Adoption by States parties of temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be 
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in no way 
entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these 
21  Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. The Concept of Representation. University of California Press, 1967.  
22  Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A., and William Mishler. “An Integrated Model of Women’s Representation.” Journal of 
Politics 67, no. 2 (2005): 407–28.
23  United Nations General Assembly. “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.” United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p.13, December 18, 1979.
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measures shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and 
treatment have been achieved.24
CEDAW’s specific effort to delink temporary special measures from notions of 
discrimination helped increase their acceptance.  As a result, we began to see more 
women entering the legislative branch through the adoption of such temporary 
special measures as legislative quotas.  At the same time pressure was increasing on 
states to demonstrate gender progress in line with their international commitments. 
Counting women in the legislative branch was seen as an easily measured, 
quantifiable standard against which women’s political progress could be judged. 
As quotas became an accepted tool in many countries for increasing women’s 
legislative representation, a corresponding area of discussion was the number of 
women perceived as optimal for a legislature.  At what number or percentage should 
you set the quota?  
In Kanter’s seminal research she sets the following baseline of understanding: 
when only a few representatives (tokens) are present they have little ability to effect 
change in the larger group.  She argued that it is only at the “tilted” category (with a 
ratio of approximately 65:35) that the minority can begin to change the institutional 
culture.25  Therefore, according to Kanter’s line of reasoning – and as applied to 
the political arena – having a few women represented in the legislature would not 
necessarily lead to political change given their minority, token status.
Building on Kanter’s work, Dahlerup argued that the size of the minority is 
important.26  Yet even as early as 1988 she expressed her reservations around the 
argument that women’s representation must achieve a “critical mass”27 in order 
for change to occur.  She acknowledges that numbers and percentages may have 
little impact on policy outcomes, and that even a few women – given the right 
circumstances – can create significant change.  In short, given all the social, cultural, 
and political factors at play, it is extremely difficult to isolate the impact of numbers 
or percentages of women alone.28
Despite her concerns cautioning the acceptance of “critical mass theory” as a 
panacea to achieving positive change for women, she acknowledges that today the 
24  Ibid.
25  Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. “Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to Token 
Women.” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 5 (March 1977): 965–90.
26  Dahlerup, Drude. “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics.” Scandinavian Political 
Studies 11, no. 4 (1988): 275–98.
27  The term “critical mass” is borrowed from nuclear physics, and refers to the quantity needed to initiate an 
irreversible situation or process.
28  Dahlerup, Drude. “The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass.” Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 522–30.
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idea of critical mass as a precursor to change has shifted from the academic realm to 
common acceptance:
The “story of the critical mass theory” refers to the actual use of the theory of a critical 
mass.  When feminist movements and female politicians themselves make use of this 
“theory,” it becomes important in itself, in spite of all scholarly reservations.  Again 
and again one hears, as part of conventional wisdom, the research has shown that 
there must be at least 30% women, a critical mass, for women to make a difference 
in politics.”29
The figure of 30% representation was codified in the Beijing Platform for Action: 
“30% of decision-making positions to be held by women.”30  Despite reservations 
surrounding the effectiveness of critical mass, the concept of achieving a minimum 
block of women – most typically targeting parliamentary representation – has 
continued to grow in strength.  In the last two decades, the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, the European Union, the Commonwealth, the African Union, 
the Southern African Development Community, and the Organization of American 
States, to name some of the more prominent regional and international organizations, 
have endorsed the idea of a 30% critical mass in line with the Beijing Declaration.31  
For two decades the trend line for adopting quotas to achieve a critical mass has been 
on the increase.32  Most recently, this shift to quotas has been prevalent in developing 
countries, where many new democracies are mandating the rapid adoption of 
quotas for women, often through constitutional and legal changes.  Dahlerup and 
Freidenvall contrast the Scandinavian model (an “incremental approach” that has 
taken decades to achieve) to the more recent “fast track” approach (a process that 
results in historic leaps in relatively short periods of time, often in only one election).33 
A number of countries with high historical barriers to women’s participation, 
resulting in continuously low levels of representation, are using new constitutional 
and legal processes to rapidly mandate changes.  These changes are often possible 
29  Ibid.
30  United Nations. “Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women,” October 27, 1995.
31  Krook, Mona Lena. “Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide.” Politics 
and Gender 2(3) 2006. 303-327.  Norris, Pippa, and Mona Lena Krook. “Gender Equality in Elected Office: A Six-Step 
Action Plan.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 9, 2011.
32  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in Parliament: 20 Years in Review.” Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-
Parliamentary Union, 2015. 
33  Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women: Why 
Scandinavia is No Longer the Model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 1 (March 2005): 26–48.
25
Introduction
following major political shifts or upheavals,34 with Rwanda and South Africa being 
highly visible examples.  One can also look more recently to Kenya.  Following 
massive electoral violence in 2008, a peace agreement was signed that included 
passage of a new constitution.  The drafters included a 30% quota for women – 
across all elected and appointed positions – that came into full play beginning with 
national and local elections in 2013.  In all three instances political upheaval allowed 
the country’s rules concerning representation levels for women to be substantially 
rewritten in a condensed timeframe. 
Today, the critical mass theory is accepted by multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, 
with programs often designed around 30% women’s participation as an acceptable 
achievement standard.  For example, the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance – at the forefront of advocating for women’s increased political 
representation and tracking the use of quotas globally – continues to highlight the 
necessity of a critical mass on its website and in publications.35  
As the use of quotas has grown in acceptance as a means to correct women’s under-
representation in formal government, the literature has also expanded around why 
and how quotas are adopted by different countries and political systems, including 
variations in the types of quotas embraced.  Krook’s analysis outlines four common 
arguments that have traditionally been used to explain quota adoption:  1) women 
mobilize to increase descriptive representation, 2) political elites recognize a strategic 
advantage behind increasing the presence of women, 3) quotas support standards 
of justice and equality of women’s representation, and 4) international norms and 
pressure help facilitate the spread of quotas.36
Explicitly, these four arguments are based on a belief that women’s descriptive 
representation is a positive factor, even as rationales for why may vary.  Implicitly, 
underpinning the quota debate is the belief that increasing women’s descriptive 
participation will increase gender-positive outcomes.  For example, research points 
to evidence that women may be more willing to introduce legislation related to 
education, health care, children’s issues, and welfare policy.37  Women, in their 
predominate role as care-giver and nurturer, can more effectively represent the 
views and needs of women and children than their male counterparts.  Likewise, 
because of their role as nurturer, women are seen as staunch defenders of the 
34  Tripp, Aili. “Women’s Political Empowerment in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding: A Baseline Study.” Madison, 
Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison, November 2012.
35  Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. “Gender Quotas Database,” 2015. 
36  Krook, Mona Lena. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford 
University Press, 2010.
37  Paxton, Pamela, Sheri Kunovich, and Melanie M. Hughes. “Gender in Politics.” Annual Review of Sociology 33 
(2007): 263–84.
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underprivileged and less willing to engage in corrupt practices.  While the academic 
literature is mixed on whether men or women are less corrupt, the perception is 
widespread that women are less willing to engage in rent-seeking behavior as it is 
not considered to be in their nature.38  Research also lends credence to the perception 
that women practice politics in a feminized manner.39  This includes a strong ability 
to build consensus and effectively negotiate differences in a non-threatening way.40 
While debates continue regarding the justification for adopting and maintaining 
quotas, the fact remains that today more than 100 countries have embraced them 
through legal or voluntary means, with approximately three-quarters of those 
countries having done so in the past 20 years.41  In 1945 women held 2.6% of all 
legislative seats.  Today, on average, women make up approximately 24% of all 
legislatures.42  The story of critical mass theory, and its usefulness as an advocacy tool 
for moving more women into legislative office, has proven successful.  In short, the 
use of quotas is putting more women into politics, in particular within the legislative 
arena.  Therefore, counting women in the legislative branch continues to be seen as 
an easily quantifiable standard against which women’s access to positions of formal 
political power can be measured. 
As a result of the critical mass story, and directed focus on women obtaining more 
legislative seats, the percentage of women in parliament is an internationally accepted 
and widely used indicator for tracking women’s advancement.  While development 
practitioners and aid organizations remain staunch supporters of legislative quotas 
as a way to improve women’s lives, academic research is increasingly questioning the 
effectiveness of quotas as a route to greater substantive representation for women.43
The idea that women will support women’s issues in itself is problematic given 
that there is no standard definition of what constitutes a “women’s issue.”  Scholars 
have defined the term narrowly, from issues that increase autonomy and well-being, 
38  Goetz, Anne Marie. “Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?” Development and Change 
38, no. 1 (2007): 87–105.
39  Childs, Sarah. “A Feminised Style of Politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons.” The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations 6, no. 1 (2004): 3–19. 
40  Tamerius, Karin L. “Sex, Gender, and Leadership in the Representation of Women.” Women, Gender, and 
Politics: A Reader, 2010, 243–50. Wilson, Marie C. Closing the Leadership Gap. New York: Penguin Books, 2007.
41  Krook, Mona Lena. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford 
University Press, 2010.
42 Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in National Parliaments,” 2019. (www.ipu.org).
43  Studlar, Donley T., and Ian McAllister. “Does a Critical Mass Exist? A Comparative Analysis of Women’s Legislative 
Representation Since 1950.” European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 233–53. Devlin, Claire, and Robert 
Elgie. “The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of Rwanda.” Parliamentary Affairs 
61, no. 2 (February 23, 2008): 237–54. Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “Should Feminists Give Up on Critical 
Mass? A Contingent Yes.” Politics & Gender 2 (2006): 522–30.   Grey, Sandra. “Numbers and Beyond: The Relevance 
of Critical Mass in Gender Research.” Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 492–502.  
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to more broadly, including issues that affect a woman’s everyday life.44  Celis’s 
work highlights that attempting to narrow issues neatly into categories defined as 
belonging to women – and thereby implying a homogeneity to what women want 
and need – is simply misleading.45  Women are not monolithic in their thinking 
and opinions.  Women are black and white, rich and poor, conservative and liberal. 
Given this diversity of race, education, culture – and numerous other factors – we 
can not inherently assume that women will support specific issues that advance a 
feminist cause simply because they are women.  
Even if, hypothetically speaking, we were able to define a common number of 
women’s issues upon which all elected and appointed women could rally behind in 
any particular country, we must be cognizant of the fact that other factors may limit 
women’s words and actions.  Political parties, as only one example, may effectively 
limit women’s voice, agency, and willingness to act.46  Political parties remain, in 
most instances, the gate-keepers to political life.47  Where a woman is placed on a 
voting list, how many women are proposed, which constituency, and how seriously 
the party undertakes its commitment to gender diversity are all important elements 
involved in getting women elected.48  Ethnic- and religious-based parties have strong 
incentives to see like-minded women candidates in office.  Likewise with systems 
based on patronage or clientelism – the “right” woman (one who will play by the 
existing rules) is more likely to garner party support.  Being recognized and selected 
as a maverick or agent of change is not the criteria upon which potential candidates 
are typically selected by established political parties.49 
If a woman successfully makes it past the numerous political party hurdles that 
may stand in her way, she often finds her ability to make substantive changes 
limited by the gender-biased nature of the institution itself in which she serves.50 
Once appointed or elected to office, positions of influence and power may be closed 
44  Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to 
Critical Actors.” Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 125–45.
45  Celis, Karen. “Studying Women’s Substantive Representation in Legislatures: When Representative Acts, 
Contexts and Women’s Interests Become Important.” Representation 44, no. 2 (2008): 111–23. Celis, Karen and 
Sarah Childs. “The Substantive Representation of Women: What to Do with Conservative Claims?” Political Studies 
60 (2012): 213-225.
46  Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski, eds. Gender and Party Politics. Sage Publications, 1993. Koch, Michael T., 
and Sarah A. Fulton. “In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established 
Democracies.” The Journal of Politics 73, no. 01 (2011): 1–16.
47  Kittilson, Miki Caul. Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments: Women and Elected Office in Contemporary 
Western Europe. Ohio State University Press, 2006. Hoekstra, Valerie. “Increasing the Gender Diversity of High 
Courts: A Comparative View.” Politics & Gender 6, no. 3 (2010): 474–82.
48  Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative 
Analysis.” Social Forces 78, no. 1 (1999): 235–68.
49  Dahlerup, Drude. “The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass.” Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 522–30.
50  Puwar, Nirmal. Space Invaders: Race, Gender and Bodies out of Place. Berg, 2004. Wängnerud, Lena. The 
Principles of Gender-Sensitive Parliaments. Routledge, 2015. Norris, Pippa, and Mona Lena Krook. “Gender Equality 
in Elected Office: A Six-Step Action Plan.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, September 9, 2011.
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through an institutional structure that prioritizes male-based attributes and styles.51 
In some legislative institutions, for example, committee chairs are awarded based 
on longevity of office.  With women moving more recently into elected or appointed 
legislative positions, they are clearly disadvantaged in this process.  The ability to link 
critical mass to substantive representation – given the potentially numerous barriers 
that exist between and around the two concepts – has been attempted through 
different modalities and will continue to be debated as new research emerges.52
1.2.4 From Critical Mass to Critical Actors
As noted earlier, even in the 1980s Dahlerup acknowledged that it was difficult to 
draw a relation between specific numbers of women and outcomes, proposing that a 
shift in social attitudes might go further towards explaining evidence of change once 
greater numbers of women enter the legislature.  This change takes place around 
“critical acts,” defined as acts or initiatives that “change the position of the minority 
and lead to further changes.”53  Importantly, Dahlerup highlights that critical acts 
depend on “the willingness and ability of the minority to mobilize the resources 
of the organization or institution to improve the situation for themselves and the 
whole minority group.” 54  Success, in short, depends on the ability of certain actors 
to mobilize the institution to embrace the views of the minority. 
More than a decade later Tremblay and Pelletier also argued that individuals may 
count more than numbers, and that getting higher percentages of women elected 
may not be the key to substantive representation.  The best strategy to advancing a 
gender-friendly agenda is to get more feminists – both men and women – elected. 
While greater numbers of women can have positive effects on, for example, 
symbolism, equality, legitimization of institutions and systems, individual feminists 
are needed to push forward progressive interests and issues of women.55  While more 
women elected can achieve a descriptive critical mass, more feminists elected – a 
51  Turquet, Laura. “Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice.” (2011). Thames, Frank C., and Margaret 
S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in Democracies Around the World. NYU 
Press, 2012.
52  Celis, Karen. “Substantive Representation of Women: The Representation of Women’s Interests and the Impact 
of Descriptive Representation in the Belgian Parliament (1900–1979).” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 28, 
no. 2 (2007): 85–114. Tremblay, Manon, and Réjean Pelletier. “More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and 
Substantive Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Elections.” International Political Science 
Review 21, no. 4 (2000): 381–405.  Childs, Sarah. “The Complicated Relationship between Sex, Gender and the 
Substantive Representation of Women.” European Journal of Women’s Studies 13, no. 1 (2006): 7–21.
53  Dahlerup, Drude “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics.” Scandinavian Political 
Studies 11, no. 4 (1988): 275–98.
54  Ibid.
55  Tremblay, Manon, and Réjean Pelletier. “More Feminists or More Women? Descriptive and Substantive 
Representations of Women in the 1997 Canadian Federal Elections.” International Political Science Review 21, no. 
4 (2000): 381–405. 
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“vocal critical mass”56 – are needed to substantively represent women’s issues.  This 
not only applies to parliamentarians, the focus of most attention, but more recent 
evidence within the judiciary also points in this direction:  feminist men appear to 
judge in line with feminist women while conservative women’s judicial decisions 
are more closely aligned to those of conservative men.57  
More recently, Krook and Childs have reiterated the call to focus more attention 
on individuals, stressing the need to move away from critical mass and direct 
greater attention towards what they term “critical actors” as a path towards better 
understanding the substantive representation of women’s concerns.58  They identify 
critical actors as legislators, either men or women, who willingly initiate and engage 
in policy actions to advance women’s issues, even as a minority.59  A common feature 
among critical actors is the low threshold at which they are willing to act politically. 
The objective of critical actors is to garner a substantial following – a critical mass, 
so to speak – to their cause in order to effect change.  Their efforts may fail, however, 
through a lack of numbers to initiate policy change or provoke a backlash among 
entrenched elites opposed to fundamental reform.  In order to understand how 
critical actors succeed or fail, the researcher must look retrospectively at the change 
which did, or did not, occur and why.  In essence, deconstruct what happened and 
the role each actor played.  This allows researchers to pay greater attention to how 
substantive representation of women occurs (rather than focus on how more women 
make a difference) as well as determine what specific individuals do to advance 
change (not what “women” as  a monolithic group accomplish).60
While the idea of shifting greater focus away from critical mass and more towards 
critical actors is a welcome addition, it is an idea that has not been widely adopted 
by practitioners.  Global indexes used to measure what they define as the progress of 
women’s political power or political empowerment focus on percentages of women. 
Currently, they are unable to differentiate between critical actors or differing levels 
of authority women may hold in an institution.  Women are considered as a whole, 
with higher percentages remaining a proxy measure for greater levels of political 
power.
56  Tremblay, Manon. “Do Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Study of Legislative Behaviour in 
Canada’s 35th Parliament.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de science Politique 31, no. 3 
(1998): 435-465.
57  Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
58  Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “The Substantive Representation of Women: Rethinking the ‘Critical Mass’ 
Debate.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 2005.
59  Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to 
Critical Actors.” Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 125–45.
60  Ibid.
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Critics have also begun to argue that too much emphasis has been placed on legislative 
quotas to the detriment of other parts of government.  Legislative members do not 
operate in a vacuum.  In functioning democracies, even weak ones, collaboration is 
required between the executive and legislature to pass bills and follow through on 
implementation.  The best legislation can also be reversed, or not enforced, by the 
courts.  In addition, de-concentrated or decentralized local governments, including 
local police, are often far from the national policy process.  They can ignore dictates 
from the capital or turn a blind eye when abuses occur.
Members of parliament may successfully draft a new law and have it passed.  But 
the executive also has to be in agreement with the law.  If there is tension around the 
law, or provisions of the law in dispute, the executive can: 1) veto the bill, 2) refuse 
to fully implement it through ministries, or 3) use budget constraints as a way to 
“starve” implementation.  Likewise, the judiciary has a role to play.  Judges have the 
ability to overturn legislation, refuse to hear cases, or fail to punish violators.  When 
land is illegally taken from a widow or domestic violence occurs, a slap on the wrist 
to the perpetrator – rather than meting out what the law dictates – sends a strong 
message to both sexes.  The police, as community responders and law enforcers, may 
hesitate to pursue future prosecutions.  Women, giving the anticipated outcome, 
may decline to report the crime.  Focusing the majority of attention on women in the 
legislature detracts from the other decision-makers who also impact and influence 
rules, decisions, and policies that may disadvantage women. 
1.3 THE DIAMOND INDEX AS A GLOBAL GENDER MEASURING TOOL 
 IN THE POLITICAL  SPACE
While we should not abandon the idea of a critical mass, we should be asking 
where other sources of information exist that can expand our understanding of 
how women are being descriptively represented in the political dimension.  For 
example, while not as widely used as legislative percentages, more gender indexes 
are including executive branch data, thanks to the efforts of UN Women and the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union which now track and present this information annually.61 
These two indicators – percentage of legislators and ministers – remain the most 
common measures for tracking women’s global progress in the political field.  What 
remains unclear is how to collect data representing other parts of government in 
the same manner.  And, if it is possible, would a broader and deeper collection of 
women’s descriptive representation across the political spectrum have additional 
intellectual or practical value?  Would collecting such data be too time consuming 
61  The latest Women In Politics report for 2017 can be found at:  www.ipu.org.
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(and therefore expensive) to warrant the investment?  A common perception one 
often hears is that better information on women in politics is simply missing and, 
therefore, we must content ourselves with what we have.  
While women’s lack of representation in the political field lags behind other areas, 
as currently measured through gender indexes today, that is not to say that women 
are not making gains as judges, police officers, mayors, governors, and senior civil 
servants.  We simply do not know to what extent.  As the common adage goes: what 
gets measured gets done.   If we want to know whether more women are moving into 
other political areas, then we should be measuring that movement.  And, given the 
growing use of technology in our daily lives and day-to-day work of government, 
is the lack of data as true today as it was more than 20 years ago when the Inter-
Parliamentary Union first began collecting statistics on women parliamentarians?
Despite the challenges surrounding the idea of what a critical mass can and can not 
do for women’s representation, we should not throw it out the window.  What it has 
clearly done is produce a body of information – representing almost every country 
for a sustained period of time – thus creating consistent information freely available 
to any stakeholder interested in this field of study.  Our focus should now turn to 
further supplementing this valuable data.  As more, and perhaps different, political 
doors open for women, there is a need to reflect a more modern view of descriptive 
representation across and within the various institutions of government.
The majority of gender composite indexes in use today attempt to measure women’s 
relationship to the political arena through a lens of what they label as political 
empowerment or access to political power.  Most global indexes use one to three 
measures to reflect these concepts.  Regional indexes may use more varied but local-
level measures, depending on data availability.62  
My purpose is to create a new index. Given the fact that a wide variety of excellent 
gender indexes already exist, my intention in creating yet another one is to expand 
the possibilities of measurement into new directions.  This includes increasing 
indicators both horizontally and vertically to create a more robust global picture 
of how and where women are descriptively represented.  Specifically, the design 
62  A total of six gender composite indicators were reviewed in Chapter 2 – Measuring Women’s Access to Political 
Power: A Critical Appraisal.  Of the six, four  were considered global indexes:  1) Gender Inequality Index - United 
Nations Development Program; 2) Social Institutions and Gender Index - Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development; 3) Global Gender Gap Index - World Economic Forum; and 4) Gender Equity Index - Social Watch. 
The remaining two were classified as regional indexes:  1) Gender Equality Index - European Institute of Gender 
Equality; and 2) African Gender and Development Index - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
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and piloting of what I will call the Diamond Index attempts to answer the following 
research question:  
Can quality data measuring women’s positions  
of formal political decision-making  
be collected on a global scale?
The Diamond Index will measure the levels of descriptive representation among a 
wider variety of positions within the formal government than currently seen in any 
global measurement tool in use today.  While the Diamond Index may have varied 
applications, I specifically piloted its use towards measuring women’s descriptive 
representation in order to better understand if and where women are gaining access 
to political decision-making positions.  A total of 12 key positions were identified 
from the executive, legislative, judicial, and security sector domains that are common 
to all countries.  These positions were weighted according to their perceived level of 
access to decision-making authority.
The Diamond Index is a first attempt to assign varying levels of decision-making 
authority to different positions, acknowledging that some positions are potentially 
more important than others.  Currently, the articulation of what is called women’s 
access to political power is most often tied to percentages of women in institutions, 
with a higher percentage equated with more access.  Yet straight percentages do 
not tell the whole story:  “Counting the number of women in a parliament … just 
tells you how many women are in parliament.  It says nothing about their freedom 
to think and vote as they choose without fear of reprisal.”63  Given the numerous 
positive outcomes associated with women’s representation in the political arena, 
descriptive representational tools that capture their presence play an important 
role.  The Diamond Index, while still focused on descriptive representation like other 
indexes, may potentially present a more detailed reflection of women’s broader 
formal political representation.  Because it focuses on selected positions that are 
perceived to have greater access to political decision-making, it also is able to 
differentiate between a block percentage of women and those considered among 
the elite.  While today it appears that most countries still allow for only a small 
percentage of “superwomen” in these coveted slots, longer-term data gathered 
through the Diamond Index could either reinforce the “superwoman” phenomenon, 
or demonstrate that a wider swath of women – more reflective of their country’s 
societal makeup – is making inroads across government and perhaps generating 
63  Foust, Joshua, and Melinda Haring. “Who Cares How Many Women Are in Parliament?” Foreign Policy, June 25, 
2012.
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benefits in new ways reflective of their presence in positions little recorded with 
today’s tracking tools.  
No index to date, including the Diamond Index, can predict how women will choose 
to vote and their rationale for doing so, in effect, their substantive representation. 
Over time, however, the Diamond Index holds the potential for highlighting how 
women are moving horizontally across any political system as well as vertically 
into more powerful political positions.  Understanding this movement is a critical 
missing piece in the academic literature.  Recognizing the differentiation in high, 
medium, and low levels of access to positions of political decision-making, while 
using descriptive representational measures to track how women are feeding in and 
out of these positions, is a valuable contribution towards building our understanding 
of the access to key political positions and, on the basis of future research, the relation 
between that access and positive gender gains.
1.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEWS 
This work consists of eight chapters, including this introduction.  Below is a short 
synopsis of what each attempts to convey to the reader:
Chapter 2 – Measuring Women in the Political Domain: A Critical Appraisal
Six leading gender indexes (four global and two regional) are examined to better 
understand the theoretical frameworks, conceptual dimensions, and selected 
indicators used to measure women’s presence in the political arena.  The analysis 
includes a review of the literature that underpins the development of each index and 
the differing terms and definitions used to reflect women’s political presence.  As each 
index is examined, the value associated with measuring women’s presence across 
different branches of government is discussed.  This includes an acknowledgement 
that the lack of appropriate data across the political spectrum is problematic for 
index measurement purposes.
Chapter 3 – For Good Measure
This chapter begins with a review of quality data definitions and frameworks 
proposed by a range of academics.  Academic approaches are then compared to 
quality data use by international organizations, including the different frameworks 
that have been developed for global use during the past 25 years.  Based on academic 
literature and international development practices, I then develop a quality data 
framework comprised of eight criteria: relevancy, completeness, comparability, 
accuracy, timeliness, cost effectiveness, accessibility, and granularity.  Each criteria 
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is then discussed in detail regarding its definition, the purpose of its inclusion, and 
nuances in relation to its use in a composite gender indicator.  
Chapter 4 – Developing the Diamond Index
The conceptual framework for developing the Diamond Index is detailed in this 
chapter, including the four guiding principles that form the foundation of the 
measurement tool.  This includes a detailed explanation of how the 12 decision-
making positions were selected.  Readers are then offered a step-by-step introduction 
as to how the index will be built.  This includes an explanation of the tool’s shape, 
with a full diamond demonstrating approximate parity between the number of 
men and women holding positions of formal political decision-making.  Mapping 
exercises are highlighted to demonstrate differing aspects and uses of the index. 
Conceptual limitations of the Diamond Index are also acknowledged and discussed.
Chapter 5 – Gathering Data for the Diamond Index
This chapter presents a detailed narrative describing the four different stages of 
data collection.  The second part of the chapter then devotes significant attention to 
outlining the numerous successes and challenges in that data collection process.  An 
expanded section details problems found in attempting data collection within the 
security sector.  After describing the collection process, statistics are then presented 
to outline where data gaps occur.  These gaps are detailed by region, country, and 
each of the four sectors:  executive, legislative, judiciary, security.  Highlights around 
the collection effort are presented in the conclusion.
Chapter 6 – Mapping the Diamond Index in 40 Countries
The data collected and mapped in the Diamond Index 40-country sample is presented 
in this chapter.  Results are first described globally, including a ranking of all countries 
from high to low scores.  Following this overview, each of the four respective 
domains – executive, legislative, judicial, security – is presented and scored with 
regional trends highlighted.  The second half of the chapter is devoted to examining 
women’s horizontal and vertical presence (glass walls and glass ceilings) across the 
different domains.  This includes using detailed graphs to present the percentage of 
women occupying each of the 12 decision-making positions according to regional 
averages drawn from the countries sampled.   
Chapter 7 – Diamond Index Findings and Limitations 
The first part of this chapter focuses on an analysis of the data quality in relation 
to the decision-making positions selected.  Each of the eight criteria outlined in 
the Diamond Index Quality Data Framework (developed in Chapter 3) is compared 
against the 12 positions chosen across formal government.  A ranking is given 
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according to whether the quality of the data is perceived to be high, medium, or 
low.  Compiled into one graph according to these rankings, the reader can easily 
see where quality concerns emerge across the 96 separate rankings (12 positions 
X 8 quality data criteria).  The second half of this chapter is focused on findings 
emerging from the data, including a number of themes where the Diamond Index 
extends our understanding of women’s descriptive representation.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion
A summary of the research project is presented in this final chapter.  This includes 
percentages detailing the total amount of data collected and the perceived quality of 
that data.  This is followed by a brief summation outlining what the research adds of 
academic value and the limitations associated with this body of work.  Additionally, 
areas of future interest and potential areas of study in the field of women’s political 
representation are highlighted for academics and practitioners alike.
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Measuring Women in the Political Domain: 
A Critical Appraisal 
The number of women in parliaments has doubled in the 
past two decades. This translates into a global average 
of 24% women holding parliamentary seats today.64
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews six prominent gender composite indexes in use today.  The 
purpose of this exercise is to better understand how leading gender composite 
indexes conceptually frame, articulate, and then specifically measure women’s 
presence in the political area. 
I began this analysis by examining the available academic literature underpinning 
the theoretical development of commonly cited gender global indexes, such as those 
in use by multi-lateral organizations and non-governmental actors.  I then expanded 
my research to include the literature produced by the organizations responsible 
for creating the indexes.  I also examined a wide variety of gender data sources, to 
better understand how and where data was being collected for the indexes in use. 
Finally, I reviewed an extensive number of indexes containing data on women, even 
if their self-defined purpose was to measure concepts other than gender or women’s 
advancement.65
64 Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in National Parliaments,” 2019. (www.ipu.org)
65  The following is not an exhaustive list of resources consulted, but contains the more prominent indexes and data 
sources examined:  African Gender and Development Index; Afrobarometer; Asian Barometer; Bribe Payers Index; 
Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data; Corruption Perceptions Index; Freedom in the World; Gender Equality 
Index; Gender Equity Index; Gender Inequality Index; Gender, Institutions and Development Database; Glass-
Ceiling Index; Global Gender Gap Index; Human Development Index; Index of Economic Freedom; Key Indicators 
of the Labor Market; Women in Politics; Ibrahim Index of African Governance; Index of Economic Freedom; No 
Ceilings Report; Opacity Index; Open Budget Index; Parliaments at a Glance; Political Constraint Index; Polity IV 
Project; Quota Project; Social Institutions and Gender Index; United Cities and Local Governments Equality Agenda; 
UN Gender Statistics; UN Millennium Development Goals; UN Sustainable Development Goals; UN Women Facts 
and Figures: Leadership and Political Participation; WomenStats Project Database.
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Based on this review, I narrowed my focus to those indexes whose self-stated 
purpose is to measure gender.  The index also had to have a specific component 
aimed at measuring women in the political space.  Although this was defined across 
indexes in different ways (women’s power, women’s political empowerment, etc.), 
the intent was to track the progress of women’s political representation.  I originally 
envisioned analyzing only global indicators, given the focus of my research.  I chose, 
however, to include two regional indexes in order to expand the number of cases, 
variety of indicators in use, and breadth of approaches to gender measurement in the 
political space.  Individual country indexes were not included due to the specificity 
of their approach and narrow intentionality of use.  I also chose to exclude indexes 
no longer being updated and published in order to focus on trends emerging from 
the availability of more recent data.  As a result of this process, a total of six indexes 
were selected for analysis, including four global and two regional indexes.66   
Each index is then reviewed separately through a number of different lenses.  The 
six are first divided according to the type of indicators used to measure women’s 
political representation.  For example, one category contains two indexes that contain 
only legislative measures.  The second category contains three indexes that focus on 
both legislative and executive measures.  The third category contains one index that 
includes all four domains of interest for this research:  legislative, executive, judicial, 
and security.  
Under each index the first sub-section is devoted to introducing the index and its 
self-stated purpose.  Because many of the terms being used are contested or open to 
interpretation, the second sub-section clarifies how that term is conceptualized (at 
times differently by various academics and institutions).  Empowerment is given a 
lengthy discussion given that half of the indexes use this term to measure progress, 
even as their conceptual underpinnings vary.  The third sub-section is devoted 
to the indicators selected by each index to measure their respective concepts of 
political representation.  In total, 20 of the 22 indicators examined in the six indexes 
are categorized as measuring women’s presence in the afore-mentioned sectors of 
formal government:  legislature, executive, judicial, and security.67  
Finally, a sub-section is provided highlighting some of the arguments as to why each 
particular domain – legislative, executive, judicial, security – adds value when creating 
66  The indexes include:  Gender Inequality Index, Social Institutions and Gender Index, Global Gender Gap Index, 
Gender Equity Index, European Union Gender Equality Index, and the African Gender and Development Index. 
67  Of the 22 indicators self-identified by the index designers as measuring women in the political arena, one 
indicator focused on education (female and male population with at least secondary education) while the second 
measured women’s presence outside of formal government (senior positions in political parties, trade unions, 
employers’ associations, heads or managers of NGOs).
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a picture of women’s political representation.  This includes an acknowledgement 
by index developers that the lack of appropriate indicator data in the political area 
is problematic; it is problematic for the development of their respective tools and for 
their ability to accurately measure the conceptual dimensions identified. 
2.2 HOW CURRENT GENDER INDEXES CONCEPTUALIZE AND MEASURE
 WOMEN’S  PRESENCE IN THE POLITICAL DOMAIN
The majority of gender indexes in use today attempt to measure equality or 
inequality between men and women.68  On average, they employ components of 
education, labor, health, and politics.  Some of the more common indicators include 
primary, secondary, tertiary education levels (education); wage earnings, workforce 
participation rates (labor); and maternal/child mortality rates, life expectancy 
(health).  Health tends to be the highest scoring domain with education and labor, 
respectively, second and third.  Most notably, however, the component intended to 
track women’s advancement in the political arena consistently scores the lowest. 
This last-place showing of the political category may indicate that it is the toughest 
dimension to change or, perhaps, the current measurement tools being employed 
are inadequate.
In order to understand the progression in the political domain, it is useful to 
understand what is being measured.  The analysis below discusses six leading 
gender composite indexes: four that attempt to measure gender globally and two 
that limit themselves to one specific region.  Each of these indexes takes a holistic 
view of women across a range of different sectors in order to capture the various 
facets of gender relations across society.  Each index also attempts to measure some 
aspect of women’s political “power” or “empowerment.”  This specific political 
dimension – the consistently lowest-scoring component – is my area of interest. 
Although reasons underpinning the slow rate of change remain outside the scope of 
this work, better understanding the analytical basis upon which each index is built 
can help shed light on the validity of indicator selection as representative of the 
concepts being measured.
2.2.1 Legislative Measures
Of the six leading gender composite indicators analyzed, the percentage of women 
parliamentarians is used in each one.  This is the only measure to appear in all 
68  Bericat, Eduardo. “The European Gender Equality Index: Conceptual and Analytical Issues.” Social Indicators 
Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 1–28.
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six.  There are many valid reasons as to why this branch of government has been 
historically used as the political power yardstick.  The legislature remains the arena 
in which laws are debated and passed.  The legislature also has varying degrees of 
budget authority and, therefore, power of the purse.69  In many governments the 
cabinet is formed from members of parliament; the path to the executive branch lies 
through the legislative branch.70  “Outsider” women’s organizations need “insider” 
legislators who can carry their issues forward and act as an advocate in the formal 
law-making process.71  In functioning democracies, legislative institutions are able to 
act as an oversight and accountability check against other branches of government. 
While all six composite indicators use the percentage of women parliamentarians 
as a core measure of what they identify as women’s political power or women’s 
empowerment, two of the global gender indexes go no further than the legislative 
branch:  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index 
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Social 
Institutions and Gender Index, detailed in Table 1.  
69  The power of the purse:  I refer to how money can be controlled by national, state, and local budgeting and 
taxation processes that fall within the legislative mandate. The policy agenda can be affected positively (through 
adequate funding) or negatively (through delayed or withheld funding).
70  Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. Yale 
University Press.
71  Weldon, S. Laurel. 2002. “Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in Democratic 
Policymaking.” Journal of Politics 64 (4): 1153–1174.
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TABLE 1:  Indexes Using Legislative Branch Measures Only
Index Name 
Organization
Publication 
Self-Identified
Overarching Concept
and Value
Approach Indicators
Index Name:
Gender Inequality 
Index72
Organization:
United Nations 
Development Program
Publication:
Global 
Annually
2010 - present
Overarching Concept:
Gender equity is an 
intrinsic component of 
human development.  
Therefore, inequality 
between female and 
male achievements 
results in the loss of 
human development. 
Value:
Computed annually for 
almost every country 
so the index provides 
a consistent global 
measure.
Approach:
Gender-based 
disadvantages are 
measured across three 
dimensions —health, 
labor market, and 
empowerment – using a 
total of five indicators.
 Empowerment:
ü	Female and 
male share of 
parliamentary seats 
ü	Female and male 
population with 
at least secondary 
education
Index Name:
Social Institutions and 
Gender Index73
Organization:
Organization for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development
Publication:
Global 
2009, 2012, 2014
Overarching Concept: 
Discriminatory social 
institutions – social 
norms, practices, 
formal and informal 
laws – have a negative 
impact on women’s 
development outcomes.  
Examining social 
institutions allows for a 
better understanding of 
the underlying causes 
of gender inequality.
Value:
SIGI compliments other 
indices by measuring 
the discrimination 
levels of social 
institutions against 
women and girls that 
cause gender inequality, 
rather than gender 
inequality in itself. 
Approach:  
Gender equality is 
measured using ordinal 
scales graded by expert 
opinion.  A total of 14 
indicators are grouped 
into 5 sub-indexes.  In 
2014 the index included 
108 countries classified 
by their level of 
discrimination.
Political Voice:
Level of discrimination 
against women’s 
political participation 
ü	Existence of legal 
quotas to promote 
women’s political 
participation
ü	Share of women in 
national parliament
72  UNDP. “Gender Inequality Index,” 2014. www.hdr.undp.org.
73  OECD Development Center. “Social Institutions and Gender Index.” 2014. http://genderindex.org.
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2.2.1.1  Index #1:  United Nations Development Program – Gender Inequality Index
The UNDP index tool is premised on a framework that maintains human 
development at its core, with gender equity considered an intrinsic dimension of 
human development.74  Evidence points to investments in girls and women as a 
means for improving human development potential and producing long-term 
economic growth.75  Denying women the same protections and opportunities 
available to men will, therefore, result in human development potential being 
negatively affected.  UNDP argues that a country cannot achieve its full potential in 
the face of constrained human development among half the population.76 
Looking at foreign assistance through a human development lens was first 
articulated by UNDP in the 1990s.  This new approach followed closely on the era of 
structural adjustment that is widely acknowledged to have exasperated inequalities 
between men and women rather than minimize inequalities.77 This new approach 
was intended to shift the concept of development advancement based on economic 
metrics to one that prioritized individuals.  “Human development is about putting 
people at the centre of development.  It is about people realizing their potential, 
increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value.”78
The Gender Inequality Index attempts to capture the disadvantages women may face 
– and resulting loss in human development – in three areas:  1) health, 2) economic 
activity, and 3) empowerment.  Women’s access to the political sphere is captured 
in the third dimension of empowerment.  Focusing on this dimension, it is useful 
to determine how this concept is interpreted, and the resulting indicators that flow 
from this interpretation.
74  Gaye, Amie, Jeni Klugman, Milorad Kovacevic, Sarah Twigg, and Eduardo Zambrano. “Measuring Key Disparities 
in Human Development: The Gender Inequality Index.” Human Development Research Paper 46 (2010): 1–37.
75  Ibid.  Permanyer, Inaki. “A Critical Assessment of the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.” Feminist Economics 19, 
no. 2 (2013): 1–32.
76  The Gender Inequality Index is closely linked to the United Nations Development Program Human Development 
Index.  This index was created “to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for 
assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone.”  The index measures three dimensions of 
human development:  1) a long and healthy life, 2) knowledge, and 3) standard of living.  Both indexes are published 
annually.  The Human Development Index can be found at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-
index-hdi.
77  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010.
78  Ibid.
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A.  Conceptualizing Empowerment
Empowerment is a particularly slippery concept to define, despite the fact that it is 
used extensively as a measure of gender progress.  Three of the six gender indexes 
analyzed in this chapter, for example, identify empowerment as the central tenant 
for measuring gender progress in the political space.  In attempting to identify the 
challenges associated with measuring empowerment, it is worthwhile to better 
understand how the term itself has evolved over the years.
The concept of empowerment has a long history, with Batliwala tracing its roots 
back to 12th and 13th century India where movements for social justice emerged, 
framed by a central concept that articulated the need to fight against cast and 
gender oppression.79  While language may have differed over the centuries, the 
concept remained embedded in efforts to achieve more democratic forms of social 
change well into the second half of the 20th century.  By the 1970s the term was 
firmly embedded in feminist literature and the fight for gender equality.80  This fight 
was articulated not from an individualistic perspective, but rather as a challenge 
to the underlying structures of subordination that reinforced women’s position in 
relation to men.  The goal of women’s empowerment, therefore, was to challenge 
the patriarchal ideology and institutions that perpetuate gender discrimination and 
social inequality.81
By the beginning of the 1990s, however, we see the definition of the word 
empowerment begin to shift: from a word denoting challenge to existing structures 
of oppression, to a more instrumentalist form of advocacy that emphasizes freedom 
of choice and action.82  This interpretation applies not only to categories or groups 
of the disempowered – women, minorities, people with disabilities, etc. – but also to 
individuals.  For example, what type and level of empowerment might emerge from 
women provided with micro-credit?  What are the empowering effects of ensuring 
women own their land?
Kabeer argues that when women’s empowerment was the end in itself, critics viewed 
empowerment as a zero-sum game in which powerful males were losers.83  The 
79  Batliwala, Srilatha. “Taking the Power out of Empowerment – an Experiential Account.” Development in 
Practice 17, no. 4–5 (2007): 557–65.
80  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” United Nations 
Development Program, 2010.
81  Batliwala, Srilatha. “The Meaning of Women’s Empowerment: New Concepts from Action.” 1994.
82  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
83  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Development and Change 30, no. 3 (1999): 435–64.
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ability to articulate arguments that focused on greater women’s empowerment as a 
means to a desirable end – increased economic growth and education, for example – 
was seen as more palatable as an advocacy and policy approach.84  
The 1995 Fourth World Conferenced on Beijing helped further the spread of women’s 
empowerment as a development goal in itself.  Signatory countries committed to 
“enhancing further the advancement and empowerment of women all over the 
world….”85  The World Bank, for example, articulates empowerment as a means 
to poverty reduction and, therefore, a primary development assistance goal.86 
UN agencies have followed suit as well, and women’s empowerment is littered 
throughout policies, papers, and language of the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Goals.87  It is this merging of feminist goals with international development 
priorities that has moved empowerment out of an edgy politically space and into 
the mainstream consciousness and development / policy vocabulary.88  
However, critics charge that this popularization in development circles has 
undermined the concept as one meant to challenge unequal power relations and 
structures and refocused it on the individual and her ability to act within a set of pre-
determined development strategies.89  In this context, empowerment as a narrative 
for tackling inherently discriminatory local, national, and international patriarchal 
structures that disadvantage women has been minimalized to represent a narrow 
zone of influence where the individual’s voice and agency must act within the 
established status quo.90  Shifting the focus away from the larger global and national 
forces negatively impacting disadvantaged populations – in favor of the individual or 
community-level engagement – has not only limited its effectiveness but essentially 
ignores the structural constraints and institutions that allow disempowerment to 
occur in the first place.91  In short, empowerment may still be transformative, but 
only to the extent it is transformative within existing power structures.
84  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
85  Women, U. N. “Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.” In Fourth World Conference on Women, Vol. 15, 
1995.
86  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
87  https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2017/goal-05/
88  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Development and Change 30, no. 3 (1999): 435–64.
89  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” United Nations 
Development Program, 2010.
90  Batliwala, Srilatha. “The Meaning of Women’s Empowerment: New Concepts from Action.” 1994.
91  Parpart, Jane L., Shirin M. Rai, and Kathleen A. Staudt. Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in 
a Global/Local World. Routledge, 2003.
45
Measuring Women in the Political Domain: A Critical Appraisal 
The wide acceptance of empowerment as a term of art in development circles has 
not only shifted its meaning, but its instrumentalization has also resulted in ongoing 
efforts to define, quantify, and verify the term.  If development organizations and 
objectives seek to empower women, the progress of this empowerment – and 
ultimate success – must be measured in a quantifiable way.  In order to develop 
reliable measures of progress, however, it is essential to define the term being 
measured.  There must be alignment between the concept and anticipated outcomes 
achieved.  
Efforts to actually define the concept of empowerment often begin with Amartya 
Sen’s Development as Freedom.92  In his classic work he identifies development as 
linked to expanding people’s choices.  Well-being must be examined in terms of 
people’s capabilities:  true opportunities to do, and be, what they value.  Freedom of 
choice is central to Sen’s articulation of individual empowerment. 
Kabeer also places choice at the center of her reflections on empowerment and 
power: “to be disempowered, therefore, implies to be denied choice.”93  She frames 
the ability to exercise choice as having three dimensions:  (1) resources (both the 
human and social resources required to exercise choice), (2) agency (the ability 
to define goals and act upon them), and (3) achievements (outcomes, i.e., the 
decisions or choices made).  It is the achievements that allow for a closer measure 
of empowerment, although Kabeer acknowledges that this is laden with problems. 
What choices are women actually presented with in a culturally restricted context? 
What are the social and economic costs of those choices?  Do the choices presented 
simply reinforce women’s subordinate status? While articulating the important role 
choice plays in women’s empowerment – and while also positing how the concept 
might be more accurately measured – Kabeer highlights that indicators can not 
accurately measure “changes in women’s ability to make change.”  Instead, they 
only point us in the direction of that change.94
Multi-lateral institutions have also turned to the task of defining empowerment 
over the years as it became an accepted part of their work and objectives.  In the 
1990s, for example, UNIEFM defined empowerment as the ability to make choices 
and exercise bargaining power; to have a voice; to have the ability to organize and 
influence the direction of social change; to create a just social and economic order, 
92  Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 2001.
93  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Development and Change 30, no. 3 (1999): 435–64.
94  Ibid.
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nationally and internationally.95  UNIFEM’s intention, it appears, is to stretch the 
concept beyond the individual and draw a vision of empowerment on a much larger 
scale that encompasses national and global change.  
The World Bank, in an effort to bring more clarity to the term empowerment 
given varied definitions in use, commissioned a background paper in 2002 for a 
workshop entitled Poverty and Gender: New Perspectives.96  This purpose of the 
paper, it states, was to take a first step towards attempting to outline promising 
methodological approaches to measuring and analyzing women’s empowerment. 
The authors employ Kabeer’s definition of empowerment as one that best captures 
the commonalities of its use across development assistance:  “The expansion in 
people’s ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was 
previously denied to them.”97  This definition encompasses two essential elements 
that help distinguish empowerment from other, commonly cited terms such as 
gender equality, gender equity, voice, etc.  The first element is a focus on  process and 
the understanding that there is a transitional period from one state to another.  The 
second key element is agency, which acknowledges that women themselves are the 
drivers of choice or change.
Mosedale further refines the term empowerment, although building on many of the 
same elements.  She outlines four characteristics: 1) one must be disempowered as, 
for example, women are relative to men, 2) empowerment cannot be given by a third 
party, 3) people make decisions and are able to carry those decisions forward, and 4) 
it is an ongoing process.98  Mosedale raises the interesting point that empowerment is 
not something that can be given.  Empowerment is driven by those disempowered. 
It is not something bestowed by those in power, donors, or sympathetic stakeholders. 
For Mosedale it is transformatory – power from within99 – and has no definable end. 
It is continuous and ongoing – one does not wake up in the morning to have arrived 
at a final state of empowerment.
UNDP’s attention to empowerment was refocused in 2010 due, in part, to strong 
criticism arising from its earlier efforts to measure gender inequality through the 
95  “ACC Task Force on Basic Social Services for All: Guidelines on Women’s Empowerment.” New York, N.Y.: 
UNIFEM, 1997.
96  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
97  Kabeer, Naila. “Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment in Discussing Women’s 
Empowerment Theory and Practice, SIDA Studies No. 3.” Stockholm: Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, 2001.
98  Mosedale, Sarah. 2005. “Assessing Women’s Empowerment: Towards A Conceptual Framework.” Journal of 
International Development 17 (2): 243–257.
99  Green, Joanne Helen. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: Development of a Model.” International Journal Of 
Media & Cultural Politics 4, no. 3 (2008): 369–89.
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Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure.100  Misunderstood 
and misused, confusion around the purpose of the indexes led UNDP back to the 
drawing board.  The more recent Gender Inequality Index draws upon the work of 
Sen,101 Kabeer,102 and Batliwala,103 among others.  In examining a cross-sector of 
academic opinions on the term, UNDP attempts to draw conceptual consensus 
from the various definitions.  It posits that consensus does exist around four shared 
dimensions that underpin empowerment: 1) control over resources and ideology, 2) 
agency, including the right to determine the most appropriate choices, 3) process, 
involving change over time, and 4) outcome, as seen through tangible improvement.104 
While attempting to argue that there is consensus around these terms, UNDP 
authors also acknowledge that emphasis on women’s empowerment varies widely 
from a focus on the individual (thus the need for local-level interventions) to 
collective empowerment (aimed at social and structural transformation).  Despite 
differences and commonalities, the one thing which seems in total agreement is that 
“empowerment is a multidimensional and multilevel concept.”105
While UNDP may propose that there is a growing consensus around specific 
terminology, others argue that it is this very lack of agreement on the concept of 
empowerment that continues to hinder better measurement tools.106  In point 
of fact, there is no single definition of “women’s empowerment” that has been 
globally accepted.  Thus, we are trying to measure a concept that lacks a common 
understanding.107  The development community perpetuates this confusion of 
definition by conflating empowerment with other concepts.  Women’s representation, 
voice, power, agency, etc., are lumped together as admirable and interchangeable 
concepts.
Even if common terms are agreed upon, divisions remain in attempting to define 
and measure empowerment at varying levels.  While empowerment as a concept 
has entered the development lexicon, critics charge that it has remained focused 
at the local level and on individuals.  Thus the emergence of empowerment as a 
100  Dijkstra, A. Geske. “Revisiting UNDP’s GDI and GEM: Towards an Alternative.” Social Indicators Research 57, no. 
3 (2002): 301–38 Klasen, Stephan. “UNDP’s Gender-related Measures: Some Conceptual Problems and Possible 
Solutions.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 243–74.
101 Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 2001.
102 Kabeer, Naila. The Conditions and Consequences of Choice: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s 
Empowerment. Vol. 108. UNRISD Geneva, 1999.
103  Batliwala, Srilatha. “The Meaning of Women’s Empowerment: New Concepts from Action.” 1994.
104 Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010.
105 Ibid.
106 Green, Joanne Helen. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: Development of a Model.” International Journal 
Of Media & Cultural Politics 4, no. 3 (2008): 369–89. Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. 
“Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
107  In a February 2013 conversation with staff members from UNDP, they noted that UN Women was in the process 
of developing a common definition for women’s empowerment. 
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development tool linked to terms such as “community,” “grass-roots,” “individual,” 
and “household.”108  Others view empowerment as nothing less than actions that 
challenge the existing power relations and structures that oppress women.109  While 
not dismissing the importance of individualistic empowerment, these critics stress 
that the focus of empowerment should remain on collective change at the national 
and global levels.  The difficulty in selecting global indicators that can bridge this 
divide between individual and structural empowerment is apparent.  Indicators 
themselves carry information, meaning, and value judgements as to what is 
important.110  Because the concepts of power and empowerment remain controversial 
in themselves, the validity of any indicators designed to capture these concepts will 
likely remain open to criticism.  
Kabeer attempts to address this tension by identifying three different levels or 
dimensions of empowerment.  The first is “immediate,” reflecting change at the 
individual or group level.  The second level, “intermediate,” is where the institutional 
rules, relationships, and resources change.  Finally, “deeper” level empowerment 
speaks to change in the structural relationships that shape resource and power 
allocation, and reproduction, in the society.111  All of these three dimensions interplay 
with  one another, as individual empowerment may require societal change in order 
to be sustainable.  Conversely, rules and structures mean little if disempowered 
individuals remain un-impacted. 
In the World Bank’s 2002 attempt to untangle definitions and measures of 
empowerment,112 the authors proposed a new framework to reflect the varying 
dimensions of empowerment by dividing indicators into three “arenas” or spheres 
of life.  These included: (1) household, (2) community, and (3) broader areas (with this 
dimension typically reflective of regional and national levels).  The authors propose 
specific empowerment indicators across all three levels.  One can easily see at a 
glance how the targeted level of empowerment being measured produces widely 
varying proposed indicators.  For example, in looking at political measurement, 
one Household-level measure suggested was “knowledge of political system.”  At 
the Broader Arenas level, “women’s representation in regional and national bodies 
of government” was proposed as more reflective of the dimension.  The authors 
108  Parpart, Jane L., Shirin M. Rai, and Kathleen A. Staudt. Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in 
a Global/Local World. Routledge, 2003.
109  Batliwala, Srilatha. “The Meaning of Women’s Empowerment: New Concepts from Action.” 1994.
110  Kabeer, Naila. The Conditions and Consequences of Choice: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s 
Empowerment. Vol. 108. UNRISD Geneva, 1999.
111  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Discussing Women’s Empowerment 17 (2001).
112  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
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suggest that in their review of the research literature and development frameworks 
measuring empowerment, the political/legal dimension is typically at high levels 
of aggregation (regional or national) while family, social, and economic dimensions 
occur at the individual or household level.113  That is not to infer that combining 
different levels of empowerment is problematic or advantageous, rather it 
highlights the numerous ways the concept is being understood, and multiple ways 
measurable outcomes may be misunderstood. Measuring different understandings 
of empowerment – as well as at different levels – can easily lead to contradictions in 
our understanding of how women’s empowerment is advancing.
While competing definitions of empowerment point to the most fundamental 
difficulty in measuring its progress, there are a number of other constraints that also 
make the development of appropriate indicators extremely challenging.  Foremost 
among these is the lack of data, especially gender-segregated data at the macro level. 
While researchers and practitioners recognize these limitations, in practical terms it 
means tools and approaches often need to be modified to accept what there is rather 
than collect what is needed.
Secondly, empowerment is context specific.  A mother’s ability to insist on an 
education for her daughter may be seen as an empowering move in parts of Africa 
or Asia while considered a non-existent issue across Europe.  As laws, policies, 
and cultural acceptance are modified, so to will notions of empowerment change. 
Deciding how to select consistent and comparable empowerment indicators across 
countries, cultures, and time has proven to be a continually developing conversation 
among index developers and critics.  
Finally, in returning to UNDP’s four dimensions of empowerment, most efforts 
today have focused on measuring women’s control over resources and the outcomes 
of empowerment as both offer more tangible results.  Less effort has been devoted to 
measuring process and agency. 114  Because empowerment is a process – with no static 
start and finish date – it is difficult to capture with a single measure. Malhotra et al. 
argue that at least two points in time are required, as well as the specification of which 
aspects are expected to change (and an acceptable timeframe agreed upon within 
which this change should occur).  Only when these components are combined can 
success or failure be determined for measuring empowerment.115  Measuring agency 
is equally challenging.  Kabeer notes that the term is about the ability to define one’s 
113  Ibid.
114  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010.
115  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002.
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goals and act upon them, and is operationalized as “individual decision-making.”116 
This neglects a range of actions, including the more intangible aspects of reflection 
and analysis.117  How did the woman arrive at a decision point?  Were the choices 
presented actually true choices?  How should we envision collective agency?   
How to accurately measure such difficult components of empowerment – beyond 
the individual level and across countries – must be acknowledged as an enormous 
challenge in light of limited standardized data available on women, especially in the 
political arena.  Given these challenges, we often see indicators repeated claiming to 
measure empowerment when, in fact, they may be more representative of gender 
inequality measures.118  Given the multiple dimensions of empowerment, however, 
finding a single indicator, or even set of indicators, that can accurately represent the 
concept in all its complexity is unlikely.   
B.  How the UNDP Gender Inequality Index Measures Women’s Empowerment
The Gender Inequality Index’s approach to measuring empowerment is somewhat 
different than other gender composite indexes.  The authors have chosen to 
combine one indicator typically found in the education dimension with one 
legislative measure.  For education the selected measure is: “Population with at 
least some secondary education: percent ages 25 and older.”  Education is recognized 
as a key factor in increasing the health of the individual and her family; creating 
greater economic opportunity; and strengthening a woman’s capacity to increase 
information, question, and act on conditions.119  Education is typically seen as a key 
factor contributing to women’s empowerment.120  UNDP especially emphasizes 
the importance in strengthening the agency of women.121  While most composite 
indexes separate education into another dimension, the Gender Inequality Index 
focus on secondary education levels reflects the concept of “empowerment” as a 
means to creating greater economic opportunities, improving health outcomes, and 
increasing space for public voice.  Enhanced educational opportunities are viewed 
as an end to achieving gender-positive outcomes across a wide range of areas that 
impact a woman’s life.
116  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Discussing Women’s Empowerment 17 (2001).
117  Ibid. 
118  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010.
119  Permanyer, Inaki. “A Critical Assessment of the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.” Feminist Economics 19, no. 2 
(2013): 1–32.
120  Parpart, Jane L., Shirin M. Rai, and Kathleen A. Staudt. Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in 
a Global/Local World. Routledge, 2003. 
121  Gaye, Amie, Jeni Klugman, Milorad Kovacevic, Sarah Twigg, and Eduardo Zambrano. “Measuring Key Disparities 
in Human Development: The Gender Inequality Index.” Human Development Research Paper 46 (2010): 1–37. 
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The empowerment compliment to the education indicator is a commonly used 
political measure identified as: “Share of seats in parliament: percent held by women.” 
Little rationale is overtly given by UNDP as to the justification for this measure, 
aside from the fact that the data is available.  “There are other crucial elements of 
empowerment, but internationally comparable measures do not exist.”122    Permanyer, 
in extensively critiquing the Gender Inequality Index following its introduction 
and publication in 2010, simply states:  “On the other hand, PR [parliamentary 
representation] is a crude, but widely available, measure of women’s access to 
power.”123  From her perspective, while not perfect, it is a proxy measure for “access 
to power.”124  In using it as a measure in the UNDP index, however, it appears that 
the authors and critics view parliamentary seats as a global proxy for the concept of 
empowerment as well.  
Supporters of this measure argue that using “deeper” level indicators, including 
political representation of women, tells us something important about the ability of 
women to make changes in other aspects of their lives.125  By focusing on this higher-
level indicator, the logic dictates that in order for women to have arrived at this 
position other levels of empowerment must have occurred along the way. 
Others disagree with this interpretation, pointing out that the percentage of 
women in parliament should be regarded as a questionable measure of women’s 
empowerment.126  While acknowledging the lack of available data in this field, 
the percentage of female parliamentarians may be construed more as a reflection 
of political factors (such as type of system, the existence of temporary special 
measures, etc.) than a reflection of socio-economic and cultural factors that point 
to women’s increasing empowerment.127  Following this line of criticism, when 
parliamentary percentages are used as an empowerment measure, care should be 
given to understanding how women arrive at their legislative seat.
While both UNDP and Permanyer acknowledge that there may be other measures 
more appropriate than the percentage of women parliamentarians, this measure 
is seen to have definitional consistency with the Global Inequality Index’s use of 
122  Ibid.
123  Permanyer, Inaki. “A Critical Assessment of the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.” Feminist Economics 19, no. 2 
(2013): 1–32.
124  Ibid.
125  Kabeer, Naila. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s Empowerment.” 
Discussing Women’s Empowerment 17 (2001).
126  Dijkstra, A. Geske. “Revisiting UNDP’s GDI and GEM: Towards an Alternative.” Social Indicators Research 57, no. 
3 (2002): 301–38.
127  Cueva Beteta, Hanny. “What Is Missing in Measures of Women’s Empowerment?” Journal of Human 
Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 221–41.  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and 
Human Development.” UNDP, 2010. 
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empowerment, even as the availability of data is noted as a key determinant for 
the indicator’s inclusion.  The Gender Inequality Index pulls from the existing Inter-
Parliamentary Union database for percentages of women parliamentarians, so the 
inclusion of legislative seats does not necessarily add any new information in the 
empowerment arena.  When aggregated with the education data, it does create a 
unique combination for reflecting women’s empowerment.  Some might argue, 
however, that aggregating education levels with political representation creates a less 
clear picture for women’s education, access to political power, and empowerment. 
Because UNDP captures the vast majority of countries on a consistent annual basis, 
however, the index remains a tool that is widely used due to its global comparability. 
2.2.1.2  Index #2:  OECD – Social Institutions and Gender Index 
The Social Institutions and Gender Index was developed by the OECD as a compliment 
to current composite indexes in use, including the heavily criticized UNDP Gender 
Empowerment Measure and Gender-Related Development Index tools.  It draws from a 
compilation of the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base developed 
in 2006.  This database, the authors state, attempts to differentiate between the 
outcome variables used by most composite indexes (that focus on measuring the 
extent of male-female inequality) and input variables (the underlying reasons 
that lead to discrimination against women). 128  Through its framework, the Social 
Institutions and Gender Index claims that it does not measure gender inequalities 
in health, education, labor, etc., but focuses rather on social institutions.129  These 
social institutions are defined as “long-lasting codes of conduct, norms, traditions, 
informal and formal laws that might contribute to gender inequalities in all spheres of 
life.”130  It is discriminatory social institutions that perpetuate women’s lower status 
in society.  Sociologists emphasize that these institutions endure and persist over 
time.  Collectively, they may restrict, exclude, and curtail access to opportunities, 
resources, and power which, in turn, negatively impact development.131  As a result, 
countries with higher inequality of social institutions are associated with lower 
development outcomes.132  In order to improve development outcomes, therefore, 
unequal social institutions must be challenged and improved.  OECD countries 
128  Jütting, Johannes P., Christian Morrisson, Jeff Dayton-Johnson, and Denis Drechsler. “Measuring Gender (In) 
Equality: The OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Data Base.” Journal of Human Development 9, no. 1 
(2008): 65–86.
129  North, Douglass С. “Institutions.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991): 97–112.
130  Branisa, Boris, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler. “The Construction of the Social Institutions and Gender Index 
(SIGI).” Discussion papers, Ibero America Institute for Economic Research, 2009.
131  Cerise, Somali, Gaelle Ferrant, and Jason Gagnon. “2012 Social Institutions and Gender Index: A Methodological 
and Technical Background Paper.” Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2013.
132  Branisa, Boris, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler. “Why We Should All Care about Social Institutions Related to 
Gender Inequality,” 2010.
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are excluded, as measures in the Gender, Institutions, and Development Data Base are 
viewed as targeting problems more prevalent in the developing world.
Five separate dimensions are captured in the index.  Language and indicators have 
been modified over the course of three iterations, but the most recent publication of the 
index in 2014 included: 1) discriminatory family code, 2) restricted physical integrity, 
3) son bias, 4) restricted resources and assets, and 5) restricted civil liberties.  Restricted 
Civil Liberties is divided into two aspects.  The first is access to public space which 
examines the individual’s freedom of movement.  For example, laws allowing women 
to travel alone, choose their residence, apply for a passport, etc.  Of greater interest to 
this research is the second aspect of restricted civil liberties defined as political voice. 
The intent here is to capture women’s participation in the public sphere.133 
A.  Conceptualizing Political Voice
Voice is defined by Goetz as a metaphor for powerful speech associated with acts or 
arguments that influence public decisions.  It is often used in the context of public 
decision-making, such as parliament.134  We also see voice linked to concepts of 
democracy and representation.  Institutions with a diversity of voices – more reflective 
of the country’s citizenry – are perceived to be more representative of the population’s 
interests and garner higher levels of trust.  While being a woman does not guarantee 
a fixed ideology, it does ensure that a different set of life experiences are included 
within public institutions.135  In this respect, the concept of voice is not only about 
women having greater say among decision-making bodies, but can equally reflect 
concepts of democratic freedoms and representation.  
Within development circles the term is often linked to agency.  Agency is about making 
and acting on choices while voice articulates those choices.  In this respect, voice can be 
described as the expression of agency.136  There seems consensus around the concept 
that voice, while not considered empowerment in itself, is a necessary component for 
achieving empowerment.  By giving women greater voice, it is suggested that they 
can achieve empowerment-linked outcomes such as improved policies for services, 
greater control over reproductive rights, and increased economic opportunities.137  
133  More information about the Social Institutions and Gender Index, including the latest variables and data 
source, can be found at http://www.genderindex.org.
134  Goetz, Anne-Marie, and C. Nyamu-Musembi. “Voice and Women’s Empowerment: Mapping a Research 
Agenda.” Pathways of Women’s Empowerment Working Paper 2 (2008).
135  Kenney, Sally J. 2002. “Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European 
Court of Justice.” Feminist Legal Studies 10: 257–270.
136  Buvinic, Mayra, Gayatri Koolwal, and Rebecca Furst-Nichols. “Data 2X:  Mapping Gender Data Gaps DRAFT.” UN 
Foundation, April 2013.
137  Goetz, Anne-Marie, and C. Nyamu-Musembi. “Voice and Women’s Empowerment: Mapping a Research 
Agenda.” Pathways of Women’s Empowerment Working Paper 2 (2008).
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B.  How the OECD Measures Political Voice
The OECD states that the Political Voice dimension of the index: “highlights the 
importance of women’s participation in community actions and public decision 
making for a range of development outcomes such as governance, health and 
education.”138  Essentially, the OECD posits that allowing women greater voice in 
the public arena will lead to substantive representation for women.  Conceptually, 
the attempt is being made to link greater political voice to improved development 
outcomes.  
It is worth noting that the Restricted Civil Liberties domain of the SIGI index has 
proven problematic to measure from the beginning.  In the original 2009 version 
of the index, this dimension was defined as “Civil Liberties” and included two 
variables: 1) Freedom of Movement (allowing for movement outside the home) and 
2) Freedom of Dress (the obligation to wear a veil or burqa).139  Since the majority of 
countries do not restrict movement and dress, out of 123 countries measured, 83 
were placed at the shared ranking of 1.  This lack of variation resulted in two-thirds 
of the countries being clustered in the same quintiles, making it difficult for policy 
makers or advocates to identify differences.  
In 2012, the index was published for a second time.  In this version Civil Liberties 
language was revised to Restricted Civil Liberties.  Within this dimension, Freedom 
of Movement was changed to Access to Public Space (although the same measure 
was retained) while Freedom of Dress was discarded.  In its place, Political Voice was 
inserted in order to measure “the level of discrimination against women with respect 
to political participation.”140  This discrimination is seen to reduce access to education 
and economic opportunities.  Women’s lower participation rates is also linked with 
reduced accountability of governments.141  This returns to the concept that greater 
voice for women results in higher levels of trust among formal institutions, such as 
parliament.
In 2014 the Restricted Civil Liberties, which in the previous version of 2012 linked 
higher levels of voice to more accountability government, was slightly modified. 
In its place the importance of voice was noted for leading to positive development 
138  Cerise, Somali, Gaelle Ferrant, and Jason Gagnon. “2012 Social Institutions and Gender Index: A Methodological 
and Technical Background Paper.” Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2013.
139  Branisa, Boris, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler. “The Construction of the Social Institutions and Gender Index 
(SIGI).” Discussion papers, Ibero America Institute for Economic Research, 2009.
140  The full OECD 2012 SIGI report can be accessed at https://www.oecd.org/dev/50288699.pdf.
141  Cerise, Somali, Gaelle Ferrant, and Jason Gagnon. “2012 Social Institutions and Gender Index: A Methodological 
and Technical Background Paper.” Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris. Retrieved 
September, 2013.
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outcomes, including governance.142  While voice was still viewed as impacting 
the political dimension, the authors pulled away from claims that it can “increase 
government accountability” while still acknowledging positive benefits accrued 
around the more generic term “governance.”143
 
Social Watch introduced a new two-measure approach to track the Political Voice 
indicator: 1) the percentage of women in parliament and 2) the use of legal quotas to 
promote women’s political participation.  These two variables, researchers state, are 
considered proxy measures of “negative attitudes towards women’s political 
and civic participation.”144  For the first indicator, as with others, the information 
comes from the Inter-Parliamentarian Union database.  For the second indicator, 
countries can garner a 0 (national and local quotas are in place), 0.5 (either national 
or local quotas are in place), or 1.0 (no quotas are in place).  This is the only index 
that uses legislative quotas as a measurement.  While an interesting concept, the 
wide-spread use of quotas around the globe – when differentiated by only three 
measures – results in multiple similar scores across the 120 countries.  This replicates 
the problem experienced in 2009 with the Freedom of Dress measure, making it 
difficult to capture country variances due to the lack of differentiation.  A quota 
rating system that further incorporates more detailed information, for example, 
the type of quota (mandatory or voluntary) and level of adherence (full, partial, 
noncompliance) would create a more robust measure of political voice and allow for 
greater differentiation among countries. 
Accurately measuring political voice is acknowledged to be difficult.  As a result, 
we again see the numbers of women in legislative seats as a proxy indicator for 
women’s voice – “it is a conveniently simple measure.”145  It is interesting to 
note that the Gender, Institutions, and Development Data Base, from which the SIGI 
is primarily constructed, also has available the percentage of women holding 
ministerial positions.  No explanation is given as to why the OECD effort focuses 
solely on the legislative branch; one must assume that the authors considered 
the use of quotas and parliamentarian numbers sufficient proxies for adequately 
measuring political voice.  
142  Ibid. 
143  Comparison of the differing language between the 2012 and 2014 Social Institutions Gender Index can be 
found at www.genderindex.org.
144  Cerise, Somali, Gaelle Ferrant, and Jason Gagnon. “2012 Social Institutions and Gender Index: A Methodological 
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2.2.1.3  Value of Legislative Branch Measures
The role of the legislative branch in ensuring oversight and accountability, shaping 
public opinion, implementing policy, and representing constituent interests all 
underlie the justification for measuring women’s descriptive representation in 
this branch.  While the existence of quotas and percentage of male and female 
parliamentarians can paint a broad picture of women’s representation, there are a 
number of cautions that should be highlighted if we only consider this branch of 
government as a sufficient measure. 
Legislative Branches Vary in Political Power:  One of the problems in attempting 
to measure women’s political power solely through the legislative branch is the 
wide disparity seen in individual legislatures and systems.  There is a Western 
presumption that the legislature is the “first power.” But this is often not the case 
in both developed and developing democracies.  Not all legislatures are created 
equally.  Using legislative numbers as a proxy measure for women’s empowerment 
or political voice can be an especially flawed approach for illiberal democracies, 
countries undergoing political transition, or authoritarian regimes.  Across much 
of Sub-Saharan Africa personalized power and clientelism undermine formal 
institutions.146  Political parties are often unstable and appear and disappear from 
election to election.147  Patronage systems and the weak nature of political parties 
combine to weaken the institutions upon which democracies rest.  As a result, in 
many illiberal or “electoral democracies” we hear references to a “rubber stamp 
legislature” – one which lacks de facto power and is viewed as simply a validation 
of executive desires – evident throughout parts of the developing world.148  This 
can be exacerbated by high turnover rates during elections creating a new cadre of 
novice parliamentarians with each election.  This lack of institutional knowledge 
can affect the professionalism of the body and lawmaking effectiveness.  These weak 
legislatures are often unable or unwilling to play an effective oversight role in curbing 
other branch powers and may exercise more limited authority in determining the 
policy direction of the country.
While it may be important to see women represented in parliament from a cultural 
and perception-changing perspective, practically speaking, parliamentary bodies 
146  Lynch, Gabrielle, and Gordon Crawford. “Democratization in Africa 1990 - 2010: An Assessment.” 
Democratization 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 275–310.
147  Ibid.
148  The Parliamentary Powers Index (Fish and Kroenig 2009) assesses the strength of national legislatures 
around the world.  The index uses 32 different items that gauge a legislature’s sway over the executive, as well 
as institutional autonomy, authority, and capacity.  The index is scored on a zero to one scale, with zero being an 
absence of power.  The average score of OECD high-income economies is .72.  The score for low-income economies 
is almost half of that at .40.  
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may wield limited power.149  For those legislatures that do wield authority, there is a 
growing consensus that elements of power are shifting to the executive branch, most 
notably in the policy area.150  Today, globalization is seen as one underlying cause 
of the power shift.151  Interlinked economies and global security concerns are testing 
the ability of legislatures to respond effectively to changing norms.  Parliamentarians 
are often viewed as ill-equipped to address growing international issues that fall 
outside of their domestic institution.  The reasons for this may be varied, but can 
include a lack of technical knowledge required for the situation, inability to forge 
a common response among government coalition partners, or issues are viewed by 
representatives as counter to the interests of their constituencies.
Legislative Lawmaking Does Not Always Result in Policy Change:  The need to 
focus women’s measurement tools on the legislature is often couched in language 
that describes not only the representative function of this branch of government, 
but also the policy-setting function.  In its capacity as rule-maker, parliaments are 
charged with establishing the laws of the land.  Therefore, having more women in 
parliament – who can better represent half of the population’s interests – in order 
to pass more gender-neutral laws – that will lead to more gender-friendly policies 
– that will enhance women’s social status – etc., is a chain of logic that makes sense 
in Western, liberal democracies.  Our assumption is that once a law is approved 
by parliament then executive implementation will follow.  If laws are not complied 
with, one can turn to the courts for enforcement.
If, for example, the goal is to eliminate violence against women, a logical place to start 
would be with the legislature and legal framework.  The premise underpinning the 
desired change is that once better approaches are passed into law – perhaps focused 
on stronger deterrence measures, an expansion of women’s rights, or greater access 
to a justice system – then new rules and policies will be implemented that can more 
effectively tackle the problem.  Practical experience of practitioners and academic 
researchers repeatedly demonstrates that this is, in fact, far from the reality in many 
countries. 152  
From laws designed to sanction domestic violence, prevent early marriage, 
and ensure land inheritance for women, we see a consistent pattern of informal 
149  Devlin, Claire, and Robert Elgie. “The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of 
Rwanda.” Parliamentary Affairs 61, no. 2 (February 23, 2008): 237–54.
150  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
151  Sassen, Saskia. “Beyond Party Politics: The New President and the Growth of Executive Power.” Dissent 56, no. 
1 (Winter 2009): 5–6.  
152  Sanematsu, Marisa. “Accessing Justice: Models, Strategies and Best Practices on Women’s Empowerment 
(IDLO, 2013).” Ciências 14 (2014): 04.
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customary law and norms undermining civil and constitutional law.153  Weak police 
and judicial enforcement are often identified as major detriments to the state’s ability, 
or willingness, to enforce codified formal law.154  The executive branch may also be 
implicated in non-compliance through either an unwillingness to implement new 
laws or policies or, in some instances, a lack of financial wherewithal to do so.  This 
supposition that passage of a new law will lead to change, and even result in greater 
gains for women, does not give adequate weight to the challenges surrounding 
resource allocation, implementation, and enforcement. 
Implementing formal laws that contradict cultural gender norms remains a significant 
challenge around the world, especially in rural areas.  That is not to say that fighting 
for improved legal frameworks should be abandoned.  Laws play a positive role by 
creating new norms that can eventually lead to wider behavioral change in society.155 
As we look to engender change, however, we must be cognizant that a Western-
focused perception of the legislative branch as the locus of policy transformation 
through its legislative mandate does not stand up to scrutiny in swaths of the world. 
We should not be fooled into a simplistic view that the passage of laws is sufficient, 
i.e., that once the legislature is done with its business, all else will follow.  As UN 
Women notes, “While acknowledging advances in legal reforms, laws mean little 
unless they are implemented.”156
Legislative Quotas have Unacknowledged Challenges:  Despite Dahlerup’s early 
reservations about critical mass,157 the critical mass “theory” today is embraced 
by most multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, with programs designed around 
30% women’s participation as an accepted standard.158  While setting targets is 
laudable – what gets measured gets done – the consensus figure of approximately 
30% women as a parliamentary goal has raised a number of challenges.  
153  “Mapping the Substantive Representation of Women in the Ugandan Parliament.” Center for Women in 
Government and Civil Service; Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany; Nkumba 
University, Uganda, September 2014.
154  Scribner, Druscilla, and Priscilla A. Lambert. “Constitutionalizing Difference: A Case Study Analysis of Gender 
Provisions in Botswana and South Africa.” Politics & Gender 6, no. 01 (2010): 37–61.
Geraghty, Terese. “Gender and State-Building: The Case for Timor-Leste.” Volume II, 2014, 121.  
155  Turquet, Laura. “Progress of the Worlds Women 2011-2012. In Pursuit of Justice.,” 2011.
156  Ibid.
157  Dahlerup, Drude. “From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics.” Scandinavian Political 
Studies 11, no. 4 (1988): 275–98.
158   USAID, the largest bi-lateral donor in the field of democracy promotion, examined more than 100 development 
programs focused on women’s political leadership between 2009-2014.  A 30% women’s participation rate was 
most often cited as the goal. The report, entitled Women’s Leadership as a Route to Greater Empowerment, 
was published in October 2014: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Women’s%20
Leadership%20as%20a%20Route%20to%20Greater%20Empowerment%20Desktop%20Study.pdf.
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First, it undermines the ideal of parity.  Early advocates for critical mass may have 
believed that a ratio of 70:30 was more realistic given the dearth of women at the 
time.  Today, however, we see donors, governments, and political parties using 
the 30% target as the end game.  Attempts to move beyond accepted minimums 
may lead to resistance.159  In short, 30% was required; 30% has been achieved. 
Efforts to reach parity are stymied due to a coherence of thinking around the 
acceptability of a lower percentage, rather than 50:50.  The idea of a 30% critical 
mass becomes in itself a new glass ceiling for women.160
Second, the development community remains wedded to the idea that legislative 
quotas lead to positive substantive change for women.  While the greater 
inclusion of women through temporary special measures continues to gain global 
acceptance, among academia there is a rising chorus of voices questioning the 
effectiveness of legislative quotas to measure women’s political power.161  If 
we elect women to simply increase numbers, then quotas have been effective. 
Underpinning the rise in women’s parliamentary percentages is the fact that 
more than 120 countries today have electoral quotas in place.162  Yet implicit in 
the critical mass argument is the notion that greater numbers of women at the 
table will result in a positive outcome for women: that once the right number of 
women are elected, they will have access to power and effect changes in gender 
equality.  If descriptive representation is able to further women’s interests, then 
quotas should be a resounding success.  The academic research on this point, 
however, remains inconclusive.  
The inability to consistently turn women’s numbers into action for women may 
be multiple and varied.  For example, in some instances the party leadership 
may act as the gate keeper to women’s participation.  The most appealing female 
candidates are those who will represent the political position of the party.  If the 
party platform rests on gender inequality, the female candidates selected will 
likely be expected to uphold these positions in public.  In some instances women 
are appointed to seats without a defined constituency.  This may make it more 
difficult for a quota candidate to argue for or against legislation on behalf of 
159  Yoder, Janice D. “Rethinking Tokenism: Looking beyond Numbers.” Gender & Society 5, no. 2 (1991): 178–92.
160  “Social Watch Report 2014:  Means and Ends.” Uruguay: Social Watch, 2014. http://www.socialwatch.org/
sites/default/files/Social-Watch-Report-Overview2014_eng.pdf.
161  Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “Should Feminists Give Up on Critical Mass? A Contingent Yes.” Politics 
& Gender 2 (2006): 522–30.  Tremblay, Manon. “The Substantive Representation of Women and PR: Some 
Reflections on the Role of Surrogate Representation and Critical Mass.” Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 502–11. 
Studlar, Donley T., and Ian McAllister. “Does a Critical Mass Exist? A Comparative Analysis of Women’s Legislative 
Representation since 1950.” European Journal of Political Research 41 (2002): 233–53.
162  “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2015. 
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any particular geographic grouping.163  Her representative function could be the 
nation as a whole.  Or, in some instances the party itself – which placed her in the 
seat – may see itself as the constituency to which she is beholding.
Quotas can also be ignored, or not enforced, or purposefully manipulated by 
political parties.  Research in Belgium suggests that parties are hesitant to accept 
legally imposed quotas that interfere with candidate selection, preferring instead 
an approach that is less binding.164  Voluntary quotas give parties more liberty 
to decide how women will be selected and where they are placed on the list.  As 
a result, voluntary party quotas may guarantee that women are considered in 
the election process, but result in fewer women being actually elected.165  Legally 
imposed quotas, on the other hand, are typically mandated through the country’s 
election law or constitution.  Parties are required by law to comply.  For this 
reason legally imposed quotas may be more controversial, yet more effective in 
achieving targets.166  
Using the existence of a quota policy or law as a mark of women’s progress is also 
problematic when the majority of countries have established quotas.  There is an 
inability to differentiate descriptive representational levels country to country.  If 
everyone is using the same measure of women’s descriptive representation, the 
indicator no longer allows for differentiation
Given the challenges identified, why do we continue to use legislative seats as a 
measure of women’s political power?  As UNIFEM succinctly stated almost 15 
years ago, “the empowerment of women does not just depend on the elimination 
of numerical gender disparities.”167  One simple explanation is that we have the 
data.  Long-standing efforts, such as the Quota Project,168 allow academics and 
practitioners to easily gather and analyze parliamentary figures on a global basis. 
Parliaments across the world are also similar in their functions and composition. 
So comparing a lower house in Albania is similar to a lower house in Zimbabwe. 
163  During a July 2012 interview with a Kenyan women parliamentarian assigned to a reserved seat, the issue of 
constituency representation was discussed.  The parliamentarian was critical of her appointed position that left 
her without a defined constituency.  Her male members could more easily travel to their areas of representation, 
better represent their smaller constituency, and be more visible in the eyes of “their” voters.  She recognized that 
she could not cover the nation, as one large constituency, in the same way.  
164  Meier, Petra. “The Mutual Contagion Effect of Legal and Party Quotas A Belgian Perspective.” Party Politics 10, 
no. 5 (2004): 583–600.
165  Thames, Frank C., and Margaret S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in 
Democracies around the World. NYU Press, 2012.
166  Meier, Petra. “The Mutual Contagion Effect of Legal and Party Quotas A Belgian Perspective.” Party Politics 10, 
no. 5 (2004): 583–600.
167  Elson, Diame, and Hande Keklik. “Progress of the World’s Women 2002: Volume 2.” UNIFEM, 2002.
168  The Quota Project brings together comparative knowledge and resources on the implementation and impact of 
quotas.  The project was initiated in 2003 by International IDEA and Stockholm University; the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union joined the effort in 2009.
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We are able to compare apples to apples.  The more complicated answer as to 
why we use this measure is that changing a country’s long-standing attitudes 
towards women is a multi-generational effort.  The number of legislative seats is 
a proxy for societal shifts in attitudes, one that can be measured annually in most 
countries.
  
*****
As composite indexes continue to rely on the legislative branch to track women’s 
progress, the ability to compare like units globally should not be minimized.  There 
remains a dearth of public data that can track women’s presence in the political 
arena.  As a result, we are reliant on a narrow set of measures that can be gathered. 
Despite these constraints, we should ask whether focusing the majority of our energy 
and resources towards the legislative branch is the most effective formal structure 
for ensuring women’s political power.  Given the historically male structure of 
most parliaments, can women have a strong voice once elected?  Many of the large, 
recent legislative gains have been in developing democracies where parliaments are 
subservient to other parts of government, typically the executive.  How strong is the 
voice and agency of women – or men – when the institution itself is weak?
It is also worth acknowledging that the majority of research that has formed 
our thinking around women in political leadership has focused on Western 
democracies.169  This research, in turn, has primarily concentrated on the legislative 
branch.  While women in the executive is a growing field, to date it has received 
less attention.  There remains a void of research on critical mass, critical actors, or 
critical acts in other parts of government.  For example, the use of quotas to increase 
court diversity is almost nonexistent.170  When we narrow our focus to one or two 
positions in government we are saying, by default, that political power held by 
other branches is unimportant or less important to women.  Our exclusionary optic 
focuses on “fixing this one part of government,” and the rest will follow.    
Western academics consistently call for greater research in lower-income countries 
– especially in light of the significant gains many have made using “fast-track” 
quotas171 in the past decade.  For example, in 1995 Europe claimed the top 10 spots in 
world rankings of women in parliament.  By January 2015, countries in Sub-Saharan 
169  Ballington, Julie, and Azza M. Karam. Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers. Vol. 2. International Idea, 2005.
170  Hoekstra, Valerie. “Increasing the Gender Diversity of High Courts: A Comparative View.” Politics & Gender 6, 
no. 3 (2010): 474–82.
171  Dahlerup, Drude, and Lenita Freidenvall. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women: Why 
Scandinavia is no Longer the Model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 1 (March 2005): 26–48.
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Africa held four of those spots.172  From South to East Africa, we are seeing large 
numbers of women entering government and the military through constitutionally 
or legally mandated quotas.  Across Africa the rise in women entering the judiciary 
has been unprecedented – and mostly undocumented (see Chapter 6: Mapping the 
Diamond Index in 40 Countries).
The rapid changes being experienced by many of these countries, which are 
typically “off the academic grid,” mean that valuable insights surrounding recent 
political gains by women remain unknown.  The difficulty of traveling to Mongolia, 
which boasts approximately 60% women in the judiciary, or gaining access to data 
on Jordan, with one of the highest percentages of police women in the region, limit 
our accessibility and understanding of the phenomena taking place.173  Access to 
data, research funding, and sufficient time required in the country being studied are 
all real constraints.  Yet we must acknowledge that a more limited research agenda, 
inordinately focused on a limited set of countries and one branch of government, 
can result in narrowed perceptions and understanding of how women are faring in 
increasing their political power globally and the resulting impacts.
While the legislature remains an important component for ensuring women’s 
political representation, there are other key positions in formal government that 
provide opportunities as well.  The international community’s commitment to the 
concept of a legislative critical mass should not blind it to other opportunities that 
could be pursued simultaneously.
2.2.2 Executive Measures
The second most common area of measurement is the executive branch.  Three 
gender indexes combine indicators from this branch of government with the 
legislative branch. 
172  “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2015.
173  Refer to Chapter 5 for a description on how data was collected in countries such as Mongolia and Jordan. 
Chapter 6 presents the data collected from 40 countries in total.
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TABLE 2:  Indexes Using Legislative and Executive Branch Measures
Index Name
Author 
Publication
+
Self-Identified 
Overarching Concept 
and Value
Approach Indicators
Index Name:
Global Gender Gap 
Index174
Organization:
World Economic Forum
Publication:
Global
Annual 
2006 - present
Overarching Concept: 
A country’s gender gap 
should be delinked 
from economic or 
development measures, 
but based rather on 
how a state uses its 
available resources, 
opportunities, and 
assets to ensure equality 
among all its citizens.
Value: 
The GGGI allows 
poorer countries to 
perform as well as 
rich countries.  The 
focus of measure is not 
wealth or resources, but 
distribution of available 
assets.
Approach:  
Benchmark gender-
based disparities 
(gender gap) using 14 
indicators in the areas 
of economic, education, 
health, and political.  
The challenges and 
opportunities identified 
for narrowing the 
gender gap can serve 
as a basis for designing 
effective measures, 
policies, and programs.
Political 
Empowerment:
ü	Ratio: Female with 
seats in parliament 
over male value
ü	Ratio: Females at 
ministerial level over 
male value
ü	Ratio:  Number of 
years of a female 
head of state (last 
50 years) over male 
value
Index Name:
Gender Equity Index175
Organization:
Social Watch
Publication:
Global
2005, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2012
Overarching Concept:
Lack of equity between 
men and women is not 
based on resources or 
differences in income, 
but rather inadequate 
policies.  Thus the index 
strives to measure the 
gap between women 
and men, rather than 
their well-being.
Value:  
The index makes gender 
inequities more visible 
by producing a country 
classification system 
that can be compared 
internationally and 
easily monitored.
Approach: 
11 indicators measure 
three dimensions: 
1) education
2) economic 
participation
3) empowerment
A value is computed 
for each dimension on a 
scale from 0 to 100.  The 
index score is a simple 
average of the three 
dimensions.  
Empowerment:
ü	Seats in 
Parliamentary
ü	Women in 
ministerial positions
ü	Legislators, senior 
officials, and 
managers
ü	Professional and 
technical positions
174  World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Index 2014,” 2014. http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-
gap-report-2014/ 
175  Social Watch. “Gender Equity Index,” 2012. http://www.socialwatch.org
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Index Name
Author 
Publication
+
Self-Identified 
Overarching Concept 
and Value
Approach Indicators
Index Name:
Gender Equality 
Index176 
Organization:
European Institute of 
Gender Equality
Publication:
Regional 
2013 
Overarching Concept:
Gender equality is a 
fundamental value 
of the EU member 
states and essential for 
sustainable economic 
and social growth.
 
Value: 
The GEI provides a 
more comprehensive 
framework of 
gender equality 
rather than women’s 
empowerment.  It is a 
better, more refined tool 
that is tailored for the 
challenges faced by EU 
members.
Approach:
Measures progress of 
EU-27 and Member 
States in achieving 
gender equality through 
eight domains.  Only six 
of the domains (Work, 
Money, Knowledge, 
Time, Health, and 
Power using a total 
of 27 indicators) are 
included in the final 
composite score.  
The two domains 
of “intersecting 
inequalities” and 
“violence” are seen as 
indicative of gender 
inequalities but not 
given a quantitative 
score.
Three main goals:
1) Measure gender 
inequality at a single 
point in time.
2) Highlight causes of 
inequality to inform 
policy makers.
3) Enable monitoring of 
policy impacts over 
time.
Political Power:
ü	Share of members of 
parliament (upper 
and lower houses)
ü	Share of ministers
ü	Share of members of 
regional assemblies
2.2.2.1  Index #3:  World Economic Forum – Global Gender Gap Index  
The introduction of the Global Gender Gap Index in 2006 was developed to measure 
the level of equality between women and men across four different dimensions: 
economic, education, health, and political.177  Because women continually lag 
176  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” 2012. http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-
publications/gender-equality-index-2015-measuring-gender-equality-european-union-2005-2012-report. 
Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender 
Equality Index.” Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
177  The first Global Gender Gap Index in 2006 covered 58 countries.  The 2016 report included 144 countries.
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behind men across these areas, the index attempts to quantify the size of the gap 
that must be closed if women are to achieve full equality.  The authors state that 
gender equality is not only about political correctness but, in fact, a country can not 
afford to misallocate half of its human resources and achieve full competitiveness.178 
Conceptually, the argument posits that equality between men and women can 
unlock greater economic potential.179  Through this lens it is not surprising that the 
economic dimension (participation and opportunity for women) plays a dominant 
role in the measurement criteria.
The index framework is premised on three underlying themes.180  The first is 
the inequality that women face irrespective of their country’s economic level of 
development.  So, while an economically poor country may have lower overall 
rates of education and access to health care, what is measured is the difference that 
women have to those same resources verses the access that men have.  If both men 
and women have limited access to health care and education opportunities, for 
example, the gender gap may be minimal.  Using this framework, more wealthy 
economies are not given an advantage over under-developed economies.  What 
matters is whether a country allows its citizens equal access to available resources.  
The second theme underpinning the index is its focus on outcomes.  Variables that 
are considered “inputs” – those related to policies, cultural, and customs – are not 
included.  Fundamental rights of women are areas of focus, including educational 
levels, access to political space, and labor force participation rates.  In this way focus 
is pulled away from laws or attitudes that may favor or hinder women’s equality, 
and looks at the impact of country-level institutions on the lives of women.  
The third area of distinction is the Global Gender Gap’s focus on gender equality 
rather than empowerment.  The term “gender equality” is defined as the stage of 
human social development at which “the rights, responsibilities and opportunities 
of individuals will not be determined by the fact of being born male or female.”181 
According to the authors, countries are rewarded for low levels of inequality (small 
gaps) but neither rewarded or penalized if women outperform men in specific areas. 
The objective is not to determine if women are more empowered than men in key 
178  Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Saadia Zahidi. “Women’s Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap.” 
World Economic Forum Geneva, 2005.
179  Porter, Michael E., Klaus Schwab, and Jeffrey Sachs. The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. Palgrave 
Macmillan New York, NY, 2004.
180  Bekhouche, Yasmina, Ricardo Hausmann, L. D. Tyson, and Saadia Zahidi. “The Global Gender Gap Report 2013.” 
World Economic Forum Geneva, 2013.
181  Lopez-Claros, Augusto, and Saadia Zahidi. “Women’s Empowerment: Measuring the Global Gender Gap.” 
World Economic Forum Geneva, 2005. 
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outcome areas of life, but whether they are reaching commensurate levels with one 
another.    
A.  Conceptualizing Political Empowerment
Given the above conceptual underpinning – that the index is focused on gender 
inequality and not empowerment – it seems incongruent that the dimension 
for measuring women’s political advancement uses the terminology “political 
empowerment.”  This term has been defined as:  “the equitable representation of women 
in decision-making structures, both formal and informal, and their voice in the formulation 
of policies affecting their societies.”182  This definition veers from earlier discussions of 
empowerment literature that envision the term as an ongoing process, with choice 
as a central tenant.  While we see the concept of voice coming into play, the term 
political empowerment means, quite literally for the World Economic Forum, equal 
representation.
One of the criticisms voiced about the Global Gender Gap Index is its lack of a theoretical 
rationale which, in turn, makes it difficult to understand the conceptual dimensions 
included.183  Neither early explanatory documents nor subsequent annual reports 
discuss the overarching concepts behind the index’s development.  In introducing 
the index in 2006, the authors do refer to “a stage when both men and women realize 
their full potential,” harking back to Sen’s human development framework.184  While 
the general intent of the index is clear – women’s equality as a means to improving 
development outcomes, including competitive economic potential – conceptual 
clarity on measurement selection is left to speculation.  This theoretical gap makes 
it difficult to understand why variables were chosen and whether they sufficiently 
cover all aspects of what is being measured.  
B.  How the Global Gender Gap Index Measures Political Empowerment
In addition to measuring the ratio of female to male seats in parliament, the 
Global Gender Gap Index uses two executive branch indicators to capture “political 
empowerment.”  These executive measures include:  1) female ministerial positions 
and 2) years of a female head of state.  The percentage of female ministerial positions 
has increasingly been used as an indicator by indexes since its introduction by the 
United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2005.  Among the indexes 
reviewed, it appears as the second most frequently used measure after female 
182  Ibid.
183  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
184  Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 2001.
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parliamentarians.  Neither the Global Gender Gap Index, nor other composite 
indicators, distinguish between the types of ministries held by women.  Evidence 
is clear, however, that women are being appointed to “lower prestige” portfolios.185 
In the most recent report by the United Nations/Inter-Parliamentary Union Women 
in Politics 2017, the top five ministries held by women include:  1) Environment, 
Natural Resources, Energy; 2) Social Affairs; 3) Family, Children, Youth, Elderly, 
Disabled; 4) Women’s Affairs, Gender Equality; and 5) Education.186  The percentage 
of women ministers would make for a more robust indicator if positions were also 
weighted according to their level of prestige, as attempted by Krook and O’Brien in 
their 2009 Gender Power Score.187
The indicator tracking years of female head of state during the last 50 years is 
unique to the Global Gender Gap Index.  While an interesting data point, it raises some 
questions around its utility.  In 2017, only 11 out of 193 countries had female heads of 
state.188  The number of countries able to register a score is small, just a few percent 
of all countries.  While this measure adds little as a benchmarking – given that the 
vast majority of countries fail to meet the standards – it certainly highlights the lack 
of representation among women at this highest level.  The proclivity of political 
dynasties in the Asian region also offers an interesting challenge to interpreting 
this indicator.  The logical assumption is that for a woman to achieve the highest 
office in the land, women will have made significant inroads throughout political 
institutions and the party hierarchy.  Asian women presidents or prime ministers, 
however, have typically been elected to the highest office as the wives and daughters 
of famous male family members (often seen as martyrs in the eyes of the public) who 
have preceded them.189  This path to power, atypical in other regions, could result 
in increased scores despite, perhaps, low levels of female representation across the 
country’s political institutions.  Countries created within the last 50 years would also 
be hindered, being able to count years only from the date of their independence or 
creation.  A number of countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa would 
all be disadvantaged with this indicator, given many of their later starting points as 
independent nations.
185  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers 
Worldwide.” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011. http://
krook.wustl.edu/pdf/mpsa_krook_obrien_11.pdf.
186  “Women in Politics.” Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017. 
187  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers 
Worldwide.” presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011. http://
krook.wustl.edu/pdf/mpsa_krook_obrien_11.pdf.
188  “Women in Politics.” Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2017.
189  Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. Women, Politics, and Power. Pine Forge Press, 2007.
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2.2.2.2  Index #4:  Social Watch – Gender Equity Index   
In its 2005 introductory publication of the Gender Equity Index, Social Watch clearly 
states that this new index is about measuring gender equity, with gender equity 
considered a necessary condition for development.  Achieving a gender equity 
society will result in equal opportunities for men and women while relations between 
people will be based on respect for differences.190  Conceptually, the Gender Equity 
Index’s claim to new territory was its focus on “measuring the degree of gender 
equity in different countries without any connection to the average level of socio-
economic development of the population.”191  As previously noted with the Global 
Gender Gap Index, a similar logic prevails that developed economies should not have 
an advantage over less-developed countries because they can provide more or better 
services to their citizens.192  
Social Watch is a non-governmental organization with a mandate to report 
independently on how the world’s respective governments are living up to their 
promises and legal obligations.  The Gender Equity Index was born out of growing 
frustration that pledges being made by governments to achieve gender equality and 
eradicate poverty, particularly through the 2000-2015 UN Millennium Development 
Goals, were not on track and unlikely to be met at the current rate of progress. The 
organization’s Basic Capabilities Index, and 2005 Gender Equity Index, were developed 
as citizen information and advocacy tools to better track global progress across as 
many countries as possible: lower-, middle-, and upper-income.193  In this light, it 
becomes more apparent why the focus of the Gender Equity Index rests on the need 
for an index that measures the status of women relative to men, independently of 
income per capita and human development levels.194  
Critics of the Gender Equity Index note that the theoretical rationale for the index 
has not been well articulated, thereby making it difficult to analyze the validity 
of its conceptual dimensions: 1) economic participation, 2) education, and 3) 
empowerment.195  If we consider the Equity Index as a tracking and advocacy tool 
directly linked to the UN Millennium Development Goals, there is close alignment 
190  Social Watch. “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers.” Montevideo: Social Watch, 2005.
191  Ibid.
192  Both the Social Watch and World Economic Forum indexes, developed and published at approximately the 
same time between 2005 and 2006, can be seen as responses to the heavily criticized UNDP Gender Development 
Index and Gender Empowerment Measure that were the first composite measures of global gender progress.  One 
of the main criticisms of the UNDP effort was that it unfairly advantaged more developed economies.
193  Social Watch. “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers.” Montevideo: Social Watch, 2005.
194  Dijkstra, Geske “Towards a Fresh Start in Measuring Gender Equality: A Contribution to the Debate.” Journal of 
Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 275–83.
195  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
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with the latter’s first three goals:  1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) 
achieve universal primary education, and 3) promote gender equality and empower 
women.196  While perhaps not satisfactory from a theoretical standpoint, there is 
coherency to what the Gender Equity Index is measuring, and its intended purpose.  
A.  Conceptualizing Empowerment
Social Watch provides no clear definition of empowerment, or references to existing 
empowerment literature, regarding how it conceptualizes the term.  The authors do 
stress that empowerment and women’s political involvement, however, unlike other 
development dimensions, are not dictated by development levels or wealth.197  Less 
developed countries, such as Rwanda, have some of the highest levels of legislative 
representation while high-income countries, such as the United States, have low 
levels of female legislative representation.  These factual realities lend credence to 
Social Watch’s argument that women’s empowerment can be disassociated with 
levels of income and development.
Throughout the index’s years of publication and reporting, the authors mix language 
in the descriptive narrative.  Sometimes Social Watch refers to the Gender Equity Index 
as measuring “empowerment” and at times “political empowerment.”198  This does 
cause conceptual confusion when reviewing the variables selected, as two of the four 
include job roles outside of government.  Capturing a number of these positions from 
the private sector or non-governmental world muddies the waters if the dimension 
being examined is defined as political empowerment.  For example, why heads of 
corporations but not directors of non-governmental organizations?  Why traditional 
chiefs but not religious leaders?  While mixing government and non-government 
positions is not without precedent, it does open up the conversation as to where 
power exists outside formal government structures, how it might be captured, and 
the validity of the positions selected.  
196  United Nations. “Millennium Development Goals,” 2011. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/.
197  Elson, Diane, and Hande Keklik. “Progress of the Worlds Women 2002. Gender Equality and the Millennium 
Development Goals. UNIFEM Biennial Report. Volume 2.,” 2002.
198  Social Watch. “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers.” Montevideo: Social Watch, 2005.  Also refer to 
the various reports authored by Social Watch.  For example, in the last Gender Equity Index published in 2012, the 
website narrative states: “The Gender Equity Index (GEI) measures the gap between women and men in education, 
the economy and political empowerment.” (www.socialwatch.org).
70
Chapter 2 Measuring Women in the Political Domain: A Critical Appraisal 
B.  How the Social Watch Gender Equity Index Measures Empowerment
Social Watch clearly states that there is no clear agreement on how to measure gender 
equity across all countries in a way that allows for comparison.  With that statement 
out of the way, the empowerment dimension is defined as: “the number of women 
with access to positions of power and decision-making in each country.”199  Four 
variables were selected. The first is the female members of parliament.  As with other 
indexes, the information is provided by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.  The authors 
justify this choice by referencing international studies supporting the view that at 
least 30% of political positions must  be held by women in order to exercise any real 
influence on political processes.200  
The Gender Equity Index captures three other indicators as it attempts to measure 
“empowerment.”  The first of these three is the percentage of women in governmental 
decision-making positions at ministerial levels.  The data for this indicator is provided by 
the states themselves to UNDP for the annual Human Development Report based on 
their own definitions of “national executive.”  It may, therefore, include a variety of 
positions, depending on individual country interpretation.  The first publication of 
the Women in Politics map also occurred in 2005.  This mapping exercise, published 
jointly by UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, provides details on the 
percentage of women ministers for the majority of countries.201  Because this data 
had not been in use prior to 2005, the more convoluted UNDP measure may have 
been the most appropriate available at the time of the first Gender Equity Index 
publication, also in 2005.
The data for the remaining two measures –  1) percentage of female legislators, 
senior officials, and managers, and 2) percentage of female professional and technical 
workers – is compiled by the International Labor Organization.  While the use of 
indicators beyond parliament and ministries is welcome, the ILO data includes 
formal government positions as well as those in the private sector.202  This makes 
it difficult to desegregate access to positions of formal political power from labor 
or economic access.  For example, the measure percent of total positions including 
legislators, senior officials, and managers is defined as: “legislators, senior government 
199  Social Watch. “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers.” Montevideo: Social Watch, 2005.
200  Ibid.
201  “Women in Politics: 2005.” Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2005. http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/
wmnmap05_en.pdf.
202  For example, under the “International Standard Classification of Occupations” (ISCO-88) used by the ILO to 
identify job categories, “Legislators, senior officials and managers” includes the following:  1) Legislators and 
senior officials (legislators, senior government officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of 
special-interest organizations); 2) Corporate managers (directors and chief executives, production and operations 
department managers, other department managers); and 3) General managers.  For a full listing of classifications: 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/isco88e.html
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officials, traditional chiefs and heads of villages, senior officials of special interest 
organizations, corporate managers, directors and chief executives, production and 
operations department managers and other department and general managers.”203  
While increasing percentages in these two measures is laudable, there is no 
distinction between economic and political domains.  When women have a difficult 
time entering the political arena they may turn to employment in the private or 
non-governmental sector as an alternative.  Or, conversely, women may be under-
represented in the private sector as space is created in the political arena.  The 
combination of indicators with private and public positions makes it impossible 
to determine.  As a result, if the intent of the index is to measure women’s access 
to positions of political power, the parliamentary and ministerial measures alone 
would appear more suited.  If empowerment is conceived as a much broader 
understanding of accessing power and decision-making positions, writ large, then  a 
wider net should be thrown.  Although, given that the index also attempts to measure 
economic inequality, statistics on business leaders might more appropriately rest 
with that dimension.  Which is all to say that the mixed terminology and lack of 
conceptual clarity makes it more difficult to understand where the selected indicators 
fit best, while not diminishing the added value that the Social Watch effort brings to 
the field of measuring gender equity.
2.2.2.3  Index #5:  European Union Institute of Gender Equality – Gender Equality Index  
The European Union Gender Equality Index was conceived as a regional tool to 
measure gender equality between men and women.  It departs from preceding 
indexes, also designed to measure gender (in)equality, in a number of ways.  First, its 
theoretical underpinnings are based on the universal caregiver model developed by 
Nancy Fraser.204  Her model deconstructs existing gender roles and rules, allowing 
for acceptable cross-over between men and women in their day-to-day lives as 
employees, caregivers, and productive contributors to civic and political space.  It 
upends the values attached to “paid” and “unpaid” labor, typically divided along 
respective male and female gender lines.  Fundamentally, Fraser’s model charges 
men to take on an equal share of the caregiver role.  Women, in turn, are freed to 
increase income, whether through the job market or valuation of  unpaid labor, 
while increasing leisure time as caregiver responsibilities are shed.205  In short, men 
are allowed to act more like women, and women are allowed to act more like men.   
203  United Nations Statistics Division: https://unstats.un.org/home
204  Fraser, Nancy. “After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the Welfare State.” Political Theory 22, no. 4 (1994): 
591–618.
205  Ibid.
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Second, the index is also described as tailored to the specific context and needs of 
EU Member States in two regards.  First, the index stands on a long series of policy 
achievements explicitly directed at achieving greater gender equality that includes 
the balanced participation of men and women in daily life as well as decision-making 
processes.206  As countries are comprised of men and women, both opinions and 
perspectives must be accounted for in the population.  This diversity of viewpoints is 
seen as inherently positive for society as well as democracy among EU Member States. 
And third, previous global indexes already in use were deemed by the index 
developers as inadequate for the EU given the selected variables.  For example, 
while some inequalities do exist in education and health levels within the EU, they 
are too small to be significant.207  As a result, traditional global indicators produce 
a clustering of European countries with no real differentiation.  This limits the 
information as an advocacy tool; if everyone is ranked the same it becomes difficult 
to differentiate which, if any, interventions should be considered and for what 
purpose.  More meaningful measures – that produce differences tailored to EU 
weaknesses – was a primary rationale for this new index.
A.  Conceptualizing Political Power
The authors state that the framework of the index and its design is intended to move 
away from a focus on women’s empowerment and adopt a gender approach that 
looks at both men and women through a lens of equality.  This effort is hampered 
to some degree by the lack of agreement on what constitutes gender equality, the 
outcomes gender equality is intended to achieve, and what data is available to track 
its progress.208  The index builds on three separate gender equality approaches, 
relying heavily on the work of Walby to intuit how these approaches may be invoked 
through a gender mainstreaming process.209
1) sameness: men and women are afforded equal opportunity and equal treatment
2) difference:  different contributions of men and women are valued equally
3) transformative: a new standard is established that transforms gender relations
206  The Gender Equality Index Report 2005, the introductory document describing the index’s development, 
contains an extensive section devoted to EU policies, treaties, and international commitments (pages 16-18) that 
underpin the EU Member States’ numerous commitments to the principle of gender equality.
207  Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender 
Equality Index.” Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
208  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012. 
209  Walby, Sylvia. “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice.” Social Politics: International 
Studies in Gender, State & Society 12, no. 3 (2005): 321–43.
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The approaches are viewed as interrelated, with no need to operationalize one 
approach over the other.  Again referencing EU policy documents such as the 
Women’s Charter (Strengthening the Commitment to Equality between Women and Men, 
2010) and the Commission Strategy for Equality between Women and Men (2010-2015), 
the authors state that EU policies accommodate and reflect all three approaches 
towards gender equality.210
In choosing dimensions to accurately measure these varying conceptions of gender 
equality, the index leans heavily on previous work undertaken by Plantenga and 
existing EU definitions of gender equality.211  Based on Fraser’s caregiver model, 
Plantenga defines the term gender equality as: “an equal sharing of assets…
conceptualized rather broadly as an equal sharing of paid work, money, decision-
making power and time.”212  The overarching definition of gender equality is 
changed in the final index to the following: “equal share of assets and equal dignity 
and integrity between men and women.”213  Achievement of gender equality is then 
measured through six domains.  The domain of “power” is of most interest to this 
research.
The concept of power, as a measurable component of gender equality, is never 
clearly defined by the index authors.  References are made to some of the existing 
literature (for example, Baker et al.) that identifies the lack of access by marginalized 
groups to political decision-making as one form of power inequality.214  Using 
Sen’s capabilities framework, the authors also cite Robeyns’ research on measuring 
inequality.  Robeyns identifies 14 different capabilities that should be used to measure 
gender inequality, with 1 of the 14 identified as political empowerment (as measured 
in the percentage of legislative seats held by women).  Her study suggests that well-
being is less than men’s in the political area, and that the inequality in empowerment 
results from the lack of equal opportunity in the first place.215
Power in the EU Gender Equality Index appears to represent the gap between the 
share of positions of power in the political, economic, and social spheres.  More 
specifically: the representation of women and men in decision-making positions. 
Not giving women the same level of participation or access to decision-making 
210  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012.
211  While Plantenga’s definition is changed in the final index report, the components of her definition are reflected 
in the six conceptual dimensions chosen to be measured: 1) work, 2) health, 3) money, 4) knowledge, 5) time, and 
6) power. 
212  Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender 
Equality Index.” Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
213  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012. 
214  Baker, John, Kathleen Lynch, Sara Cantillon, and Judy Walsh. Equality: From Theory to Action. Springer, 2016.
215  Robeyns, Ingrid. “Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities.” Feminist 
Economics 9, no. 2–3 (2003): 61–92.
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positions in these three areas will have “detrimental consequences,” while greater 
gender balance in positions of power is articulated as having a “positive effect” on 
gender equality.216  
Further justification for targeting political power rests on the need to provide 
positive women role models and promote greater political legitimacy, but also to 
reshape attitudes towards the respective roles of women and men.217  This includes 
moving entrenched attitudes that call for women to overcome numerous social and 
psychological barriers to enter the world of politics, while not requiring that men 
make any accommodations themselves.218  The index posits that addressing power 
remains important given the large gaps that still exist in this domain (ranked as having 
the largest gap of all six domains) as well as the symbolic impact women in positions 
of power has on other domains.  Although no data or literature is cited to back up 
this statement, if the symbolic impact of increasing descriptive representation in the 
power domain contributes positively to other domains such as health, education, 
and economic advancement, it would prove an interesting rationale for focusing 
increased attention and resources in this area.
The justification for choosing the domain of political power is also reinforced 
through frequent references to EU policies that emphasize, in particular, political 
power as a priority in achieving gender equality.  This includes the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, Article 7), the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG 3), and the 2005 United Nations World Summit. 
A gender gap in male/female representation may also be linked to a “democratic 
deficit” within the EU, a notion outlined in a number of more recent EU policies.219
216  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012
217  Tremblay, Manon. “Do Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Study of Legislative Behaviour in 
Canada’s 35th Parliament.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 31, no. 3 
(1998): 435–65.
218  Meier, Petra, Emanuela Lombardo, Maria Bustelo, and M. Pantelidou Maloutas. “Women in Political Decision-
Making and Gender Mainstreaming: Obvious Partners?” In 2nd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of the ECPR 
Standing Group on the EU. Bologna, June 2004.
219  Authors cite the 2006-2010 Roadmap for equality between women and men as well as the 2010-2015 
Strategy for equality between women and men as important references underpinning the importance of equal 
representation for democracy.
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B.  How the Gender Equality Index Measures Political Power
The index developers acknowledge that the lack of available, harmonized 
data is an overriding constraint, and the need remains for broader measures of 
gender equality.220  Despite these acknowledged constraints across domains, the 
measurement approach for “political power” begins with the two indicators relied 
upon by other indexes:  the percentage of women parliamentarians and ministers. 
The Gender Equality Index also adds one new measure: “share of members of regional 
assemblies.”  This is one of the few attempts to capture women’s political power at 
a decentralized level and extremely welcome.  The level of women’s representation 
beyond the national level is a yawning gap in the existing data.  Although extending 
this measure beyond Europe is currently difficult – most developing countries do 
not collect this information – it should be considered as a standard measure for 
future composite indicators.221
2.2.2.4  Value of Executive Branch Measures
In trying to articulate why inclusion of the executive branch is an important aspect of 
understanding women’s political access, it must be acknowledged that quantifying 
the power of the executive branch – especially vis a vis other parts of government – 
is not a simple indicator that can be gathered globally.  Again, like legislatures, every 
country presents a context grounded in its own cultural and political realities.  
Each year Freedom House attempts to classify the countries of the world into “free,” 
“partly free,” and “not free” categories.222  If we look to the indicators used to define 
these different categories, the governments223 of “partly free” or “not free” countries 
are typically restricting the civil and political rights of its citizens.  While the Freedom 
in the World index does not directly grade the influence of the executive branch, 
it does attempt to measure interference and the negative impact of “the state.”  A 
careful reading of the 25 questions and 140 sub-questions that inform the index 
highlights the role of the executive as the locus of power, and thus its ability to 
curtail individual freedoms.224  In “partly free” and “not free” countries, the executive 
220  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012.
221  UN Women, in recognition of this data gap, organized and convened a workshop (led by Julie Ballington) of 
gender experts in December 2015  to review what type of sub-national data was currently available, identify what 
additional information might be reasonably collected,  discuss definitions of various sub-national levels of interest. 
While stressing that mandating the collection of new data points takes time and energy to formalize, UN Women is 
working towards ensuring that sub-national data on women’s political participation be prioritized. 
222  Freedom House. 2011. “Freedom in the World.” http://www.freedomhouse.org.
223  On occasion, Freedom House notes, terrorist organizations, separatist movements, or foreign governments can 
impact the freedom score of a country, rather than the government itself.
224  Ibid.
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branch is typically regarded as the most powerful government branch according to 
the index.
Buttressing this finding is Steven Fish and Matthew Kroenig’s 2009 Parliamentary 
Powers Index.225  Their index attempts to measure the power of individual legislatures 
through 32 separate measures.  The majority of measures look at a legislature’s 
influence over the executive as well as its institutional autonomy, authority, and 
capacity.  Almost universally, the “partly free” and “not free” countries received the 
lowest parliamentary power scores,226  reinforcing the conclusion that the executive, 
and not the legislative, is the most powerful government branch in weaker 
democracies.
Some experts argue that globalization may also be increasing the influence of the 
executive, in particular within the realms of foreign policy227 and financial affairs. 
Democratically elected bodies, such as legislatures, are often slow to gain consensus 
and act.  This becomes even more apparent in a politically divided congress or 
parliament.  In response to the U.S. financial crisis of 2008, it was the executive 
technocrats that acted quickly to shore up the global financial system and avoid 
collapse.228  To address European financial ills, the European Central Bank not only 
maintains control of the Euro, but also acts as the enforcer when requiring national 
policy changes.229 
There are a number of reasons put forth as to why the executive is gaining ground in 
the era of globalization.  As noted above, central bank managers, treasury executives, 
and trade representatives are seeing their powers increase in a globally interlinked 
economy that often calls for a high-level of expertise and speedy response.  The major 
global regulators, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization, also only deal with the executive branches of countries.  Legislative 
bodies around the world are being relegated to managing domestic affairs and 
playing catch-up to decisions made by the executive in the global arena.230
225  Fish, Steven, and Matthew Kroenig. “The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey.” Index. New York, 
2009.
226   The index is scored on a zero to one scale, with zero being an absence of power.  The average score of OECD 
high-income economies was .72.  The score for low-income economies averaged 0.4
227  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. 1997. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive 
Branch. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
228  Sassen, Saskia. “Beyond Party Politics: The New President and the Growth of Executive Power.” Dissent 56, no. 
1 (Winter 2009): 5–6.
229  Irwin, Neil. 2013. “Why the Financial Crisis Hurt Democracy.” The Washington Post, April 7, sec. B.
230  Sassen, Saskia. 2009. “Beyond Party Politics: The New President and the Growth of Executive Power.” Dissent 
56 (1): 5–6.
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Along with the global economy, national security is another area of growing 
executive influence.231  Over the past 15 years there has been a steady spread of anti-
constitutional measures undertaken in the name of fighting terrorism, resulting in 
strengthened state security and expanded executive authority.232  The international 
nature of terrorism, and with it the increasing perception of a world in a constant 
state of emergency, has allowed national executives to increase authority, often 
through the undermining of domestic constitutions.233  The growth of technology in 
warfare is also reshaping the military-executive-legislative relationship.  In the U.S., 
for example, drone strikes from thousands of miles away – requiring rapid decision-
making – are being approved by the executive and military branches with little to no 
legislative consultation or democratic debate.  
Citing threats to internal security, 2014 alone saw a number of African presidents 
launch military operations, both internally and into neighboring countries, to combat 
perceived threats at home.234  The reality of porous borders, weak security systems, 
and international terrorist networks connected through technology are reshaping 
traditional responses to insecurity.  There is no “war” the public can rally behind, 
no strategy the legislative branch funds with a clear timeframe.  Rather the constant 
state of alert, covert nature of attacks, and increasing sophistication of warfare (both 
to defend and initiate) is creating a situation that lends itself to ongoing decision-
making taking place behind closed executive doors to address each day’s new threat 
on a constantly shifting global stage.
The strength of the executive branch also lies in its role as the locus of policy 
implementation.  While the legislative branch is charged with passing the laws, 
the practical day-to-day application of those laws falls upon the executive, both 
at the national and local level.  The most far-reaching gender-friendly laws have 
little impact if they are not executed.  What access to positions of decision-making 
authority women leaders have within the executive branch, one could argue, is 
equally important to that held by the legislative arm of government.
231  Scheppele, Kim Lane. “Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11.” University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2004): 1001–83.
232  Cooley, Alexander. “Countering Democratic Norms.” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (2015): 49–63.
233  Scheppele, Kim Lane. “The International State of Emergency: Challenges to Constitutionalism after September 
11.” Schmooze ’tickets’, 2006, 49.
234  One of the most prominent examples is the joint fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia.  Following the organization’s 
September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi that killed approximately 67 people, the attack in Kampala that 
killed 74 people watching a World Cup match, and threats of an eminent terrorist attack during 2013 in Addis 
Ababa, all three countries committed increased troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) to enter 
Somalia and erase the remaining strongholds of Al-Shabaab.  Tekle, Tesfa-Alem. “Somalia:  Ethiopia Decides to Join 
Amisom Force in Somalia.” Sudan Tribune. November 12, 2013.
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While individual countries can debate the rising or falling influence of the executive, 
vis a vis other branches of government, the powerful role it plays in executing the 
law and governing mandates that it be included as a key area of measurement for 
examining women’s access to decision-making in the political space.
2.2.3 Judicial Measures
Only one of the six indexes analyzed includes a measure of the judiciary alongside 
executive and legislative indicators:  the African Gender and Development Index.  
TABLE 3:  Index Using Legislative, Executive, Judicial, and Security Measures
Index Name 
Organization
Publication
Self-Identified
Overarching Concept
and Value
Approach Indicators
Index Name:
African Gender and 
Development Index235
Organization:
United Nations 
Economic Commission 
for Africa
Publication:
Regional 
2009 Phase I 
(12  countries)
2011 Phase II
(30 countries)
Overarching Concept:
Women’s full and equal 
involvement in society 
is critically important 
for all aspects of human 
development.
Value:
The index focuses on 
variables that have 
particular salience 
for African men and 
women.  Data is 
collected nationally, 
and not reliant on 
international databases.
Approach:
The index combines 
two types of data.  The 
first uses data on 44 
indicators and combines 
the information into a 
“Gender Status Index.”  
The second component 
– the “African Women’s 
Progress Scorecard” –  
qualitatively measures 
34 areas on government 
policy progress and 
performance regarding 
women’s advancement 
and empowerment. 
Political Power 
“Agency”:
Public Sector:
ü	Members of 
parliament
ü	Cabinet ministers
ü	Higher positions 
in civil service and 
parastatals
ü	Judges
ü	Members of local 
councils
ü	Traditional rulers 
ü	Employment in 
security forces
Civil Society:
ü	Senior positions 
in: political 
parties, trade 
unions, employers’ 
associations, heads 
or managers of 
non-governmental 
organizations
235  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011. Schüler, 
Dana. “The Uses and Misuses of the Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure: A 
Review of the Literature.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 161–81.
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2.2.3.1  Index #6:  UN Economic Commission for Africa –  African Gender and 
Development Index
The UN Economic Commission for Africa presented the African Gender and 
Development Index in 2004.236  The framework upon which the index is based focuses 
on a range of different concepts, including gender, power, and empowerment.237 
Beginning with gender, the concept is envisioned in a holistic way with all aspects 
of concern to women addressed.  These areas include:  physical, socio-cultural, 
religious, legal, political, and economic.  
Power, while acknowledged as a contested term, is examined in various ways.  First, 
by identifying how power operates.  For example, is it oppressive? Is it challenging 
existing gender relations?  Second, under what conditions does power appear?  This 
acknowledges that power relations are pervasive and found at all levels, from the 
state down to the individual.  Third, how is power made visible?  Of particular 
concern is Lukes’ third dimension of power where “real interests” are being denied 
through the presence of biased institutions and structures that do not allow such 
interests to ever emerge.238  Real interests of women are then identified as those 
contained in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women and its Optional Protocol.239
Empowerment is also included as underpinning the index development.  This concept 
is emphasized as a process containing the following elements:  1) consciousness of 
the problem or situation, such as discrimination or oppression; 2) real choices or 
alternatives to address the problem; 3) the necessary resources; 4) voice to discuss 
grievances in the public and political arena; and 5) agency to act on one’s own behalf. 
These different elements may occur from an individual or collective perspective.240
Along with gender, power, and empowerment underpinnings, the opening narrative 
in the 2004 report introducing the new index states that women’s full integration 
and equal participation in society is also important for human development. And, 
236  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2014.
237  Charmes, Jacques, and Saskia Wieringa. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: An Assessment of the Gender-
Related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure.” Journal of Human Development 4, no. 3 
(2003): 419–35.
238  Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View—The Original Text with Two Major New Chapters. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005.
239  A full copy of the convention is available at: www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx. 
While the original researchers cited CEDAW as the overriding document used to identify women’s “real interests,” 
the index was developed using a much broader array of international agreements and policy documents.
240  Charmes, Jacques, and Saskia Wieringa. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment: An Assessment of the Gender-
Related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure.” Journal of Human Development 4, no. 3 
(2003): 419–35.
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finally, the index states that it is designed to measure gender equality.  This is 
defined as equality of rights, participation, opportunities, and access and control 
over resources.241  
The compilation and co-mingling of so many different complex concepts makes 
it difficult to distinguish what exactly the index is trying to accomplish from a 
theoretical perspective.  Conversely, incorporating concepts of power, empowerment, 
human development, and gender equality into the AGDI framework was perhaps 
intentional in order to allow for great latitude in choosing the final 78 measures that 
make up the index.  It does lead to the perception, however, that the index is trying 
to be all things to all stakeholders.  
While the theoretical framework may lack precision, the stated purpose of the index 
seems well articulated.  The index aims to accomplish two objectives:  1) measure 
the gender gap between women and men in Africa and 2) assess the progress made 
by African governments against national policies and international commitments. 
The first component is viewed as a quantitative exercise that uses numbers and 
percentages to arrive at a definitive Gender Status Index score.  The second component 
is viewed as a qualitative exercise that requires expert opinions to judge the progress 
governments are making against identified policies.  This is captured through the 
African Women’s Progress Scoreboard.  These two different components together form 
an individual country’s score in the African Gender and Development Index.
Despite the existence of another gender composite index in the UN family, the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa argued that a new index was needed as less-
developed countries were being excluded due to insufficient international data. 
For example, in the UNDP 2002 Gender Empowerment Measure, Egypt was the only 
African country to have sufficient data for inclusion.242  As a monitoring or tracking 
tool, therefore, the Gender Empowerment Measure was largely irrelevant for African 
realities.  A new index, based on nationally available data, was required if the 
intent was to provide policy messages, track measurable progress, and allow for 
comparisons across the African development landscape.
The introduction of a qualitative component was also a new innovation and remains 
a unique focus of the index.  It was specifically designed to monitor progress against 
agreements that Africa countries have ratified.  Along with standard conventions, 
such as CEDAW and the Beijing Platform for Action, the index also includes the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the African Charter on Human 
241  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2004.
242  Ibid.
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and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development.  This qualitative component is specifically designed with 
policy advocacy in mind, allowing for governments and civil society to shed light 
on progress being made, draw attention to stasis, and highlight backsliding against 
self-identified commitments.
A.  Conceptualizing Political Power “Agency”
The index is built on three dimensions, referred to as “blocks” by the index authors: 
1) social power (capabilities), 2) economic power (opportunities), and 3) political power 
(agency).  Of most interest to this research is the third block, political power (agency). 
There is no literature cited that explains how the terms are conceptualized.  The 
authors define the political power block as comparing “the extent to which men 
and women are participating in decision-making in a country.”243  The term agency 
is described as the “ability to influence and contribute to outcomes, organization, 
bargaining power, or ‘voice.’”244  While the majority of indicators are taken from the 
formal government public sector, the index also makes room for senior positions 
in civil society.  As an explanation, the authors state that the boundaries between 
the public sector and civil society are left open as, depending on the individual 
country context or shifts in political power, one area can spill over into the other.245 
The component of political power (agency) is, therefore, comprised of the two sub-
components: public sector (reflected through 10 indicators) and civil society (reflected 
through 4 indicators).  While weight is given to the idea that power resides in other 
spheres beyond formal government, no other explanation is provided as to why the 
public sector is given significantly more attention nor criteria as to how civil society 
positions were selected.
B.  How the African Gender and Development Index Measures Political Power 
“Agency”
The African Gender and Development Index measure of political power (agency) contains 
the most robust and expansive data of all political power domains.  The index 
goes well beyond the standard legislative and ministerial measures to provide an 
insightful and in-depth look at individual countries.  The index incorporates five 
new measures, while also including the percentage of female parliamentarians and 
ministers.  They are:  1) higher positions in civil service and parastatals, 2) members 
of local councils, 3) judges, 4) traditional rulers, and 5) employment in security forces. 
243  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011.
244  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2004.
245  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011.
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Regarding the first new measure, unlike the Social Watch Gender Equity Index (Table 4), 
the African index differentiates between senior government and non-governmental 
roles.  Positions to be counted include directors and secretary generals in the 
various ministers, ambassadors, regional governors, and directors of government 
institutions.  This approach of disaggregating formal government positions from 
corporate or non-governmental roles makes for a much clearer quantitative picture 
of women’s representation in the private sector as compared to the formal public 
sector.
Measures of the percentage of women local council members and traditional rulers 
have also been included, especially appropriate for the African context.  As the 
authors explain: “The number of women in local councils is of particular relevance 
in a period when decentralization and local development have gained a high priority 
in most countries of the continent.”246  In regard to the measure of traditional rulers, 
the 2011 narrative report states that this is a sub-component measure of civil society. 
Later calculations of the index in the report, however, show that the “number of 
male/female traditional rulers” is defined as a sub-component indicator of the 
“public sector.”247  Perhaps the inconsistency speaks to the difficulty of classifying 
this category of leader which may be viewed, depending on the country context, 
as either a formal part of government or a non-governmental actor.  Despite this 
contradiction in classification, attempts to include local-level measures of women’s 
leadership should be applauded.  The European-based Gender Equality Index (Table 
5) is the other index to attempt a sub-national level measure.  The fact that the two 
regional indexes are the only ones reporting sub-national data highlights the lack of 
globally comparable indicators at this political level.
The indicator measuring judges is also of significant importance given the increasing 
influence of the judicial branch and the lack of attention to this sector in other gender 
indexes.  The indicator includes a breakdown of the number of women and men in 
various courts, defined as “higher, lower, and traditional/religious courts.”248  The 
only criticism of this approach is that no differentiation is made between the levels of 
judges: a high court judge is given the same weight as a lower court judge.
The greatest strength of the African Gender and Development Index lies in its wide 
array of measures – a total of 44 quantitative indicators across seven components. 
This includes nine indicators in the public sector component, most of which must 
246  Ibid. 
247  Ibid.
248  During the Phase 1 pilot only Higher Court judges were included.  The addition of other court levels was 
included for Phase II.  No explanation is given for the change, so whether it was due to a greater availability of data 
than anticipated, or for other reasons not articulated, it remains unknown. 
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be collected independently within each country.  It is this strength, however, which 
may also be its greatest hindrance.  While data is consistently available for the other 
components through existing reports or data bases, in the political power (agency) 
component all data is identified as “to be collected.”  The methodology included 
selecting independent institutions in each participating country and establishing 
a national advisory panel (consisting of government, experts, and civil society 
representatives).  The role of each country panel was to support the local institution 
collecting data and review their work, including oversight of the national country 
report submitted to the European Commission for Africa as part of the index.  
While such a rigorous process helps guarantee the quality of independently collected 
data, there is an associated cost.  A 2002 public budget proposal outlining the support 
required to prepare and conduct eight country trials249 was estimated at more than 
US $800,000, essentially $100,000 per country.250  A 2003 report by the Economic 
Commission noted that progress on completing the index had been delayed due 
to the participatory nature of its development, which was requiring more time 
than anticipated, as well as funding constraints, which together had postponed the 
completion of the pilot project targeting 12 countries.251
The final results of the Phase I trial were reported in the 2009 African Women’s Report.252 
An additional 18 countries were added as part of Phase II in 2011.  The UN states 
that its intention is to expand to all African countries and report every two to three 
years.  Given that approximately seven years has elapsed since the last round of 
data collection, questions remain regarding the ability of the Economic Commission 
for Africa to sustain this index on a regular basis.  While costs might be reduced 
over time, the ability to expand this model to encompass the majority of countries 
worldwide would appear to be unfeasible.  However, putting criticisms and funding 
difficulties aside, the African Index’s broad approach towards capturing a range of 
positions in the political space is one that should be emulated as it provides important 
insights into how one might measure women’s access to positions of political power.
249  The Dutch organization Hivos (Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking) agreed to pay the 
costs associated with the remaining 5 of the 12 countries identified for the Phase I pilot.
250  United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa. “Production of the African Gender and Development Index 
and the African Women’s Report 2002/2004: Project Proposal. Addis Ababa.
251  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “Measuring and Reporting Gender Equality: The African 
Gender and Development Index.” Meeting of the Bureau of the Committee on Women and Development (2003, 
Sep. 16-17: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).  The Dutch NGO HIVOS has agreed to pay the costs for conducting the pilot in 
the remaining five countries.
252  “African Women’s Report: Measuring Gender Inequality in Africa - Experiences and Lessons from the African 
Gender and Development Index.” Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Economic Commission for Africa, 2009. 
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2.2.3.2  Value of Judicial Branch Measures
Although only the African Gender and Development Index includes the judicial branch, 
a strong case can be made for the growing influence of the judiciary, both at domestic 
and international levels.  It is clear that the composition, independence, and authority 
of courts will vary across regions and countries, and thus general trends will impact 
each court system differently.  Yet, if the goal is to understand women’s political 
access to formal decision-making, and a number of trends point to the increasing 
global expansion of judicial power, it then becomes important to better understand 
women’s descriptive representation in this branch of government. 
Increasing Judicial Review:  Constitutions, written by people, are at times unclear, 
vague, and open to interpretation.  Those drafted in an effort to end conflict may be a 
broad compilation of compromises aimed at bringing peace rather than legal clarity. 
The ability to review and interpret the meaning and application of the constitution 
typically falls to the courts, often a specific constitutional court.253  In Lijphart’s study 
of 36 democracies, he notes the trend towards more and stronger judicial review.254 
The newer democracies, without exception, all maintain judicial review of their 
constitutions.  The five older democracies he catalogs, such as Great Britain, do not 
follow a similar system, either lacking judicial review authority or a constitution to 
review.  Yet all of the older democracies have accepted the supranational judicial 
review of the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. 
Through this process, supranational courts are able to restrict the power of individual 
countries and elected individuals within those countries. 
Increasing Judicial Activism:  Globally, we see a growing trend of judges becoming 
more willing to enter the political space once dominated by politicians and 
parliaments.255  Around the sphere of women’s rights, litigation before the courts 
is being used to challenge accepted gender norms on economic employment, land 
ownership, inheritance, and rights of the girl child.  Gains are also being made 
through litigation in the private sphere around issues such as rape, domestic 
violence, and reproductive rights.256  While acknowledging that women’s victories 
in courts can lead to ostracism when she tries to enforce a positive ruling,257 there are 
253  Horowitz, Donald L. “Constitutional Courts: Opportunities and Pitfalls.” Towards a New Constitution for 
Afghanistan, 2003.
254  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
255  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
256  Turquet, Laura. “Progress of the Worlds Women 2011-2012. In Pursuit of Justice.,” 2011.
257  Sanematsu, Marisa. “Accessing Justice: Models, Strategies and Best Practices on Women’s Empowerment 
(IDLO, 2013).” Ciências 14 (2014): 04.
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numerous examples where gender-positive rulings have had far-reaching impact on 
cultural norms.  
The increasing reliance on regulation as a form of governance has also encouraged 
courts to intervene.  Rules made through the executive branch, rather than 
by statutory law, result in more legal challenges.258  This in turn lends greater 
influence to the judiciary in determining policy.  As a recent example, state-by-state 
regulations aimed at denying gay marriage and government benefits to same-sex 
couples resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court determining one national policy.  While 
not every judicial intervention has such dramatic policy effect on the country as a 
whole, the increasing power of the executive in relation to the legislative – and the 
inherent conflicts this is creating – is drawing the judiciary into the role of arbitrator 
and policy maker in an unpredictable and increasing manner.
Increasing Application of International Law:  The move from judicial restraint to 
judicial activism259 has been attributed, in part, to the growing influence and use of 
international conventions, charters, declarations, and covenants that create domestic 
obligations.260  For example, most countries in the world are signatories to CEDAW. 
Individuals of participating countries are allowed to refer complaints to a Committee 
established under the Optional Protocol to the Convention in 2000.  The CEDAW 
Committee will review individual cases when “all available domestic remedies have 
been exhausted unless the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged 
or unlikely to bring effective relief.”261  
While enforcing international obligations at the state level is not without its 
challenges, there is growing precedent – of both judges and individuals – to use 
these instruments when local laws or retribution are perceived to be lacking or in 
conflict with international law.  From the judicial perspective, magistrates now have 
a greater breadth of tools from which to draw.  While in the past the country context 
or legal constraints may have directed a judge’s inclination towards restraint, today 
an increasing body of international law can offer greater protection and justification 
for a more progressive legal stance.
258  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
259  Judicial activism has been defined by Hague and Harrop (2010) as the willingness of judges to venture beyond 
narrow legal reasoning to influence public policy.  They define judicial restraint as a more conservative philosophy 
that maintains that the role of the judge is to apply the letter of the law, leaving politics to elected bodies.
260  Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
261  United Nations General Assembly. “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.” United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p.13, December 18, 1979.
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Increasing Prestige of the Judiciary:  The judiciary, in most liberal democracies, 
has maintained its prestige in the face of declining trust among other institutions, 
most notably political parties.262  With a reputation as being impartial, there is a 
greater tendency for all sides of the political spectrum to turn to the courts for 
adjudication.  This process is seen as reinforcing, expanding legal authority as more 
and varied complainants are referred to the judicial arena.263  Globally, judiciaries are 
also gaining in credibility as the composition of the judicial benches becomes more 
diversified.264  
Finally, it is harder to deny that courts play no political role given increasing 
evidence of national courts shaping public policy as do supranational courts, such 
as the European Court of Justice and its leading role in such politically charged 
issues as European integration.265  Given the intersection between judicial decisions 
and societal practices, it is important to better understand how women’s descriptive 
representation is being reflected throughout this area of formal government.
2.2.4 Security Measures
The fifth unique measure in the African Gender and Development Index is “employment 
in security forces” (Table 6).   It is the only gender composite index that attempts to 
measure any type of descriptive representation of women in the security domain. 
Once again, however, the 2011 report is contradictory in what is being measured; 
the narrative states “the number of women in security forces” while the actual index 
states the indicator as “employment in the security forces.”  This indicator was not 
included in the 2009 pilot round, but added during the 2011 Phase II in an effort to 
capture UN Security Council resolutions aimed at ensuring the greater inclusion 
of women in the peace processes and negotiations.266  While the security sector is 
not a separate branch of government, the influence it wields in the political sphere 
bolsters the rational for using an indicator of this type. 
While we can state that women have made progress  in other areas of government, 
albeit slowly, women have gained limited descriptive representational ground 
within the military, police, intelligence, and investigative agencies.  On continents rife 
262  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
263  Sweet, Alec Stone. Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford University Press, 2000.
264  Doherty, Joshua. “Women’s Representation in Judiciaries Worldwide,” 2012.
265  Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
266  Specifically, The African Gender and Development Index 2011 states (page 25) that this indicator is designed to 
take into account UN Security Council resolutions 1325, 1820, 1888, and 1889. “An increasing number of women in 
the security forces can be considered as a guarantee for more peaceful treatment of conflicts whether individual 
or collective.”
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with insecurity and conflict, the perceived ability of women to competently handle 
conflict may be a difficult cultural jump to make – in part because women rarely 
hold key decision-making positions in the security sector.  United Nations Security 
Council 1325, passed in 2000 in recognition of women’s lack of representation, calls 
on member states to protect women in conflict and include them in peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping, and peace negotiations.  Progress has been slow to date:  between the 
years 2000 to 2008 no woman was appointed as a mediator in the 13 major peace 
processes and only 2.7% of the signatories were women.267  More than half of all 
peace agreements fail within the first 10 years. 268 
2.2.4.1  Value of Security Sector Measures
While the security sector is not a separate branch of government, the influence it 
wields in the political sphere bolsters the rational for using an indicator of this type. 
Rising Influence of the Security Sector:  If we look at Mills’ work on power, he 
argued that by the 1950s America’s military, economic, and political elite were 
inextricable linked.  Personnel shifted interchangeably between all three arenas and 
economic interests and ties between the trio were tightly bound.  A second edition of 
The Power Elite was published in 2000, with Alan Wolfe contributing an Afterward. 
In this section Wolfe argues that Mills’ theory is faulty as the military never became 
the political force he envisioned.  At the time of the writing, Wolfe states: “Yet it 
seems clear that in the 1990s, opposition to military adventures abroad has severely curtailed 
the ability of the military to have its way in both foreign and domestic policy.  Their [most 
Americans] opposition to higher taxes makes it impossible for the military to grow.  The 
rhetoric of emergency – and with it the need for significant personal sacrifice – is not a rhetoric 
to which they are attracted.” 269  And then September 11, 2001 occurred.  Followed by 
London 2005, Mumbai 2008, Uganda 2010, Kenya 2013, Boston 2013… . 
With the rise in global terrorism around the world the importance of national security 
has resumed center stage, increasing both the power and influence of the military. 
Mills’ belief that a permanent military threat was the impetus for this increased 
influence270 rings much truer today than when Wolfe was writing in 2000.  At home 
and abroad, security forces are changing to meet the new global war on terrorism.271 
267  Tirman, John. “UNSCR 1325: Slow Progress, Uncertain Prospects.” Foreign Service Journal, April 2011.
268  United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. White House, December 2011.
269  Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. 1956, 2000 ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
270  Ibid. 
271  In the United States, for example, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a massive reorganization of the Executive 
Branch that resulted in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the third-largest cabinet with an 
annual budget of approximately $40 billion and 240,000 employees (https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs).
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In some illiberal democracies, especially evident in a number of African countries, 
the security sector continues to invade and permeate everyday life.272  Lynch and 
Crawford’s study of democratization in Africa notes that between 1990 and 2010 
there were 50 attempted coups in Africa and 13 were successful.273  While the 
study ends in 2010, the trend has continued in a number of countries, including 
Madagascar, the Central African Republic, and Mauritania.  Direct takeover of the 
government by the military, or with the support of the military, not only impacts 
the political power dynamics of today but may have implications for years to 
come as a pattern of military influence in politics is established (through unfair 
elections, installed leaders, or successive military interventions).274  The third wave 
of democracy has not resulted in the withdrawal of the military from political life 
on the continent.  In fact, the escalating fight against home-grown insurgent groups 
has strengthened the role and political influence of the security sector.  Whether 
fighting Al-Shabaab in East Africa or Boko Haram in Nigeria, we increasingly see 
the call for aggressive military action supported by the political class as well as by 
affected citizens.  And this is not a situation common only to Africa.  One need only 
look at the United Nations “Consolidated List” of 618 individuals and 421 groups 
that are subject to sanctions to understand the breadth of terrorist organizations and 
their global reach.275  Today, both developed and developing countries are finding 
it difficult to ignore the rising influence of the security sector as terrorism groups 
gain footholds in poorly governed countries and almost 60 million people have been 
forcibly displaced worldwide.276  
While currently no gender index attempts to measure women’s leadership role in 
the military or police, in a world constantly on “high alert” we must acknowledge 
the influence of the security sector in addressing both external as well as internal 
threats to the state.  The ongoing destabilization of the Middle East, rise in terrorist 
organizations, and increasing difficulty in controlling borders in a globalized world 
all point to trends that will unlikely see the importance accorded the security sector 
diminish in the foreseeable future.
272  Petchesky, Rosalind. “Critical Perspectives on Empowerment.” Development 53, no. 2 (2010): 181–83.
273  Lynch, Gabrielle, and Gordon Crawford. “Democratization in Africa 1990 - 2010: An Assessment.” 
Democratization 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 275–310.
274  Ibid.
275  http://www.un.org/sc/committees/list_compend.shtml.
276  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees http://www.unhcr.org.uk/about-us/key-facts-
and-figures.html
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2.3 CONCLUSION
In analyzing a number of the leading composite gender indexes in use today, each 
is making a substantive contribution towards tracking women’s presence in politics. 
While relying on a variety of different terminologies and theoretical frameworks, all 
of the indexes attempt to capture the gap or inequality existing between the presence 
of men and the presence of women in the formal political space. 
The array of indicators used to capsulize this idea of women in the political space 
varies by index, as summarized in Table 4.  It becomes clear that even as theories and 
dimensions differ across indexes, a number of the same indicators are repeatedly 
used.  Perhaps this is not surprising, however, as attempting to draw a straight line 
between the theoretical framework, the conceptual dimension, and the final selection 
of indicators is, for several reasons, a difficult task.
Table 4:  Political Domain Indicators Used across Six Gender Indexes 
Gender 
Inequality 
Index
Social 
Institutions 
and Gender 
Index
Global 
Gender Gap 
Index
Gender 
Equity Index
EU Gender 
Equality 
Index
African 
Gender and 
Development 
Index
Parliamentary 
Seats X X X X X X
Existence of 
Quotas X
Ministerial 
Positions X X X X
Years Female 
Head of State X
Senior
civil service X
Legislators, 
Sr. officials/
managers
X
Professional
and technical 
positions
X
Regional 
Assembly 
seats
X
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Gender 
Inequality 
Index
Social 
Institutions 
and Gender 
Index
Global 
Gender Gap 
Index
Gender 
Equity Index
EU Gender 
Equality 
Index
African 
Gender and 
Development 
Index
Members of 
Local 
Councils
X
Traditional 
Rulers X
Judges X
Security 
Forces X
Senior 
Non-
Government 
X
Secondary 
Education X
First, as discussed earlier, there is no global consensus on definitions surrounding 
the terms being measured.  Our collective understanding of power, empowerment, 
voice, agency, etc., is dependent on context and interpretation.  As highlighted with 
empowerment, how is it possible that one term can be used to describe a reordering 
of the patriarchal political order as well as greater decision-making in the household? 
Terms such as power and empowerment remain open to contestation when applied 
to gender in a global context because they themselves are not definitive.
Second, the unavailability of data remains a driver of indicator selection in the political 
field, rather than theory or the conceptual dimension itself.  Each index speaks to the 
lack of appropriate global information that is harmonized, collected, and available. 
Experts repeatedly state that current tools are inadequate and only a proxy for what 
is being measured to date.  The one index that attempts to remedy the problem – the 
African Gender and Development Index – has made great strides towards increasing 
information to measure what it terms “political power (agency).”  Yet, it is this very 
granular measurement approach that creates impediments for conducting wider 
comparisons in terms of cost, data harmonization, and replicability.  The index’s 
current approach appears unsustainable beyond a limited number of countries.  
This raises the question as to whether one single theoretical approach or index 
methodology can adequately capture gender differences in formal politics across all 
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countries.  The global indexes examined in this chapter remain limited in providing 
information beyond legislative and ministerial percentages.  None of the four 
global measures include data on sub-national governments, the judiciary, or the 
security sector.  Given the limitations to gathering quality data on a global scale, it 
appears that trade-offs between data relevance and importance have been made to 
accommodate geographical coverage.277  To include as many countries as possible, it 
is clear that the global indexes have fewer political measures to draw from annually, 
thus limiting their detailed applicability.  In direct response to the generalized nature 
of global indexes in use, the European Union and African indexes were developed to 
specifically target the different challenges of their respective regions.  Both indexes, 
as compared to their global counterparts, capture a wider selection of measures. 
In particular, the African Gender and Development Index makes a valiant attempt at 
collecting robust data on a country-by-country basis. 
The tension remains, however, between this desire to capture a wider range 
of political measures for women on a global scale and the unavailability of 
systematically collected data that would allow researchers and practitioners to do 
so.  While regional efforts are pointing in the right direction, they have yet to be 
replicated beyond a small sub-set of countries.  
In this analysis of six leading gender indexes, it is clear from the academic 
literature, as well as the research undertaken by index developers, that the lack 
of appropriate data on women’s political representation remains problematic.  An 
insufficient number of indicators are systematically collected across countries, in 
particular within the judiciary and security sectors.  Data at the sub-national level 
in all domains remains incomplete or non-existent.  As a result, researchers remain 
constrained in their ability to reflect theoretical concepts through data.  Whether this 
data scarcity derives from a lack of accessibility, quality, resources, or interest is open 
to discussion.  What is known, however, is that the picture of women’s presence in 
positions of formal political government remains incomplete. 
277  Permanyer, Inaki. “A Critical Assessment of the UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index.” Feminist Economics 19, no. 2 
(2013): 1–32.

93
Chapter 3
For Good Measure
What Gets Measured, Gets Done.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Many names have been attributed to the oft used adage “what gets measured, 
gets done.”  The most likely source of its inspiration is Scottish mathematician and 
physicist William Thomson, also known as Lord Kelvin. During a lecture on May 
3, 1883,  he stated:  I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, 
and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning 
of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, 
whatever the matter may be. 278
Knowing something, according to Lord Kelvin, is not the same as being able to express 
it through numbers.  The numbers provide scientific standing to the idea.  We know, 
for example, that women are underrepresented in the political field as compared to 
men.  But to what extent do we know it with numbers?  Numerical data surrounding 
this field is consistently described as lacking, inadequate, and of poor quality.279  This 
research effort attempts to improve quality data collection efforts in a field where 
“no data” or “poor data” are often appropriate categorizations.  As Herrera and 
Kapur note, just because data is lacking or bad does not mean researchers must 
accept the status quo; the improvement of data remains a continuous task.280
278  Stellman, Jeanne Mager. Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety. International Labour Organization, 
1998.
279  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010. 
Cueva Beteta, Hanny. “What Is Missing in Measures of Women’s Empowerment?” Journal of Human Development 
7, no. 2 (2006): 221–41.   Corner, Lorraine. Gender-Sensitive and Pro-Poor Indicators of Good Governance. United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2005.  Gaye, Amie, Jeni Klugman, Milorad Kovacevic, Sarah Twigg, and 
Eduardo Zambrano. “Measuring Key Disparities in Human Development: The Gender Inequality Index.” Human 
Development Research Paper 46 (2010): 1–37.  Economic Commission for Africa. “African Women’s Report: 
Measuring Gender Inequality in Africa - Experiences and Lessons from the African Gender and Development 
Index.” Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2009.
280  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
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This chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section begins with a discussion 
of how the literature defines and frames quality data.  It then compares academic 
definitions with quality data frameworks established by international organizations 
during the past 25 years.  These frameworks set the standard for how international 
and local organizations, private institutions, and governments define quality data.  
Based on established academic and international organization definitions, in section 
two I develop a quality data framework as it applies to my research.  This includes 
articulating how quality data is defined in relation to 12 key positions identified 
across different branches of government and the security sector as well as where 
my framework aligns and departs from current practices.  Each of the eight quality 
data criteria selected is defined, with nuances discussed in relation to the creation of 
a composite indicator and index that measures women’s descriptive representation 
in formal government.
3.2 CRITERIA OF QUALITY DATA 
In speaking specifically about the construction and use of data in composite 
indicators, two fundamental characteristics drive the overall quality of the product, 
even as concepts may vary in what an indicator is trying to measure.  These two 
characteristics include: 1) the quality of the data being used, and 2) the quality of the 
process used in constructing the composite indicator.281  Turning to the first aspect, 
how “quality” data is defined remains an ongoing discussion among academics, 
international organizations, multi-laterals, and governments, as efforts to reach a 
global consensus merge closer.  In the past, quality was often associated with the 
accuracy of the data.  Today there is recognition that the term quality is multi-faceted 
with no single characteristic effectively defining the concept.282  The terms fitness 
for purpose or fitness for use – in relation to what the consumer actually needs – are 
today more often used to describe quality data.283  Does the data produced meet the 
requirements of the user to the greatest degree possible?  Accuracy, for example, 
becomes secondary if the data is unavailable in the applicable timeframe or too 
expensive for the user to procure.  
281  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005.  “Quality Framework 
and Guidelines for OECD Statistical Activities.” Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2011.  
282  Wang, Richard Y., and Diane M. Strong. “Beyond Accuracy: What Data Quality Means to Data Consumers.” 
Journal of Management Information Systems 12, no. 4 (1996): 5–33. Statistical Commission. “Guidelines for the 
Template for a Generic National Quality Assurance Framework (NQAF).” United Nations Statistics Division, New 
York 8 (2012).
283  Echoing this concept of “fit for purpose,” the United Nations National Quality Assurance Framework Group 
of Experts defines quality as: The degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfills requirements. https://
unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/docs-nqaf/NQAF%20GLOSSARY.pdf.   
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In attempting to better understand “fitness for purpose” in relation to my research 
around gender composite indexes, I began with a broad search on quality data 
literature.  The variety and diversity of approaches led me to narrow the literature 
to quality data associated with governance or gender concepts.  While interesting 
theoretically, the literature proved unsatisfactory in advancing an understanding of 
how quality data frameworks have been applied to composite gender measures in 
the political space.  I next turned to the literature underpinning the development 
of current gender indexes.  Two of six indexes made oblique references to guidance 
provided by quality data frameworks in use by international bodies.  This then led 
me to an analysis of the major quality data frameworks established by multi-lateral 
and global organizations.  
These frameworks were then examined through several lenses before final criteria 
selection was made for my own research framework.  This included the level of 
consistency and repetition seen across the reviewed data quality frameworks.  For 
example:  were the same criteria being used over and over across instruments?  My 
intent was not to reinvent an entirely new quality data framework, but rather to 
build on existing frameworks if consensus existed.  Secondly, I paid special attention 
to any framework that was applied to a composite indicator given the special data 
needs emerging from this type of measurement tool.  If different criteria were used, 
what was the rationale for doing so?  Finally, I examined the frameworks through 
a gender lens, attempting to understand and document how criteria was framed to 
address issues of gender data and measurement.
In examining the more general literature on measuring quality data, criteria 
varies fairly dramatically according to different authors and fields of study.  For 
example, rather than taking a theoretical or intuitive approach,284 Wang and Strong 
specifically examined how data consumers themselves identify quality data.  Their 
efforts resulted in the isolation of 179 separate attributes.  During the second survey 
phase, these 179 were collapsed into 20 criteria ranked by importance.  Recognizing 
that even 20 different attributes remain unwieldy as a data-quality framework, the 
authors further collapsed these attributes into four target categories of quality data: 
1) accuracy, 2) relevancy, 3) representation, and 4) accessibility.285  While the final 
research product produced only four target categories in its final summation, these 
four were derived from 179 different attributes.  The breadth and variety of attributes 
identified by the survey respondents reinforces the concept that data quality is a 
multi-faceted concept encompassing a wide range of criteria.
284  The authors define an intuitive approach as the one most commonly used to identify quality data, resulting 
from the researchers’ experience or intuitive understanding of which attributes are the most important. 
285  Wang, Richard Y., and Diane M. Strong. “Beyond Accuracy: What Data Quality Means to Data Consumers.” 
Journal of Management Information Systems 12, no. 4 (1996): 5–33.
96
Chapter 3 For Good Measure
Again highlighting that data quality is a multi-dimensional concept, Pipino et. al. 
developed usable data quality metrics by examining both subjective and objective 
aspects of data.286  The authors presented a final list of 16 quality criteria for 
consideration as a framework.  While identifying the same four attributes described 
earlier – accuracy, relevancy, representation, and accessibility – two other criteria 
were included of particular interest.287  These included:  
1 Appropriate Amount of Data:  The extent to which the volume of data is appropriate 
for the task at hand.
2 Completeness: The extent to which data is not missing and is of sufficient breadth and 
depth for the task at hand
The emphasis is not only on valid and accurate data, but also the amount of data. 
Is there too much data, therefore containing extraneous components?  Is the overall 
volume unwieldly to manage?  Conversely, is there sufficient breadth and depth of 
data – i.e., is there enough information – to achieve what is intended?  While these 
ideas may be inherent in such criteria as validity or coverage,  the larger number of 
criteria in this research capture greater nuance in defining quality criteria, including 
quality as it relates to the right amount of data. 
In comparison to the large number of criteria identified by the previous authors, 
Herrera and Kapur specify only three quality criteria of data, even as they attempt to 
examine such complex concepts as democracy and anti-corruption.288  Their criteria 
for measuring data quality include validity, coverage, and accuracy.  Validity captures 
the relationship between the theoretical concepts and the information collected, 
coverage refers to data set completeness, and accuracy describes the degree of error, 
or correctness, of the data.
Although these same three attributes can be found in many quality data frameworks, 
Herrera and Kapur go on to argue that while quality criteria are important, more 
attention should be focused on the incentives and capabilities of those individuals 
and organizations implicit in the development and collection of data.  Even with 
validity, coverage, and accuracy at an acceptable level, data actors have acknowledged 
vulnerabilities, constraints, and biases that can potentially compromise information 
in ways that are not being adequately examined.
286  Pipino, Leo L., Yang W. Lee, and Richard Y. Wang. “Data Quality Assessment.” Communications of the ACM 45, 
no. 4 (2002): 211–218.
287  The 16 dimensions include: accessibility, appropriate amount of data, believability, completeness, concise 
representation, consistent representation, ease of manipulation, free-of-error, interpretability, objectivity, 
relevancy, reputation, security, timeliness, understandability, value-added.
288  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
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In turning to academics as an identified set of data actors, for example, the authors 
argue that the positive incentives for generating new data sets are limited, thus 
reflecting an increasing bias towards – and reliance on – existing data sets.289 
New data collection is costly in terms of time, skills, and finances.  Off-the-shelf 
and downloadable datasets are now easily accessible for anyone with a computer 
and interest, allowing academics to better understand corners of the world where 
previously they had little reach.  At the same time, the commensurate costs 
associated with field work have not declined.  Given time and funding limitations, if 
a pre-existing dataset can meet the outlined research needs, common sense dictates 
that the dataset will likely take precedent over field work.  Given the plethora of 
reputable institutions producing datasets – World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Freedom House, 
and multiple United Nations agencies, to name only a few – the use of data from 
these organizations is not considered a hindrance but can, in fact, lend credibility to 
research efforts.290 
As data users increasingly depend on established datasets, especially those using 
the information for policy- or decision-making, assurances of data quality gain 
in importance. Composite indicators that compare country performance are 
particularly vulnerable, as they rely heavily on statistical information produced 
by individual governments that is then provided to international or regional 
organizations for collection and aggregation.  The quality of the data generated will 
be driven by: 1) the quality of national statistics received, and 2) the quality of the 
receiving organization’s ability to collect and analyze what has been provided.291 
Regarding the first factor, information is typically provided by national statistics 
offices.  This data is then used by multiple stakeholders to conduct research and 
analysis; develop policy and programs; and undertake individual, regional, and 
cross-country comparisons.  Especially in the case of global benchmarking, it 
becomes imperative that the government of Andorra is reporting in a consistent and 
comparable manner to that of Zambia.  
Modern efforts to harmonize this collection of data across all countries is based 
on the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, drafted in 1991.  The principles 
were originally conceived as a way to help maintain the quality, reliability, and 
professionalism of data as Central European countries shifted from centrally planned 
economies to market-oriented democracies. 292  The principles were adopted by the 
289  Ibid.
290  Ibid.
291  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Quality Framework and Guidelines for OECD 
Statistical Activities,” January 2012.
292  https://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/gp/fundprinciples.aspx
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United Nations as a global set of standards in 1994 and remain in use today.  These 
principles underpin the concept of quality criteria upon which later frameworks 
were developed and adopted by other institutional organizations and actors, to 
which the remainder of this section is devoted. 
International Monetary Fund Data Quality Assessment Framework
Beginning in 1995, the International Monetary Fund executive board noted the 
need to improve the quality of data being provided by member countries for use 
in policy analysis.  Building off the UN Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, 
the IMF developed a Data Quality Assessment Framework that it introduced in 2003. 
The goal of the framework was to provide a structure for assessing data quality 
while also clarifying and promoting an understanding of data quality among users 
and compilers, including: 1) the IMF itself, 2) the respective country authorities 
providing the data, and 3) private and public data users.  Through the IMF Data 
Quality Assessment Framework, much greater detail was devoted to defining the traits 
of quality data based on best practices and internationally accepted methodologies.293 
A total of five criteria were defined as essential to ensuring quality data.294
TABLE 5:  Data Quality Assessment Framework – International Monetary Fund 
Data Quality Criteria
Assurances of Integrity Data must be collected in an objective manner based on professional, 
transparent, and ethical standards.  
Methodological Soundness The methodological basis for collecting data reflects internationally 
accepted standards and practices.  
Accuracy and Reliability Different criteria for which data is collected reflect the reality of the 
country’s economy.295
Serviceability Data is released in a timely manner, is comparable to similar data sets, 
and revised on a regular basis.
Accessibility Data must be presented in a clear and understandable way, remain 
accessible, and assistance to users made available.
293  “Data Quality Assessment Framework and Data Quality Program.” Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund, June 25, 2003.
294 “International Monetary Fund’s Data Quality Assessment Framework.” Helsinki, Finland: International Monetary 
Fund, January 8, 2018.
295  As would be expected for International Monetary Fund purposes, the focus of data collection is on economic 
variables.
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In the International Monetary Fund Framework there are many direct linkages 
back to the Fundamental Principles, including the need for impartiality, sound 
methodological approaches, and an imperative to make data available to the public. 
In addition, as would be anticipated for purposes of the International Monetary 
Fund, there is an emphasis on the collection of economic data.  Under “Accuracy 
and Reliability,” the data specifically refers to data that reflects the country’s 
economic reality.  So while the Fundamental Principles remain the cornerstone of 
the framework, we also begin to see differentiation among the quality data criteria 
according to organizational needs, reinforcing the earlier definition that data must 
be fit for its intended use or purpose.
Eurostat European Statistics Code of Practice
Building off the work of the International Monetary Fund, the European Statistics 
Code of Practice was introduced by Eurostat in 2005.296  The code sets up a framework, 
based on 15 principles, to examine the institutional environment, statistical processes, 
and quality of output produced.  Developed for national and community statistical 
authorities, the stated purpose of the Code is to ensure the quality of statistics 
produced within the European Statistical System, and to make this information 
available to anyone for purposes of decision-making, research, or debate.297  While 
one tends to equate a statistics code of practice as being targeted to statistical 
institutions, we can also see references to the code in non-governmental contexts.  As 
one example, the Gender Equality Index refers to the European Statistics Code of Practice 
as one of its core criteria for indicator selection.298  Like the International Monetary 
Fund, Eurostat also identifies five principles related to quality data.299 
296  The Code was adopted in February 2005 and revised in 2011.
297  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-32-11-955
298  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” European Institute for Gender Equality, 2012.
299  European Statistics Committee. European Statistics Code of Practice. Eurostat, 2011.
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TABLE 6:  European Statistics Code of Practice – Eurostat
Data Quality Criteria
Relevance The statistics produced meet the needs of the users.   This includes 
consultation processes and monitoring user satisfaction.
Accuracy and Reliability Statistics produced accurately and reliably portray reality.  This includes 
ongoing assessment, validation, error sampling, and revision processes.
Timeliness and Punctuality Statistics are published according to international release standards; 
deviations from the schedule are publically explained. 
Coherence and Comparability Statistics are internally consistent and comparable both over time and 
between regions and countries.
Accessibility and Clarity Statistics are presented in an understandable format, released in a 
convenient manner, and accessible with supporting guidance.
In many respects, the Eurostat data quality criteria are similar to those of the 
International Monetary Fund, again linking back to the UN Fundamental Principles 
of Official Statistics.  There is no specific alignment to economic data, however, as the 
Eurostat framework is intended for application across all types of data.  A second 
distinction, perhaps of more interest, is the greater amount of attention paid to the 
data end-user.  Specific language is inserted to ensure that the statistics produced:  1) 
meet the needs of the user, 2) allowed for consultation with the user, and 3) satisfy 
the user.   Any changes in publication should also be publically explained as to why 
the deviation occurred.  The perception emerges that there is little point in producing 
information for its own sake.  More careful consideration must be given to whether 
the user, in the end, will find utility and satisfaction in what was produced.
UN National Quality Assurance Framework
With a mandate not to “recreate the wheel,” and to continue to build on the existing 
quality frameworks such as the International Monetary Fund and Eurostat, the 
United Nations Statistics Division set about building a flexible template to help 
countries develop their own data quality frameworks.  The resulting National 
Quality Assurance Framework, with accompanying guidelines, was approved by the 
UN in 2012.300  Because it is impossible to determine the uses each country might 
require for statistical output, extensive guideline questions are provided for each 
quality dimension with the intention of assuring quality control as individual 
300  Statistical Commission. “Guidelines for the Template for a Generic National Quality Assurance Framework 
(NQAF).” United Nations Statistics Division, New York (2012).
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countries determined their own specific needs.301  The UN National Quality Assurance 
Framework again provides five criteria related to the production of quality data.302
TABLE 7:  National Quality Assurance Framework – UN
Data Quality Criteria
Relevance Information should meet the most important current and/or emerging 
needs of all stakeholders within given resource constraints.  This 
includes methodological soundness, and the manner in which 
particular concepts, definitions, and classifications correspond to user 
needs.
Accuracy and Reliability To what degree does the statistical information correctly describe the 
phenomena being measured and is it reliably consistent over time. 
Timeliness and Punctuality How fast is the information made available in relation to the reference 
period and is the data delivered on the dates publically promised.
Accessibility and Clarity Data can be found without difficulty, presented in a clear manner, and 
accessible to all users (including for research purposes), either free or at 
an affordable price.  Explanatory information and metadata should be 
made available to properly understand the information uses.
Coherence and Comparability Statistics should be consistent internally and comparable over time 
using common standards.  It should be possible to combine and make 
joint use of data from different sources.
The UN Framework pulls heavily from Eurostat, with both using the same five 
criteria.  There are some modest changes in language used to describe each of the 
five criteria, but the intent of each remains the same.  The only significant deviation 
from the International Monetary Fund and Eurostat is the UN framework’s specific 
reference to cost.  In the “Relevance” criteria it is clearly acknowledged that 
competing demands may outstrip available resources – a likely reality in under-
resourced government institutions.  Part of determining “relevance” of quality 
data is determining which statistics produced target the greatest priority needs. 
These decisions will be subjective, given differing country contexts.  However, the 
recognition that trade-offs must be made, and that financial limitations exist, is 
useful to acknowledge given the framework’s intention to be used across countries 
with widely varying levels of economic development and budget resources.
301  The four areas for which questions are provided include:  1) agency level, 2) program design stage, 
3) program implementation stage, and 4) post-collection evaluation stage.  These questions, entitled 
“elements to be assured,” provide a range of topics for framework developers to consider in their own 
design process.
302  Statistical Commission. “Guidelines for the Template for a Generic National Quality Assurance Framework 
(NQAF).” United Nations Statistics Division, New York (2012).
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Along with its own National Quality Assurance Framework, the UN highlights a wide 
range of other country data quality frameworks, guidelines, principles, protocols, 
methodologies, etc.,  (258 reference documents in total) from individual countries as 
well as multi-lateral organizations.303  A cursory review of these frameworks indicates 
that the majority pull heavily from the earlier work of the International Monetary 
Fund and Eurostat, leading to a high level of consistency in the identification of 
criteria used to define quality data.
Quality Data and Composite Indicators
In looking across academic and practitioner definitions of what constitutes “quality 
data,” there is consistency around the use of a core grouping of criteria.  My research 
interest lies at the intersection of quality data, as it relates to composite indicators 
and, in particular, the use of composite indicators as a measure of descriptive 
representation in the formal political arena.  I use the term “composite indicator” 
to indicate a manipulation of individual indicators, and possible weights, to create 
an aggregate ordinal or cardinal measure of country performance.304  Policy-makers 
and practitioners are increasingly turning to composite indicators to combine large 
amounts of data and then distill them into a single measure that captures complex 
ideas.  These scores are then used to benchmark or rank country performance, 
allowing for comparisons at individual country, regional, or global levels. 
The Quality Framework and Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development was first published in 2003 and revised in 2011.305  Of particular 
interest for my research, Nardo et. al., pulling from the International Monetary Fund, 
Eurostat, and Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development quality 
frameworks, further elaborated on the criteria used to define quality data and how 
it relates to composite indicators.  These have been summarized in Table 8.306
303  Reference documents can be found at UN STATS: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/dnss/qualitynqaf/nqaf.aspx.
304  Saltelli, Andrea. “Composite Indicators between Analysis and Advocacy.” Social Indicators Research 81, no. 1 
(2007): 65–77.
305  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Quality Framework and Guidelines for OECD 
Statistical Activities,” January 2012.
306  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005.
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TABLE 8:  Data Quality Framework in Relation to Composite Indicators 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
Data Quality Criteria
Relevance Relevance must be examined in relation to the overall purpose of the 
composite indicators, including ensuring that the range of domains are 
covered in a balanced way.  “Proxy” series are often used, given data 
unavailability.  If a proxy is used, evidence of its relationship to the 
“target” series should be produced when possible.
Accuracy The accuracy and credibility of the data used to constructed a composite 
indicator must be based on the confidence associated with the producer. 
Information must be viewed as professional and produced according to 
statistical standards without manipulation or political pressure.  Official 
sources – national statistical offices or public bodies with clear codes of 
conduct – are typically preferred as data sources. 
Timeliness Data covering the various conceptual domains of a composite indicator 
are often released at different times.  Attention must be paid to 
establishing coherence in dates in order to minimize estimations of 
missing data or revisions once published.
Accessibility Because composite indicators pull data from a variety of sources, 
accessibility to that information can affect the cost of production.  
Poor accessibility – including the presentation format, manner of 
dissemination, and availability of metadata and support services – can 
all affect the index’s credibility if others are unable to access basic data 
and replicate the results.  
Interpretability How easily users can understand and properly use the data.  Given the 
wide range of data often used to construct composite indicators – and 
differing methodologies needed to aggregate varied indicators – access 
to definitions, concepts, classifications, and the underpinning metadata 
is essential.
Coherence Coherence over time and across countries is extremely important for 
composite indicators and their use as a comparison or benchmarking 
tool.  Concepts, definitions, and methodology must be based on a 
common understanding and any differences allowed for or explained.
Throughout the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Data Quality 
Framework we see many of the same indicators previously discussed.  Nardo, however, 
highlights that subtle differences emerge when striving for quality data through 
the lens of a composite indicator.  Many of these differences are associated with 
access to data, given that a typical composite indicator pulls from multiple sources 
to address varied domains.  For example, proxy data may be used in some instances 
when information isn’t available.  Evidence of its relevance to the concept being 
measured must be substantiated if the data is to be considered credible.  Because 
multiple sources are used, establishing coherence in dates can also be problematic. 
Information may be published annually, bi-annually, or intermittently.  The author 
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or researcher must then bring coherence to these differences as they attempt to 
aggregate results.  Gaining access to varied data streams may also increase the cost 
of production, including researcher access to a potentially wide range of data sets 
or sources.  Finally, given the wide range of information often used to construct 
a composite indicator, special attention must be devoted to ensuring a common 
understanding of concepts, definitions, and classifications that hold across all 
entities or countries being measured.  Because composite measures are often used as 
benchmarking or comparison tools, those building the indicator must ensure clarity 
over time and countries that apples are being compared to apples and oranges to 
oranges.  
While these quality data concerns apply to the majority of frameworks, they do 
take on special significance given the nature of composite indicators that rely on 
multiple data streams that often do not often lend themselves to easy collection or 
aggregation.  
Quality Gender Data
While fully agreeing with the work of Nardo in relation to quality data for composite 
indicators, several criteria he describes need further elaboration, especially in the 
context of a gender composite indicator.  For example, nowhere in the quality 
data definitions or frameworks discussed thus far does language about gender or 
desegregation occur.  One might argue that “fitness for purpose” means the ability to 
segregate by sex, age, race, etc., if that is considered essential to the research.  A number 
of recent gender data collection projects would frame the argument differently, 
however, citing instead that there has been a systematic lack of data collection that 
affects women and girls due to societal undervaluing of their contributions and 
status.307  These gender biases both impede and distort data collection.308
One of the most prominent of these projects is Data2X, launched in July 2012 by 
then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.309  Underpinning its genesis was the 
perceived need to better identify gaps in the availability of gender data and improve 
collection efforts.310  In the project’s own words:  “Our mission is to improve the 
quality, availability, and use of gender data in order to make a practical difference 
307  According to UN Women, only 13% of countries worldwide dedicate a regular budget to collecting and analyzing 
gender statistics.
308  Buvinic, Mayra, Rebecca Furst-Nichols, and Gayatri Koolwal. “Data 2X: Mapping Gender Data Gaps.” United 
Nations Foundation, Washington, D.C. 2014.  Clinton Foundation, and Gates Foundation. “No Ceilings: The Full 
Participation Report,” 2015.
309  The name “Data2X” was chosen to represent the power women have to multiply progress in their societies. 
310  Data2X developers note that this mapping exercise builds off the framework developed by Amartya Sen in the 
early 1990s. 
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in the lives of women and girls worldwide.”311  The rise of Data2X coincides with 
the development of the 2015-2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals and the need 
for gender data to effectively monitor progress and achievement.  Currently, more 
than 80% of the indicators housed under the Sustainable Development Goal 5: Gender 
Equality cannot be measured.  In addition, less than one-quarter of the key gender 
indicators across all Sustainable Development Goals have adequate information for 
tracking.312
Of particular relevance to my research, one of the project’s four objectives in 
gathering gender data is to:  “Quantify and make visible women’s participation 
in society and their contributions to development.”313  To accomplish this, five 
domains are mapped to identify what information is available, where gaps occur, 
and what constraints exist around the use of specific variables.  The five domains 
include: health, education, economic opportunities, human security, and political 
participation.  Data2X is housed at the United Nations Foundation and coordinates 
with a mix of 27 partner organizations and government entities. Because data helps 
drive decision-making, the project posits that incomplete or missing data about 
women and girls does not allow for an accurate depiction of their lives or realities. 
This, in turn, negatively affects policy and decision-making.314
The Data2X project authors further articulate between data and “gender data.” 
Gender data includes data that pertains specifically to women and girls as well as 
data that is disaggregated by sex.  The first might include, as an example, maternal 
mortality rates; primary education rates, disaggregated by girls and boys, is an 
example of the latter.  The concept of quality gender data is also defined in the Data2X 
research.  This definition outlines quality gender data as having five desirable 
features.315
311  www.Data2X.org.
312  UN Women, 2016. “UN Women launches flagship programme initiative, Making Every Woman and Girl Count,” 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/9/un-women-launches-flagship-programme-initiative-making-
every-woman-and-girl-count
313  Buvinic, Mayra, Rebecca Furst-Nichols, and Gayatri Koolwal. “Data 2X: Mapping Gender Data Gaps.” United 
Nations Foundation, Washington, D.C. 2014. 
314  Ibid. 
315  Ibid.
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TABLE 9:  Gender Data Quality Framework – Data2X
Gender Data Quality Criteria
Quality Sources should be reliable, valid, and representative.
Coverage The extent of countries covered and regular production of data.316
Standards Data is comparable in terms of concepts, definitions, and measures.
Complexity The same source of data covers different domains, or data between 
different domains is interrelated.317
Granularity The ability to disaggregate the data into smaller units, for example, sex, 
race and ethnicity, age, geographic location, etc. 
Among the international frameworks, Data2X is the first to define one of the quality 
data criteria as granularity – the ability to disaggregate the data into smaller units. 
The authors do not limit themselves to sex disaggregation alone, but also highlight 
other units that should be considered.  While not explicitly defined as one of the 
five “desirable features” of quality data, Data2X also notes that quality data must be 
free from gender biases.  For example, indicators that account only for formal paid 
labor as a measure of work, while discounting or undervaluing the contribution of 
unpaid and informal labor, which is predominantly undertaken by women, would 
be considered problematic.
Along with the Data2X project, a second gender data project – No Ceilings – was also 
initiated at approximately the same time through a joint venture of the Clinton and 
Bill and Melinda Gates foundations.318  The project was undertaken to commemorate 
the 20th anniversary of the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. 
Its goal was to collect and analyze data on the status of girls and women over 
two decades to try and evaluate the progress made since Beijing and to identify 
where gaps still exist.  These gaps were then used to create recommendations and a 
blueprint for action.  No Ceilings aggregated 850,000 data points on approximately 
1,000 indicators across 197 countries, releasing the data on March 2015.319  The No 
Ceilings project was less a commentary on the quality of gender data, and more an 
316  Coverage is considered “good” when data is available and regularly produced for more than 80 countries.
317  Ideal data sets, authors state, should allow for interaction between different domains that can be cross-
referenced and cross-tabulated.  For example, a woman’s economic participation in relation to her home life. 
318  Primary collaborators on the project also included the Economist Intelligence Unit and the University of 
California Los Angeles World Policy Analysis Center.
319  Clinton Foundation, and Gates Foundation. “No Ceilings: The Full Participation Report,” 2015.
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exercise on understanding what gender data is actually available in order to gauge 
the gains women have made during the past two decades.
Of particular interest to my research, the “political and civic preparation” category 
comprised approximately 2% of all indicators collected.320  The report notes that 
indicators remain missing in key areas of women’s political and civic representation, 
“including participation in local government, public administration, the judiciary, 
political parties, unions, and civil society organizations.”321  In an examination of the 
1,000 indicators,322 eight indicators attempt to capture women’s representation in 
formal political positions.323  While all categories contain gaps in data, the political 
arena seems particularly stark when compared to the quantity of gender data 
recorded in health, education, economics, and the environment.  For example, in 
drilling down into the eight indicators, the data deficit becomes quickly apparent. 
In measuring the percentage of women’s representation on local/municipal councils, the 
data sources used vary in definition (thus making the consistency of the measure 
difficult).  Of the 61 countries included in this measure, approximately half were able 
to provide 10 or more of the 17 data points between 1995 and 2013.  
The number of indicators is neither a measure of high- or low-quality data.  Rather, 
the question is: Do the eight indicators identified accurately capture women’s 
progress in the political arena?  While eight out of 1,000 indicators may seem trivial, 
in point of fact it is progress.  Attempting to collect 20 years of data on the overall 
percentage of women in the judiciary, on local councils, and at the central bank has 
not been done.  While recognizing that significant gaps occur in data availability, 
and definitional problems exist, No Ceilings remains  an ambitious attempt to capture 
more information in areas where international organizations, gender experts, and 
academics agree that insufficient quality gender data exists.
* * *
320  There are a total of 10 categories in the report across which approximately 1,000 indicators were collected.  The 
10 categories, followed by the approximate percentage of indicators assigned to each respective category, include 
the following: (1) economic opportunity – 37%, (2) health – 17%, (3) environment – 15%, (4) education – 14%, (5) 
background data – 9%, (6) communications  – 3%, (7) conflict – 2%, (8) the girl child – 2%, (9) political and civic 
preparation – 2%, and (10) violence against women – 1%.
321  Clinton Foundation, and Gates Foundation. “No Ceilings: The Full Participation Report,” 2015.
322  Indicators can be located at: https://www.noceilings.org
323  These include: (1) Female representation in national parliaments, (2) women’s share of government ministerial 
positions, (3) central bank governor (male or female), (4) % of total seats held by women in central banks, (5) Chief 
Justice (male or female), (6) women justices on the Constitutional Court, (7) % of total women in the judiciary, (8) 
% of women’s representation on local/municipal councils.  
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In examining the concept of quality data, there is definitional consistency around a 
core group of three to four criteria, whether the data is used for research, policy, or 
advocacy purposes.  Differences emerge, however, depending on the specific uses 
of the data.  For example, quality data for business planning, information systems, 
or humanitarian assistance might preference different criteria of quality  depending 
on priorities and intended outcomes.  Composite indicators also have their own 
set of challenges.  While core quality data criteria are still applicable, the nature of 
composite construction – which typically draws upon a wide variety of indicators 
across different criteria – creates unique quality data challenges.
In turning to my own research, how quality data is defined as applicable to global 
gender composite indicators is of most interest.  Figuring prominently in this 
discussion is the element of data granularity – defined as the ability to disaggregate 
data into smaller units.  The concept of granularity is missing in the more established 
international frameworks and appears only recently as a definitional element in 
relation to quality gender data specifically.  As a practical example of application, the 
following section will focus more explicitly on quality data considerations used when 
constructing a composite indicator to measure women’s descriptive representation 
in the area of formal politics.
3.3 USING QUALITY DATA TO MEASURE WOMEN’S POLITICAL PRESENCE 
In returning to the opening quote of this chapter – “what gets measured, gets done” – much 
of the impetus behind my research stems from perceived weaknesses in the ability 
to measure women’s political participation “and express it in numbers,” as stated by 
Lord Kelvin at the beginning of this chapter.  Qualifying standards associated with 
high-quality data, poor-quality data, or mediocre-quality data can only be applied 
when data actually exists.  One can’t help but question such exhaustive efforts as 
the No Ceilings project which, out of 1,000 indicators, was able to collect 0.8% of the 
measures as a reflection of women’s presence in politics, given general consensus on 
its importance.324  And even within the 0.8% collected, the majority of countries were 
unable to provided adequate data.  It remains difficult to examine gender issues 
and data quality – in particular the wide male/female disparities in availability – 
without engaging in efforts to “generate improved measures.”325
324  Phillips, Anne. The Politics of Presence. Oxford University Press, 1995.
325  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
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My research is one effort to “generate improved measures.”  I propose a modified 
approach towards measuring descriptive representation in the formal political 
space using a composite indicator and index approach.  I apply this methodology 
to specifically measure women’s descriptive representation, building off the 
previous work of composite indexes detailed in Chapter 2 – Measuring Women in the 
Political Domain:  A Critical Appraisal.326  The main research question being explored 
is framed as follows:  
Can quality data measuring women’s positions  
of formal political decision-making be collected  
on a global scale?
My research intention is to move the work completed to date another step forward by 
testing whether a greater amount of quality gender data can be collected effectively 
and efficiently, on a global scale, focusing on women’s presence in 12 decision-
making positions.  These positions are divided into four different conceptual criteria 
(legislative, judicial, executive, security), weighted according to their perceived 
decision-making authority, and aggregated into one composite indicator score. 
From individual country scores the Diamond Index will be created, with four points 
reflecting the four criteria measured.  In attempting to create a composite indicator 
and index focused on the formal political arena, a framework comprising eight 
quality data criteria was defined and applied to women’s political descriptive 
representation.  
3.3.1 Theoretical Framework
I began the index construction by borrowing from theoretical frameworks, conceptual 
dimensions, and practical applications already at play.  I continue to build off the 
majority of gender composite indicators, and resulting indexes, that use (in)equality 
as a framework.  I am interested specifically in the conceptual dimension of descriptive 
political equality.  Adhering to the Social Watch Gender Equity Index definition 
reflected in the dimension of “women’s empowerment,”327  I define the concept of 
political equality in a similar manner: “The number of women holding positions 
of formal political decision-making in each country.”328  Of the six leading gender 
326  The indexes include the following:  (1) Gender Inequality Index, (2) Social Institutions and Gender Index, (3) 
Global Gender Gap Index, (4) Gender Equity Index, (5) European Union Gender Equality Index, and (6) African 
Gender and Development Index. 
327  Social Watch. “Social Watch Report 2005: Roars and Whispers.” Montevideo: Social Watch, 2005.
328  The Social Watch Gender Equity Index used the following definition: “The number of women with access to 
positions of power and decision-making in each country.”  Social Watch does not distinguish between formal or 
informal political power, but attempts to capture aspects of both forms by mixing government with non-government 
positions.  For that reason I have inserted the word “formal” to clarify that the focus is on government institutions 
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indexes I reviewed, Social Watch is the only one to incorporate the term “position” 
into its political definition. The terminology and use of position most appropriately 
reflects my research and index development intent.  By choosing to focus on 
position I immediately pull back from discussions or expectations about substantive 
representation.  A woman holding a specific position in formal government does not 
constitute a mandate for acting on behalf of women, representing women’s interests, 
or ensuring that a critical mass of women leads to change.329  It does, however, open 
the door to all of those possibilities, as women occupying such positions may be 
able to increase their voice, exercise agency, or institute gender-positive change. 
Access to specific positions is about giving women the same opportunities as men: 
the political equality of numbers to sit at the decision-making table.   
This research is focused on political equality, with respect to the institutions that 
comprise the formal state.  It does not attempt to look at political equality through an 
individual lens (for example, percentage of women voters) nor within international 
structures (supranational courts, joint military forces, etc.).  Political equality is 
examined at the individual country level focused on common national institutions 
that exist across the vast majority of states.   
Finally, building off the work of Sen, the index I propose does not include any well-being 
indexes that reflect the individual’s level of health, welfare, etc.330  Indexes focused 
on measuring inequality, such as the Global Gender Gap Index, have been criticized 
for mixing well-being indicators with those that measure access to resources that can 
lead to empowerment.331  While recognizing that well-being measures are important 
to the lives of individuals, they do not measure women’s access to resources that can 
impact or sustain one’s social status.  For this reason well-being measures have been 
excluded as viable measures within a gender political equality framework.
3.3.2 Twelve Positons of Formal Political Decision-Making
To date, practical application leads us to believe that “the greater the number of 
countries, the less comparable empirical data there will be available.”332  This 
has proven to be particularly relevant for the political dimension, where globally 
available data is consistently cited as problematic.  There is no clear evidence on 
and not the non-governmental sector. While these political positions are deemed to have both power and decision-
making authority, the focus of my definition is on the positions themselves, rather than how that position will be 
used and for what purposes.
329 Phillips, Anne. The Politics of Presence. Oxford University Press, 1995.
330  Sen, Amartya. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, 2001.
331  Bericat, Eduardo. “The European Gender Equality Index: Conceptual and Analytical Issues.” Social Indicators 
Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 1–28.
332  Ibid.
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the need for a minimum number of indicators to measure a concept.  When dealing 
with complex ideas, however, a review of the evidence by Malhotra et al. suggests 
that single indicators, and even composite indictors,333 are inadequate for the task 
at the aggregate level.334  She suggests as one remedy the formation of a strong 
cluster of aggregate level indicators on one specific dimension.335  The authors see 
this approach as an exercise in triangulation, as multiple measures within the same 
dimension provide greater opportunity to either confirm or contradict.  One of the 
major constraints to this approach, the authors note, has been the lack of gender 
disaggregated data for developing countries that can form an adequate cluster. 336
The composite indicator I will propose, and develop in more detail in the next chapter, 
adopts this approach by attempting to form a more robust cluster of indicators 
around the measurement of political equality, defined as equal access to formal 
political decision-making positions.  This includes 12 separate variables identified as 
having formal decision-making authority.337  Table 10 outlines the selected decision-
making positions in the formal political arena.
TABLE 10:  Selected Positions of Formal Political Decision-Makers
DIMENSION TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3
EXECUTIVE Ministers Top-Level Bureaucrats Mayors 10 Largest Cities
LEGISLATIVE Political Party Leaders Committee Chairpersons Legislative Members
JUDICIAL Judges
Highest Court
Judges
Second-Level Court(s)
Judges
Third-Level Courts 
SECURITY Security Officers
Top-Level
Security Officers
Mid-Level
Security Officers
Lower-Level 
333  The authors specifically cite the UNDP Gender Empowerment Measure index as inadequate.  As noted earlier, 
this index was replaced in 2010 by the Gender Inequality Index by UNDP due, in large part, to criticism of the index’s 
construction and bias towards high-income economies.
334  Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. “Measuring Women’s Empowerment as a Variable in 
International Development.” World Bank, 2002. Bardhan, Kalpana, and Stephan Klasen. “UNDP’s Gender-Related 
Indices: A Critical Review.” World Development 27, no. 6 (1999): 985–1010.
335  Malhotra was specifically looking at the concept of “women’s empowerment” and its use and measurement 
among international development partners.
336  What constitutes an adequate cluster is not defined.  Malhotra does note that using this approach should also 
be done across at least two points in time.
337  Further definitions for each of the 12 decision-making positions is detailed in Chapter 4: Developing the 
Diamond Index.
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Data collected from these 12 positions is weighted and aggregated to form one country 
score.  These scores are then placed in an index (the Diamond Index) consisting of four 
axes to reflect each of the four conceptual dimensions measured.  When final scores 
are graphed for each of the conceptual dimensions, a full diamond approximates 
gender equality among political decision-makers.  Countries can then be ranked 
according to their final composite score or by each respective conceptual dimension: 
executive, legislative, judicial, security.  The quality data criteria considered when 
selecting the 12 positions and constructing the composite indicator and index are 
discussed below.
3.3.3.  Quality Data Framework for the Diamond Index
1. Relevance
Relevancy, sometimes referred to as validity, appears in every data quality 
framework I examined as an essential criteria.  It captures the relationship between 
the information collected and the concept being measured.    Does the data, in short, 
measure what it claims to be measuring?  For a composite indicator, balancing the 
different domains is also a consideration.  For example, are the different conceptual 
domains measured in an equal manner, either through the number of indicators 
selected, weighting methodology applied, or a combination of both?  This balance 
can be difficult to achieve as composite indicators typically use varied datasets to 
measure different concepts.  Each concept may have a unique methodology and, 
therefore, a distinctive way of collecting and presenting information using a small 
number, or extensive array, of variables.  Rather than trying to mix apples and oranges, 
composite indicators often resemble an elaborate fruit bowl.  Efforts to harmonize the 
validity and weight of disparate and varied number of measures across dimensions, 
often in the face of data unavailability, can be extremely challenging.  
In attempting to broaden and deepen measures of women’s political descriptive 
representation, I took care in selecting each of the 12 decision-making positions 
comprising the Diamond Index.  It was imperative that there be logical coherence 
and balance – both horizontally and vertically – across the four domains.  For these 
reasons, three positions were selected from each branch of government and the 
security sector.  This consistency in the same number of positions across domains 
was intended to allow for equality of weighting between each domain. 
  
Of equal concern was the vertical selection of decision-making positions.  Three 
tiers of decision-maker were chosen within each sector, with each tier intended to be 
approximately equivalent in its perceived level of decision-making authority across 
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each of the four domains.  Problems arise, however, in trying to compare levels 
of authority.  Does a regional court judge have the same level of decision-making 
authority as a police captain or city mayor?  Difficult to prove or disprove, as each 
country context will likely present different results.  Of more relevance is the focus 
on increasing levels of decision-making authority.  A high court judge will have more 
authority than a regional court judge.  A police captain will have more authority 
than a police sergeant.  While efforts have been made to compare authority level to 
authority level across sectors to the greatest extent possible, a vertical examination 
of positions reflects increasing decision-making authority.  So while a low-level 
police sergeant may not match exactly to a district judge, within each sector they 
are considered at a third level of decision-making authority, with two higher levels 
clearly identified.  
Also constraining the selection process was the limited number of political decision-
making levels available that might be captured on a global basis.  In the judicial 
system there are a finite number of court levels.  In the security sector a finite 
number of leadership ranks.  Constraints also exist in the legislative and executive 
branches.  For example, the president or prime minister, as head of the executive 
branch, might at first glance seem a logical choice to include as a decision-maker. 
The difficulty in choosing this level of leader, however, is that no equivalent position 
exists in other parts of government.  A cabinet of ministers reflects greater decision-
making equity with a court of judges, grouping of party leaders, or a collective of 
police commanders.  
My research was aimed at targeting influential leaders – those with decision-making 
authority – across differing government structures and the roster of political positions. 
In examining formal governments, we may agree that no single institution, branch, 
or individual holds full decision-making authority, with perhaps the exception of a 
few notable countries.  This decision-making authority shifts within the structure 
of each state and, when attempting to compare across almost 200 governments, one 
must look to common denominators.  As a result, there will be positional selection 
limitations.
While acknowledging that limitations exist around the selection of equivalent 
decision-making positions across all countries, the question remains as to whether 
what I intend to measure is being measured?  Do the 12 selected positions actually 
measure political equality?  My definition of political equality – equal access to 
positions of formal political decision-making – is purposefully narrow.  While my 
intention is to broaden and deepen how we think about women’s political descriptive 
representation, it does not propose any drastic changes to current descriptive 
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representational efforts.  What is new is attempting to systematically broaden the 
formal institutions being measured – horizontal representation – and then focusing 
greater value on the specific positions women hold – vertical representation.  Despite 
these nuances, however, the focus is still on counting numbers of women.  And, 
specifically, women in formal government.
According to Dahl, power is dispersed across society; government is only one locus 
of power.338  Civil society organizations, lobby groups, trade unions, advocacy 
organizations, private sector, and the media may all play a role in setting the 
political agenda and in shaping government decisions.  One could argue that by 
ignoring these other sources of influence, I am only capturing a piece of the political 
decision-making.  Excluding outside political influences and decision-makers was 
intentional. 
In returning to the Data2X project, one of its main objectives was to “quantify and make 
visible women’s participation in society.”  For my purposes this includes quantifying 
the senior-level cadre of women political decision-makers in each country.  That is 
not to say that these leaders are immune from other forces of persuasion.  That is not 
to imply that other political pressures and actors have no influence on their decisions. 
A wide array of power brokers may have significant impact on political deals struck. 
This is true for both men and women in these positions.  But my research interest 
is not related to how decisions are made or whether substantive representation 
occurs when women are placed in these positions.  My interest, because current 
measurement tools are viewed as insufficient, is to adequately capture the face of 
final decision-makers in formal politics.  The Diamond Index is an attempt to more 
robustly capture who voices the final decision, regardless of power dynamics at play. 
In this regard, the validity between the 12 selected positions and political equality of 
decision-making positions is coherent.
2. Completeness 
One of the greatest challenges associated with building a composite indicator is 
collecting the appropriate breadth and depth of data for use as a global measure. 
This concept is embedded in quality data frameworks as completeness or, in some 
instances, it is included as a component of relevance.  What differs with a global 
composite indicator is, however, indicators selected must typically cover the 
majority of countries in the world, be publically accessible, and reliably produced. 
These difficult criteria can often be incompatible with what is being measured, 
338  Dahl, Robert Alan. Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City. Yale University Press, 2005.
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forcing researchers to rely on what is available or to use proxy data.339  “Choices of 
convenience” – using the data at hand – can result in weaknesses, a failure to capture 
the full meaning of the conceptual dimension being measured, or a lack of validity 
between data and concept.340  As one example, this lack of conceptual reflection 
was one of the main failings of UNDP’s first effort to create a gender composite 
index, as the indicator used (parliamentary seats held by women) was considered 
too narrow a measure of the political empowerment dimension.341  As a result, the 
Gender Empowerment Measure was not well understood, misused, and (after coming 
under heavy criticism) eventually replaced.342  It was essentially deemed insufficient 
to measure what it claimed to measure.  The ability to collect the amount and type 
of appropriate quality data on a global level, given the lacuna of information in 
many parts of the world, should not be minimized.  This tension between validity 
of data and accessibility of data remains at the heart of global composite indicator 
construction.
Increased Horizontal Representation (Glass Walls):  The trend line for numbers 
of women in parliament has steadily increased during the past two decades, which 
is partly attributable to the growth of quotas that we now see in more than 100 
countries.  In January 2005 the global average of women in the lower house of 
parliament was 15.9%.  By January 2015 that number had risen to 22.1%, an increase 
of 6.2 percentage points.343  Other branches of government have not benefitted 
from the application of the same quota pressures.  For example, during the same 
10-year period the number of women holding ministerial positions – the second 
most commonly tracked political gender indicator – increased by only 4 percentage 
points.344  There are no figures available for the judiciary, security sector, or local 
government.  Given the greater focus on legislative quotas in both academia and 
among development practitioners, it is possible that research and advocacy efforts 
are creating a bias towards one branch of government and potentially limiting our 
understanding of what is occurring in other areas.  Could our overemphasis on the 
legislative branch, for example, be creating glass walls that result in the horizontal 
segregating of women345 into specific parts of government over others? 
339  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005.
340  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
341  Desai, Manisha A. “Hope in Hard Times: Women’s Empowerment and Human Development.” UNDP, 2010. 
Klasen, Stephan. “UNDP’s Gender-Related Measures: Some Conceptual Problems and Possible Solutions.” Journal 
of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 243–74.
342  Schüler, Dana. “The Uses and Misuses of the Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Empowerment 
Measure: A Review of the Literature.” Journal of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 161–81. 
343  Inter-Parliamentary Union www.ipu.org.
344  Ibid.
345  W Charles, Maria. “Deciphering Sex Segregation Vertical and Horizontal Inequalities in Ten National Labor 
Markets.” Acta Sociologica 46, no. 4 (2003): 267–87.
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Greater breadth of measurement is also important in the face of indications pointing 
to a parliamentary slowdown in the growth of women.  The days of “fast track” 
quotas, that were seen particularly in the developing world and which drove 
significant increases during the past decade, may have peaked.346  We also continue 
to see extremely slow gains in majority systems with single-member districts where 
it continues to be especially challenging to get women elected.347  In these types of 
polity, better efforts to track women’s representation across government – in the face 
of slow or stalled growth in one branch – can help shed light on whether women are 
finding opportunities in other institutions.
 
Increased Vertical Representation (Glass Ceilings):  Along with horizontal breadth 
of measurement, there is a significant gap in today’s gender composite indicators 
in the differentiation between political positions within specific institutions, i.e., 
depth of measurement.  Research indicates that the more prestige and power 
associated with a position, the more difficult it becomes for women to encumber that 
position.348  This may be due to inequalities in:  1) social structure – women’s access 
to education or relevant work experience, 2) political structure – type of electoral 
system or absence of quotas, and 3) cultural attitudes – views that disfavor women’s 
acceptance in the public sphere.349  
While earlier attempts to quantify the existence of a glass ceiling for women were 
focused on the labor market,350  the same concept and language were adopted early 
by academics to describe women’s lack of advancement in the political arena.351 
The impediments that hinder women’s entrance into senior leadership positions 
(allowing them to rise above the glass ceiling) have been identified as wide-ranging 
and numerous, from strong cultural preferences for male candidates to gender biases 
built into institutions.  Rule lists these obstacles as: “narrow gender roles; restrictive 
religious doctrines; unequal laws and education; discriminatory socioeconomic 
conditions; male-biased party leaders, other political elites, and voters; and “women 
346  The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2015.
347  Thames, Frank C., and Margaret S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in 
Democracies Around the World. NYU Press, 2012. Reynolds, Andrew. “Women in the Legislatures and Executives of 
the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling.” World Politics 51, no. 4 (July 1, 1999): 547–72.
348  Thames, Frank C., and Margaret S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in 
Democracies Around the World. NYU Press, 2012.  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the President’s Men? 
The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association 
National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011.   Williams, Margaret S., and Frank C. Thames. “Women’s Representation on 
High Courts in Advanced Industrialized Countries.” Politics & Gender 4, no. 03 (2008): 451–71. 
349  Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative 
Analysis.” Social Forces 78, no. 1 (1999): 235–68. doi:10.2307/3005796.
350  Cotter, David A., Joan M. Hermsen, Seth Ovadia, and Reeve Vanneman. “The Glass Ceiling Effect.” Social forces 
80, no. 2 (2001): 655-681.
351  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Reynolds, Andrew. “Women in the Legislatures and Executives 
of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling.” World Politics 51, no. 4 (July 1, 1999): 547–72.
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unfriendly” election systems.352  When women are elected or appointed to the 
legislature, for example, evidence points to women being blocked from higher-level 
positional power due to institutional bias towards men’s experiences and authority.353
In a 2008 study of women’s representation on high courts in the OECD, findings 
highlighted that the most statistical significant variable for predicting women’s 
representation on the court was the total number of seats available.354  The greater the 
number of seats, the greater the percentage of women represented.  As the prestige 
of the court rose, the number of judicial seats and the percentage of women declined, 
leaving men predominant on those courts with the greatest authority.
In current gender indexes, the percentage of women is prioritized over the 
occupation of specific positions.  They fail to differentiate between varying levels 
of authority associated with specific elected and appointed roles.  Indexes are 
constructed upon the premise that one seat in the legislature is as powerful as the 
next and judicial seats are equivalent on any court; therefore, they are weighted 
the same.  Institutionally, however, some seats in any parliament or congress wield 
more influence than others.  This may be especially true in a legislature with a strong 
committee system.355  Likewise, this differentiation of power applies to judicial courts, 
command structures within the security sector, and positions within the executive.356 
If we think of powerful positions aligned within a pyramid, with the most influential 
rising to the top, we should be cognizant of not only what parts of government we 
see women being elected and appointed to, but where they reside in the pyramid – 
at the top, clustered in the middle, or consigned to the bottom ranks.  In recognizing 
that some government positions are higher in the hierarchy than others, we must 
acknowledge that it matters which seats women access.  Large numbers of women 
352  Rule, Wilma. “Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?” Contributions in Political Science 338 
(1994): 15-15. Lindberg, Staffan I. “Women’s Empowerment and Democratization: The Effects of Electoral Systems, 
Participation, and Experience in Africa.” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 1 (2004): 28–53. 
Matland, Richard E. “Women’s Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries.” 
Legislative Studies Quarterly (1998): 109-125. Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. “Gender Inequality in Political 
Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis.” Social Forces 78, no. 1 (1999): 235–68. Norris, Pippa, and Joni 
Lovenduski. “‘If Only More Candidates Came Forward’: Supply-Side Explanations of Candidate Selection in Britain.” 
British Journal of Political Science 23, no. 3 (1993): 373–408.
353  Childs, Sarah, and Mona Lena Krook. “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation: From Critical Mass to 
Critical Actors.” Government and Opposition 44, no. 2 (2009): 125–45.
354  Williams, Margaret S., and Frank C. Thames. “Women’s Representation on High Courts in Advanced 
Industrialized Countries.” Politics & Gender 4, no. 03 (2008): 451–71.
355  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
356  Krook and O’Brien undertook an excellent study in 2009 that documented the overall distribution of ministry 
portfolios in 118 countries.  This was followed by: 1) rating each minister position as masculine, neutral, feminine 
and 2) ranking each position as low-, medium-, or high-prestige.  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the 
President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide.” Presented at the Midwest Political 
Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011.
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in legislative seats may, in fact, be less desirable than having smaller numbers in 
more powerful positions, such as chairwomen of influential committees.  
In an attempt to capture this nuance of positional location, I have weighted the 
three positions identified in each dimension.  Positions are assigned a different 
value according to the perceived level of access to political decision-making each 
holds.  As with all weighting efforts, normative choices are made based on an overall 
judgement and an individual’s perception of the context.357  This is a first attempt to 
better delineate the concept that positional differences matter.  If there is value in the 
concept that not all positions are equal, then there is value in understanding where 
women are finding space in relation to positions deemed as having greater decision-
making authority. 
The 12 positions selected attempt to provide a more complete picture of women’s 
descriptive representation in politics through greater depth and breadth of 
measurement.  The ability to include even a wider range of  decision-making 
positions is tempered, however, by collection constraints on a global level.  The 
Diamond Index attempts to be realistic in what information can be garnered, while at 
the same time doing justice to definitions of quality data completeness.
3. Comparability 
In grappling with data availability across all countries, composite indicators must pay 
equal attention to the consistency of concepts and definitions.  In some frameworks 
this is incorporated under the terms relevancy or coherence.  At its core lies the ability to 
consistently measure the same thing, across time, and across all countries included. 
It is this comparability, or external validity, that allows composite indicators to be 
used as a benchmarking tool.  
Lijphart points out in his extensive study on patterns of government that variations 
in democracies are wide ranging, and the type of political system greatly influences 
the strength of the legislature, judiciary, and executive vis a vis one another.358 
The variation Lijphart documents is based on 36 countries, all classified as liberal 
democracies.  If we extend our view globally, the variations in how decision-making 
authority is dispersed and wielded among liberal, illiberal, and authoritarian 
regimes offers an extraordinary and imaginative range of possibilities.  
357  Robeyns, Ingrid. “Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: Selecting Relevant Capabilities.” Feminist 
Economics 9, no. 2–3 (2003): 61–92.
358  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
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Trying to measure how and where authority rests across such a wide spectrum of 
systems does not lend itself to a one-size-fits-all approach.  One cannot assume that 
decision-making authority in a liberal democracy mirrors that of an authoritarian 
government.  And even countries within the same classification strata vary widely, 
as Lijphart illustrates.  Each different regime type will affect opportunities for 
women.359
The percentage of women in the legislative branch can be challenging in trying to 
compare countries as diverse as Switzerland and Swaziland.  For example, in Fish 
and Kroenig’s Legislative Powers Index, on a scale from zero to 1, with zero being 
an absence of power, the Parliament of Swaziland receives a score of .25 while the 
Federal Assembly of Switzerland achieves .72, almost triple the score.  Using this 
indicator alone as the basis for measuring women’s access to political decision-
making tells a very different story of access to power and authority levels that the 
men and women that comprise these institutions have in these two countries.  
While the example I use is for the legislative branch, it could equally be applied to 
the executive.  One would expect to see stronger executive branches in countries 
with weaker parliaments and weaker executives paired with stronger legislatures. 
In looking only at the executive branch, therefore, the decision-making authority of 
ministries may also vary considerably in relation to other parts of government.  And, 
systems change as old constitutions are voted out and new leaders voted in.  Formal 
government power is not static, but a constantly shifting commodity.  As a result, 
both appointed and elected positions can gain or lose authority over time.  How 
then, given the importance of comparability across the globe, can we reconcile the 
need for data coherence with data availability?  
First, we concede that there is no one perfect measure to track women in the political 
space.  Second, we acknowledge that structural differences exist across the world’s 
varied systems of government.   From liberal to authoritarian, and from presidential 
to parliamentary, the distribution of formal decision-making positions will vary 
significantly.360  These two facts allow us to recognize that trying to measure one 
or two data points – given shifting authorities across and within institutions – may 
minimize, or overemphasize, actual reality.  
By casting a wider net across a range of political decision-making positions, we 
attempt to mitigate individual country variations.  While not ideal, the alternative 
359  Reynolds, Andrew. “Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass 
Ceiling.” World Politics 51, no. 4 (July 1, 1999): 547–72.
360  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
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is to analyze each country’s political system on its own merit, detail how decision-
making authority functions across its varied institutions, then devise a methodology 
that horizontally weights those variations.  For example, in a country I know well, 
Tanzania, the legislative branch would receive less weight than the executive but 
more than the judicial branch, with the security sector wedged just below the 
executive but above the legislative.  While this approach might be possible for a 
limited number of countries, it presents a much larger challenge to accomplish this 
globally.  
Using comparable leadership positions across governments has been the accepted 
practice for gender composite indexes to date.  That is not to say that just because 
others approach measurement this way makes it right.  The 12 positions I have 
selected, however, are consistently represented in almost every country in the world. 
While variations in their authority do exist depending on the type of political system, 
they are stable variables across countries and time.
4. Accuracy
Composite indicators are particularly dependent on other entities for supplying 
data.  This includes the data collection agencies in individual countries as well as the 
international and non-governmental organizations receiving, collating, analyzing, 
presenting, and distributing the information.  These institutions are the gateways 
for accessing global data typically used in gender composite indicators.  Captured 
in other frameworks as data accuracy, credibility, or timeliness, composite indicators 
may face particular challenges in this regard, especially in less-developed countries. 
Governments across many regions face limited budgets and lack qualified personnel. 
National statistics offices, as part of government, are not immune to these problems.361 
Poor working conditions, funding availability, few work incentives, low salaries, 
and poor education systems can all intentionally, or unintentionally, impact the 
production and release of quality data.  
The UN National Quality Assurance Framework is one of the few tools to make a 
specific reference to generating information “within given resource constraints.”362 
This signals to partner countries using the framework template that recognized 
limitations may come into play when deciding data priorities and production. 
While more difficult to document, a lack of political independence can also 
361  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
362  UN Statistical Commission. “Guidelines for the Template for a Generic National Quality Assurance Framework 
(NQAF).” United Nations Statistics Division, New York 8 (2012).
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compromise data quality.363  For example, closed governments may refuse to share 
information with international organizations.  Low-performing governments may 
be unwilling to acknowledge their own failings out of embarrassment or negative 
incentives for doing so.  As policy-makers turn to composite indicators to benchmark 
performance, there are strong incentives for an individual country to put forward a 
positive reflection of progress.  A UNDP analysis in 2003 of indicators selected for 
the Millennium Development Goals found “not only are there significant gaps for 
every indicator, there are also extensive problems in relevance, accuracy, consistency 
and reliability.”364  
The inherent difficult in assuring data quality along the entire spectrum of production 
makes composite indicators vulnerable to potential bias, errors, and gaps.  While 
we assume that countries and international organizations are attempting to provide 
quality data to the best of their abilities, given their respective constraints, for 
researchers using this data there is little to no recourse for addressing data gaps, 
inaccuracies, or the type and quantity of data collected on a country-by-country 
basis.  One must make the most of the data that is provided, given the cost, effort, 
and difficulty in replicating these international efforts.  While safeguards are in place 
to help alleviate the problem – including the international codes of practice and 
frameworks highlighted earlier – the continued reliance on constrained agencies for 
quality data remains a point of tension for global composite indicators.
The 12 positions were selected to specifically test whether the new information 
being sought could be collected independently by researchers or interested 
stakeholders.  By choosing to measure individual government positions – a 
descriptive representational head count – the chance of injecting bias or error from 
either the researcher or respondent is reduced.  It is a simple binary measure that 
indicates the presence of a man or woman in a specific decision-making position. 
The determination of male or female is left to the individual encumbering that seat.
The intention was not to “by-pass” government agencies or offices.  Rather, the 
research effort was a test as to whether new data on women’s political representation 
could be accurately collected, and the extent of formal government involvement 
required.  With the growing use of technology throughout all countries, and the 
increasing amount of information now accessible electronically, this research aimed 
to explore the data available in the area of women’s descriptive representation 
in formal government, and to identify the sources used.  The benefit of this 
363  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
364  United Nations Development Program. “Human Development Report 2003: Millennium Development Goals: A 
Compact Among Nations to End Human Poverty.” New York: United Nations Development Program, 2003.
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approach could potentially minimize inaccuracies introduced by overwhelmed 
and underfunded government agencies; collect information that governments and 
independent organizations are unable, unwilling, or uninterested in gathering; and 
increase the amount of independently collected data in a field noted for its significant 
information gaps. 
5. Timeliness
Trying to gather all the appropriate data at the same time into one composite 
measurement tool often brings to mind the idiom “herding cats.”  By the very nature 
of being a composite indicator, there is typically no single source of information. 
Researchers, therefore, are reliant on the release dates determined by the various 
collecting organizations according to their priorities. Different conceptual 
dimensions can require substantially different data collection approaches and 
sources.  Datasets produced by international or non-governmental organizations 
may be published annually, bi-annually, or when resources allow.  There also exists 
a “data lag” between the time of collection, publication, and the actual state-of-play 
on the ground.  Fast-moving changes resulting, for example, from a snap election, 
may take significant time to register in a composite indicator depending on the data 
collection schedule.  Data gathered before the election in one dimension, versus data 
collected after the election in another dimension, may be difficult to reconcile.  As 
a result, a number of timing factors, either separately or combined, can potentially 
create incoherence in aggregate measures.   
This research effort examines the possibility of collecting data on women’s political 
descriptive representation across a single-year time frame.  While data collection in 
“real time” would be the ideal objective,  realistically gathering information across 
12 different data points – many of them new areas of collection – seems unlikely. 
Moving the data points closer to one calendar year, however, was deemed more 
feasible.
6. Cost Effectiveness
Little attention in the literature or international frameworks is devoted to the quality 
data element of cost.365  Accessibility of data is the element most closely corresponding 
to this concept.  Definitions of accessibility, however, are more focused on how the 
data is presented for consumption, whether it is understandable to researchers or the 
365  Nardo et al., does mention that accessibility to a variety of sources can have cost implications.  The UN National 
Quality Data Framework states that data should be accessible to all users (including for research purposes) either 
free or at an affordable price. 
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public, and if interested parties can access the data and understand its application. 
While all of those criteria hold true for composite indicators, cost implications may 
be an additional vulnerability.  Composite indicators gather an array of information 
from multiple sources, relying on pre-collected data sets that are often incomplete. 
Typically, gaps occur in lower-income and information-scarce countries.  Researchers 
and practitioners using this data have two options: 1) devise a mathematical formula 
to fill the gaps based on the data available, or 2) attempt to collect the data through 
other means.  The sheer number of variables typically selected to construct a 
composite indicator compounds this problem.  While the affordability of filling in 
one data point might be feasible, multiple dimensions equate to multiple costs.  The 
use of private data collection firms may further compound this problem.  Finally, 
the very countries lacking data may be more costly in which to operate, gain access, 
or establish partnerships due to their political situation and/or ongoing security 
concerns.    
It is surprising how little cost is addressed in most international data quality 
frameworks, given it remains a constraint for researchers, organizations, and 
governments.  Most quality data criteria – completeness, accessibility, timeliness, etc. 
– all have cost implications.  International and multi-lateral organizations collecting 
data may be driven in specific directions by what donors or member states prioritize 
and show a willingness to fund.366  The No Ceilings data collection effort relied on 
the deep pockets of the Clinton and Gates foundations, a financial powerhouse duo 
most ordinary researchers and stakeholders are unlikely to call upon as partners. 
As a result, researchers must make the best use of available datasets, even in the 
face of validity and completeness challenges.  The other option is the production of 
their own data, either individually or through partnerships, as resources allow.367 
As noted, composite indicators may be particularly vulnerable as they typically pull 
from a variety of data sources.  
This research effort attempts to collect a broader array of sustainable and replicable 
data around women’s formal political representation in a cost-effective manner. 
This includes an attempt at data collection in some of the most difficult “data-scarce” 
countries.  These countries are typically challenging for international organizations 
and researchers to include due to the lack of data availability and the cost of working 
in these countries, often exacerbated by difficult travel and living conditions as 
366  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
367  As noted in Chapter 2, the United Nations African Gender and Development Index – an exemplary data 
collection effort upon which I build – appears from program documents and budgets to be an expensive endeavor. 
While the country-by-country data collection effort produced information unseen previously, the ability to replicate 
this model beyond a sub-set of African countries seems unsustainable.
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well as potentially higher levels of insecurity.  Public information sources, with no 
attached cost, were targeted as the primary data collection methodology.  Most of 
the 12 positions selected were considered high-profile political actors, prominent 
either nationally or at regional levels.  Choosing easily identifiable and influential 
positions was expected to increase the likelihood that coverage would occur through 
such public sources as government websites, media, social media, official reports, 
and grey literature.
7. Accessibility 
In previous frameworks reviewed, accessibility is articulated as data presentation to 
the public.  For example, what is the format, the timing of the release, and how is it 
disseminated to the public?  This definition also includes whether researchers and 
the public have the ability to use the information.  In other frameworks the term 
used is interpretability.  This aligns more with the ability of the researcher or public 
to understand, use, and replicate the results.  Accessibility for women’s political 
description representation encompasses both meanings.  
My research, like the UN African Gender and Development Index, was designed 
as clearly as possible “to democratize and simplify statistics.”368  Complicated 
mathematical processes seen in other gender indexes were eschewed in favor of 
more easy replicability by interested governments, non-governmental organizations, 
and individual stakeholders who do not have the expertise to handle complicated 
mathematical formulas.  As will be explained in the next chapter, the logical layout 
of the Diamond Index, and the data creating the composite indicator underpinning 
the index, were designed with full public access and ease of use as foundational 
principles.  The goal was to present the data in a clear and understandable way 
while, at the same time, creating a template easily replicable within any country-
specific context.
8. Granularity
As discussed earlier in relation to Data2X, the ability to disaggregate statistics 
into smaller units should be considered an element of quality data.  The common 
international frameworks discussed make no explicit reference to this element. 
For my purposes, the ability to disaggregate information remains fundamental to 
the research given the need to differentiate women’s access to political positions. 
Quality data, therefore, must encompass this concept of granularity.
368  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011. 
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Each of the 12 positions selected for the Diamond Index can be disaggregated according 
to sex – whether a man or woman occupies that position.  These positions also hold 
the possibility of disaggregation in other ways, depending on the availability of 
information.  Age, for example, is one level of granularity that could be of interest to 
researchers.  Tribal, religious, or geographic affiliation may be other ways to examine 
granularity, cultural sensitivities and data availability not withstanding.  For my 
research purposes, however, the ability to differentiate by sex was the minimum 
level of disaggregation required.  
***
 
These eight criteria form the basis for defining quality data as conceptualized in 
the design of the Diamond Index.  While pulling extensively from the established 
and tested quality data frameworks previously discussed, I also expand on several 
criteria in relation to my research.  These criteria include, in particular, completeness 
(sufficient depth and breadth), timeliness, cost effectiveness, and granularity.  Table 
11 brings all eight quality data criteria together.
TABLE 11:  Quality Data Framework for the Diamond Index
Quality Data Criteria
Relevance Data adequately captures the theoretical concept or ideas that it claims to be 
measuring.
Completeness Data provides sufficient breadth and depth of information on a global scale.
Comparability Data definitions and concepts are consistent across countries and over time.
Accuracy Data has limited bias, inaccuracies, and data gaps.
Timeliness Data is collected across a single-year timeframe.
Cost Effectiveness Data can be collected in a cost-effective manner that is sustainable and 
replicable on a regular basis.
Accessibility Data is presented in a format that is easy to understand, access, and replicate 
by the general public.
Granularity Data can be disaggregated into smaller information units including, at a 
minimum, by sex.
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3.4 CONCLUSION
I began this chapter by describing the different criteria used to define quality data, 
first examining the academic literature around quality data and then moving on 
to frameworks used by global practitioners.  This included examining a range of 
quality data criteria developed by multi-laterals and the United Nations.  From these 
two literature streams I then developed a quality data framework that forms the 
foundation for the Diamond Index.  
The Diamond Index framework developed contains eight separate quality data 
criteria, including: relevance, completeness, coherence, accuracy, timeliness, cost 
effectiveness, accessibility, and granularity.   Each of these criteria is defined in 
relation to its use in the Diamond Index and, in particular, definitional nuances that 
occur when applied to a composite indicator.  My quality data framework does not 
deviate significantly from other frameworks developed during the past 25 years, 
although additional insights were added around the criteria of completeness, 
timeliness, cost effectiveness, and granularity.   
With a quality data framework clearly defined to develop the Diamond Index, I 
now move to the development of the index itself in the next chapter.  The purpose 
in creating the Diamond Index is to shed greater light on political descriptive 
representation by identifying the faces of leading decision-makers and then, as Lord 
Kelvin stated, express it in numbers.
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The global proportion of women elected to  
local government is currently unknown.369
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Among donors and democracy practitioners, there is an interest in developing 
better, user-friendly measurement tools that provide a more nuanced understanding 
of women’s presence in the formal political arena.  Academics as well continue 
to highlight the lack of robust data available for use on a global basis.370  It is in 
this space where society’s rules and laws are debated, passed, implemented, and 
enforced.  “The terrain in which to gain and share power is in the political process.  Once 
active, policy and budgetary levers from that process can be evoked and accessed to negotiate 
gender equality outcomes.”371  In that respect, according to Parpart et al., what happens 
in the political area affects all other sectors and areas of women’s daily lives.372
In attempting to capture more data in the political space, neither academics nor 
practitioners are typically in a position to create their own tool that would broaden 
measures.  The methodology of developing a framework, selecting indicators, 
collecting information, normalizing the data, weighting it appropriately, aggregating 
scores, and ensuring the data is published on a regular basis is beyond the scope 
of most government civil servants, development workers, local non-governmental 
organizations, and individual researchers.  Lacking the ability to create individual 
country measuring tools, interested stakeholders rely on what is published.  As a 
369  UN Secretary-General’s Report on Women and Political Participation (2013). “Measures taken and progress 
achieved in the promotion of women and political participation,” A/68/184. 
370  The Diamond Index has been presented on three different occasions to mixed groups of experts comprised of 
bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, academics, and democracy practitioners (United States Agency for International 
Development, Washington D.C., November 2014; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris, 
February 2015; United Nations Development Program, New York, June 2015.) Positive feedback from all audiences 
emphasized the clear logic in the development of the measurement tool, its replicability, and incorporation of new 
data points as valuable contributions to the field of study. 
371  Parpart, Jane L., Shirin M. Rai, and Kathleen A. Staudt. Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in 
a Global/Local World. Routledge, 2003.
372  Ibid. 
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result, we see a disproportionate amount of resources and attention on the electoral 
cycle and getting women into parliament, as the legislative branch has produced the 
most reliable, annually reported data to date. 
In this chapter I build on the work of existing gender composite indicators to increase 
measures of women’s political descriptive representation.  The Diamond Index is an 
attempt to broaden and deepen the relatively narrow set of global indicators currently 
being used to track women’s access to positions of decision-making authority in 
formal government.  This chapter discusses the conceptual framework behind the 
Diamond Index, including four identified principles that underpin the construction 
of the measurement tool.  This is followed by a discussion of the different domains 
to be measured and rationale for indicator selection within each of those domains. 
Detailed steps for building the index then follow. 
At the conclusion of this chapter the reader will have a complete picture of the 
Diamond Index and how it was constructed, a clear understanding of how it might 
be used, a step-by-step guide as to how it can be replicated and applied, and an 
awareness of conceptual limitations surrounding the tool.
4.2 RESEARCHER POSITIONALITY
The intent in developing this research tool for measuring women in the political 
space was to create an applicable and usable tool for any country in the world.  The 
majority of the research was, however, piloted in economically developing and 
democratically weak countries.  As a white, educated woman from a high-income 
economy, I am positioned as an outsider in the pilot countries.  This is less of a 
concern given I have spent most of my adult life living as an expatriate, working in a 
wide array of languages, cultures, and economic circumstances.  Of more concern is 
a set of strong principles that I hold regarding what a democracy should “look like,” 
certainly influenced by my home country, education, and cultural exposure.     
The ongoing work that I undertake on a daily basis also continues to shape opinions 
in relation to this research.  I have spent the last 20 years as a development practitioner 
in the field of democracy promotion.  This work has been undertaken with non-
governmental organizations and the United States government.  A significant amount 
of my time is spent working on countries experiencing democratic backsliding, 
growing authoritarianism, flawed elections, and an increasing risk of intrastate 
violence.  As a result, personal and professional comparisons and judgements are 
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made across countries regarding the “preferred” type of government, how it should 
function, and its member composition.
This includes intimate work with legislatures, parliamentarians, political parties, 
and election bodies.  In most of the focus countries where I work, quotas for 
women’s legislative representation have been instituted.  How the quotas have been 
operationalized has been insufficient or detrimental to advancing women in the 
political space, in my opinion.  Women’s placement in other parts of government, 
as a counterpoint to what is taking place in the legislative arena, is considered of 
less relevance.  My perception is colored, certainly, by the individual circumstances 
and context of the selected countries framed by my work.  I do not have the similar 
breadth of experience working with Western and high-income countries where the 
implementation and use of quotas may be perceived quite differently. 
While attempting to maintain a dispassionate distance when constructing my 
measurement tool for this research, I acknowledge that my reflections of “political 
equality” rest on preconceived professionally and culturally constructed notions 
based on Western democratic ideals.  Attempts were made to mitigate this by using 
the current literature and established indexes as a foundational base for globally 
accepted best practices upon which to build.  National experts from Latin America, 
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Eastern Europe were employed in their respective 
countries to ground-truth the construction of the tool and piloting effort.  Finally, the 
information was also vetted in a public forum by a cross-section of approximately 
100 academic and development experts prior to publication.  While these collective 
efforts do not dispel researcher bias, they can highlight its presence and potential 
effect on the research product.
4.3 INDICATOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIAMOND INDEX 
Indexes are used by different groups for different purposes.  While impossible to 
create a measurement tool that is all things to all people, there is agreement on 
some basic principles.  Building off Haq’s373 work in designing the UNDP Human 
Development Index, as well as Dijkstra’s374  work on proposing an improved alternative 
to UNDP’s Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure, 
the following four principles guided the construction of the Diamond Index:
373  Haq, Mahbubul. Reflections on Human Development. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
374  Geske Dijkstra, A. “Towards a Fresh Start in Measuring Gender Equality: A Contribution to the Debate.” Journal 
of Human Development 7, no. 2 (2006): 275–83.
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1. Indicators should be limited in number, yet sufficient to cover as many 
dimensions of decision-making authority in formal government as reasonably 
possible.  
2. The index should be simple to calculate and understand.
3. The index should be easily replicable by interested parties, including non-
governmental organizations, governments, donors, and stakeholders. 
4. Quality data considerations should underpin the selection of all variables.375
While these four principles may be more easily applied to a select number of 
countries, the challenge lies in making them work for countries on a global scale.  If 
we examine the major gender composite indexes in use today, the difficulty becomes 
more apparent.  The six commonly used gender composite indicators and indexes 
(reviewed in Chapter 2 – Measuring Women in the Political Domain:  A Critical Appraisal) 
can be divided into two general categories.376  
Global and Annual:  These global indexes produce annual results but at a cost to 
the number and breadth of the indicators.  The same indicators are replicated from 
index to index, as the frequent nature of publication demands that they rely on 
pre-collected data from the same institutions.  Index builders return to the Inter-
Parliamentary Union database377 to measure a wide variety of theoretical concepts. 
“In short, the greater the number of countries, the less comparable empirical data 
there will be available; and the more heterogeneous the social reality of the countries 
being compared, the less descriptively relevant empirical data there will be.”378 
While these annual indexes remain a valuable tool for tracking ongoing progress on 
a global scale, the higher the number of countries included, the less customized the 
data becomes.
Focused and Infrequent:  Some of the best indexes, noted for their breadth of 
indicator coverage beyond the percent of women legislators and ministers, focus 
solely on one geographic region.  A smaller number of countries allows for more 
tailored indicators in addition to the standard global measures used.  This creates 
375  Chapter 3 – For Good Measure, describes the quality data framework designed for the Diamond Index.  The 
framework includes eight elements used to define quality data:  relevance, completeness, comparability, accuracy, 
accessibility, timeliness, cost effectiveness, and granularity.
376  The gender composite indicators reviewed in Chapter 2 – Measuring Women’s Access to Political Power: A 
Critical Appraisal, included the following:  1) Gender Inequality Index - United Nations Development Program; 2) 
Social Institutions and Gender Index - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 3) Global Gender 
Gap Index - World Economic Forum; 4) Gender Equity Index - Social Watch; 5) Gender Equality Index - European 
Institute of Gender Equality; and 6) African Gender and Development Index  - United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa.
377  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Parliaments at a Glance,” 2017.
378  Bericat, Eduardo. “The European Gender Equality Index: Conceptual and Analytical Issues.” Social Indicators 
Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 1–28.
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better linkages between the theories articulated and what is measured.  It also 
provides a wealth of data for advocates and development practitioners in a targeted 
country.  
However, using custom indicators also comes at a cost, both in financial and labor 
intensive terms.  The European Equality Index and the African Gender and Development 
Index are published infrequently: once (2013) for the former and twice (2009 pilot, 
2011) for the later.379  It remains unclear when future index results will be released. 
While the indexes provide a snapshot in time of an individual country’s gender 
status, their utility as a global tool is hampered by their infrequent publication and 
inability to make in-country and cross-country comparisons over time.  
The Africa Gender and Development Index is especially vulnerable. Part of the self-
identified value of the index, according to its authors, is that data is collected 
nationally and not reliant on international databases.380  While laudable, this also 
makes the index more difficult to replicate, especially in regions with serious 
information-access constraints.  Perhaps this has contributed to the limited number 
of countries and publication frequency, which in turn lessons its utility to undertake 
longitudinal analysis, track trends, or document individual country changes.381  The 
number of indicators, level of expertise, and time required to construct this index 
means, for all practical purposes, interested parties may find it difficult to collect the 
same data or replicate it on a consistent basis.  
Table 12 highlights the tension between global and regional measures, including the 
heavy reliance of global indexes on one to two measures.  Beyond “female members 
of parliament” and “female members of cabinet” the number and indicator use 
begins to decline, and stratification occurs by region.382  
379  The African Gender and Development Index has included 12 countries twice and 18 countries once. 
380  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011. 
381  The Economic Commission for Africa states in the 2011 report that its medium- and long-term plans include 
expanding the use of the African Gender and Development Index to all 52 African countries and publishing the 
results every two years (page 62). 
382  I have included only those indicators whose stated purpose is to measure the political domain.
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TABLE 12:  Indicators Measuring Women in the Political Space from  
Six Gender Indexes
Measurement Global Europe Select 
Countries 
in Africa
Female members of parliament
1. Female and male share of parliamentary seats
2. Percent of women in parliament 
3. Members of parliament
4. Share of members of parliament
5. Seats in parliament
6. Female with seats in parliament over male value
X
X
X
X
X
X
Female members of cabinet
1. Women in ministerial positions
2. Share of ministers
3. Cabinet ministers
4. Females at ministerial level over male value
X
X
X
X
Senior-level government officials
1. Higher positions in civil service and parastatals
2. Legislators, senior officials, and managers X
X
Senior-level non-government professionals
1. Senior positions in political parties, trade unions, 
employers’ associations, heads or managers of 
NGOs
2. Professional and technical positions
X
X
Local government officials
1. Share of members of regional assemblies
2. Members of local councils
X
X
Head of State
1. Number of years of a female head of state (last 
50 years) over male value
X
Judges
1. Judges higher, lower, traditional, religious courts X
Legislative Quotas
1. Existence of quotas X
Security
1. Employment in security forces X
Education
1. Female and male population with at least 
secondary education
X
We can see the tension between the ability to measure women’s political presence 
using a variety of indicators and the global data we have available to do so. 
Gathering a wider array of indicators has typically required a country-by-country 
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collection effort, especially in less-developed countries, as there is no standardized 
effort to capture much of this information.  As a result, for most composite gender 
indicators in the political domain, little attention has been devoted to examining 
women’s breadth and depth of leadership across government and especially within 
the security sector.  In the leading gender indexes in use today, there is no attempt 
to identify any variation in specific positions women hold in formal government. 
In essence, the focus has been more generally directed at tracking percentages of 
women in institutions with less attention to the levels of decision-making authority 
inherent in the political positions women are garnering.
Indicator selection was based on measures of progress towards equality between 
men and women verses what women have attained in society or women’s well-
being.383  As an example, the percentage of women who have access to health care 
(attainment) and low rates of maternal mortality (well-being) are important measures 
of women’s status.  But neither measure equality.  Likewise in the political arena, the 
number of women running for election or nominated by parties as candidates do 
not always translate into women in office.  The Diamond Index focuses on outcome 
indicators that directly measure the equality relationship between men and women 
in the formal political sphere.
When measuring equality, it is also necessary to make the clear distinction between 
the “status of attainment” verses the “status of equality.”384  Attainment indices 
measure levels reached by women or men in the country.  In Bangladesh, for 
example, the male literacy rate is 62% while the female literacy rate is 53%.  Levels 
are compared against full attainment, rather than against one another.  Inequality 
or equality indices, on the other hand, measure the level of status women have in 
relation to men.385  To measure inequality, indicators must look at the relation of 
women’s status compared to that of men’s.386  Some indexes mix both attainment 
and equality indicators.  For purposes of conceptual clarity, the Diamond Index 
only measures political inequality between men and women in the formal political 
sphere.  I define political equality as “an equal number of women holding positions 
of formal political decision-making.”
383  Bericat, Eduardo. “The European Gender Equality Index: Conceptual and Analytical Issues.” Social Indicators 
Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 1–28.
384  Sugarman, David B., and Murray A. Straus. “Indicators of Gender Equality for American States and Regions.” 
Social Indicators Research 20, no. 3 (1988): 229–70.
385  Di Noia, Jennifer. “Indicators of Gender Equality for American States and Regions: An Update.” Social Indicators 
Research 59, no. 1 (2002): 35–77.
386  Permanyer, Iñaki. “The Measurement of Multidimensional Gender Inequality: Continuing the Debate.” Social 
Indicators Research 95, no. 2 (2010): 181–98.  Bericat, Eduardo. “The European Gender Equality Index: Conceptual 
and Analytical Issues.” Social Indicators Research 108, no. 1 (2012): 1–28.
134
Chapter 4 Developing the Diamond Index
Horizontal Measures:  Measuring access to political decision-making horizontally 
includes all three branches of government and the security sector.  As a result, the 
four different dimensions of formal political decision-making that define the Diamond 
Index include components of the legislative, executive, judicial, and security sector. 
Vertical Measures:  Vertical measures attempt to capture three tiers of senior 
decision-makers within each horizontal dimension.  Tier 1 leaders are considered 
to have the greatest decision-making authority, Tier 2 moderate decision-making 
authority, and Tier 3 lower decision-making authority.  Despite this stratification 
into tiers, all positions selected are perceived as influential in formal government.  
With three indicators selected for each dimension, and four dimensions included 
(executive, legislative, judicial, security), the Diamond Index contains a total of 12 
positions identified as decision-makers.  Decision-makers are defined as individuals 
who have the potential to achieve impact based on the authority and agency 
inherent in the position they hold.  In selecting and weighting these positions, I have 
attempted to choose those having common definitions and duties applicable to the 
broadest range of countries possible.
4.3.1 Executive Branch
Tier 1 – Cabinet Ministers:  Although the executive branch has been described as 
the most male branch of government,387 women are making headway in gaining 
ministerial positions.  While the literature and documentation to date by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union and UN Women indicate women hold up to 17% of all cabinet 
positions,388 they are often shunted into lower prestige posts, such as education, 
culture, and women’s affairs.389  Whether controlling the foreign affairs or health 
docket, however, ministers may hold enormous sway in overseeing budgets, staff, 
and policy direction.  In some countries the individual “line” ministries themselves 
develop laws.390  Once vetted by cabinet, they are introduced into Parliament 
thereby influencing both the law-making and policy-implementation functions.  In 
Parliamentarian systems this ensures that the executive and legislative branches are 
387  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
388  According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union and UN Women: “The total includes deputy prime  ministers and 
ministers. Prime ministers/heads of government were also included when they held ministerial portfolios. Vice-
presidents and heads of governmental or public agencies have not been included.”  I have included only ministers 
in the Tier 1 category. 
389  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in Politics,” 2017.  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the 
President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers Worldwide.” Presented at the Midwest Political 
Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011.     
390  Devlin, Claire, and Robert Elgie. “The Effect of Increased Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Case of 
Rwanda.” Parliamentary Affairs 61, no. 2 (February 23, 2008): 237–54.
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closely aligned in policy priorities.391  That is not to imply that ministers have complete 
freedom to dictate the direction of their ministries.  Factors such as legislative and 
judicial oversight, a strong president, party platforms, public opinion, etc., all come 
into play in the decision-making process.  
There is a growing body of literature that has looked at women ministers across 
countries and an increasing recognition that the percentage of women ministers is a 
useful indicator in measuring women’s access to political power.  While this branch 
of government still remains understudied in comparison to the legislative branch, 
annual data on the percentage of women ministers is now more readily available. 
Individual countries have official websites identifying ministers.  The names and 
portfolios of all cabinet ministers are available through the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency.392    
ü The Diamond Index incorporates the position of minister only as the Tier 1 position in 
the executive domain.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women ministers in the executive cabinet. 
Tier 2 – Senior Executives:  As in other domains, women have been making 
steady, although slow, progress in obtaining senior executive positions.  Research 
by Mathiason and Kookhony, for example, points to women’s representation in 
sub-ministerial positions doubling from 7% to 15% between 1994 and 2005.393  The 
Diamond Index captures the composition of staff located directly below the minister. 
This includes deputy ministers, vice ministers, under secretaries, and permanent 
secretaries.  While titles will vary across countries, these individuals sit at the highest 
levels of the ministry.  These positions may be appointed by the executive or held by 
career members of the civil service.  Positions may be inherently political in nature 
or demand technically strong expertise.  While each country will differ, this cadre 
of officials may be somewhat more insulated from the political fray being viewed 
as the leadership behind the minister.  Whether political or technocratic in nature, 
however, these senior executives both support and report to the Minister.
A more robust measure for Tier 2 – Senior Executives would have also included one 
lower bureaucratic level that captures heads of agencies or divisions within each 
ministry.  This head of an agency or director of a division captures more technocratic 
391  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
392  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1.
393  Mathiason, John, and Loveena Kookhony. 2006. Women in Governmental Decision-Making in the Early 21st 
Century: What Has – and Has Not – Been Achieved in the Post-Beijing Period. 
136
Chapter 4 Developing the Diamond Index
individuals given their greater distance from the minister.  Unfortunately, this layer 
of data within formal government does not exist across countries.  It is also difficult 
to gather on a country-by-country basis using public data.  For example, while 
ministerial organizational charts identify the different divisions led by a director or 
agency head,  staff profiles are often not provided to this level.  It would require in-
depth research to unearth the various directorships through non-public data sources. 
Even in smaller, less developed countries, the number of these positions may add 
into the hundreds when compiled across multiple ministries.  For these reasons, the 
positional line was drawn at a higher level in hopes of gathering consistent data 
within the executive.  While recognizing that politics continues to infuse this level of 
appointee, managerial and technocratic expertise is also likely to emerge to ensure 
the day-to-day running of the ministry.  How the government’s vision and policy is 
put into place – in very practical terms – often resides with these top-level executive 
branch positions.
ü Data on women’s share of senior executive positions across countries is currently not 
available.
ü	Indicator:  The percentage of women holding top executive positions.  Positions 
include deputy ministers, vice ministers, under secretaries, and permanent 
secretaries.
Tier 3 – Mayors of the 10 Largest Cities:  This measure attempts to capture 
senior decision-makers of the executive branch at the sub-national level.  This is 
a challenging proposition for a number of reasons.  First, there is no consistent 
definition of local political leadership at the sub-national level and, therefore, no 
consistent methodology or approach for organizations or governments collecting this 
data.  Comparability has been defined as a key element of quality data underpinning 
the Diamond Index.  In this respect, indicators should  consistently measure the same 
definitional concept, across time, and for all countries.
In attempting to include a sub-national unit of the executive, I began by looking 
at decision-makers within the top administrative level of government below the 
national level.  This stratification is often defined as a state, region, or province, 
although contradictions quickly emerge when comparing federal and unitary 
structures.  A federal system accommodates the differing constituent units of 
the state, allocating specific functions and authorities to each tier through the 
constitution.394  The national and sub-national government structures legally exist, 
with neither able to eliminate the other.  In a unity system, sovereignty resides 
394  Burgess, Michael. Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice. Routledge, 2006.
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with the central government.395  That is not to impugn, however, that sub-national 
governments wield no authority under a unity system.  The increased focus on 
decentralization during the past decades has resulted in regional bodies taking  on 
greater formal authority,396 including administrative responsibility for the delivery of 
services, economic development, and planning.  However, the political significance 
of regions, even as it may be increasing in some systems, remains highly variable.397 
While one country may use a region or province as a territorial marker, another 
country will decentralize significant autonomy to this level of government.  For 
example, both Canada and China identify provinces as their first level of governance 
below the national level.  The resulting political decision-making authority residing 
with each country’s respective elected and appointed provincial leaders, however, 
diverges considerably.398   This inconsistency in how each country defines this level 
of government – including the range of decision-making authority held by this level 
of sub-national leader – makes for challenging comparisons.
A  second difficulty is the lack of consistency in the number of sub-national government 
levels.  Kenya, for example, has two levels below the national government:  47 districts 
followed by local government.  In three-tiered South Africa, by comparison, the first-
level administrative division below the national level is a province.  The country’s 
nine provinces are divided into 52 districts.  Given similarities in population and 
size, Kenya’s 47 districts (and first sub-national administrative tier) are more 
closely aligned to South Africa’s 52 districts (the country’s second sub-national 
administrative tier).  
Third, a number of countries have opaquely defined sub-national levels alongside 
clearly defined levels of government.  For example, we see the term “territory” 
used across a range of countries and definitions.  Territory might refer to a capital, 
dependent, federal,  disputed, or occupied geographic area, to name some of the 
different classifications used around this term.   “Autonomous region” is another 
classification in use, from the Åland islands in Finland to the Zanzibari islands in 
Tanzania, the wide range of countries applying this term to a level of administration 
does not allow for consistency of definition.  The level of autonomy and decision-
making authority held by these more specialized sub-levels, again varying 
395  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
396  Marks, Gary, and Liesbet Hooghe. “Types of multi-level governance.” European Integration online Papers 5, no. 
11 (2001): 31.
397  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
398  Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. “Types of Multi-Level Governance,” 2001.  Zhang, Xiaobo. “Fiscal 
Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: Implications for Growth and Inequality.” Journal of 
Comparative Economics 34, no. 4 (2006): 713–726.
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significantly country-by-country, makes it difficult to classify, harmonize, and 
compare leadership positions in a consistent manner.
Given this range of administrative levels and authorities, the quality data choices 
seem limited.  One option is to try and match like units of sub-national government 
across countries.  So, in returning to our example, Kenya’s first-tier districts would be 
collected and compared to South Africa’s second-tier districts.  In reality, this would 
create an unwieldly and highly subjective range of data if attempted on a global 
scale.  A second option might include picking one administrative tier and tracking 
its leadership consistently, knowing that provinces of Cuba and Indian states have 
little in common besides their definition as the first sub-national geographic unit of 
their respective countries.  What to do with autonomous regions or territories – such 
as Tibet and the Navajo Nation of the U.S. – also complicates efforts to compare 
similar units.  While acknowledging that variations will be the status quo when 
attempting worldwide comparisons, given the differences in sub-national levels, 
authorities, roles, and definitions, comparing decision-makers directly below the 
federal level was deemed inadequate.
Local government, however, is universally found in all types of political systems – 
federal or unitary, authoritarian or democratic, presidential or parliamentarian – and 
each local government is divided into rural and urban centers.399  In grappling for a 
meaningful, yet common decentralized unit of measure, I have chosen to look at the 
composition of mayors across the largest urban centers of each country.  Although 
titles will vary, the top official at this municipal or city level has many similarities 
across countries and continents.  For example, each is responsible for the day-to-day 
functioning of a defined, generally legally recognized, geographic area.400  Each is 
elected or appointed to represent the interests of citizens within the boundaries of 
that city.  Each oversees some capacity to generate revenue.  Finally, each mayor 
typically represents the executive branch of government.  As leader of a major urban 
area, mayors can wield significant sway over resources and staff.  Innovative mayors 
from the largest cities are often influential in helping shape the national agenda.  In 
this respect, a popular mayor can also use his or her position as a launching pad into 
national politics.401  
399  Teune, Henry. “Local Government and Democratic Political Development.” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 540, no. 1 (1995): 11–23.
400  Ibid.
401  National Democratic Institute. “Women and Local Executive Office,” 2015.  Murray, Rainbow. Parties, Gender 
Quotas, and Candidate Selection in France. New York: Palgrave, Macmillan Basingstoke, 2010.  Hague, Rod, and 
Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 2010. 
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This is not to assert that mayors are the perfect sub-national level measure.  The 
level and type of decentralized authority allocated to an urban leader will vary 
significantly.  Also the size of cities is a factor that can determine the role it plays 
in relation to other administrative levels.  In some states the major urban centres 
(Tokyo, Beijing, and São Paulo, for example) encapsulate populations exceeding that 
of many countries.  In less developed economies, urban centres beyond the capital 
often have a very rural feel with a small population to match.  Ideally, the executive 
head of all cities above a specified population, for example 50,000 residents, would 
help average variations in size and population.  Because this data is not collected 
in any systemic way, however, and could include hundreds or thousands of cities 
for larger countries, it was seen as extremely difficult to gather this level of detailed 
data, especially in more information-scarce countries.  
Given the quality data constraints surrounding issues of completeness, coherence, 
accessibility, and cost effectiveness, I chose to attempt to collect the gender 
composition of only the top 10 urban leaders.  While not ideal, adding new data 
at this level can at least begin to paint a picture about women’s decision-making 
authority below the national executive level.
ü Data on women’s share of mayoral positions across countries is currently not available. 
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women who hold the top executive position of 
authority among the country’s 10 largest cities.
4.3.2 Legislative Branch
Tier 1 – Political Party Leaders: I have selected the top leadership position of each 
party with representation in the lower house of the national parliament as the Tier 
1 measure in the legislative area.  Given the variety of party structures across the 
globe, however, it must be acknowledged that where decision-making authority 
actually resides within a political party is not consistent.  Another factor making 
it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons across party typologies has been the 
research emphasis placed on Western European parties over the past century and a 
half, and the lack of data associated with developing countries.402
Global trends do indicate, however, that the redistribution of power within the party 
is shifting towards the leadership as parties move away from mass, dues-paying 
402  Basedau, Matthias, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and 
Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2007. 
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members and towards “electoralist” typologies.403  Electoralist parties, i.e., those 
whose primary function is to conduct campaigns, are typically organizationally thin, 
maintaining only a skeletal staff between elections.  During the election period these 
parties rely on professional experts to direct the campaign and mass communication to 
mobilize voters.404  While Gunther and Diamond go further to sub-divide electoralist 
parties into three sub-genres,405 within each type of party structure power gravitates 
towards leadership’s prominent role.  In some more extreme cases, the rationale 
for the party’s existence is simply to act as a vehicle for the party leader to win the 
election and exercise power.406  Most of the newer democracies, for example across 
Eastern Europe, are more aligned towards the electoralist party model, lacking the 
traditionally large, dues-paying membership historically seen in Western Europe.407 
In looking at other parts of the world, attempts to categorize African and Asian 
political parties into western-developed party models can prove challenging, given 
the different historical and societal contexts from which they arose.  “Mass,” “catch-
all,” “cartel,” etc., are derived from experiences in Europe and the United States, 
and may not adequately account for the tribal, regional, and religious differences 
overlaid across many parts of the world.  Research does, however, point to the 
strong personalism that dominates formal party structures, as well as informal 
systems (without written rules), that exist across parties in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.408  While more research is called for on party typologies throughout the 
developing world, the accumulation of power attached to strong personality-based 
party leadership is a common thread across regions.
Political parties also serve as the gatekeepers to political life.409  Even as the size 
and membership of parties has slipped in numbers, they still hold the keys to 
office for both men and women.  In most countries, parties determine who runs for 
403  Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 4 
(2009): 753–766.  Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: 
The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 5–28.
404  Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. “Species of Political Parties: A New Typology.” Party Politics 9, no. 2 
(2003): 167–199.
405  These are identified as: 1) catch-all party, 2) personalistic party, and 3) programmatic party.
406  Gunther and Diamond define this as the personalistic party:  “Its electoral appeal is not based on any programme 
or ideology, but rather on the personal charisma of the leader/candidate, who is portrayed as indispensable to the 
resolution of the country’s problems or crisis.”
407  Costa Lobo, Marina. “Parties and Leader Effects: Impact of Leaders in the Vote for Different Types of Parties.” 
Party Politics 14, no. 3 (2008): 281–298.
408  Basedau, Matthias, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and 
Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2007. Costa Lobo, 
Marina. “Parties and Leader Effects: Impact of Leaders in the Vote for Different Types of Parties.” Party Politics 14, 
no. 3 (2008): 281–298.
409  Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. Gender and Party Politics. Sage Publications, 1993. Dahlerup, Drude, and 
Lenita Freidenvall. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia Is No Longer the 
Model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 1 (2005): 26–48.  Hoekstra, Valerie. “Increasing the Gender 
Diversity of High Courts: A Comparative View.” Politics & Gender 6, no. 3 (2010): 474–82.
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office.  Typically, each party is free to make its own rules, with few national laws 
dictating how a party will choose its candidates.410  Parties decide not only who 
will run, but the candidate’s chances of winning depending on whether they are 
selected to represent a safe seat in a majoritarian race or a safe slot on a proportional 
representation list.411  Rahat refers to this as the “selectorate” – the individuals 
or members that decide who gets to run for office.412  He likens it to a restaurant 
menu where, as the customer (or voter), you are allowed to select what you would 
like to eat (or who to vote for), but your choice is already constrained by what the 
chef (selectorate) has decided to offer.  Because few rules guide the selection, the 
process may range from a single individual hand-picking his successor to an open 
primary where any eligible voter has a say in determining the candidate.  Both of 
these extremes are rare, with most countries falling somewhere in the middle of 
the continuum.413  This would include selectorates such as a central or nominating 
committee, party agency, use of appointed delegates, or a convention.  Despite 
differences in selectorate composition, party leadership still plays an important role 
in determining who will run and where.  This includes allowing candidates access 
to party resources, expertise, and support.  The trending rise of candidate-centered 
politics – away from the mass parties of the past – has increased the importance of 
candidate selection as well as the party leadership guiding those choices. 
Within the legislative framework, party leadership and influence are instrumental 
in determining which issues take precedence, how they are framed for the wider 
public, and what actions must be taken to bring about the party’s vision.  When 
in power,  leaders can encumber both parliamentary and party leadership spaces 
concurrently, playing an influential role in determining policy while steering the 
direction of government.  Legislative agendas typically reflect the hierarchy of ruling 
party priorities, with specific pieces of legislation or themes targeted throughout the 
parliamentary or congressional term.  While some individual members of parliament 
may have latitude in how they vote on any particular piece of legislation, in other 
systems voting against the party position can negatively impact a candidate’s future 
funding and support.  In some instances, breaking from the party ranks can result 
in members being removed from their seat.  In the most extreme cases, particularly 
in less developed democracies or fragile states, voting against the party can result 
in threats to the member’s economic interests and/or personal safety.  While voting 
discipline may vary across parties and countries, the leadership in most political 
410  Rahat, Gideon. “Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice.” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 
157–170.
411  Lindberg, Staffan I. “Women’s Empowerment and Democratization: The Effects of Electoral Systems, 
Participation, and Experience in Africa.” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 1 (2004): 28–53.
412  Rahat, Gideon. “Candidate Selection: The Choice before the Choice.” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 
157–170.
413  Ibid.
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parties will play a significant role in crafting the organization’s platform on which to 
run and priorities to be achieved.
The position of the political party takes on special significance with the establishment 
of quotas for women.  Throughout the world temporary special measures have 
been implemented to ensure that women have greater representation.  The party 
is typically responsible for selecting the women, providing training and resources, 
and determining her position on the candidate list (either high or low) and thus her 
viability of winning.414  This can create a dilemma for women placed into elected 
office by her party leaders.  She often has no directly elected constituency to answer 
to aside from the party itself.  In these instances, incentives to maintain the party line 
may be especially compelling.
Given the variable roles that party leadership can play as gatekeepers, candidate 
selection, and in crafting policy priorities, these positions are considered high-level 
decision-makers.  That is not to say that power vested in the party leader does not 
vary.  Throughout Africa, for example, we see instances where the leader is the 
embodiment of the party; the party and personality are inextricably linked. Yet, 
even in countries where the head of the party maintains a lower-profile away from 
the political limelight, one could argue that they still wield influence.  In looking 
to the U.S., where party leaders do not compete as candidates for elected office 
and maintain a lower public profile, the chairperson plays an influential role in 
developing the party platform, raising funds, and developing election strategies. 
The recent chairman of the U.S. Republican Party Reince Priebus was, for example, 
selected in 2016 by President Trump as his first Chief of Staff upon entering the 
White House, echoing the influential link between party leadership and political 
influence.415
To ensure greater data accuracy and coherence across all political systems, only those 
political parties with representation in the lower house of the national legislature 
were included.  As many countries do not have a bi-cameral system, collection at the 
lower-house level was deemed more consistent rather than attempting to aggregate 
the composition of upper and lower chambers for some countries and not others. 
Limiting the leadership measure to only those parties with national-level presence 
was done to weed out smaller parties that have minimal representation in the general 
population.  That is not to state that parties outside of parliament have no influence 
414  Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. Women, Politics, and Power. Pine Forge Press, 2007. 
415  The formal governing body of the Republican Party is the Republican National Committee, headed by a 
chairperson.  Reince Priebus’ official title was Chairman of the Republican National Committee.  The other major 
U.S. party is, likewise, governed by the Democratic National Committee and led by a chairperson.
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on the political environment.  However, their ability to craft, vote, and pass laws and 
policies is constrained in the political sphere without formal representation or seats. 
ü Data on women’s share of political party leadership across countries is currently not 
available.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women occupying the top leadership position of 
a party with representation in the lower legislative house.  
Tier 2 – Committee Chairs:  The chairmen and chairwomen leading permanent 
parliamentary committees have been selected as the position represented at the 
second level of the legislative domain.  Parliamentary committees appear on all 
continents and, in most countries, serve as the organizing structure responsible for 
legislation and government oversight.416  Whether legislation is introduced by the 
executive, party leadership, individual member, or other, it is typically referred to an 
appropriate committee for review.  During the review process laws may be changed. 
It is here that recommendations are made and bargains struck.  Some laws may 
never make it out of committee.  Woodrow Wilson, the 28th President of the United 
States, once said, “… it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is 
Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee rooms is Congress 
at work.”417  As issues become increasingly complex, committees are being viewed as 
venues for addressing political conflict and achieving policy resolution.418
Along with influencing the legislative review process, including how legislation 
is shaped, the committee chairperson is typically recognized as having enhanced 
status and access to more resources.419  That is not to imply that all committees, and 
therefore their chairs, wield the same amount of decision-making authority.  The 
Scandinavian countries and the United States, at one end of the spectrum, are vested 
with significant power to negotiate and change the bills on which the full assembly 
will later vote.  However, even in party-dominated legislatures such as Britain’s 
House of Commons, there has been a more recent expansion of its system of select 
committees.420    
416  Mattson, Ingvar, and Kaare Strøm. “Parliamentary Committees.” Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western 
Europe, 249–307, 1995.
417  Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1885, quoted in the Joint Committee on the Organization of 
Congress Final Report.
418  Longley, Lawrence D., and Roger H. Davidson. “Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on Changing 
Institutions,” The Journal of Legislative Studies 4, no. 1 (1998): 1-20.
419  Kathlene, Lyn. “Position Power versus Gender Power: Who Holds the Floor?” Gender Power, Leadership, and 
Governance, 1995, 167–94.
420  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010. 
144
Chapter 4 Developing the Diamond Index
Committees can also play an important role in bi-cameral systems of government, 
where differing versions of proposed legislation will be reconciled through a 
committee system.  While not all committee systems wield the same clout as those 
in Sweden’s Riksdag or the U.S. Congress, the global trend has been a growth in the 
centrality of committees to legislative work and an increase in committee numbers 
and significance.421  In newer democracies this has included experimentation 
with more elaborate committee structures; in legislatures with highly developed 
committee systems there has been a move to increase their variety and flexibility.422
To ensure data coherence across all political systems, only standing or permanent 
committees, rather than temporary or ad hoc committees, were considered.  Again, 
the lower house was prioritized across countries given that many systems lack an 
upper legislative chamber.
ü Data on women’s share of committee leadership positions across countries is currently 
not available.  
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women holding permanent committee head 
positions.  
Tier 3 – Members of the Legislature:   For the third tier in the legislative domain, 
the position of parliamentary member in the lower house was selected.  The intent 
of this measure was to capture women’s access to senior elected positions at the sub-
national level.  Recent efforts to consistently collect comparable data at this level of 
government, however, continue to highlight the difficulties of such an exercise.  For 
example, the No Ceilings Report, one of the most ambitious data collection efforts 
recently undertaken on the status of women, attempts to gather the percentage of 
“women’s representation on the local/municipal councils.”  Using data from the 
European Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Women, and the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the report notes that 
definitions vary by source with some capturing women members of municipal 
councils, some measuring women elected to city councils, while others record 
members of local area governing bodies.423  The number of countries collecting 
and reporting this data on a regular basis is also insufficient for use as a global 
indicator.424  Given that many countries are not currently collecting this data in any 
421 Longley, Lawrence D., and Roger H. Davidson. “Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on Changing 
Institutions.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 4, no. 1 (1998): 1-20.
422  Ibid.
423  Clinton Foundation, Gates Foundation, The Economist Intelligence Unit, World Policy Analysis Center, Maternal 
and Child Health Equity Research Program. “No Ceilings: The Full Participation Report,” 2015. 
424  The No Ceilings Report was able to gather some form of this data from a total of 61 countries over a 17-year 
period.  Approximately half of the 61 countries were able to report consistently throughout the timeframe.  The 
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consistent way, and the ongoing lack of definitional consistency, I determined that 
the ability to find this information in a comparable, timely, and cost-effective manner 
was not possible on a global scale. With no ability to use locally elected positions as 
a Tier 3 indicator – either at the state, regional, district, or municipal levels – I turned 
to individual legislators as a viable option.  A fundamental function of a legislator 
is to represent the views and opinions of their constituency.  In instances where 
legislators have a defined geographic constituency, they may spend a significant 
amount of time at the sub-national level in their area of representation.   
Women’s representation in parliament becomes extremely important in systems 
drawing cabinet positions from that body; the lack of experienced women 
parliamentarians limits the selection pool of potential women cabinet members. 
Likewise, long-term and robust representation as an individual legislator may be a 
requirement for parliamentarians to advance to positions as committee chairs and 
ultimately party leaders.  
To ensure greater data consistency across all political systems, only parliamentarians 
in the lower house were counted in bi-cameral systems.
ü This indicator is reported annually by the Inter-Parliamentary Union.425
			
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women in the lower or single house of the national 
legislature.
4.3.3 Judicial Branch 
Tier 1 – Judges Highest-Level Court:  Whether based on a common law or civil law 
tradition, the judiciary plays a valuable role in interpreting and enforcing laws.426 
In many countries the judicial branch can also act as an effective check against the 
misuse of executive and legislative powers.  Increasingly since 1945 there has been a 
global tendency away from judicial restraint and towards greater judicial activism.427 
This is due, in part, to the increasing proliferation of international conventions 
that allow judges more latitude to step outside their domestic constraints.  With 
the wide acceptance of principles outlined in such documents as the UN Universal 
African Gender and Development Index has collected this information once for 30 countries using local expertise. 
The Gender Equality Index is able to collect this data from EU member states.
425  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Parliaments at a Glance,” 2017.
426  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
427  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010.
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Declaration of Human Rights428 and the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women,429  judges and aggrieved parties can turn to 
regional or supra-national bodies and frameworks to build legal decisions.  The past 
decades have also seen the stature of judges rise in relation to members of parliament 
and executive branch ministers.430  When courts are seen as fair arbitrators, there 
is increased confidence in using the judicial system as a way to address political 
issues.  The process becomes reinforcing as, for example, interest groups, citizens, 
and political parties, vest increased faith in the courts and, therefore, more readily 
turn towards them as a way to resolve struggles.431
This global expansion of judicial powers – what Tate and Vallinder refer to as the 
“judicialization of politics”432 – reinforces the importance of understanding who is 
representing citizens and, increasingly, helping to determine policy direction.  The 
select group of Tier 1 judges constitutes the country’s ultimate repository of legal 
authority; the court where they sit is considered the most prestigious as its decisions 
and influence are felt throughout the country.433
In attempting to differentiate three tiers within the judiciary across all countries the 
issue of data comparability emerges, especially at the Tier 3 level.  Judicial systems 
vary by structure, mandate, authority, and geographic coverage.  The Tier 1 category 
in the judiciary is more consistent in what it captures, specifically the percentage of 
women sitting on the highest-ranking court in the country.  While often identified 
as the constitutional court, in other instances this may be a supreme court.  A more 
recent phenomenon has been the creation of a special constitutional court that stands 
apart from the ordinary judicial system.434  Between 1978 and 2005 the number of 
countries with constitutional provisions for such a court increased from 26% to 
44%.435  In instances where both supreme courts and constitutional courts were 
present, the constitutional court was considered superior unless specific information 
was provided detailing otherwise.
428  United Nations General Assembly. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A (III).” United 
Nations, December 10, 1948.
429  United Nations General Assembly. “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.” United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, December 18, 1979.
430  Tate, C. Neal, and Torbjorn Vallinder. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. NYU Press, 1995.
431  Sweet, Alec Stone. Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. Oxford University Press, 2000.
432  Tate, C. Neal, and Torbjorn Vallinder. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. NYU Press, 1995.
433  Williams, Margaret S., and Frank C. Thames. “Women’s Representation on High Courts in Advanced 
Industrialized Countries.” Politics & Gender 4, no. 3 (2008): 451–71.
434  Hague, Rod, and Martin Harrop. Political Science: A Comparative Introduction. Sixth Edition. St. Martin’s Press, 
2010
435  Horowitz, Donald L. “Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers.” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 4 
(2006): 125–137.
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ü The World Bank maintains a database of constitutional judges.436  Gaps occur, however, 
as data is not available for all countries or for courts not identified as “constitutional.” 
When possible, the World Bank database is used.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women judges seated on the highest-level court.
Tier 2 – Judges Second-Level Court(s):  Names and mandates of this court will vary, 
but this judicial level sits directly below the highest court in the country.  Judges 
from this court, or at times multiple courts, are selected as Tier 2 representatives.  For 
countries maintaining a constitutional court, this court is often labeled as supreme, 
high, or appellate.  While no definitive statements can be made about what this 
court can or can not do, it typically does not have constitutional review and more 
often serves as a court of appeal.  In some instances, this level of court may have a 
bifurcation of duties.  For example, different branches to deal with criminal, civil, and 
administrative cases.  If the courts are considered of equal stature then judges from 
each branch are included. Most courts at this level are present at the national level 
only.   
ü Data on women’s share of judicial seats allocated at the second-level of the court system 
across countries is currently not available.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women judges seated on the second-level court(s).
Tier 3 – Judges Third-Level Courts:   Judges from the third-highest level of the 
judicial system were selected for this judicial measurement.  Differences among 
courts at this classification of the judiciary begin to emerge and quality data concerns 
around the comparability of information are raised.  This third tier is an effort to 
measure the presence of women judges directly below the national level although, 
again, variations are rife.  Depending on the size of the country and structure of 
the judicial system, this may be a state, regional, or district court.  It often has 
appellate authority over lower courts with original jurisdiction or courts of first 
instance.  In some countries the numbers of judges at this level may be quite limited. 
In others, especially countries reaching down into district-level courtrooms, there 
may be hundreds of magistrates across its collective benches.  While authorities and 
numbers of judges at this level vary across the globe, the consistency of this measure 
is its focus on the third tier of courts within the country’s overall judicial system.
436  World Bank. “Women, Business and the Law,” 2015.
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ü Data on women’s share of judicial seats allocated at the third-level of the court system 
across countries is currently not available.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women judges seated on third-level courts.
4.3.4 Security
Tier 1 – Security Officers Top Level:  The security sector has been slow to embrace 
women, despite the passage in 2000 of UN Resolution 1325, which called for the 
greater inclusion of women in all aspects of peace and security.437  Due to the 
hierarchical nature of this sector, command lines are clear and authority derives 
from above.  It becomes imperative, therefore, to understand who has decision-
making authority and to what extent other voices are being reflected as priorities are 
set and orders issued. 
How and where to measure women’s presence in the security sector is not 
straightforward.  The range of agencies and institutions charged with a country’s 
internal and external security is wide and open to interpretation.  Along with the 
military and police institutions that immediately come to mind when cataloguing 
security actors, other players could include the intelligence services, parliamentary 
committees, and ministries in the executive branch.  Expert organizations, for 
example the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, also works 
with non-state actors such as civil society and the media given their oversight role in 
ensuring security governance.438  
Attempts to detail the differing levels of female leadership across such a wide 
array of agents is difficult and complicated.  For example, including parliamentary 
members within the security sector – even while acknowledging their oversight and 
funding role – would entail double counting in the Diamond Index.  Legislators or 
members of parliament are currently included under the legislative domain, Tier 3. 
Information surrounding intelligence service personnel is unlikely to be found in the 
public domain, or willingly shared, given the inclination of these agencies to avoid 
public scrutiny.  Drawing a clear distinction between the day-to-day work of civil 
society and their oversight role of the security sector would be difficult, especially 
for the media.  What constitutes investigative or news reporting, vis-à-vis attempts 
at defining this work as an oversight function, seems a difficult distinction to make 
with any consistency.  
437  United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1325 (2000), 2000.
438  The security sector government and non-governmental actors with whom the Geneva Center engages, and the 
approaches used, are detailed on its website: www.DCAF.ch 
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Given this initial range of hurdles that negatively impact quality data considerations, 
I narrowed the focus to identifying leading decision-makers in the military.  The 
immediate problem was the inconsistency among countries in they types of forces 
they maintain.  A significant number of countries have neither a navy nor an air 
force.  To ensure comparability, emphasis shifted to the army only, which the 
overwhelming majority of countries in the world maintain. 
Within the military, the difficulty in defining an “officer” became apparent given its 
different definitional use across militaries.  Women often hold non-commissioned 
positions, typically in the fields of health, logistics, or administrative services.  In 
some countries, non-commissioned officers include enlisted military personnel who 
rise to leadership ranks.  In other countries the ability to move into an officer position 
from a support position is difficult or impossible.  In Mexico, for example, “The 
command corps includes officers who have been educated at military academies 
from the beginning of their careers, as opposed to those who develop a career in 
the civilian sphere and are then incorporated into the military.”439  This blurring of 
military categories is perhaps less of an issue at the top echelons where leaders are 
commissioned officers.  The ability to differentiate between a commissioned and 
non-commissioned army officer, however, becomes more salient in the middle and 
bottom third of the command structure.  Given data limitations in this field, it was 
impossible to segregate officers by male/female and then again by commissioned/
non-commissioned.   
At this point, many quality data issues emerge around the use of an indicator 
incorporating army officers.  Foremost was the issue of comparability:  the ability 
to measure the same concept across all countries.  While the difference between 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers might be palatable, the extent and 
means by which women (and men) are able to gain differing levels of officer positions 
varied significantly.  Accuracy was also a concern.  The security sector data, more 
than the other domains, inherently relies on the government to produce some level 
of information for public consumption.  Given more restrictive attitudes typically 
found concerning public information on military work and operations, there was 
concern that governments may not be in a position, or willing, to share accurate 
data to the level needed.  This included the quality data need for granularity, 
differentiating male and female officers across all levels.
439  “A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean.” Latin American Network of Security and 
Defence, 2014. http://www.resdal.org/ing/assets/resdal-2014_complete2.pdf.
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Given these concerns,440 I then examined including police as an appropriate 
measure.  Selecting those with decision-making authority in the police, however, 
was not without challenges. The different types and levels of police enforcement 
vary considerably by country.  Policing by community, city, district, state, region, 
tribal area, etc., are all different stratifications that may (or may not) be used.  Again 
with an eye to quality data – with concerns surrounding data comparability and 
accessibility – I determined that a focus on decision-making leadership within the 
national police force was the most equitable measure across countries and the most 
realistic level of information that might be gathered.
In looking specifically at the national police, the next challenge was to delineate 
equitable ranks among these organizations for cross-country comparisons.  The 
difficulty in this regard is the variety in the number and types of officers.  Each police 
force has its own hierarchical system of command.  While a number of positions 
are similar – commander, inspector, sergeant – the range of listed officer positions 
between these categories varies considerably.  In attempting to ensure comparability 
to the greatest extent, all police officer ranks were collected from high to low and 
then divided into three tiers.  The top one-third of these command structures are 
considered Tier 1 positions.  
ü Data on women’s share of police officer positions is currently not available.  To ensure 
greater data consistency across all political systems only positions from the national 
police force were included.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women occupying the top one-third of police 
officer ranks.
Tier 2 –Security Officers Middle Level:  There are no globally comparative statistics 
on women’s share of leadership positions in the police forces.441  When estimates 
of women’s presence are given, they typically represent an overall percentage of 
women in the organization.  For example, the UN estimates that women comprise 
approximately 9% of police globally.442  This statistic is based on individual country 
estimates of the overall number of women in their respective policing organizations. 
In most instances, there is no differentiation for the rank or role of those women. 
Although command structures vary to a large degree, this tier is typically three to 
four officer positions and will likely include positions varying across the ranks of 
440  A detailed description surrounding the process and challenges of data collection in the security sector can be 
found in Chapter 5 – Gathering Data for the Diamond Index.
441  Hughes, Melanie M. “Women’s Leadership As A Route To Greater Empowerment:  Report on the Diamond 
Leadership Model.” Washington DC: USAID, December 2014.
442  Turquet, Laura. “Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice.” (2011).
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superintendent and inspector.  While Tier 1 positions total a relatively small number 
of individuals, Tier 2 positions more typically include hundreds of officers.  In larger 
countries, this level may reach into the thousands.   
ü Data on women’s share of police officer positions is currently not available.  To ensure 
greater data consistency across all political systems only positions from the national 
police force were included.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women occupying the middle one-third of police 
officer ranks.
Tier 3 –Security Officers Lower Level:  This includes the bottom one-third of all 
officer ranks for the police.  While these officers may not be dictating high-level 
policy, they are closest to the rank-and-file and instrumental in setting the tone and 
culture in which employees operate.  Officers at this level may be charged with the 
training of new-entry and lower-level officers.  In many countries these positions 
are likely to be deployed to the sub-national level.  Throughout Africa, for example, 
smaller district and provincial police stations will be staffed by officers at this level. 
Even in smaller countries, the number of positions in Tier 3 will likely include several 
thousand officers.  Lower-level inspector, sergeant, and corporal are ranks typically 
found within the corps at Tier 3.
ü Data on women’s share of police officer positions is currently not available.  To ensure 
greater data consistency across all political systems only positions from the national 
police force were included.
ü Indicator:  The percentage of women occupying the bottom one-third of police 
officer ranks.
*****
In combining all four domains, each containing three tiers, the final Diamond Index 
contains 12 decision-making positions in total.  I deemed this number sufficient to 
meet the first principle of the index framework:  a limited number of indicators, yet 
able to cover a variety of formal government dimensions.  While there is interest 
in casting a wider net to better capture the percentage of women’s representation 
holistically across the political sphere, the Diamond Index is equally focused on 
tracking women’s access to key leadership positions imbued with decision-making 
authority.  Moving below the Tier 3 level would likely result in higher percentages of 
women and also less-influential positions.  The decision to stop at Tier 3 was made 
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to best maintain the focus on greater breadth and depth of measurement, while still 
maintaining a focus on important positions.  Moving below the Tier 3 level also 
begins to raise serious quality data concerns in terms of information completeness, 
accuracy, cost-effectiveness, and granularity.  In the future, as more information 
on women’s political leadership becomes publically available, it may be possible 
to collect this information while at the same time ensuring quality data principles. 
Table 13 details the final 12 positions selected for the Diamond Index. 
TABLE 13:  Diamond Index – 12 Selected Positions
SECTOR TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3
EXECUTIVE Ministers Senior Executives Mayors 10 Largest Cities
LEGISLATIVE Political Party Leaders Committee Chairpersons Legislative Members
JUDICIAL Judges
Highest Court
Judges
Second-Level Court(s)
Judges
Third-Level Court(s) 
SECURITY Security Officers
Top Level 
Security Officers
Middle Level 
Security Officers
Lower Level 
4.4 CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIAMOND INDEX
4.4.1 Step 1:  Calculation and Weighting
The purpose behind the design and construction of the Diamond Index is to allow any 
interested stakeholder the opportunity to easily discern women’s presence in key 
decision-making positions across government, including how each particular part of 
government fares in relation to the other dimensions.  From a horizontal perspective, 
all four domains of the Diamond Index – executive, legislative, judicial, security – 
are accorded the same value.  Conceptually, authority is distributed equally among 
the four domains.  In practicality, this inter-relation among branches will vary not 
only by country, but also over time.  As the country context changes, so also will 
the formal rules and inter-governmental relationships.  While the Diamond Index  is 
unable to measure the relative strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis one domain to 
another, great care was taken in considering which decision-making positions to 
include in order to offer the most equitable balance among the four areas.  
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From a vertical perspective, the Diamond Index makes a clear distinction between 
all three tiers.  Other gender composite indicators do not differentiate between 
positions; all are assigned the same value.443   Yet evidence indicates that the more 
powerful the leadership position, the harder it becomes for women to gain access.444 
Not all positions are the same, nor should they be weighted equally.  
Across all four sub-components the Tier 1 positions are valued at three times the 
weight of Tier 3 positions.  Tier 2 positions are valued at two times that of Tier 3.  Tier 
3 positions are not weighted, and the straight percentage of women is used at this 
level.  This formula is followed consistently across the executive, legislative, judicial, 
and security.  The rationale being that increasingly powerful positions exist in each 
of these sub-components.  
Once a percentage is arrived at for each of the three tiers, the scores are added 
together and then divided by 6, achieving a single weighted score for each domain. 
The following formula is used to weight each position:
Executive = (3 x % ministers) + (2 x % senior executives + (1 x % mayors top 10 cities)
 6
Legislative = (3 x % party leaders) + (2 x % committee chairs) + (1 x % legislators)
 6
Judicial = (3 x % top-level judges) + (2 x % second-level judges) + (1 x % third-level judges)
 6
Security = (3 x % top-level officers) + (2 x % mid-level officers) + (1 x % low-level officers)
 6
It is worth reiterating that the number arrived at for each domain is no longer a 
percentage of women, but a weighted score derived from the percentages of women 
in Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3.  This can be confusing as it varies from other gender 
composite indexes that maintain the percentage of women as the final score because 
all positions are weighted equally.  So, for example, the second phase of the African 
Gender and Development Index developed by the UN included a breakdown of 
the number of women and men in various courts defined as “higher, lower, and 
443  Nardo, Michela, et al. Handbook on constructing composite indicators: methodology and user guide. No. 
2005/3. OECD publishing, 2005.
444  Williams, Margaret S., and Frank C. Thames. “Women’s Representation on High Courts in Advanced 
Industrialized Countries.” Politics & Gender 4, no. 03 (2008): 451–71. 
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traditional/religious courts.”445  In the final aggregation, however, no differentiation 
is made between the different levels of judge, so a high court judge is given the same 
weight as a lower court judge.446  In the case of the Diamond Index, clear distinctions 
are made between different positions, and thus the need for a weighting process 
that does not conflate all positions as equal.  Table 14 shows an illustrative Country 
Scorecard demonstrating the Diamond Index weighting and calculation process.
TABLE 14:  Step 1 – Example of Diamond Index Weighting Process 
Executive weighted score = 
TIER 1 Ministers 30.0%  women
TIER 2 Senior Executives 29.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities   0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 30.0) + (2 × 29.0) + (1 × 0.0) ÷ 6 = 24.6
Legislative weighted score = 
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders   0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 43.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 0.0) + (2 × 43.0) + (1 × 20.0) ÷ 6 = 17.6
Judiciary weighted score = 
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 23.5% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 27.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 22.2) + (2 × 23.5) + (1 × 27.1) ÷ 6 = 23.5
Security weighted score = 
TIER 1 Top-level officers   7.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-level officers 11.0%  women
TIER 3 Lower-level officers   6.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 7.0) + (2 × 11.0) + (1 × 6.0) ÷ 6 = 8.1
445  During the Phase 1 pilot only Higher Court judges were included.  The addition of other court levels was 
included for Phase II.  No explanation is given for the change, so whether it was due to a greater availability of data 
than anticipated, or for other reasons not articulated, it remains unknown. 
446  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011. 
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The Diamond Index emulates the African Gender and Development Index by ignoring 
population-weighed harmonic means as a basis for computation in an effort to 
“democratize and simplify statistics.”447 One might argue that in measuring levels of 
education or health statistics it is important to account for differences in the overall 
percentage of men and women in the population.  This also becomes important 
in those indexes using the ratio of achievement rates, such as the Global Gender Gap 
Index.  The index attempts to better understand the proportion of women who have 
reached a specific achievement in relation to males who have reached that same 
achievement.448  
The focus of the Diamond Index, however, varies from other gender composite 
indicators.  First, it is focused in one specific area: the political space.  Second, it 
is a very deliberate attempt to track key positions that are associated with greater 
access to decision-making authority.  These positions are set in the legal framework 
of each individual country, and not subject to change based on variations in male 
to female population ratios.  The Diamond Index focuses less on the population as a 
whole and more on equality of representation among political elites.  For this reason 
a straight percentage (percentage of women occupying decision-making positions) 
was identified as most appropriate – both in terms of its simplicity and accuracy – 
for calculating Diamond Index scores prior to weighting.  
The weighting method devised, no matter how straightforward, still remains an 
individual value judgement.449  One might try to argue that the authority of the mayor 
from a capital city (Tier 3 – Executive) outstrips that of an appellate court judge (Tier 
3 – Judiciary).  Or, that the authority of a Supreme Court judge (Tier 1 – Judiciary) is 
superior to that held by a Minister of Gender (Tier 1 – Executive).  Attempting these 
comparisons on a global scale will always produce outliers or examples that deviate 
from the trend.  But by distinguishing different domains of government, and then 
tiers within, we attempt to capture and understand, in a less biased way, women’s 
positioning in the system as a whole.  
In examining how the weighting system translates into scores, two examples are 
provided.  In Table 15 Yemen’s “Tier 3 – Judicial” score can be seen as reflecting 
that 2.1% of District Court judges are women.  Because this tier is not weighted 
as heavily as Tier 1 or Tier 2, the final score is .35 – not  2.1% if the purpose were 
to measure straight percentages of women in the judiciary. Again, the score of .35 
447  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011. 
448  World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Index 2015,” 2015.
449  Nardo, M., M. Saisana, A. Saltelli, and S. Tarantola. “Tools for Composite Indicators Building. European 
Commission Joint Research Centre.” Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen, Econometrics and 
Statistical Support to Antifraud Unit, I-21020 Ispra (VA) Italy, Report Number: EUR 21682 (2005).
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is a weighted score rather than a percentage.  Likewise for Rwanda in Table 16. 
Despite the country’s admirable Tier 3 percentage of 63.8% legislators, the final score 
equates to 31.1 due to the more heavily weighted Tier 2 and Tier 1 scores where 
lower percentages of women are present.   
TABLE 15:  Yemen’s Weighted Judicial Score
Judiciary weighted score = 0.35
TIER 1 Supreme Court 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Appeals Court 0.0%  women 
TIER 3 District Courts 2.1% women
TOTAL:  (3 × 0.0) + (2 × 0.0) + (1 × 2.1) ÷ 6 = 0.35
 
TABLE 16:  Rwanda’s Weighted Judicial Score
Legislative weighted score = 31.1
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 14.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 40.0%  women 
TIER 3 Legislators 63.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 14.3) + (2 × 40.0) + (1 × 63.8) ÷ 6 = 31.1
4.4.2 Step 2:  Aggregation of the Different Indicators into One Index
Because no distinction is made between the four different domains, with each 
accorded the same weight across different political systems, the domains are simply 
added together to achieve a final score.  Were the process to end there, the overall 
Diamond Index could potentially have a score ranging from 0 to 400.  A score of 400 
would indicate all positions are held by women while 0 would indicate women are 
completely absent.  Within each of the four domains the scores could vary between 
0 and 100.   Here again, a maximum score of 100 would indicate that women hold 
all leadership positions in that particular domain.  A score of 0 would indicate that 
women do not hold any of the identified decision-making positions in that domain. 
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For reasons of readability, we locate the Diamond Index on a 0 to 100 scale.  This is 
done by dividing each individual domain score by four.  As a result, rather than 
final scores ranging between 0 to 100 for each domain, all have been rescaled by one-
fourth to create a range from 0 to 25.  With each of the four domains able to achieve 
a total of 25, the maximum score for the entire index is 100. Table 17 presents an 
example of the Diamond Index Scorecard which is weighted and rescaled.
TABLE 17:  Step 2 – Example of Albania Diamond Index Scaled from 0 to 100 
Executive weighted score = 6.2
TIER 1 Ministers 30%  women
TIER 2 Senior Executives 29%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities   0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 30.0) + (2 × 29.0) + (1 × 0.0) ÷ 6 = 24.6 ÷ 4 =  6.15
Legislative weighted score =  4.4
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 43.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 0.0) + (2 × 43.0) + (1 × 20.0) ÷ 6 = 17.6 ÷ 4 = 4.40
Judiciary weighted score = 5.9
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 23.5% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 27.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 22.2) + (2 × 23.5) + (1 × 27.1) ÷ 6 = 23.5 ÷ 4 = 5.88
Security weighted score = 2.0
TIER 1 Top-level officers 7.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-level officers 11.0%  women
TIER 3 Lower-level officers 6.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 7.0) + (2 × 11.0) + (1 × 6.0) ÷ 6 = 8.1 ÷ 4 = 2.03
Once the Diamond Index has been adjusted to the 100-point scale, aggregation follows. 
The maximum score of 100 (4 sectors X 25 each) would indicate that women hold all 
critical decision-making positions in all sectors; a score of 0 would reflect a total lack 
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of women in any critical decision-making positions.  Likewise, a score of 50 would 
indicate that some level of parity between men and women has been achieved.  In 
our example the aggregate score would be calculated as follows:
6.15 (Executive) + 4.40 (Legislative) + 5.88 (Judiciary) + 2.03 (Security) = 18.5
Of course, as with any composite indicator, a score that appears to achieve parity 
may be camouflaging inequalities among the different domains.  An exceptionally 
high score in one branch, the Judiciary for example, could help balance out a 
particularly low score in the Security.   For this reason, all Diamond Index  Country 
Scorecards clearly reflect how each sector fares according to the weighting system 
before the aggregation process, as can be seen in Table 18 demonstrating an example 
of a completed Country Scorecard.
TABLE 18:  Diamond Index Albania Country Scorecard Achieving a  
Final Score of 18.5
Executive weighted score = 6.2
TIER 1 Ministers 30%  women
TIER 2 Senior Executives 29%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities   0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 30) + (2 × 29) + (1 × 0) ÷ 6 = 24.6 ÷ 4 =  6.15
Legislative weighted score =  4.4
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 43.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 0) + (2 × 43) + (1 × 20) ÷ 6 = 17.6 ÷ 4 = 4.40
Judiciary weighted score = 5.9
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 23.5% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 27.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 22.2) + (2 × 23.5) + (1 × 27.1) ÷ 6 = 23.5 ÷ 4 = 5.88
Security weighted score = 2.0
TIER 1 Top-level officers 7.0%  women
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TIER 2 Mid-level officers 11.0%  women
TIER 3 Lower-level officers 6.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × 7) + (2 × 11) + (1 × 6) ÷ 6 = 8.1 ÷ 4 = 2.03
6.2 (Executive) + 4.4 (Legislative) + 5.9 (Judiciary) + 2.0 (Security) = 18.5
As we can see in Albania’s example, the country’s relatively high score is bolstered 
by representation in the judiciary and executive branches.  The aggregate score is 
important, however, as it allows for ranking within the larger index and provides a 
simple benchmark for each particular country.  In this respect, advocates, members 
of government, women’s organizations, and any interested stakeholder can see at a 
glance both overall country achievement and specific domains where more attention 
is required.
4.4.3 Step 3:  Mapping Diamond Index Scores 
Given valid criticisms that composite indicators can mask weaknesses through the 
aggregation process,450 it was important that the Diamond Index allow for a 
nuanced understanding of women’s political representation in one glance.  This 
concern was also in line with quality data concerns of “accessibility,” defined as an 
index that, in terms of its construction and presentation, is easily understandable to 
a lay audience.  After experimenting with a variety of different options, I followed 
the lead of the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index.451  This index uses 
a spider graph to map four measurement domains:  health, education, economy, 
politics.  I use this same style to map the findings of the Diamond Index, with each 
dimension – executive, legislative, judicial, security – creating a different point on 
the diamond.  The four points of the diamond graph represent the four domains of 
the index.  
Each side of the diamond is placed on a scale ranging from 0 to 12.5.  This represents 
half of the 25-point total score possible.  Thus, a score extending out to the end of 
any individual diamond point would represent approximate parity in that domain. 
As shown in Graph 1, a full blue diamond – which would equal a score of 50 – 
represents complete parity in all domains.  
450  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005. Saltelli, Andrea. 
“Composite Indicators between Analysis and Advocacy.” Social Indicators Research 81, no. 1 (2007): 65–77.
451  World Economic Forum. “Global Gender Gap Index,” 2017.
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GRAPH 1:  Diamond Index – Country Score of 50 Representing Parity
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This style of presentation deconstructs the composite nature of the index into its 
component parts.  Through the mapping exercise, weaknesses and strengths for 
all four domains become visually apparent and the overall country context can be 
readily grasped.  
The Diamond Index graph stops at a representation of parity in any particular domain. 
A country exceeding a score of 12.5 in any domain would be captured numerically 
on its scorecard, although visually any area exceeding parity becomes truncated.  If, 
for example, a country were to exceed 12.5 in the judicial domain, the Diamond Index 
Scorecard would reflect the score, but the full extent of the domain would not be 
captured by the current scale of 1 to 12.5.  For example, a score of 15.0 in the judiciary 
is seen in Graph 2.
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GRAPH 2:  Example of Domain Exceeding Parity
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While clear that the point representing the judiciary continues past the end of the 
diamond, the viewer can not see its final end point.  Looking at the reverse situation 
of parity, the total absence of women from the identified critical decision-making 
positions would fail to register on any part of the diamond graph, as seen in Graph  3.
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GRAPH 3:  Diamond Index – Country Score of 0 Representing the  
Absence of Women
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More typically, a variety of representation occurs across the four points of the 
diamond.  If we return to our earlier example of Albania scoring a total of 18.5, the 
Diamond Index in Graph 4 clearly shows the additional gains made in the executive 
and judiciary branches, and to some extent the legislative, as opposed to the security 
domain that lags significantly behind the other domain scores.  
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GRAPH 4:  Diamond Index Albania Country Scorecard = 18.5
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Countries might also vary quite dramatically in women’s representational areas, 
resulting in a triangular shape when one sector dominates.  In the Graph 5 example, 
we can see that the legislative branch outscores all other domains combined.  In 
this country context women are over-represented in one sector in comparison to the 
other three domains.
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GRAPH 5:  Diamond Index with One Dominant Sector
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
Executive - 2.38
Legislative - 6.15
Judiciary - 1.88
Security - 1.08
While difficult to imagine today, the future may bring us to a point where women 
are over-represented in the political sphere.  The simplicity of the model allows for 
it to be “flipped” by reversing the calculations to demonstrate men’s lack of political 
access. 
Our reality today, however, brings us back to female-focused calculations of Country 
Scorecards and maps to accurately show where women are gaining access – both 
vertically and horizontally – in a transparent and clear format.  For example, we 
can easily intuit if women are being ghettoized into one particular sector, and better 
understand through a vertical approach whether women are being marginalized or 
over-represented within the specific tiers of that sector.
4.5 CONCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS
Efforts to create a model that is logically coherent, drawn from public data, and 
simple to calculate have also given rise to a number of conceptual limitations.  While 
each sector is designed to weight power between the different tiers, within the 
individual tiers themselves (Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3) there is no distinction made 
between levels of decision-making authority.  An obvious case exhibiting this lack of 
nuance would be among ministry positions.  Evidence shows that women are often 
shunted towards the least powerful ministries and rarely appointed to the most 
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powerful, such as economy and defense.452  In the Tier 1 ranking under the executive 
branch, however, the Minister of Youth and Sports is given the same weight as the 
Minister of Defense.  In examining the role of mayors under the executive domain, 
one could argue that the responsibility and role of the mayor at the capital level 
exceeds that of a mayor in most other cities.  In some countries, especially those 
with highly ruralized societies, the lower-ranked cities might be more akin to a large 
town.  In the Diamond Index, however, the mayor of the most populous city, the 
capital city, and the 10th largest city are given the same value.
Turning to the legislative branch, neither party leaders nor committee chairs are 
weighted differently: so a woman leading a political party with three seats in 
parliament has the same value as a party leader with 30 or 300 seats.  Tier 2 committee 
chairs are also given equal weight, despite the recognition that some committees 
may be considered more influential than others depending on their subject matter 
and parliamentary authorities. 
Conceptual problems within the judiciary are more confined to the Tier 3 level, as 
this is where the greatest differentiation arises.  Depending on the structure of the 
judicial branch and court system, judges at this tier might be small in number and 
wield significant authority over a range of matters.  In most countries a Tier 3 court 
is at the level of an Appellate Court with the second most popular classification 
being a High Court.  In some countries (for example, Haiti, Benin, and Nepal) this 
tier resides at the district level.  There may be dozens, or even hundreds, of district 
judges appointed.  Again, whether there are 300 or 30 judges appointed to the bench 
at the Tier 3 level, all are given equal value.  
While police forces will vary across countries in terms of status and authorities, their 
individual command structures appear analogous to one another.  A police inspector 
in Brazil, for example, appears at a similar level as a police inspector in South Africa. 
While some countries will vary in the number of ranks they include in their chain of 
command, when analyzed across countries the leadership structures are consistently 
comparable.  The Diamond Index gathers the entire command structure then divides 
it into thirds; it does not attempt a side-by-side comparison of officer ranks.  So if 
the entire number of officer rankings is 21 in Brazil but 24 in South Africa, Brazil will 
include seven officer rankings for each third while South Africa will include eight. 
Looking at the command structure as a whole, rather than comparing them rank-by-
rank, helps obviate individual country differences.
452  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers 
Worldwide.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011.  Inter-
Parliamentary Union. “Women in Politics,” 2015.
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Along with limitations in each sector, it must be acknowledged that each sector itself 
will vary in relation and power to others in the model.  Although the Diamond Index 
gives each sector equal weight, illiberal democracies will likely see a legislative and 
judicial branch more subservient to the executive.  In liberal democracies, these 
same branches may play a stronger oversight role, significantly limiting executive 
power.  Likewise, the police may be firmly under civilian control in the majority of 
countries while in weaker democracies security may constitute a separate sphere 
of influence acting as a positive or negative force against other branches.  Despite 
these limitations, the Diamond Index does provide a more holistic view of women’s 
decision-making representation across the political spectrum than current indexes 
and data have been able to provide.    
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have described how the Diamond Index was constructed as a means 
towards creating a more nuanced picture of where women are accessing decision-
making authority through formal government structures. To date, the majority of 
focus on women’s political access has been on increasing percentages while the 
question of where decision-making authority resides in formal structures has been 
sidelined.  Fundamental to the Diamond Index is the following concept: there should 
be less focus on the percentages of women and more focus on which positions women 
hold that allow for greater access to decision-making authority across a range of 
formal government branches and positions.  The index was developed following 
four guiding principles.
Number 1:  Indicators should be limited in number, yet sufficient to cover as many dimensions 
of decision-making authority in formal government as reasonably possible.  
In an effort to broaden the number and variety of indicators currently used to 
measure gender inequalities in the political power domain, indicators were selected 
among four different parts of government:  executive, legislative, judicial, and 
security.  A broader horizontal selection of indicators is conditioned on the premise 
that the locus of decision-making authority is variable according to different polities. 
It is a constantly shifting intangible, difficult to measure in any one place at any one 
point in time.  
Also important, the Diamond Index attempts to focus less on the overall percentages of 
women in any particular institution.  It places greater attention on decision-makers, 
i.e., individuals who have the potential to achieve impact based on the authority and 
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agency inherent in the positions they hold.  Three decision-making positions were 
selected within each domain.  All three positions have been weighted differently, 
according to their levels of authority.  
Interlinking these two concepts – broader and deeper measures of decision-makers 
– resulted in the selection of 12 different indicators around which the Diamond Index 
is built.  The ability to differentiate where women are situated in the formal political 
system, both from a wider horizontal and deeper vertical perspective, allows us to 
evaluate more holistically where women are finding representational opportunities 
and where they are being denied those opportunities.  
Number 2:  The index should be simple to calculate and understand.
One aim in developing the Diamond Index was to specifically build a tool that any 
interested party could pick up and easily understand the logic behind indicator 
selection, weighting, aggregation methodology, and math used to produce the final 
score.  With this principle in mind, three tiers of measurement were selected from 
each domain.  Therefore, no domain contributed more indicators (or fewer) than 
any other.  As much as possible, equivalent decision-makers were selected across the 
different tiers to ensure like comparisons both horizontally and vertically.  The same 
unit of measure – percentage of women – was used in all indicators to minimize 
standardization differences.  Each tier was weighted identically across domains 
to maintain consistency of process.  Final domain scores were divided by four to 
maintain a 0 to 100 scale.  Each domain score was then added together to achieve an 
overall Diamond Index score.  While basic math skills are required to complete these 
steps, individual Country Scorecards provide a template that is easy to follow for 
most interested stakeholders.
Number 3:  The index should be easily replicable by interested parties, including 
non-governmental organizations, governments, donors, and other stakeholders.
The intuitive and simple calculation process involved in the development of the 
Diamond Index offers local organizations and government officials an opportunity 
to recreate a similar effort at their own country level.  Rather than relying on one or 
two global measures currently available, a country-led process using the Diamond 
Index methodology could potentially capture a more in-depth picture of women’s 
decision-making authority.  For the donor community, the Diamond Index can easily 
be generated as part of a larger political economy analysis or gender assessment to 
provide a more holistic snapshot in time on women’s relationship to key decision-
making positions in formal government.  
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Number 4:  Quality data considerations should underpin the selection of all variables.
The lack of quality data on women’s political representation is the often unspoken 
lacuna in the room.  How do you create a robust index around women’s political 
representation when limited data exists on a global scale?  The goal was not to create 
another regional index – for example, picking one region where data is readily 
available – but to select a range of countries across the globe that face differing data 
limitations.  
Great effort was exerted in selecting relevant indicators for measuring political 
decision-making authority.  This included indicators that could capture sufficient 
depth and breadth on a global scale as well as positions having common definitions 
that would hold for comparison across all countries.  Additionally, the information 
had to be seen as relevant, accurate and without bias, accessible to the public across a 
reasonably consistent timeframe, and available to interested parties in a cost-effective 
manner.  Finally, the data had to be disaggregated into smaller information units by 
sex.  While not perfect, the 12 indicators attempt to meet the quality data criteria 
outlined to the greatest extent possible.  As more data becomes available globally, 
especially at the sub-national level and across a broad range of government positions, 
there may be new opportunities to include other decision-making positions that, for 
now, we are unable to capture in any consistent and reliable form. 
The ability to collect robust, worldwide data every year has been a challenge with 
current measurement tools.  The greater the number of countries included, when 
paired with the need for frequent data publication, has resulted in the use of limited 
global indicators being available.  Inversely, the selection of a wide range of political 
indicators has typically resulted in a more narrow collection of countries being 
measured and infrequent publication of the data.  The Diamond Index attempts to 
thread that needle.  It provides a robust number of indicators across the political 
spectrum common to almost every country in the world.  Once the initial data is 
collected, annual updates would appear to be feasible with a minimal level of effort. 
Regular reporting for a robust set of countries should increase the reliability in the 
way we record women’s political access across time.  
While the Diamond Index is by no means the definitive answer to all descriptive 
representation ills, it does move beyond what current gender indexes have been 
able to achieve in the political domain.  Its wider range of indicators, and attempts 
to differentiate varying levels of political access, add new dimensions to ongoing 
efforts to track gender inequality.  Equally important, the Diamond Index offers a tool 
that interested stakeholders will find logical in its construction and easy to use.  The 
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hope is that its simplicity will inspire governments and advocates alike to make use 
of the index at a country level to improve analysis and understanding around the 
challenges women are facing, as well as the hard-won progress women are making, 
to gain an equal footing with men in the political arena.
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Women’s average representation in the police 
does not exceed 13% in any region of the world.453
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I describe the application of the Diamond Index, including how 
information was gathered in 40 countries, many of which are perceived as “data-
scarce.”  The collection effort focused on capturing women’s breadth of representation 
across the three branches of government and the security sector.  The Diamond Index is 
premised on the belief that in order to more accurately capture women’s descriptive 
representation among diverse polities, this wider selection of indicators – gathered 
both horizontally across institutions and vertically within institutions – can create 
a more nuanced picture while minimizing measurement risk of over-attributing or 
under-attributing  women’s presence in the political space.  By melding these two 
concepts – broader and deeper measures of decision-makers – the intent is to draw 
a clearer picture of women in the political arena globally, regionally, and within 
individual countries.
Along with selecting conceptually relevant indicators, a second aim of the Diamond 
Index is to create a tool that is replicable by any interested party for whatever 
measurement purposes envisioned:  advocacy, programming, or simply tracking 
women’s progress.  One of the main constraints to understanding women’s political 
access to decision-making positions is the lack of reliable data at both national and 
sub-national levels.  The Diamond Index attempts to be creative by using an array of 
tools available to gather the information being sought, with or without individual 
government’s willingness or ability to do so.  Leading decision-makers, given their 
typically higher-profile in government, are often cited in independent or state 
media, official government sources, grey literature, and social media.  This chapter 
will explore the research question:
453 Turquet, Laura. “Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice.” (2011).
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Can quality data measuring women’s positions  
of formal political decision-making  
be collected on a global scale?
In order to answer this question, the chapter is organized into two major sections. 
The first includes each stage of data collection: individuals involved, methodology 
used, and description of what was accomplished.  The second section discusses in 
detail the successes and challenges encountered: what information proved easy, 
difficult, or impossible to collect.  Given that 9 of the 12 indicators are new data 
points, it is important for future researchers and practitioners to understand what 
was required in the collection effort if the goal is to replicate the index.  The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how missing data was handled and a compilation of 
what was collected in each of the 40 countries.
 
5.2 THE FOUR PHASES OF DATA COLLECTION
The first round of data collection for the Diamond Index was undertaken as part of 
a larger research project – Women’s Leadership as a Route to Greater Empowerment – 
that I developed and led.  The project received generous funding from the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and took place between 
October 2013 and December 2014.  The project was a joint undertaking between 
USAID’s Center of Excellence in Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance and 
the U.S.-based Management Systems International.  Leading U.S. academics were 
also included as part of the core team.454  The goal of the project was threefold:  1) 
document the challenges and lessons learned from approximately 100 USAID 
projects supporting women’s political empowerment, 2) create an Agency map 
detailing support for women’s empowerment across all USAID technical sectors, 
and 3) test the feasibility of the Diamond Index as a viable measure of women’s access 
to political power.455
454  An enormous tribute of thanks goes out to all who helped work on the project.  At USAID, this included David 
Yang (who gave the project a green light), Julie Denham, Summer Lopez, Lauren Siegfried, and Johanna Wilkie.  The 
MSI team was led and directed with aplomb by Darcy Ashman.  Academic researchers included Melanie Hughes, 
Aili Tripp, and Mona Lena Krook.  A special thanks as well to the expertise of Brittany Duncan, Milad Pournik, and 
Layla Moughari for their relentless research.    
455  A summary report of the USAID Women in Power Project can be found at:  https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/2496/USAID-WiP%20summary%20report_FINAL.pdf
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Country Selection
A day-long workshop was held with all parties in October 2013 to develop a common 
understanding of the project’s objectives, as well as determine in which countries 
the Diamond Index would be tested.  As USAID was funding the pilot, its interest was 
primarily in those countries where it provided development assistance.  Therefore, 
the first criteria for country selection was to examine only those (approximately 100 
countries) where USAID works.  It was clear from the beginning that there was neither 
sufficient time nor resources to pilot all 100 countries with USAID programming. 
Therefore, a second criteria used to influence the selection process was prioritization 
of those countries likely to have ongoing, future activities, especially those in the 
political arena – so that the data produced could be made available for consideration 
in the development and monitoring of new programs.  Decision-making up to this 
point was primarily driven by the USAID team given its unique understanding of 
institutional priorities and future funding.
In the second phase the wider team played a more active role, debating the merits of 
including or excluding specific countries.  While USAID primarily works in Low- or 
Lower-Middle Income countries456 and Partly Free democracies,457 the team agreed 
that a wider range of countries, better reflecting the global spread of differences, was 
preferred.  In addition, the team sought to select countries from varying parts of the 
world, again to ensure that no specific region was excluded.  These selection criteria 
would allow for the model to be tested across economic, democratic, and regional 
variations.  Ultimately, 40 countries were chosen.  Because the level of access to 
information was unknown at this point, the premise moving forward was that of 
the 40 countries identified, approximately 25 to 30 of them would yield sufficient 
data for adequately mapping the Diamond Index.  Table 19 lists the final 40 countries 
selected, including their World Bank and Freedom House rankings.
456  World Bank 2013 (http://data.worldbank.org/country).
457  Freedom House 2013 (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013).
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TABLE 19:  Final 40 Countries Selected
REGION – COUNTRY WORLD BANK 2013 FREEDOM HOUSE 2013
Asia 
Bangladesh Low Income Partly Free
Cambodia Low Income Not Free
India Lower-Middle Income Free
Indonesia Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Mongolia Lower-Middle Income Free
Nepal Low Income Partly Free
Philippines Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Thailand Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Timor-Leste Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Eastern Europe/Eurasia
 Albania Upper-Middle Income Partly Free
Bosnia-Herzegovina Upper-Middle Income Partly Free
Georgia Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Kyrgyzstan Low Income Partly Free
Ukraine Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Latin America/Caribbean
Brazil Upper-Middle Income Free
Colombia Upper-Middle Income Partly Free
Guatemala Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Haiti Low Income Partly Free
Mexico Upper-Middle Income Partly Free
Middle East/North Africa
Algeria Upper-Middle Income Not Free
Iraq Lower-Middle Income Not Free
Jordan Lower-Middle Income Not Free
Lebanon Upper-Middle Income Partly Free
Morocco Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Tunisia Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Yemen Lower-Middle Income Not Free
Africa
Benin Low Income Free
Burkina Faso Low Income Partly Free
Cote d’Ivoire Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Ghana Low Income Free
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REGION – COUNTRY WORLD BANK 2013 FREEDOM HOUSE 2013
Kenya Low Income Partly Free
Liberia Low Income Partly Free
Madagascar Low Income Partly Free
Mali Low Income Partly Free
Mozambique Low Income Partly Free
Niger Low Income Partly Free
Nigeria Lower-Middle Income Partly Free
Rwanda Low Income Not Free
Senegal Lower-Middle Income Free
South Africa Upper-Middle Income Free
Because USAID was funding the first step in the data collection effort, using a random 
sampling approach to the research was not considered.  The development agency, 
while flexible, required a minimum set of selected countries be mapped.  As a result 
of where USAID works, there is no inclusion of Middle- or High-Income countries. 
No countries, for example, from Western Europe were included.  Likewise, of the 
40 countries selected only seven are designated Free.  Had a random sampling 
approach been pursued, a greater number of mature democracies and economically 
advanced states would have likely been included.  
5.2.1 Phase One – Public Resources 
The first phase of data collection was led by Dr. Melanie Hughes, University of 
Pittsburgh, with the assistance of researchers Brittany Duncan and Milad Pournik. 
The goal was to see how much data could be found using only publicly available 
resources.    Four Excel spreadsheets were created, one for each branch of government 
and one for the security sector.  Within these sectoral matrixes a page was created 
for each of the 40 countries and organized alphabetically.  Within each country 
spreadsheet the source for every data point, and the information provided, was 
painstakingly coded.  When possible, a link was created leading back to the source 
of data.  This became extremely important as the research progressed, as different 
sources often provided conflicting information.  Being able to return to each source 
was critical in trying to triangulate and resolve variations in the numbers provided. 
Beyond simply collecting the numbers or percentages of women, coders recorded 
the actual names, positions, dates of elections, appointments, and age of the data. 
Each coder also made extensive notes on any concerns and how they interpreted 
176
Chapter 5 Gathering Data for the Diamond Index
conflicting information that emerged from multiple data sources.  Because a 
fundamental purpose of the exercise was to see what public data could be collected, 
we were unsure from the beginning what would be useful, the level of detail 
available, and what gaps we might find by sector, tier, or region.  The team was 
keenly aware that this was, to its knowledge, the first effort to collect data in different 
areas of government and the security sector, at specific leadership levels, on such a 
wide scale, and in primarily developing countries.  As a result, the team attempted 
to collect as much data as possible knowing that not everything would be used but 
unsure of what might be valuable as the research continued. Again, this became 
extremely important as the research progressed.  So, in total, four spreadsheets were 
developed.  Each spreadsheet contained 40 countries and each country recorded 
a minimum of 15 sources of information (three for each category – executive, 
legislative, judiciary, police, and military).  In total, more than 600 points of were 
collected.458   
Once all four spreadsheets (executive, legislative, judicial, security) were completed, 
the percentages for each tier and sector were combined into one master spreadsheet 
with individual countries grouped by region.  Showing all the percentages of women 
by sector,  and leadership tiers in one document, allowed for easier country analysis. 
Regional differences and similarities could also be more clearly highlighted in this 
format.  Coding categories contained in the master spreadsheet, as well as definitions, 
are presented in Table 20.
458  In fact, there were multiple data sources for numerous indicators; 600 points of data collection is a low 
estimate.
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TABLE 20:  Master Spreadsheet Headings and Definitions
HEADING DEFINITION
Country Name of the individual country.
Freedom Status Status as classified by Freedom House.
Region Countries were classified into one of five regions: 
1) Eastern Europe & Eurasia, 2) Latin America & the Caribbean,  
3) Asia, 4) Africa (Sub-Saharan), 5) Middle East & North Africa.
Priority As part of the research agenda five case studies were conducted.  
These countries were labeled as Category I, meaning researchers 
attempted to gather as much data as early as possible before teams 
left for their respective countries to conduct field work.  Category 
II countries were those perceived to have substantial information 
available, and had the best chance of being included in the final 
countries that could be robustly mapped.  Categories III and IV 
were perceived as being data scarce and more time intensive.  
While not excluded from efforts to gather data, the team focused 
on the higher categories first to ensure that funding and time was 
not exhausted attempting to gather data on Category III and IV 
countries.
Coder Identified Brittany Duncan or Milad Pournik as the principle coder 
for the country.
Status Overall (*indicates 
reservations; ~ indicates 
complete without security data; 
I indicates incomplete)
Once all the data was gathered into the master spreadsheet, an 
evaluation could be made as to the overall quality of the data and 
identify those countries where it would be difficult to draw a final 
score given incomplete data.
# Missing Legislative, Executive, 
Judicial Indicators
Because the security sector was proving so problematic to gather for 
almost every country, the end of phase one focused on identifying 
missing data in the three branches of government, leaving the 
security sector aside.  The number indicates missing indicators from 
a total of nine measures (three Executive, three Legislative, and 
three Judicial). 
Sample 30 This indicated which countries should be included in the final 30 
countries for analysis under the auspices of the USAID project.  
Those countries with the most complete data set were selected.
Legislative Status Data within the Legislative Branch was identified as one of the 
following:  
C = Complete; C* = Complete with Reservations; 
C~ =  Complete without security data; I = Incomplete
% Party The percentage of women occupying the top party leadership 
position.  Only those parties with representation in the lower house 
of the national legislature are included.
% Committee The percentage of committees in the lower or single house of the 
national legislature that are chaired by women.
% of Women in Lower or Single 
House
The percentage of women in the lower or single house of the 
national legislature.
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HEADING DEFINITION
Notes Any information considered pertinent for understanding challenges 
encountered, and how percentages were calculated, is explained in 
this section.
Executive Status Data within the Executive Branch was identified as one of the 
following:  
C = Complete; C* = Complete with Reservations; 
C~ =  Complete without security data; I = Incomplete
% Women in Cabinet The percentage of women in the Executive Cabinet.
% Senior Executives The percentage of women’s share of lower-level leadership in 
executive cabinet.  Positions include deputy minister, vice minister, 
under secretary, and permanent secretary.
% Top 10 Mayors The percentage of women who hold the top executive position of 
authority among a country’s 10 largest cities.
Notes Any information considered pertinent for understanding challenges 
encountered, and how percentages were calculated, is explained in 
this section.
Judicial Status Data within the judicial branch varied slightly due to difficulties 
in determining the three top tiers of courts within the country’s 
judicial system:
C = Complete; C* = Complete with Reservations; C^ = Data 
rearranged because there is no constitutional court; C? = there is no 
constitutional court so unsure of 3rd tier of the judiciary.
% Constitutional Women’s percentage of seats on the Constitutional Court.
% Supreme Women’s percentage of seats on the Supreme Court.
% Appellate Women’s percentage of seats in all second-tier appellate courts.
% Magistrate In an effort to collect as much judiciary data as possible, the 
percentage of magistrates, typically from courts of first instance, 
was collected when available. 
% Total Total percentage of female judges in a country.  While not 
specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, it was collected when 
available.
Notes Any information considered pertinent for understanding challenges 
encountered, and how percentages were calculated, is explained in 
this section.
Military Status Data within the Military was identified as one of the following:  
C = Complete; C* = Complete with Reservations; 
C~ =  Complete without security data; I = Incomplete
% Upper Women’s share of positions in the top one-third of officer ranks in 
the army.  While not specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, it 
was collected when available.
% Middle Women’s share of positions in the middle one-third of officer ranks 
in the army.  While not specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, 
it was collected when available.
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HEADING DEFINITION
% Lower Women’s share of positions in the bottom one-third of officer ranks 
in the army.  While not specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, 
it was collected when available.
% Officers Total percentage of women officers in the army.  While not 
specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, it was collected when 
available.
% Total Total percentage of women serving in the army.  While not 
specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, it was collected when 
available.
Notes Any information considered pertinent for understanding challenges 
encountered, and how percentages were calculated, is explained in 
this section.
Police Status Data within the Police only was identified as one of the following:  
C = Complete; C* = Complete with Reservations; 
C~ =  Complete without security data; I = Incomplete
% Upper The women’s share of positions in the top one-third of officer ranks 
in the national police force.
% Middle Women’s share of positions in the middle one-third of officer ranks 
in the national police force.
% Lower Women’s share of positions in the bottom one-third of officer ranks 
in the national police force.
% Total Total percentage of women officers in the national police force.  
While not specifically a measure of the Diamond Index, it was 
collected when available. 
Notes Any information considered pertinent for understanding challenges 
encountered, and how percentages were calculated, is explained in 
this section.
5.2.2 Phase Two – Case Studies
As part of the USAID Women in Power research project, five case studies were 
selected in an effort to better understand the challenges and impact of programs 
aimed at politically empowering women.  As noted earlier, while Dr. Hughes and 
her team focused broadly on collecting publicly available data for all 40 countries 
selected, they immediately prioritized the five case-study countries so that the teams 
would have the latest data before traveling to each location.  The countries selected 
included:  Georgia, Cambodia, Mexico, Jordan, and Kenya.459  Each country team 
had specific terms of reference for their case study.  This included the mandate to 
collect as much information as possible for the 12 Diamond Index indicators.  The 
459  In addition to leading the overall research project, I was also the team leader for the Kenya case study.
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rationale behind this approach was to test if having an in-country presence, and 
direct access to government decision-makers, would allow for the collection of 
additional information not available through public resources.
Each team consisted of at least three experts on women’s political leadership, 
including one development professional from USAID, one academic, and one host-
country national.  The teams were frequently supplemented by in-country staff 
from USAID.  Each group spent between seven to 10 working days in their assigned 
country.  During this time they met with a wide range of experts in this field, including 
staff from the UN, local and international non-governmental organizations, donors, 
U.S. Government personnel, and country officials from each branch of government, 
including the security sector when possible.  All information and data collected to 
date for the Diamond Index was openly discussed and shared.
The success in gathering additional data through in-person interviews and local 
contacts was mixed.  For most of the five countries, the largest gap in data revolved 
around the security sector and Tier 3 of the judiciary.  In Georgia, the team successfully 
obtained a full security sector data set.  A Georgian national working at USAID 
introduced the team to the Deputy Minister of Defense.  The locally employed 
expert met personally with the Deputy Minister, asked for the data in her meeting, 
and was immediately given the information.  Georgia proved to be the best example 
of accessing additional information through person-to-person interventions.  
There are several factors worth considering in this example.  First, both the Minister of 
Defense and the Deputy Minister (with whom the team member met) were women. 
Perhaps equally important, the team member herself is a well-respected gender 
expert in the country.  The Ministry has published a Gender Equality Strategy of the 
Ministry of Defence, and this document was also shared with the case-study team.  The 
strategy specifically states that the Ministry, in line with the Constitution of Georgia, 
“defines the main guarantees for providing equal rights, freedoms and opportunities to men 
and women.  It takes into account Georgia’s international obligations and is obligatory for 
the Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Armed Forces of Georgia, their Structural Units, and 
the Legal Entities of Public Law (LEPLs) within the defence system.”460   The seriousness 
with which the Ministry appears to be embracing gender, the willingness to openly 
discuss the challenges, the presence of women at the highest levels of the Ministry, 
the positive relationship between the governments of Georgia and the United States, 
460  A hard copy of the document was given to the team while in country.  It appears to be unavailable on the 
Georgia Ministry of Defense website.
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and the recognized technical expertise of the local Georgian expert were all likely 
influential factors in being able to procure the needed data.461   
Cambodia462 and Jordan463 were at the opposite end of the spectrum with officials 
refusing to share any information on the security sector.  One Cambodia government 
official went so far as to state that this type of information was not released publically 
as it was a matter of “national security.”  Government experts did not deny having 
the information.  The perception among the country experts was that information 
was available, but officials were unwilling to share it with the case-study teams.
Kenya464 and Mexico465 fell between the two extremes.  In-country publications, 
experts, and NGOs were able to fill in missing data gaps within the three branches 
of government.  Judicial officials in Kenya were, in fact, proud of the gains women 
were making in the sector and willing to share what information was available 
to demonstrate their progress towards greater gender equality on the bench.  The 
security sector, however, once again proved the most challenging.  In general, 
there was a hesitation to share the data.  As might be expected with a hierarchical 
organization, the critical factor in gaining access to the information was to find and 
ask the “right” person.  While lower-level officers seemed open to sharing the data, 
they did not view themselves as having the authority to do so.  The short time in 
country did not allow for the teams’ requests to work their way up to the appropriate 
decision-maker.  With more time and a sustained effort to gather the data, there was 
the perception that the information would – eventually – be provided.  The resistance 
seemed to stem more from a bureaucratic nature verses one of transparency.
 
While the teams were able to make more headway on filling in data gaps through 
access to in-country publications and experts, both government and non-
governmental, it was by no means without using some level of U.S. government 
461  Heartfelt thanks to Lauren Seyfried (who crawled out of her sick bed to join the team), Phyllis Dininio, Khatuna 
Khvichia, and Nana Sumbadze.  Their full report  – Women’s Leadership as a Route to Greater Empowerment: 
Georgia Case Study – can be found at:  https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WiP%20
Georgia%20Case%20Study.pdf
462  Johanna Wilkie, Darcy Ashman, Sopeat Mer, and Sopheap Sreng comprised the Cambodian team of experts 
that forged on in the heat of Cambodia despite hitting many roadblocks.  Their report can be found at:  https://
www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WiP%20Cambodia%20Case%20Study.pdf
463  Working in a difficult environment, the Jordan team of Summer Lopez, Kai Spratt, Dima Toukan, and Namar 
Kayed produced an excellent report found at:  https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/
WiP%20-%20Jordan%20Case%20Study.pdf
464  The Kenya team consisted of myself, Aili Tripp, and Louise Khabure.  Despite a tense security situation in the 
country during the team’s field trip, which mandated my early departure, the remaining Kenya team members 
forged on and finished the report on time.  It can be found at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1866/WiP%20-%20Kenya%20Case%20Study%20Report.pdf
465  The self-sufficient Mexico case-study team members included Julie Denham, Mona Lena Krook, and Silvia 
Gurrolla Bonilla.  With little support but a lot of ingenuity, they were able to capture excellent data.  Find their 
report at:  https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/WiP%20-%20Mexico%20Case%20Study.
pdf
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influence.  The teams were all identified as being led by USAID.  In some countries, 
USAID experts were used to provide references or even make phone calls to set 
up appointments.  Official letters on USAID letterhead were also used to ask for 
meetings when requested.  While USAID could help open doors, however, that was 
no guarantee that governments would share their information.  In countries such 
as Jordan and Cambodia, for example, the presence of the American flag might, in 
fact, make a wary official less inclined to share data.  What was clearly highlighted 
in all five case studies, however, was the fact that governments did not deny having 
the information.  In explaining that we were interested in a breakdown of all army 
and police officers by rank and gender, there was typically a knowing nod followed 
by excuses.  No one ever stated that the information was not collected, tracked, or 
available.     
By September 2014 the data collection effort supported by USAID ended.  With the 
exception of the security sector, which will be discussed separately, the majority of 
data for the Diamond Index was collected through public records and meetings.  At 
the end of Phase II, Dr. Melanie Hughes and the case study team were able to collect 
all 9 indicators (3 each in the executive, legislative, and judicial sectors) for 25 of 
the 40 pilot countries (62.5%).  They were able to collect 8 of the 9 indicators for 30 
of the 40 countries (75%).  A full data set for the police was collected in 16 out of 40 
countries (40%).466
5.2.3 Phase Three – Other U.S. Government Agencies, Donors, and Implementing
 Partners
At the conclusion of Phase Two, I took over the data collection effort to see if I could 
fill in more of the remaining gaps.  In my role as the Deputy Director for the USAID 
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, I had access to 
a number of U.S. experts and offices working in this field.  I queried other colleagues 
and offices to ask if they had ever seen information or reports on the type of data 
we were trying to find.  In particular I was looking for security sector data, although 
significant gaps still existed in the lower tiers of the judiciary and mayors of the 10 
largest cities.  I reached out to colleagues within USAID/Washington, as well as 
the Department of Justice, State Department, and Department of Defense.  I also 
spoke with colleagues from the Department for International Development (DFID), 
UN Women, United Nations Development Program, and Swedish International 
466  Hughes, Melanie M. “Women’s Leadership As A Route To Greater Empowerment:  Report on the Diamond 
Leadership Model.” Washington DC: USAID, December 2014. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1866/Diamond%20Model%20Report.pdf
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Development Cooperation to verify whether they were collecting this type of 
information.467  
While none of the organizations are replicating the data, both UN Women and UNDP 
had begun complementary efforts that could enhance data collection efforts for the 
Diamond Index.  UN Women is working to define and measure women’s presence in 
local leadership positions.  This includes identifying what information is available, 
documenting the existing gaps, and determining how a global and systematic data 
collection effort would best be initiated.468  Standardized data collected and available 
for local leaders at the sub-national level might neatly replace the Diamond Index 
“Tier 3 – Mayors” indicator in the future.  
UNDP’s efforts have focused on the executive branch through its Gender Equality in 
Public Administration project. This activity is collecting data on the overall number 
of women in the executive branch, including women in “decision-making positions 
in public administration.”  The Gender Equality in Public Administration project has 
currently collected data on 35 countries from five different regions.469  While definitions 
vary to some degree, “decision-making positions in public administration” could 
supplement the Diamond Index “Executive Tier 2 – Senior Executives” measure 
if globally available.  At present, it is unclear whether the UNDP project will be 
expanded to cover additional countries.  Both UN efforts are promising in their data-
gathering potential, and could add significant information to the Diamond Index. 
Apart from these two projects, however, there appears to be no other global efforts 
to disaggregate data on mayors, political party leadership, legislative committees, 
or judicial seats beyond the constitutional court.  The security sector might best be 
described as a black hole of information.  A number of the other donors noted:  “If 
you find it, be sure to share it!”  
467  At the field level, as part of the data collection process, all case study teams met with the major donors and 
NGO organizations in the country to ask about their research and available data.  The larger USAID project findings, 
including those of the Diamond Index, were presented in November 2014 in Washington, D.C.  Attending the two-
day event were leading academics, implementers, and donor partners working in this field.  This was also used as 
an opportunity to verify if we were missing any duplicative work or available data in this area.
468  A workshop held in December 2014, led by Julie Ballington, brought together leading gender experts to discuss 
the descriptive representation of women at the sub-national level and better explain the long-term process of how 
such an indicator would be mandated and collected.  While UN Women continues to move forward with this global 
measurement effort, there is no timeframe as to when the data might be available.
469  “Global Report on Gender Equality in Public Administration.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations Development 
Programme, 2014.
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5.2.4 Phase Four – Individual Contacts
Reasonably certain that the remaining data gaps would not be filled through public 
documents,  U.S. government agencies, or other donor knowledge, the final phase 
of collection entailed reaching out to expert individuals in specific countries.  Again, 
as Deputy Director of USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Center 
in 2014, I had access to a cadre of USAID democracy experts located around the 
world.  Cognizant of the fact that I could spend years trying to dig up non-public 
data – and also aware of my colleagues’ busy schedules – I chose to focus on some 
of the most glaring country gaps, especially those presenting extreme contradictory 
evidence.  In preparation for peer-to-peer requests, I spent July and August of 2015 
reviewing every data source used, verifying numbers, considering the rationale for 
how selections were made when numbers did not match, and ensuring that I fully 
understood the gaps or contradictions. I then focused on those countries where I 
had close contacts, thought it probable that the information would be available, and 
believed that the U.S. relationship with the host government might allow for sharing.
Liberia is a classic case in point on how individual USAID experts were used.  The 
Tier 3 Executive measurement – mayors of the 10 largest cities in each country – was 
surprisingly difficult to collect on a global level and revealed an enormous gap in 
women’s representation.  Out of 400 mayors (10 mayors for each of the 40 countries), 
the Diamond Index identified 25 women (6.3%).  Equally surprising, information 
from Liberia seemed to indicate that most of the 10 mayors were women.  No other 
country came close to this level of representation.  I contacted the Democracy Officer 
in the USAID/Liberia Mission to ask her to verify the state of play in the country.  Her 
team explained that 7 out of the 10 mayors were, indeed, women.  These women had 
been appointed by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as mayoral terms had expired and 
local elections have not taken place to date.  One expert also highlighted that these 
mayors had less authority, both in terms of decision-making and fiscal spending, 
than one would anticipate of a mayor in charge of a large urban center. 470 
In some instances, Mali and Madagascar 471 for example, the USAID experts were 
able to reach out to their contacts and gather data published locally or provided in 
a briefing.  Any corrections or additions made to a country’s data set were recorded 
in red on the appropriate sectoral matrix, under the country’s individual tab.  So, 
in the “Executive” matrix, “Liberia” tab, I added in red text the list of the 10 largest 
470  Many thanks to Nina Bowen and her team for providing the back story on women’s mayoral leadership in 
Liberia.
471  Also thanks to Valerie Hovetter in Mali and Corinne Rafael in Madagascar for providing such detailed data.
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cities, names and sex of each mayor, and a note explaining how this information was 
obtained and contextual insights offered from local field experts.  
In total, I worked with approximately 30 different USAID field staff.  In most 
instances, several rounds of e-mails were required to gather the full amount of 
information needed.  For example, in Timor-Leste472 the number of female officers 
was quickly provided.  It was not clear to staff, however, that I needed to calculate 
percentages, so additional rounds of e-mail went back and forth asking for the 
overall number of officers, then officers separated by rank.  Precise, clear e-mails 
detailing EXACTLY what was being requested were essential.  Aside from the five 
case-study countries, USAID field officers were not intimately involved in the day-
to-day ongoing research and the findings had not been made public to allow for a 
greater understanding of our goals.  As a result, staff members were unaware of the 
larger research context being undertaken by USAID and were operating only on the 
instructions they received, thus the need for detailed, specific directions.
5.3 COLLECTING DATA:  FROM EASY TO HARD
Of the final 12 Diamond Index decision-makers identified, only three (Tier 1 – Executive 
Ministers; Tier 3 – Legislative Members; and Tier 1 – Constitutional Court Judges) 
are collected in a systematic way and desegregated by sex.  The remaining nine 
indicators required various approaches to gather.  Table 16 is an effort to capture 
what was required and the level of difficulty.  It details:  1) sources used to gather 
data in the three branches of government, 2) rating as to the level of difficulty in 
procuring the information, and 3) explanatory notes about the challenges.  Coders 
tried to collect the most recent information available in the summer and early fall 
of 2014.  I added and adjusted data in the spring and summer of 2015.  Whenever 
possible, the most recent data was used to build the index.  Dates are recorded for 
each source of information on the sectoral matrixes under each individual country 
tab.  Because the challenges of data collection in the security sector posed a number of 
additional challenges, this sector was not included in Table 21, but will be discussed 
separately.  
  
472  Thanks to Lisa Whitney and Eugenio dos Santos Marcal at USAID/Timor-Leste for their patience in getting me 
just what was needed.
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TABLE 21:  Information Sources for the Diamond Index
No color indicates access to information was easy; light shade of medium difficulty; 
and dark shade difficult
TIER LEVEL SOURCES NOTES
EXECUTIVE
Tier 1: Cabinet Members §	 Central Intelligence 
Agency 473
§	 Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 474
§ The CIA provides the names of all cabinet 
members, although the sex of individuals is 
not identified.
§ Many countries host official ministry 
websites that feature information about 
individual ministry staff, including its 
leadership.
§ The Inter-Parliamentary Union, in 
conjunction with UN Women, publishes 
the percentage of women in ministerial 
positions by country bi-annually.  This data, 
however, combines deputy ministers with 
ministers.
Tier 2: Senior Executives §	 Government websites, 
individual experts
§	 Recent cross-national data on women in sub-
ministerial positions is not available.  The 
Diamond Index focuses on deputy ministers, 
vice ministers, and permanent secretaries.  
The majority of these positions – verses a 
broader definition of senior executives – can 
typically be found on-line.
Tier 3: Mayors of 10 
Largest Cities
§ News stories, 
government websites, 
reports, individual 
experts
§ Citymayors.com 475
§	 There is no systematic collection of data 
on mayors.  Public references to mayors 
are frequent for the larger cities and/or the 
capital.  As anticipated, moving away from 
the main urban center to the less populated 
resulted in less media coverage.   
§	 This website does have some limited utility.  
It lists the mayors, by country, of the largest 
600 cities in the world.  Smaller countries, 
however, may see only their capitals appear 
on the list.  There are also extensive gaps 
in identifying the mayors of cities in less 
developed countries.
473  Central Intelligence Agency. 2015. “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments.” (https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/world-leaders-1/)
474  Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2015. “Women in Politics: 2015.” (http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/
wmnmap15_en.pdf)
475  City Mayors. 2011. “Largest Cities and their Mayors 2011.” (http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-
cities-mayors-el2.html)
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TIER LEVEL SOURCES NOTES
LEGISLATIVE
Tier 1: Political Party 
Leaders 
§	 Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 476
§	 Central Intelligence 
Agency 477
§	 The IPU provides some narrative of party 
leaders, although it is not consistent for all 
countries and all parties.  
§	 The CIA lists all parties, percent of vote 
received, number of seats allocated, and 
party leaders.  This makes it easy to verify 
which parties have gained parliamentary 
representation.  Difficulties can arise in 
determining if the party leader is male or 
female, as only the name is listed, not the sex 
of the individual.  Verification by an expert 
within the country may be required.
Tier 2: Committee Chairs §	 Individual legislative 
and party websites
§	 There is no dataset of legislative committee 
leaderships.  Public websites, in general, 
provide this information. 
Tier 3: Representatives §	 Inter-Parliamentary 
Union 478
§	 The Diamond Index also makes use of this 
global standard for measuring women’s 
legislative representation.
JUDICIAL
Tier 1: Judges Highest 
Court 
§	 World Bank479
§	 Government 
websites
§	 The World Bank tracks the number of 
women on “constitutional courts” for each 
country.  This is a somewhat problematic 
definition as a number of countries do 
not have separate constitutional courts.  
In some countries, constitutional review 
is granted to, for example, the Supreme 
Court.  The intent of the Diamond Index is 
to capture the judicial body with the power 
of constitutional review and the country’s 
highest-level court.
§	 Governments typically have information 
about their highest court and judges posted 
on an official website.
476  Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2014. “PARLINE database on National Parliaments.” (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/
parlinesearch.asp)
477  Central Intelligence Agency. 2015. CIA Factbook. (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ic.html)
478  Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2015. (http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm)
479  World Bank. 2015. “Women, Business, and the Law.” (http://wbl.worldbank.org/data/exploretopics/going-to-
court)
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TIER LEVEL SOURCES NOTES
Tier 2: Judges Second-
Level Court(s)
§	 Government 
websites, articles, 
donor reports, NGO 
reports, individual 
experts
Because judicial systems vary, and there is no 
systematic collection of data, it becomes more 
difficult beyond the constitutional level to 
determine what is considered a second-level 
court.  In some countries this is the supreme 
court, in others an appellate court.  Some 
countries have multiple courts at this level, 
divided into civil, criminal, and administrative 
branches.  In the case of a country having 
multiple courts at the Tier 2 level, all judges 
were included.
Interpretations of judicial authority are not 
always clear.  For purposes of future research, 
every Country Scorecard explicitly notes the 
title of the court being considered at each tier 
level.  
Tier 3: Judges Third-
Level Courts
§	 Government 
websites, articles, 
donor reports, NGO 
reports, individual 
experts
This data has been little studied or collected.  
Different systems result in different court 
structures at this level.  In some countries this 
might be an appellate court, in others a regional 
court, and in some of the less-developed or 
populated countries a district court.  District 
courts may be staffed by hundreds of 
magistrates across the country.  Coders were 
able to find a number of government websites 
with lists of judges and then identify each by 
sex.  In some countries local expertise may be 
required to distinguish male/female names.  
Magistrates’ names and profiles were not 
always available.  Following on the Phase I-II 
work, I was able to add additional countries 
by using judicial experts to gather data in the 
selected country.  For most countries there was 
no perceived intent to hide the data.  It seemed 
more an issue of having it available in a single-
source format that could be publicly shared.
5.3.1 The Security Sector and its Challenges
The original intent of the Diamond Index was to capture two aspects of the security 
sector and average them together into one score.  These two components were:  1) 
the military apparatus, which generally looks outwards towards ensuring national 
security and 2) the national police, which is focused more towards internal security 
concerns.  If the security sector were to be color-coded according to level of effort 
required to collect the data, you would see a solid block of red for both the police 
and army.  
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Military Data Collection
The team understood that gathering data in the security sector would be difficult. 
Dr. Hughes and her team began by collecting data for all branches of the military – 
army, navy, and air force.480  It soon became apparent, however, that gathering this 
information was going to be more difficult and time consuming than anticipated. 
Given that a number of countries lack an air force and navy, issues of comparability 
were soon evident.  The project also had limited resources, and the time required to 
hunt down military data was quickly eating into the allocated budget.  As a result 
of quality data concerns around comparability, completeness, and cost-effectiveness, 
the team decided to focus only on the army branch of the military.
There are currently no globally comparable statistics on the number of women 
in the military.  We also know little about which leadership positions women are 
encumbering in this field.  The UN does track the overall percentage of women 
peacekeepers on mission, and has pushed to increase that number globally.481  This 
stems, in part, from the passage of UN Security Council resolution 1325 reaffirming 
the important role women play in the promotion of peace and security.482  The team 
could often find overall percentages of women in the military.  In Mozambique, 
for example, women’s overall participation in the military is reported at 5%.483 
While peacekeeping figures and general statistics can help paint a broad picture of 
women’s representation, the Diamond Index is focused on decision-makers.  Because 
the military and police are hierarchical in their decision-making, it was important to 
try and capture the varying levels of leadership and women’s representation within 
the command structure.
  
The most advanced work in this area has been undertaken by the Latin American 
Security and Defense Network (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina - 
RESDAL).   RESDAL describes itself as:  “A network that creates, strengthens and 
links the capacities and efforts of decision-makers, academics and members of civil 
society within the field of security and defence….”484  Marcela Donadio, RESDAL 
Executive Secretary, and Paz Tibiletti, President of the Executive Secretariat, have 
spent years cultivating strong relations and high levels of trust between military 
480  While I also thought it would be extremely interesting to include the intelligence agencies, I was not so naïve 
as to believe that this information would be made available.
481  United Nations. 2015. “UNPOL: Sustainable Peace through Justice and Security.”  (http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/sites/police/initiatives/globaleffort.shtml)
482  Kuehnast, Kathleen. “Why Women’s Involvement in Peacebuilding Matters.” Foreign Service Journal, April 2011.
483  Nomthandazo, Mankazana. “SADC Gender Protocol 2015: South Africa.” Gender Links, 2014.
484  Donadio, Marcela, and Maria de la Paz Tiblietti. A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean. 
Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America (RESDAL), 2010.
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leaders throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.485  According to Donadio, 
there remains significant mistrust between the security sector and outsiders.  “You 
must know someone personally within the military, and they must trust that the 
data will not be misused.  Only then will they share information.”486
RESDAL’s 2014 atlas published on security and defense is the definitive public 
voice on military budgets, structural organization, legal framework, and personnel 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.487  For many of the countries covered in the 
atlas, RESDAL provides a breakdown of personnel by rank and sex, including 
officers in command positions.  In fewer instances they are able to desegregate by 
commissioned or non-commissioned personnel.488  Financial limitations make it 
difficult for RESDAL to publish the atlas on an annual basis and extend significantly 
beyond its current regional coverage.  The organization has clearly shown, however, 
that with the right expertise and long-term commitment, gathering excellent, 
systematic, and replicable data on women in the security sector is possible.
Police Data Collection
Determining the  division of duties between army and police is not without its 
challenges.  In many countries there are organizations that have overlapping 
responsibilities between internal and external security.  We see this dual role in the 
plethora of national guard units found across most regions and the gendarmerie 
that is predominant in many Francophone countries.  Given the grey area that these 
entities straddle between the army and police, and the variation in their range of 
duties from country to country, the leadership ranks of these dual-hatted unit types 
were not included.
Countries also maintain a range of security forces, at times making it difficult to 
clearly define what constitutes “the police.”  Mexico, for example, has a state police 
system that reports to each respective state governor.  It also maintains a federal 
police system, accountable to the Secretariat of Public Security.  Looking at a range 
of quality data concerns – comparability, accuracy, and cost effectiveness – the team 
decided to narrow its focus to national police forces only.  So again returning to the 
case of Mexico, only data on the federal police – with national jurisdiction and a 
presence across the country – became the focus of attention. 
485  The process of how RESDAL collects its data was discussed in a meeting between myself, Donadio, and Tibiletti 
at USAID, Washington D.C., June 2014.
486  Interview with RESDAL director, Washington D.C., May 2015.
487  “A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean.” Latin American Network of Security and 
Defence, 2014.
488  The atlas defines the command corps as officers who have been educated at military academies from the 
beginning of their professional careers.
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Information on the police, while by no means easy, was more available than 
information on the military.  Of the 40 countries, the team was able to gather full 
data sets for the police in 20 countries (50%) and overall percentages of women in the 
police force in an additional 12 countries (30%).  Military figures, in comparison, were 
significantly lower with nine countries having full data sets (23%); overall figures for 
women in the military were gathered in another eight countries (20%).  To date, there 
is no systematic collection of police data globally, including their representation in 
leadership positions.  
A typical example of information provided is the case of Jordan:  “Women’s 
participation in police service was increased to 7%, divided between military and 
administrative functions.”489  While 7% might seem an impressive figure in light of 
neighboring countries, we have no sense of how women’s roles are divided (military 
verses administrative), nor if women are under- or over-represented in a particular 
level of officer rank. 
In general, the perception of the case study teams was that governments and sources 
were more willing to talk about women in the police than the military.  In the case 
of the Kenya team, for example, changes in the 2010 Constitution have led to an 
increase in women police officers.  While their presence is nowhere near parity, or 
even 30%, a number of interviewees acknowledged that progress was being made. 
The local press also reported that the most recent tranches of recruits had yielded 
significantly higher numbers of females.  In this instance, the openness to meet with 
the case study team and discuss women in the police may have been based on being 
able to report a “good news” story.  
It is also possible that police data is culturally considered a part of the public domain 
in a way that military data is not.  The reluctance to share police data seemed to stem 
more from the interviewee’s lack of authority to meet the request (thus higher-level 
approval was required) or that the information was not readily available in a single 
spreadsheet or fact sheet for public consumption.490
  
In attempting to collect data on the security sector, both police and army, no 
proverbial rock was left unturned.  Along with RESDAL, an important source of 
information was the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
489  “National Report: Progress of Jordanian Women In Pursuit of Justice, Participation and Equality 2010-2011.” 
Amman, Jordan: The Jordanian National Commission for Women (JNCW), 2011.
490  Of course, it is also possible that excuses such as lack of authority or publically presentable data are another 
way, although perhaps more diplomatically, of simply saying no. 
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and its country reports.491  These reports often provided both overall and detailed 
figures for women’s participation in the military and police for the individual 
country analyzed.  Other sources consulted to try and glean insights into the 
security sector world included:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United 
Nations Democracy Fund, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
United Nations Development Program, UN Women, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Southern African Development Community, government reports and websites, non-
governmental organization reports and websites, journals, media articles, speeches, 
and blogs.  
Once all sources and documents had been tapped for information, the security sector 
demonstrated how on-the-ground experts could be extremely valuable.  In several 
instances, Timor-Leste for example, the USAID staff was able to find exactly what 
was required.  In others, such as Mali, the USAID gender expert found data for the 
police but not the military.  Finally, in some of the most difficult countries, such as 
Tunisia, in-country experts confirmed that the door on this data was firmly shut and 
time would be better spent on other countries.
It should be noted that the data collected in the security sector varies greatly by 
date, source, and reliability.  The team undertook a heroic effort in attempting 
to gather information never before collected, using every public tool available, 
individual contacts, as well as large doses of patience and persistence.  Rather than 
being discouraged by the gaps in data, I was encouraged by the significant amount 
we were able to find.  The Diamond Index sets a baseline for what data is available, 
and underscores that even developing countries, in data-scarce environments, can 
provide the needed information if there is the will to do so.
5.4 MISSING DATA
There were a number of challenges associated with accessing data, especially given 
the type of information required and countries targeted.  Like other indexes, the 
Diamond Index remains interested in tracking the descriptive representation of 
women in government.  This includes measuring percentages of women within 
formal institutions.  Unlike other efforts, however, the model dictates that data be 
collected on identified decision-making positions within each sector.  
491  Thanks to Anja Ebnöther from DCAF whose keen interest in this work included her participation in the project’s 
final two-day conference where all results were reported. (http://www.dcaf.ch).
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Of the 480 data points attempted for the 40 countries (12 per country) a total of 
416 were collected (86.7%).  The team anticipated that data collection would be 
the most difficult in the security sector as it attempted to disaggregate data on the 
command structure rather than overall percentages of women in the police.  Team 
members were not disappointed in their expectations.  Of the missing 64 indicators, 
2 remained uncollected in the legislative branch, 6 in the executive branch, 12 in the 
judiciary, and 44 in the security sector.  Table 22 highlights the missing indicators per 
sector for each of the 40 countries.
TABLE 22:  Missing Diamond Index Indicators by Domain
COUNTRIES EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY TOTAL
MISSING
1. Kyrgyzstan - - 3 3 6
2. Tunisia - - 2 3 5
3. Algeria 1 1 1 2 5
4. Senegal 1 - 1 2 4
5. Mongolia 1 - - 3 4
6. Niger 2 - 2 - 4
7. Ukraine - - - 3 3
8. Benin - 1 - 2 3
9. Madagascar - - 1 2 3
10. Mozambique - - 1 2 3
11. Iraq - - - 3 3
12. Morocco - - - 3 3
13. Jordan - - - 2 2
14. Lebanon - - - 2 2
15. Yemen - - - 2 2
16. Colombia - - - 2 2
17. Cambodia - - - 2 2
18. Philippines - - - 2 2
19. Ghana - - - 2 2
20. Liberia - - - 2 2
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21. India - - 1 - 1
22. Burkina Faso 1 - - - 1
23. Albania - - - - 0
24. Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina
- - - - 0
25. Georgia - - - - 0
26. Brazil - - - - 0
27. Guatemala - - - - 0
28. Haiti - - - - 0
29. Mexico - - - - 0
30. Bangladesh - - - - 0
31. Indonesia - - - - 0
32. Nepal - - - - 0
33. Timor-Leste - - - - 0
34. Thailand - - - - 0
35. Cote d’Ivoire - - - - 0
36. Kenya - - - - 0
37. Mali - - - - 0
38. Nigeria - - - - 0
39. Rwanda - - - - 0
40. South Africa - - - - 0
TOTAL MISSING 6 2 12 44 64
In terms of indicator collection by region, Latin America/Caribbean was the most 
successful with an average of 11.6 indicators gathered out of a possible 12, as seen in 
Table 23.  This is due primarily to the excellent work of RESDAL, which partnered 
on this project.  Through its extensive network, RESDAL was able to gather security 
sector data on four of the five countries in the region.492  The organization appears 
unique in its mandated focus on the security sector and ability to collect this type 
of information annually.  Unfortunately, due to financial and human resource 
constraints, the organization remains geographically limited in its coverage.  
492  “A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean.” Latin American Network of Security and 
Defence, 2014.
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TABLE 23:  Average Number of Indicators Collected by Region
Latin America 
Caribbean
Asia Africa Eastern Europe
Eurasia
Middle East
North Africa
11.6 11.0 10.5 10.2 8.9
Excluding the expertise of RESDAL, there was more uniformity in collection, with 
Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe/Eurasia collecting 11.0, 10.5, and 10.2 indicators, 
respectively.  The Middle East/North Africa region proved the most difficult region 
in which to gather information, with an average of 8.9 indicators across the seven 
countries.  Somewhat surprisingly, information was quite accessible in the three main 
branches of government in this region.  Out of 63 possible indicators (3 indicators in 
3 domains x 7 countries), only 5 data points were unavailable (7.9%).  The difference 
in scoring between the Middle East /North Africa and other regions results from 
the dearth of public information in the security sector.  Even having strong contacts 
in a number of the countries – and sending a team into Lebanon to specifically ask 
experts and government officials – cumulatively turned up little data. 
How to handle missing data – in particular within the security sector – required 
extensive thought and deliberation.  In some composite indicators, data gaps result 
in a country’s exclusion.  Plantenga alternatively proposed, when developing the 
framework for the Gender Equality Index, to insert the average European Union 
score for data gaps.493  So if Portugal, as an example, was missing the data point for 
women’s share of regional assembly member seats, the overall European average 
score would be inserted to allow for a full data set and inclusion of the country.   This 
is a reasonable approach given the availability of information for most EU countries 
and confidence that once all countries are averaged you would have an accurate 
reflection of the missing data.  
Using this methodology with the Diamond Index is not as straightforward.  First, 
Plantenga averages among countries all within the same region, even if countries 
varied widely in their scores.  The Diamond Index looks at a total of 40 countries 
across five different regions.  Africa has the largest number of countries included 
(14), followed by Asia (9), the Middle East and North Africa (7), Latin America and 
the Caribbean (5), and Eastern Europe and Eurasia (5).  Given the limited number 
of countries included from several of the regions, it is difficult to say with any 
certainty that an “average” score is fully reflective.  In the Latin America/Caribbean 
493  Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender 
Equality Index.” Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
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region, five countries in total were mapped (Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, 
and Mexico).  Of the five countries, only Colombia was missing a full data set in 
the security sector.  While one might argue that from the other four countries a 
reasonable average could be ascertained, one might also argue that the five-country 
set used is absent numerous important states which, if included, might influence the 
final score in either direction.  
As seen from Table 22, the vast majority of data gaps occurred in the security 
sector.  Focusing on the executive, legislative, and judicial domains only, 20 data 
points (6.0%) were missing out of a possible 333 (37 countries x 9 data points = 
333).  In looking only at the security domain, 20 countries in total (50.0%) included 
all three security data points (Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3).  Scores were weighted and 
calculated if only one data point was missing from any domain.  I did not attempt to 
insert a regional average given the limited number of countries used in three of the 
regions (Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East/North Africa, and Eastern Europe/
Eurasia) and lack of confidence that any average calculated was reflective of the 
larger region.  If more than one data point was missing from any domain, then no 
score was calculated for either that domain nor a final country score.  Each Country 
Scorecard (Annex B) clearly indicates, by tier and domain, where data gaps exist. 
All of the Middle East/North Africa countries were a “black hole” of security 
sector information.  Despite the teams’ best efforts, little data emerged.  Overall 
percentages of women in the police force were found for four of the seven countries: 
Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen.  This overall percentage was used as the 
Tier 3 measure as a reasonable approximation reflecting the percentage of Lower-
Level Officers.  This methodology was used for the Middle East as well as the other 
regions.494  If the overall percentage of women in the police force was the only data 
point available, however, no score was achieved in the domain (as the percentage of 
Mid-Level Officers – Tier 2 and Top-Level Officers – Tier 1 could not be calculated 
without more specific information).  As a result, only 20 countries out of the 40 met 
the high bar of reporting sufficient data in the security sector to warrant a final score. 
While commitments to increase women’s participation (codified in such international 
documents as the Beijing Platform for Action and Resolution 1325) require 
reporting information be made available on a country, regional, and international 
basis, reporting expectations have not been realized to date.  As more police and 
military open their doors to women’s participation, we would expect to see better 
494   This methodology was selected based on the close correlation between the overall percentage of women 
in the police force and Tier 3 (female Low-Level Officers).  A total of 13 countries recorded both percentages. 
Averaged together, Tier 3 female officers totaled 9.4% while overall number of women in the police force totaled 
8.6%.    
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disaggregated data emerge and more accurate modeling of women’s leadership 
status in security sector institutions.  Until that time, however, the Diamond Index at 
least provides a starting point for further discussion. 
5.5 CONCLUSION
The Diamond Index focuses on capturing a greater breadth of descriptive representation 
across the three branches of government and the security sector while also paying 
greater attention to specific decision-making positions in formal government.  This 
wider selection of indicators – gathered both horizontally across institutions and 
vertically within institutions – can together help create a more nuanced picture of 
women’s representation throughout government and access to decision-making 
positions of authority.  
At the end of all four collection phases, significant headway was made in gathering 
new data for the Diamond Index.  In total, a full data set was collected for 18 (45%) 
of the 40 countries.  Examining only the executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
resulted in a full data set for 29 (72.5%) of the 40 countries.  Within these same three 
domains the collection teams were able to gather 8 out of 9 indicators for 35 (87.5%) 
of the 40 countries.  Table 24 details percentages of countries in relation to the 
number of indicators collected. 
TABLE 24:  Number/Percentage of Indicators Collected for the Diamond Index 
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INDICATORS COLLECTED % OF TOTAL 40 COUNTRIES
18 12 45.0%
2 11 5.0%
8 10 20.0%
6 9 15.0%
3 8 7.5%
2 7 5.0%
1 6 2.5%
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In summarizing the 40-country pilot data collection effort, there are several themes 
worth highlighting:
§ The breadth and depth of data required to build the Diamond Index – as a more 
nuanced measure of women’s formal political leadership – was successfully 
collected across the 40-country sample in the executive, legislative, and 
judicial sectors primarily through access to public data.  In using public data, 
however, quality data concerns around the accuracy of the data must be taken 
seriously.  Public sources are often contradictory and require a methodology 
for reconciling different information.  
§ Security sector information was not collected at the level of detail required 
in the majority of instances, either through public data or the use of personal 
contacts.  This was especially true for military data.  Attitudes do, however, 
seem more open towards discussing and sharing information about women in 
the police.  Relevant data was found in 34 of the 40 (85%) countries, although 
this information was often limited to the overall percentage of women 
represented in an individual country’s police or military force.  Quality data 
concerns around the accuracy, timeliness, and disaggregation of decision-
making positions remain relevant for the security sector.  
§ The capacity to reach back to an extensive network of on-the-ground global 
experts in the democracy field was useful when trying to gather targeted data 
points, in particular security sector information, in the most challenging data-
scarce environments.  While very specific questions or clarifications could be 
addressed, relying on individuals to gather wider levels of information was 
not deemed cost efficient.
§ The ability to find significant levels of data for the 40 pilot countries – while not 
without is challenges – speaks to its availability.  Cultural constraints, mistrust 
of institutional “outsiders,” and weak demand for greater transparency are all 
stifling access to information, rather than the lack of information itself.
The current perception exists that data on women’s political representation 
is extremely limited.  This research effort, while not without its challenges, 
demonstrated that more data exists in the public domain than has been previously 
recognized.  There is also an acknowledgement by governments that much, if not all, 
of the data on the identified 12 decision-makers, disaggregated by sex, already exists. 
The difficulty lies in its lack of availability to the public to allow for its transparent 
and systematic collection.
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The ultimate objective, either through the Diamond Index approach or others, is 
to improve descriptive representational efforts in order to shed more light and 
understanding around women’s political access and inequality.  If the data already 
exists, as was perceived through this academic exercise, then future efforts must 
increasingly focus on how to make that information publically available. 
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Mapping the Diamond Index in 40 Countries
Women hold approximately 18% of the ministerial 
positions, with the majority overseeing social sectors, 
such as education and the family.495
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In an effort to increase understanding of women’s descriptive representation in the 
formal political arena, I developed the Diamond Index as a tool to test whether global 
quality data can be collected to broaden the current set of indicators being used in 
this space.  The index identifies a total of 12 decision-making positions from the 
executive, legislative, judicial, and security domains that are consistently found 
across the majority of countries.  A total of 40 pilot countries were selected and then 
mapped according to the Diamond Index methodology.  
This chapter presents the data collected in an 18-month period between 2014 to 
2015.  The research is designed to answer the overarching question: Can quality data 
measuring women’s positions of formal political decision-making be collected on 
a global scale?  In addition, two sub-components of the research question are also 
explored through the data:
1)  To what extent are women accessing decision-making positions horizontally across formal 
government and the security sector?
2) To what extent are women accessing decision-making positions vertically across formal 
government and the security sector?
While the main research question attempts to examine the quality and quantity of 
global data, the sub-questions shed more nuance on women’s descriptive political 
representation both horizontally across institutions and vertically within institutions. 
Looking only at percentages of women, these two questions attempt to further 
495  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Women in Politics.” 2017.
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examine the phenomenon of glass walls and glass ceilings within the political sector. 
While the main research question uncovers global trends regarding the availability 
of political data on women, the two sub-questions present an unweighted 
representational picture of how that data is dispersed across governments.
The chapter begins with a rank ordering of all 40 countries according to their scores 
from highest to lowest.  Separate indexes were then created according to each of the 
four domains in order to visualize how countries compared to one another in relation to 
each selected branch of government.  Countries were then examined by geographical 
clustering.  This allowed for an examination of similarities and differences across the 
five regions selected.  Finally, horizontal and vertical representation were examined. 
This included looking first at the percentage of women encumbering different 
positions and then at trends emerging from geographic clusters of countries.
Because the Diamond Index represents only one moment in time, it is impossible 
to conclude whether women are moving across varying levels of decision-making 
authority.  One data collection point can only present the current state-of-play in 
any respective country.  Looking at the data across 40 countries and five regions, 
however, does allow for certain patterns to emerge for further consideration.
6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE DIAMOND INDEX IN 40 COUNTRIES
Of the 40 countries analyzed for the Diamond Index, 18 (45%) of those countries 
collected 100% of the selected indicators across all four dimensions.  An overall 
score of 50 (12.5 in each sector) represents approximate parity between men and 
women among the identified decision-making positions.  A maximum score of 100 
indicates all decision-making positions are held by women while a score of zero 
would indicate women are not present in any of the positions.  Table 25 highlights 
the 18 countries with full scores in rank order from highest to lowest.  
TABLE 25:  20 Countries with Full Diamond Index 2015 Scores
COUNTRY
RANKING
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
1. South Africa 9.5 7.6 6.0 7.0 30.1
2. Rwanda 9.5 7.8 9.2 1.4 27.9
3.  Kenya 6.4 4.1 8.0 2.0 20.5
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4. Albania 6.2 4.4 5.9 2.0 18.5
5. Bosnia-Herz. 2.6 2.5 11.6 1.1 17.8
6. Timor-Leste 3.0 4.0 8.9 1.8 17.7
7. Georgia 5.0 2.5 8.4 1.5 17.4
8. Guatemala 4.8 4.0 6.4 1.8 17.0
9. Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2 15.3
10. Nigeria 5.0 1.7 6.7 1.5 14.9
11. Mexico 4.4 3.5 4.5 1.5 13.9
12. Brazil 4.5 0.8 4.4 3.6 13.3
13. Mali 2.5 2.5 6.6 1.1 12.7
14. Indonesia 3.1 3.7 2.0 1.7 10.5
15. Bangladesh 1.7 4.3 2.7 1.3 10.0
16. Nepal 1.9 3.6 1.3 0.3 7.1
17. Haiti 3.6 0.2 2.9 0.2 6.9
18.  Thailand 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.6
Of the remaining countries not fully scored, the security sector proved a data 
collection impediment for 19 of the 20 countries.  The countries of Tunisia and 
Kyrgyzstan also lacked data in the judiciary and no score was calculated for either. 
Niger was the single country, out of 40, to have a full security data set but lack 
sufficient information in other domains (executive and judicial) to calculate a score.496 
Table 26 shows all 40 countries.  Scores were calculated if only the security sector 
was missing.  
TABLE 26:  Diamond Index 2015 Scores of all 40 Countries
COUNTRY
RANKING
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
1. South Africa 9.5 7.6 6.0 7.0 30.1
2. Rwanda 9.5 7.8 9.2 1.4 27.9
3. Kenya 6.4 4.1 8.0 2.0 20.5
4. Albania 6.2 4.4 5.9 2.0 18.5
5. Bosnia-Herz. 2.6 2.5 11.6 1.1 17.8
6. Timor-Leste 3.0 4.0 8.9 1.8 17.7
7. Philippines 6.2 5.1 6.3 - 17.6
496  Individual Diamond Index Country Scorecards (Annex B) detail how scores were calculated and where data gaps 
exist.  
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COUNTRY
RANKING
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
8. Georgia 5.0 2.5 8.4 1.5 17.4
9. Burkina Faso 2.6 2.5 10.4 1.7 17.2
10. Guatemala 4.8 4.0 6.4 1.8 17.0
11. Mongolia 3.1 3.6 9.7 - 16.4
12. Liberia 8.4 1.5 6.4 - 16.3
13. Colombia 6.8 4.3 4.8 - 15.9
14. Ghana 5.5 2.1 7.8 - 15.4
15. Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2 15.3
16. Nigeria 5.0 1.7 6.7 1.5 14.9
17. Madagascar 4.3 4.6 5.9 - 14.8
18. Mozambique 5.2 4.7 4.4 - 14.3
19. Benin 4.6 2.1 7.2 - 13.9
20. Mexico 4.4 3.5 4.5 1.5 13.9
21. Brazil 4.5 0.8 4.4 3.6 13.3
22. Mali 2.5 2.5 6.6 1.1 12.7
23. Algeria 2.3 2.0 7.4 - 11.7
24. India 2.4 6.2 1.9 1.1 11.5
25. Ukraine 2.8 3.0 5.0 - 10.8
26. Indonesia 3.1 3.7 2.0 1.7 10.5
27. Senegal 3.0 5.6 1.0 - 10.4
28. Cambodia 2.2 3.6 4.4 - 10.2
29. Bangladesh 1.7 4.3 2.7 1.3 10.0
30. Morocco 3.0 2.6 3.8 - 9.4
31. Nepal 1.9 3.6 1.3 0.3 7.1
32. Haiti 3.6 0.2 2.9 0.2 6.9
33. Jordan 2.2 1.9 1.6 - 5.7
34. Lebanon 0.9 1.2 1.5 - 3.6
35.  Iraq 0.8 2.3 0.5 - 3.6
36. Thailand 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.6
37. Yemen 2.2 0.0 0.1 - 2.3
38. Tunisia 4.4 3.4 - - -
39. Kyrgyzstan 3.0 2.2 - - -
40. Niger - 3.6 - 0.9 -
- Insufficient Data to Calculate Score
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Of the 40 countries selected, more than 26 points separate the highest-scoring country, 
South Africa, from the lowest scoring country, Yemen.  Visually, the difference is 
quite dramatic when mapped.  South Africa has all 12 data points included.  Yemen 
includes all data points for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.  Both 
countries’ Diamond Index scores are presented in Graph 6.
GRAPH 6:  Diamond Index Scores for South Africa and Yemen
South Africa
Diamond Index Score = 30.1
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
Executive - 9.5
Legislative - 7.6
Judiciary - 6.0
Security - 7.0
Yemen
Diamond Index Score = 2.3 (minus security)
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
Executive - 2.2
Legislative - 0.0
Judiciary - 0.1
Security - NA
While the security sector is not calculated in the current Yemeni score, given the stark 
absence of women throughout the government and police,497 it is unlikely that there 
would be a significant boost in score if all officer positions in the police were weighted 
and included.  South Africa, on the other hand, was the only country to exhibit the 
strong representation of women in the security sector and the semblance of a robust 
diamond representing progress towards parity in all four domains.  A much more 
typical configuration for a country was a triangle shape with the judiciary score 
often exceeding other domains, as seen in Mali, paired with a low security score. 
The combined 40-country average exhibits as a small diamond, although again the 
judiciary outscores the other three domains.  Scores for Mali and the 40-country 
Diamond Index average  are presented in Graph 7.
497 Yemen’s police forces contained 168,996 men and 2,868 women (1.7%):  Al-Methaq. “Yemen: female police 
surveillance of terrorists in the security points and at the entrances to major cities.” 14 October 2010. 
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GRAPH 7:  Diamond Index Score for Mali and the 40-Country Average498
Mali
Diamond Index Score = 12.7
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The global average score of 13.6 – with conversely a male global average of 86.4 – 
indicates that women’s representation in decision-making positions is less than one-
sixth men’s representation according to the Diamond Index scoring methodology, 
with the concept of parity a futuristic vision rather than today’s reality.  Table 27 
highlights regional and global average scores in each of the model’s four domains 
across the 40-country sample.  Again, a score of 12.5 in each domain would 
approximate male-female parity.
TABLE 27:  Diamond Index 2015 Weighted Scores by Region and Global Average
REGIONAL AVERAGE SCORES EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Eastern Europe/Eurasia 3.9 2.9 7.7 1.5
Latin America/Caribbean 4.8 2.6 4.6 1.8
Asia 2.7 3.9 4.3 1.1
Africa 5.4 3.8 6.7 2.2
Middle East/North Africa 2.3 1.9 2.5 NA
TOTAL 19.1 15.1 25.7 6.6
GLOBAL AVERAGE SCORES 3.8 3.0 5.1 1.7
498  Diamond Index graphs of all countries and regions can be found in Annex A.  
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Glass Walls – Overview
Looking horizontally across government, with the exception of security, we see 
significant numbers of women represented in all three branches.  In no area, however, 
have women decision-makers achieved the popular 30% critical mass benchmark 
when reviewing averages across all 40 countries.  Overall, appointments within the 
judiciary are moving closest to 30%, and all three tiers in this branch outscored their 
equivalents in the other domains.  Tier 3 judicial positions scored especially high, 
with an average of 27.1% women occupying this decision-making position. The 
judiciary was also the only area to have all three tiers of women’s representation 
exceed 10%.  Conversely, strong glass walls would appear to be erected around 
the security sector.  All three tiers of security scored below 10% representation. 
The distribution of women by percentage across the four domains is highlighted in 
Table 28.
TABLE 28: Global Percentage of Women by Horizontal Distribution  
(Glass Walls)
Percent Executive Legislative Judicial Security 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X
6-10 X X X X
11-15
16-20 X X X X X X
21-25
26-30 X
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
Average 16.8 18.3 6.0 6.0 18.2 19.2 18.0 20.1 27.2 4.8 7.6 8.3
Glass Ceilings – Overview
In all regions there appears to be the existence of a “glass ceiling,” with higher 
percentages of women inhibiting Tiers 2 and 3.  Most noticeably, women are clustered 
in lower levels within the judicial and security domains.  Within the executive, the 
contrast between Tier 1 positions and Tier 2 positions was less apparent.  Percentages 
208
Chapter 6 Mapping the Diamond Index in 40 Countries
are closer between senior executives (Tier 2 – 18.3%) and ministerial positions (Tier 1 
– 16.8%).  In the legislative branch, the percentage of women parliamentarians (Tier 
3 – 19.2%) aligns closely with the percentage of committee chairs (Tier 2 – 18.2%).  It 
would appear that women elected or appointed to parliament are also being elected 
or appointed to head committees in roughly equal measure.
     
An exception to the appearance of the glass ceiling is found within the executive. 
For a glass ceiling to be present, the expectation is that Tier 3 and Tier 2 positions 
– those with lesser authority – would have higher percentages of women than 
Tier 1 positions.  This pattern holds true for the legislative, judicial, and security 
domains.  Within the executive branch, however, there is a stark absence of women 
in the Tier 3 category of mayoral positions.  Globally, out of 385 top urban centers 
measured, women were found to occupy 23 positions.499  If you subtract Liberia’s 
unique situation, in which eight mayors were appointed by the president due to 
delayed local elections, there are 15 women mayors or 3.9%.  The story is similar 
for political party leadership (Legislative, Tier 1) where numbers of women present 
were strikingly low.  In total, women led 6.0% of the parties that hold seats in lower 
houses.
As noted earlier, the percentage of women in the security sector falls below 10% in 
all three tiers.  This was anticipated given the small overall percentage of women 
in police institutions as a whole.  Women seem to be making the most gains in the 
lower-level officer ranks of police forces.  The distribution of women by percentage 
across the three tiers within each domain is highlighted in Table 29. 
499   No Tier 3 data was found for Niger; only data on the top five cities for Ghana was available.  This resulted in a 
total of 385 available data points out of a possible 400.
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TABLE 29:  Global Percent of Women by Vertical Distribution (Glass Ceiling)
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
Judicial
Constitutional X
Supreme Court X
High Court X
Security 
Sr.-level officers X
Mid-level officers X
Low-level officers X
EXECUTIVE: 16.8-18.3-6.0 LEGISLATIVE: 6.0-18.2-19.2 JUDICIARY: 18.0-20.1-27.2 SECURITY: 4.8-7.6-8.3
6.3 DIAMOND INDEX – EXECUTIVE DOMAIN
Overview
Within the executive domain, the 40-country average score was 3.8 on the Diamond 
Index (based on a maximum score of 25, with 12.5 approaching parity).  Women 
appear in significant percentages at the Tier 1 Ministers level (16.8%) as well as Tier 
2 Senior Executives (18.3%).  Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 decision-makers are typically 
appointed through an executive process.  While both may be open to further 
confirmation procedures, through the legislative branch for example, they are not 
voted on by the general populace.  This stands in sharp contrast to the number of 
Tier 3 Mayors (6.0%), a position that may be gained through appointment, a voting 
process, or combination of the two.   
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Despite low percentages and scores in mayoral positions, the executive was the 
second highest-scoring domain.  A total of 15 executive scores (41%) outperformed 
judicial scores in the 37 countries that allowed for comparison (no judicial scores were 
calculated for Tunisia, Kyrgyzstan, or Niger).  However, the executive outscored the 
legislative domain in 27 (69%) of the 39 countries compared (no executive score was 
calculated for Niger).  Countries from the Asia region in my sample proved to be 
the exception to this trend.  Of the nine Asian countries measured, seven legislative 
scores outperformed the executive.500  
Conversely, Africa seems to be making the most significant headway in accessing 
executive branch political power with the leading average score of 5.2 compared to 
the 40-country average of 3.8.  In total, African countries in my sample hold six of 
the top ten slots in the executive domain of the Diamond Index.  Countries within my 
sample from Asia and the Middle East regions equally divide the last 10 slots in the 
executive domain.
The highest ranking Tier 1 decision-maker was identified as a minister.  The Tier 
2 measure – senior executives – was typically occupied by a higher percentage of 
women than positions of minister.  (Latin America/Caribbean was the exception 
to this trend.)  In total among the 40 countries, there was less than a 2% difference 
between the percentage of ministers (16.8%) and senior executives (18.3%).  The 
Tier 3 measurement – mayors of the 10 largest cities in each country – revealed an 
enormous gap in women’s representation.  If we set aside the special case of Liberia, 
women comprised 3.9% of the total number of mayors found in the 10 largest cities 
across the 40 countries mapped.  Table 30 documents the straight percentage of 
women in the executive branch according to each tier level and averaged by region 
for the selected countries.
TABLE 30:  Percent of Women in the Executive Branch by Tier and Region
 Eastern 
Europe/
Eurasia
Latin 
America/ 
Caribbean
Asia Africa Middle 
East/ 
N. Africa
Total Global
Average
EXECUTIVE
Tier 1 15.9 24.2 11.1 23.8 9.0 84.4 16.8
Tier 2 21.2 18.5 12.7 25.7 13.4 91.5 18.3
Tier 3 4.0 6.0 6.7 11.7 1.4 29.8 6.0
500  Those countries with higher legislative domain scores included:  Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Senegal, Iraq, Lebanon, and Ukraine.
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While percentages of women in each tier is important if we remain interested 
in tracking towards a critical mass or parity in these areas, we must also look at 
weighted scores established by the Diamond Index given the varying levels of 
authority accorded different tiers and decision-making positions.  The 40-country 
executive Diamond Index score achieved an average of 3.8 out of a possible 25 points 
(with 25 representing all decision-making positions filled by women).  Table 31 
provides all 40 countries according to their weighted index executive score, ranked 
from highest to lowest.  
TABLE 31:  Executive Rankings:  Diamond Index 2015 
ALL 
COUNTRIES
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Global Executive Average Score = 3.8
1. South Africa 9.5 7.6 6.0 7.0 30.1
2. Rwanda 9.5 7.8 9.2 1.4 27.9
3. Liberia 8.4 1.5 6.4 - 16.3
4. Colombia 6.8 4.3 4.8 - 15.9
5. Kenya 6.4 4.1 8.0 2.0 20.5
6. Philippines 6.2 5.1 6.3 - 17.6
7. Albania 6.2 4.4 5.9 2.0 18.5
8. Ghana 5.5 2.1 7.8 - 15.4
9. Mozambique 5.2 4.7 4.4 - 14.3
10. Georgia 5.0 2.5 8.4 1.5 17.4
11. Nigeria 5.0 1.7 6.7 1.5 14.9
12. Guatemala 4.8 4.0 6.4 1.8 17.0
13. Benin 4.6 2.1 7.2 - 13.9
14. Brazil 4.5 0.8 4.4 3.6 13.3
15. Mexico 4.4 3.5 4.5 1.5 13.9
16. Tunisia 4.4 3.4 - - -
17. Madagascar 4.3 4.6 5.9 - 14.8
18. Haiti 3.6 0.2 2.9 0.2 6.9
19. Mongolia 3.1 3.6 9.7 - 16.4
20. Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2 15.3
21. Indonesia 3.1 3.7 2.0 1.7 10.5
22. Timor-Leste 3.0 4.0 8.9 1.8 17.7
23. Senegal 3.0 5.6 1.0 - 10.4
24. Morocco 3.0 2.6 3.8 - 9.4
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ALL 
COUNTRIES
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Global Executive Average Score = 3.8
25. Kyrgyzstan 3.0 2.2 - - -
26. Ukraine 2.8 3.0 5.0 - 10.8
27. Bosnia-Herz. 2.6 2.5 11.6 1.1 17.8
28. Burkina Faso 2.6 2.5 10.4 1.7 17.2
29. Mali 2.5 2.5 6.6 1.1 12.7
30. India 2.4 6.2 1.9 1.1 11.5
31. Algeria 2.3 2.0 7.4 - 11.7
32. Cambodia 2.2 3.6 4.4 - 10.2
33. Jordan 2.2 1.9 1.6 - 5.7
34. Yemen 2.2 0.0 0.1 - 2.3
35. Nepal 1.9 3.6 1.3 0.3 7.1
36. Bangladesh 1.7 4.3 2.7 1.3 10.0
37. Thailand 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.6
38. Lebanon 0.9 1.2 1.5 - 3.6
39. Iraq 0.8 2.3 0.5 - 3.6
40. Niger - 3.6 - 0.9 -
-  Unable to calculate score
Regional Highlights
Looking at all executive scores reinforces that while women are present in the 
executive branch, interesting differences appear when we examine the data across 
regions.  Sample countries in the two regions of Africa and Latin America/Caribbean 
scored first and second, respectively, as seen in Table 30.  Africa garners the highest 
average with 5.2 (again out of a total score of 25 with 12.5 approaching parity).  This is 
achieved through the index’s highest scores of South Africa, Rwanda, and Liberia.501 
Kenya, with its 2010 constitution mandating one-third of all elected and appointed 
positions for women, is also among the higher-scoring countries at 6.4.  The five 
lowest-scoring countries in this region are all from West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal).  
The sample countries from the regions of Asia and Middle East/North Africa 
were ranked respectively fourth and fifth, with scores close to one another.  Asia’s 
501  Calculating Liberia’s score without Tier 3 Mayors, all appointed by the president, results in an executive score 
of 24.3 putting it in fourth place behind South Africa, Rwanda, and Kenya.
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executive score averaged 2.7 across nine countries while the Middle East/North 
Africa averaged 2.3 across seven countries.  Despite India and Bangladesh having a 
history of women leaders at the highest executive level, both countries scored low 
in this domain.
Among the seven Middle East/North African countries, Morocco was the bright spot 
with a score of 3.0.  This resulted from having the highest ministerial representation 
of women (15.8%) and the sole woman mayor of a large urban center.  Table 32 
represents the Diamond Index scores across the 40 countries organized by region with 
the executive branch highlighted.
TABLE 32:  Diamond Index 2015 – Weighted Executive Scores by Region
REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Eastern Europe/Eurasia – 3.9 Average Score
  Albania 6.2 4.4 5.9 2.0 18.5
  Georgia 5.0 2.5 8.4 1.5 17.4
  Kyrgyzstan 3.0 2.2 - - -
  Ukraine 2.8 3.0 5.0 - 10.8
  Bosnia-Herz. 2.6 2.5 11.6 1.1 17.8
Latin America/Caribbean – 4.8 Average Score
  Colombia 6.8 4.3 4.8 - 15.9
  Guatemala 4.8 4.0 6.4 1.8 17.0
  Brazil 4.5 0.8 4.4 3.6 13.3
  Mexico 4.4 3.5 4.5 1.5 13.9
  Haiti 3.6 0.2 2.9 0.2 6.9
Asia – 2.7 Average Score
  Philippines 6.2 5.1 6.3 - 17.6
  Mongolia 3.1 3.6 9.7 - 16.4
  Indonesia 3.1 3.7 2.0 1.7 10.5
  Timor-Leste 3.0 4.0 8.9 1.8 17.7
  India 2.4 6.2 1.9 1.1 11.6
  Cambodia 2.2 3.6 4.4 - 10.2
  Nepal 1.9 3.6 1.3 0.3 7.1
  Bangladesh 1.7 4.3 2.7 1.3 10.0
  Thailand 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.4 3.6
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REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREEXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Africa – 5.2 Average Score
  South Africa 9.5 7.6 6.0 7.0 30.1
  Rwanda 9.5 7.8 9.2 1.4 27.9
  Liberia 8.4 1.5 6.4 - 16.3
  Kenya 6.4 4.1 8.0 2.0 20.5
  Ghana 5.5 2.1 7.8 - 15.4
  Mozambique 5.2 4.7 4.4 - 14.3
  Nigeria 5.0 1.7 6.7 1.5 14.9
  Benin 4.6 2.1 7.2 - 13.9
  Madagascar 4.3 4.6 5.9 - 14.8
  Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2 15.3
  Senegal 3.0 5.6 1.0 - 9.6
  Burkina Faso 2.6 2.5 10.4 1.7 17.2
  Mali 2.5 2.5 6.6 1.1 12.7
  Niger - 3.6 - 0.9 -
Middle East/North Africa – 2.3 Average Score
  Tunisia 4.4 3.4 - - -
  Morocco 3.0 2.6 3.8 - 9.4
  Algeria 2.3 2.0 7.4 - 11.7
  Jordan 2.2 1.9 1.6 - 5.7
  Yemen 2.2 0.0 0.1 - 2.3
  Lebanon 0.9 1.2 1.5 - 3.6
  Iraq 0.8 2.3 0.5 - 3.6
Global Average Executive Score – 3.8 
-  Unable to calculate score
6.4 DIAMOND INDEX – LEGISLATIVE DOMAIN
Overview
In the legislative domain, the 40-country average achieved a score of 3.0 on the 
Diamond Index (based on a maximum score of 25, with 12.5 approaching parity). 
Women appear in significant percentages at the Tier 2 Committee Chair level 
(18.2%) as well as the Tier 3 Legislators (19.3%).  Tier 1 Political Party Leaders scored 
significantly lower, with an average of 6.0% female representation in this decision-
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making position.  Women were strikingly absent from the Tier 1 position in all 
regions within the research sample, with Asia scoring the highest at 11.1% women in 
party leadership positions.  
In examining the percentage of women holding Tier 2 committee leadership 
positions, it generally appears in proportion to the number of legislative seats held. 
So, as women are gaining legislative seats, they are also gaining access to committee 
leadership.  What the Diamond Index does not attempt to measure, however, is 
which committee chairs women are gaining.   Based on the analysis of ministerial 
appointments in 117 countries by Krook and O’Brien,502 one might assume that 
women are disproportionately assigned to “lower-prestige” committees.  Currently, 
there exists insufficient data on legislative committee chairs to verify such claims. 
The legislative branch composite measure averaged 3.0 (out of a maximum of 25), 
a score lower than the executive or judicial branches.  Because the Diamond Index 
does not measure straight percentages of women, but rather weights specific 
positions, the overall percentage of females may be higher in the legislature than 
other parts of government but result in a relatively low score because women are 
under-represented as committee chairs or heads of parties.  Table 33 documents the 
straight percentage of women in the legislative branch according to each tier level 
and averaged by region for the selected countries.
Table 33:  Percent of Women in the Legislative Branch by Tier and Region
 Eastern 
Europe/ 
Eurasia
Latin 
America/ 
Caribbean
Asia Africa Middle 
East/ 
N. Africa
Total Global
Average
LEGISLATIVE
Tier 1 4.4 8.2 11.1 4.7 1.6 30.0 6.0
Tier 2 21.0 10.8 18.7 27.9 12.5 90.9 18.2
Tier 3 17.6 17.1 21.7 22.6 17.2 96.2 19.2
The highest ranking (Tier 1) decision-maker was identified as a political party leader 
with party representation in the lower house.  So, for example, in a country where 40, 
502  Krook, Mona Lena, and Diana O’Brien. “All the President’s Men? The Appointment of Female Cabinet Ministers 
Worldwide.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, Chicago, IL, 2011. http://
krook.wustl.edu/pdf/mpsa_krook_obrien_11.pdf.
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50, or more parties are registered, only those obtaining seats in the legislature (lower 
house if a bi-cameral system) were counted.  Women occupying party leadership 
positions averaged 6.0% across the 40 countries.  
The Tier 3 measurement – percentage of women legislators – was also included, 
although weighted less than committee chairs and party leaders.  The percent of 
women in the legislature has been the most common standard used to measure 
women’s access to what other indexes term “political power” or women’s “political 
empowerment.”  The data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) is used in 
most gender indexes measuring the political space.  It was also one of the indicators 
tracked for achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals through 2015. 
Currently, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also use the proportion of 
seats held by women in national parliaments as a measure through 2030.503  Because 
the national-level parliamentary figures are continually updated as elections occur, 
and they cover almost every country in the world, this indicator is a valuable source 
for measuring and benchmarking progress by country of women in the legislature.   
To understand how the Diamond Index might differ from the IPU’s straight percentage 
measure of women in the lower legislature, I compared the Diamond Index countries 
to the IPU ranking of the same countries.  The 40 countries were rank ordered from 
the highest to the lowest percentage of women – the typical IPU scoring method.  In 
Table 34, the 40-country IPU list was then placed alongside the 40 countries of the 
Diamond Index, also ordered from highest score to lowest score.  A “positive” match, 
highlighted in light grey, was considered when each of the two indexes located a 
country within five rankings of one another.  A “negative” match, highlighted in 
dark grey, was noted when a country was separated by more than five rankings on 
each respective list. 
Table 34:  Comparison of 2015 Diamond Index to IPU Legislative Rankings
Country Diamond Index
Legislative Score
IPU Index Percent 
Parliamentarians
1. Rwanda 7.8 1.  Rwanda 63.8
2. South Africa 7.6 2.  Senegal 42.7
3. India 6.2 3.  South Africa 41.9
4. Senegal 5.6 4.  Mozambique 39.6
503  The official list of indicators used to track progress against the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can 
be found at:  https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/indicators-list/
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Country Diamond Index
Legislative Score
IPU Index Percent 
Parliamentarians
5. Philippines 5.1 5.  Timor-Leste 38.5
6. Mozambique 4.7 6.  Mexico 38.0
7. Madagascar 4.6 7.  Algeria 31.6
8. Albania 4.4 8.  Tunisia 31.3
9. Bangladesh 4.3 9.  Nepal 29.5
10. Colombia 4.3 10. Philippines 27.2
11. Kenya 4.1 11. Iraq 26.5
12. Timor-Leste 4.0 12. Kyrgyzstan 23.3
13. Guatemala 4.0 13. Bosnia-Herzegovina 21.4
14. Indonesia 3.7 14. Albania 20.7
15. Mongolia 3.6 15. Madagascar 20.5
16. Cambodia 3.6 16. Cambodia 20.3
17. Nepal 3.6 17. Bangladesh 20.0
18. Niger 3.6 18. Colombia 19.9
19. Mexico 3.5 19. Kenya 19.7
20. Tunisia 3.4 20. Indonesia 17.1
21. Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 21. Morocco 17.0
22. Ukraine 3.0 22. Mongolia 14.9
23. Morocco 2.6 23. Burkina Faso 13.3
24. Mali 2.5 24. Guatemala 13.3
25. Bosnia-Herz. 2.5 25. Niger 13.3
26. Georgia 2.5 26. India 12.0
27. Burkina Faso 2.5 27. Jordan 12.0
28. Iraq 2.3 28. Ukraine 11.8
29. Kyrgyzstan 2.2 29. Georgia 11.3
30. Benin 2.1 30. Liberia 11.0
31. Ghana 2.1 31. Ghana 10.9
32. Algeria 2.0 32. Brazil 9.9
33. Jordan 1.9 33. Cote d’Ivoire 9.2
34. Nigeria 1.7 34. Mali 8.8
35. Liberia 1.5 35. Benin 7.2
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Country Diamond Index
Legislative Score
IPU Index Percent 
Parliamentarians
36. Lebanon 1.2 36. Thailand 6.1
37. Brazil 0.8 37. Nigeria 4.2
38. Thailand 0.7 38. Lebanon 3.1
39. Haiti 0.2 39. Haiti 4.2
40. Yemen 0.0 40. Yemen 0.0
Countries ranked within 5 positions on the two indexes
Countries ranked more than 5 positions apart on the two indexes
The two indices align closely in the rankings of the top four countries and the bottom 
six countries.  This is not unexpected.  Because Tier 1 positions (party leadership) 
were among the most underrepresented in the Diamond Index, countries had to score 
strongly in Tier 2 and Tier 3 (overall percentage of women legislators) to place high 
in the index.  This correlates with how the IPU – reliant on percentages of women – 
scores its index.  Likewise, the bottom six countries not only have scant representation 
in the legislature, but the lack of women is reflected throughout committees and 
party leadership.  For purposes of the Diamond Index and IPU indexes, there are 
simply very few women present in any legislative capacity.  Apart from the two 
extremes of the indices, however, there is wide variance in how countries are ranked. 
If we look at the remaining 30 countries, a total of 22 are considered a negative match 
while eight are considered a positive match.
Iraq and Guatemala are examples of the varying rankings, as presented in Graph 8. 
The IPU ranks Iraq 11th (out of the 40 selected countries) based on a representational 
rate of 26.5% women in the legislature.  The Diamond Index ranks Iraq much lower 
(28 out of 40) as there is limited committee leadership (15%) and no women holding 
party leadership positions (0%).  Guatemala, for the opposite reasons, was ranked 
more than 11 places higher than its IPU rank of 24.  While the country lags behind 
in straight percentage of women legislators (13.3%), it has a disproportionately high 
number of committee chairs (20%) and party leadership (26.7%).   Because committee 
chairs and party leaders are defined as having greater decision-makers authority in 
the legislative, the Diamond Index recognizes and allocates greater weight to those 
positions as compared to those of rank-and-file members.  
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GRAPH 8:  Diamond Index – Iraq and Guatemala
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Regional Highlights
There were a number of regional differences worth noting in the legislative domain. 
In the Asian countries included in the regional sample, the average legislative 
score exceeds that of the executive branch; this is the only region where this occurs. 
Generally, the higher scores in Asia’s legislative sector can be attributed to increased 
percentages of women encumbering the Tier 1 Political Party Leaders position. 
Of the nine Asian countries measured, six (Bangladesh, India, India, Indonesia, 
Mongolia, Philippines) had at least one woman party leader.  This lends credence to 
research in this area around the approval of women stepping into party leadership 
positions, often assuming the role following the death of a close family member such 
as a husband or father; a phenomenon that D’Amico has described as “the widow’s 
walk to power.”504  This acceptance of the wife or daughter as a suitable replacement 
for the original male politician would seem to indicate a high level of tolerance for 
women as political leaders, whether she arrived at the position through her own 
accomplishments or in the wake of a male family member.505
High scores in the legislative domain do, however, seem to come at the expense of 
representation in other parts of government.  The regional scores of the selected 
Asian countries in the executive and judicial domains are well below the 40-country 
504  D’Amico, Francine, and Peter R. Beckman. Women in World Politics: An Introduction. Bergin & Garvey Westport, 
Connecticut, 1995.
505  Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. Women, Politics, and Power. Pine Forge Press, 2007.
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average and second only to the Middle East/North Africa average.  In the security 
sector the two regions tie for last place.  Within the sample of nine Asian countries 
selected, the Diamond Index points to women gaining significant representational 
ground in one sector of government – the legislature – but lagging behind global 
averages in the remaining.
Sample countries comprising the Africa region finished with the second-highest 
ranking behind Asia, with an average score of 3.8 as compared to Asia’s 3.9.  While 
close in score, for African countries selected (and other regions as well), the legislative 
score is the lowest among the three government branches.  Kenya seems to typify 
this pattern, with relatively low levels of representation in the legislative branch 
(19.7%) and higher scores in the judiciary and executive.  In the case of Kenya, this 
may be due to 2010 constitutional quotas that now require a minimum of one-third 
women in all areas of government, either elected or appointed.  While legislative 
numbers remain below the one-third mark for women, it would appear that other 
sectors relying on appointments are seeing greater gains.
Countries representing the Middle East/North Africa region, as consistently seen 
across the four domains, finished with the lowest regional score – 1.9 out of a 
possible maximum of 25.  Table 35 represents the Diamond Index scores across the 40 
countries organized by region with the legislative branch highlighted.
TABLE 35:  Diamond Index 2015 – Legislative Scores by Region 
REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORELEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Eastern Europe/Eurasia – 2.9 Average Score
  Albania 4.4 6.2 5.9 2.0 18.5
  Ukraine 3.0 2.8 5.0 - 10.8
  Georgia 2.5 5.0 8.4 1.5 17.4
  Bosnia-Herz. 2.5 2.6 11.6 1.1 17.8
  Kyrgyzstan 2.2 3.0 - - -
Latin America/Caribbean – 2.6 Average Score
  Colombia 4.3 6.8 4.8 - 15.9
  Guatemala 4.0 4.8 6.4 1.8 17.0
  Mexico 3.5 4.4 4.5 1.5 13.9
  Brazil 0.8 4.5 4.4 3.6 13.3
  Haiti 0.2 3.6 2.9 0.2 6.9
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REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORELEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Asia – 3.9 Average Score
  India 6.2 2.4 1.9 1.1 11.6
  Philippines 5.1 6.2 6.3 - 17.6
  Bangladesh 4.3 1.7 2.7 1.3 10.0
  Timor-Leste 4.0 3.0 8.9 1.8 17.7
  Indonesia 3.7 3.1 2.0 1.7 10.5
  Mongolia 3.6 3.1 9.7 - 16.4
  Cambodia 3.6 2.2 4.4 - 10.2
  Nepal 3.6 1.9 1.3 0.3 7.1
  Thailand 0.7 1.1 1.4 0.4 3.6
Africa – 3.8 Average Score
  Rwanda 7.8 9.5 9.2 1.4 27.9
  South Africa 7.6 9.5 6.0 7.0 30.1
  Senegal 5.6 3.0 1.0 - 9.6
  Mozambique 4.7 5.2 4.4 14.3
  Madagascar 4.6 4.3 5.9 - 14.8
  Kenya 4.1 6.4 8.0 2.0 20.5
  Niger 3.6 - - 0.9 -
  Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2 15.3
  Burkina Faso 2.5 2.6 10.4 1.7 17.2
  Mali 2.5 2.5 6.6 1.1 12.7
  Ghana 2.1 5.5 7.8 - 15.4
  Benin 2.1 4.6 7.2 - 13.9
  Nigeria 1.7 5.0 6.7 1.5 14.9
  Liberia 1.5 8.4 6.4 - 16.3
Middle East/North Africa – 1.9 Average Score
  Tunisia 3.4 4.4 - - -
  Morocco 2.6 3.0 3.8 - 9.4
  Iraq 2.3 0.8 0.5 - 3.6
  Algeria 2.0 2.3 7.4 - 11.7
  Jordan 1.9 2.2 1.6 - 5.7
  Lebanon 1.2 0.9 1.5 - 3.6
  Yemen 0.0 2.2 0.1 - 2.3
Global Average Score – 3.0
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6.5 DIAMOND INDEX – JUDICIAL DOMAIN
Overview
The judicial 40-country average was 5.1 (out of a possible maximum of 25).  This 
component of the Diamond Index achieved the highest score, significantly above 
executive, legislative, and security.  At the Tier 1 level, the constitutional court was 
considered the highest court unless in-country expertise or documentation explicitly 
identified it as a Tier 2 court (or, of course, there was no constitutional court as part 
of the judicial system).  For 20 countries the constitutional court was considered the 
premier court and in 19 countries the supreme court was the highest court.  Timor-
Leste was the sole country to have only two tiers of formal courts in its judicial 
system.  In this instance, appellate courts were considered Tier 1 and district courts 
Tier 2.  Table 36 documents the straight percentage of women in the judicial branch 
according to each tier level and averaged by region for the selected countries.
TABLE 36:  Percent of Women in the Judicial Branch by Tier and Region
 Eastern 
Europe/ 
Eurasia
Latin 
America/ 
Caribbean
Asia Africa Middle East/ 
N. Africa
Total Global
Average
JUDICIAL
Tier 1 26.4 16.7 15.2 26.6 5.1 90.0 18.0
Tier 2 32.0 18.1 18.9 27.5 3.8 100.3 20.1
Tier 3 41.4 23.7 18.3 26.6 26.1 136.1 27.2
In measuring straight percentages of women, the judiciary outscores the other 
sectors in numbers of women present in all three tiers.  As expected, this translates 
into higher weighted scores in each tier and thus overall scores.  Table 37 provides 
all 40 countries according to their weighted index judicial score, ranked from highest 
to lowest.  
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TABLE 37:  Diamond Index 2015 – Judicial Scores 
ALL 
COUNTRIES
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL 
SCORESJUDICIAL EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
Global Judicial Average Score = 5.1
1. Bosnia-Herz. 11.6 2.6 2.5 1.1 17.8
2. Burkina Faso 10.4 2.6 2.5 1.7 17.2
3. Mongolia 9.7 3.1 3.6 - 16.4
4. Rwanda 9.2 9.5 7.8 1.4 27.9
5. Timor-Leste 8.9 3.0 4.0 1.8 17.7
6. Georgia 8.4 5.0 2.5 1.5 17.4
7. Kenya 8.0 6.4 4.1 2.0 20.5
8. Ghana 7.8 5.5 2.1 - 15.4
9. Algeria 7.4 2.3 2.0 - 11.7
10. Benin 7.2 4.6 2.1 - 13.9
11. Cote d’Ivoire 6.9 3.1 3.1 2.2 15.3
12. Nigeria 6.7 5.0 1.7 1.5 14.9
13. Mali 6.6 2.5 2.5 1.1 12.7
14. Liberia 6.4 8.4 1.5 - 16.3
15. Guatemala 6.4 4.8 4.0 1.8 17.0
16. Philippines 6.3 6.2 5.1 - 17.6
17. South Africa 6.0 9.5 7.6 7.0 30.1
18. Albania 5.9 6.2 4.4 2.0 18.5
19. Madagascar 5.9 4.3 4.6 - 14.8
20. Colombia 4.8 6.8 4.3 - 15.9
21. Ukraine 5.0 2.8 3.0 10.8
22. Mexico 4.5 4.4 3.5 1.5 13.9
23. Mozambique 4.4 5.2 4.7 - 14.3
24. Brazil 4.4 4.5 0.8 3.6 13.3
25. Cambodia 4.4 2.2 3.6 - 10.2
26. Morocco 3.8 3.0 2.6 - 9.4
27. Haiti 2.9 3.6 0.2 0.2 6.9
28. Bangladesh 2.7 1.7 4.3 1.3 10.0
29. Indonesia 2.0 3.1 3.7 1.7 10.5
30. India 1.9 2.4 6.2 1.1 11.5
31. Jordan 1.6 2.2 1.9 - 5.7
32. Lebanon 1.5 0.9 1.2 - 3.6
33. Thailand 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 3.6
34. Nepal 1.3 1.9 3.6 0.3 7.1
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ALL 
COUNTRIES
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL 
SCORESJUDICIAL EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
35. Senegal 1.0 3.0 5.6 - 9.6
36. Iraq 0.5 0.8 2.3 - 3.6
37. Yemen 0.1 2.2 0.0 - 2.3
38. Tunisia - 4.4 3.4 - -
39. Kyrgyzstan - 3.0 2.2 - -
40. Niger - - 3.6 0.9 -
-  Unable to calculate score
Regional Highlights
In examining regional differences among the selected sample countries, significant 
women’s representation was found at all three tiers of the judiciary across all regions. 
In particular, high percentages of women emerged in the countries representing 
the Eastern Europe/Eurasia region.  In this geographic area, the score totaled 7.7, 
more than twice the average score of 2.9 recorded in the legislative domain and well 
above the executive score of 3.9.  In this region women are finding more space in the 
judiciary as compared to other domains measured.
We see the same trend in sample countries from Africa, with an average score of 6.7. 
Although not as dramatic as Eastern Europe/Eurasia, women are making greater 
headway in the judicial area when compared to the average scores in the executive 
(5.4), legislative (3.8), and security (2.2) sectors.  Of the 14 African countries mapped, 
a total of 11 score above the Diamond Index 40-country average.
While the Middle East/North Africa countries again averaged the lowest scores, 
there are several states within this region that appear to be making headway. 
Algeria scored 7.4 and Morocco, while still below the 40-country average, registered 
a score of 3.8.  The seven-country average from this region tempers these individual 
country gains, however, with Yemen (0.1) and Iraq (0.5) at the low end of all judicial 
spectrum scoring.  Table 38 represents the Diamond Index scores across the 40 
countries organized by region with the judicial branch highlighted.
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TABLE 38:  Diamond Index 2015 – Judicial Scores by Region 
REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREJUDICIAL EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
Eastern Europe/Eurasia – 7.7 Average Score
  Bosnia-Herz. 11.6 2.6 2.5 1.1 17.8
  Georgia 8.4 5.0 2.5 1.5 17.4
  Albania 5.9 6.2 4.4 2.0 18.5
  Ukraine 5.0 2.8 3.0 - 10.8
  Kyrgyzstan - 3.0 2.2 - -
Latin America/Caribbean – 4.6 Average Score
  Guatemala 6.4 4.8 4.0 1.8 17.0
  Colombia 4.8 6.8 4.3 - 15.9
  Mexico 4.5 4.4 3.5 1.5 13.9
  Brazil 4.4 4.5 0.8 3.6 13.3
  Haiti 2.9 3.6 0.2 0.2 6.9
Asia – 4.3 Average Score
  Mongolia 9.7 3.1 3.6 - 16.4
  Timor-Leste 8.9 3.0 4.0 1.8 17.7
  Philippines 6.3 6.2 5.1 - 17.6
  Cambodia 4.4 2.2 3.6 - 10.2
  Bangladesh 2.7 1.7 4.3 1.3 10.0
  Indonesia 2.0 3.1 3.7 1.7 10.5
  India 1.9 2.4 6.2 1.1 11.6
  Thailand 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 3.6
  Nepal 1.3 1.9 3.6 0.3 7.1
Africa – 6.6 Average Score
  Burkina Faso 10.4 2.6 2.5 1.7 17.2
  Rwanda 9.2 9.5 7.8 1.4 27.9
  Kenya 8.0 6.4 4.1 2.0 20.5
  Ghana 7.8 5.5 2.1 - 15.4
  Benin 7.2 4.6 2.1 - 13.9
  Cote d’Ivoire 6.9 3.1 3.1 2.2 15.3
  Nigeria 6.7 5.0 1.7 1.5 14.9
  Mali 6.6 2.5 2.5 1.1 12.7
  Liberia 6.4 8.4 1.5 - 16.3
  South Africa 6.0 9.5 7.6 7.0 30.1
  Madagascar 5.9 4.3 4.6 - 14.8
  Mozambique 4.4 5.2 4.7 - 14.3
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REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCOREJUDICIAL EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE SECURITY
  Senegal 1.0 3.0 5.6 - 9.6
  Niger - - 3.6 0.9 -
Middle East/North Africa – 2.5 Average Score
  Algeria 7.4 2.3 2.0 - 11.7
  Morocco 3.8 3.0 2.6 - 9.4
  Jordan 1.6 2.2 1.9 - 5.7
  Lebanon 1.5 0.9 1.2 - 3.6
  Iraq 0.5 0.8 2.3 - 3.6
  Yemen 0.1 2.2 0.0 - 2.3
  Tunisia - 4.4 3.4 - -
Global Average Score – 5.1
-  Unable to calculate score
6.6 DIAMOND INDEX – SECURITY SECTOR DOMAIN
Overview
The average security score for all regions was 1.7 (with a score of 25 representing 
only women in decision-making positions and 12.5 approaching parity).  While 
some headway was made in opening this black box of data, there were shortfalls 
in collecting all three data points in the security domain.  Table 39 documents the 
straight percentage of women in the security domain according to each tier level 
and averaged by region for the selected countries.
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Table 39:  Percent of Women in the Security Sector by Tier and Region
 Eastern 
Europe/
Eurasia
Latin 
America/ 
Caribbean
Asia Africa Middle East/ 
N. Africa
Total Global
Average
SECURITY
Tier 1 3.7 4.9 2.8 7.7 - 19.1 4.8
Tier 2 8.5 8.6 5.0 8.3 - 30.4 7.6
Tier 3 8.9 9.4 7.5 10.8 4.8 41.4 8.3
-  Unable to calculate score
Of the 40 countries, full security sector data sets were collected for 21 countries 
(52.5%).506  The percentage of women in all three tiers of security, and resulting overall 
country average, is low in comparison to other domains measured.  As a result, 
scores appear not only low but also close to one another.  For example, in the judicial 
sector more than 11 points separate the highest scoring (Bosnia-Herzegovina) from 
the lowest-scoring (Yemen).  In the legislative domain there is almost an 8-point 
difference and close to a 10-point variation between the top and bottom countries in 
the executive.  On the other hand, if we remove the outlier South Africa – the only 
country to have a robust security score – the difference between second place Brazil 
and last-place Haiti is 3.4 points.  We see many more countries clustered around a 
few scores – for example, 12 countries scored between 1.8 and 1.1.  This is the only 
domain of the four to have this type of closely clustered scoring among numerous 
countries.  Table 40 provides all 40 countries according to their weighted index 
security score, ranked from highest to lowest.  
TABLE 40:  Diamond Index 2015 – Security Sector Scores 
COUNTRY AND
CATEGORY 
RANKING
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORESSECURITY EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
Global Security Sector Average Score = 1.7
1. South Africa 7.0 9.5 7.6 6.0 30.1
2. Brazil 3.6 4.5 0.8 4.4 13.3
3. Cote d’Ivoire 2.2 3.1 3.1 6.9 15.3
506  This includes Niger, for which data collection in the security sector was successful.  Due to gaps in other sectors, 
however, an overall score for Niger could not be calculated.
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COUNTRY AND
CATEGORY 
RANKING
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORESSECURITY EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
4. Kenya 2.0 6.4 4.1 8.0 20.5
5. Albania 2.0 6.2 4.4 5.9 18.5
6. Timor-Leste 1.8 3.0 4.0 8.9 17.7
7. Guatemala 1.8 4.8 4.0 6.4 17.0
8. Burkina Faso 1.7 2.6 2.5 10.4 17.2
9. Indonesia 1.7 3.1 3.7 2.0 10.5
10. Georgia 1.5 5.0 2.5 8.4 17.4
11. Nigeria 1.5 5.0 1.7 6.7 14.9
12. Mexico 1.5 4.4 3.5 4.5 13.9
13. Rwanda 1.4 9.5 7.8 9.2 27.9
14. Bangladesh 1.3 1.7 4.3 2.7 10.0
15. Bosnia-Herz. 1.1 2.6 2.5 11.6 17.8
16. Mali 1.1 2.5 2.5 6.6 12.7
17. India 1.1 2.4 6.2 1.9 11.5
18. Niger 0.9 - 3.6 - -
19. Thailand 0.4 1.1 0.7 1.4 3.6
20. Nepal 0.3 1.9 3.6 1.3 7.1
21. Haiti 0.2 3.6 0.2 2.9 6.9
Regional Highlights
When looking at the different geographical zones, there are several points worth 
noting.  Sample countries from Asia and Middle East/North Africa scored the 
lowest of the five regions.  For the nine Asian countries selected, however, significant 
data was found.  Out of a possible 27 data points, only seven were missing across 
three countries (Philippines, Cambodia, and Mongolia), allowing for the reasonable 
calculation of averages in the three tiers.  Table 41 presents the security sector data 
collected for the selected Asian countries across all three tier levels. 
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TABLE 41:  Asia – Percent of Women by Security Tier and Weighted Security 
Score
TIER 1
Percent of 
Women
TIER 2
Percent of 
Women
TIER 3
Percent of 
Women
Weighted  
Score
Bangladesh 4.0 3.2 12.5 1.3
Cambodia  - - 4.9 -
India 4.2 3.7 5.9 1.1
Indonesia 4.6 11.7 3.3 1.7
Mongolia - - - -
Nepal 0.4 0.3 5.8 0.3
Philippines - - 7.7 -
Thailand 0.0 1.7 5.8 0.4
Timor-Leste 3.4 9.5 14.4 1.8
TOTALS 16.6 30.1 60.3 6.6
AVERAGE 2.8% 5.0% 7.5% 1.1
-  Unable to calculate score
The data collection effort for countries representing the Middle East/North Africa 
region, however, yielded little information.  Out of the 21 total possible indicators 
across seven countries, only four were collected and only in Tier 3.  Governments 
were completely unwilling to share statistics, and little public information was 
available.  Averaging together the four countries of Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Yemen produced a Tier 3 average of 4.8%.  It is fairly certain, based on the pattern 
seen in other countries, that Tier 1 and Tier 2 percentages of higher-ranking women 
officers would be less than Tier 3.  This would most likely result in the lowest 
overall regional average.  On a more positive note, women in Algeria and Jordan 
appear to be making some headway in entering the police force at the Tier 3 levels. 
Table 42 presents the security sector data collected for the selected Middle East/
North African countries across all three tier levels. 
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TABLE 42:  Middle East & North Africa – Weighted Security Scores by 
Individual Tier
TIER 1
Percent of 
Women
TIER 2
Percent of 
Women
TIER 3
Percent of 
Women
Weighted  
Score
Algeria - - 8.0 -
Iraq - - - -
Jordan - - 7.0 -
Lebanon - - 2.4 -
Morocco - - - -
Tunisia - - - -
Yemen - - 1.7 -
TOTALS - - 19.1 -
AVERAGE - - 4.8 -
-  Unable to calculate score
Turning to Africa, South Africa stood out as the one exception among the 40 countries 
that recorded robust percentages in all three tiers of police decision-makers.  While 
not on par with men, the final weighted score of 7 (out of a maximum of 25) 
demonstrated that women were present in all areas of the command structure.507 
Brazil was also an interesting case in the security arena.  While well behind South 
Africa, it recorded the second-highest score at 3.6.  This score, in fact, far exceeded the 
country’s weighted legislative score of 0.8, which was much lower than the regional 
average and second only to Haiti.  Table 43 represents the Diamond Index scores 
across the 40 countries organized by region with the security sector highlighted.
507  While not recorded for purposes of the Diamond Index, research collection also indicated that women in South 
Africa’s military far outpaced all other African countries in terms of overall representation in army officer ranks.
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 TABLE 43:  Diamond Index 2015 – Security Scores by Region 
REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORESECURITY EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
Eastern Europe/Eurasia – 1.5 Average Score
  Albania 2.0 6.2 4.4 5.9 18.5
  Georgia 1.5 5.0 2.5 8.4 17.4
  Ukraine - 2.8 3.0 5.0 10.8
  Bosnia-Herz. 1.1 2.6 2.5 11.6 17.8
  Kyrgyzstan - 3.0 2.2 - -
Latin America/Caribbean – 1.8 Average Score
  Brazil 3.6 4.5 0.8 4.4 13.3
  Guatemala 1.8 4.8 4.0 6.4 17.0
  Colombia - 6.8 4.3 4.8 15.9
  Mexico 1.5 4.4 3.5 4.5 13.9
  Haiti 0.2 3.6 0.2 2.9 6.9
Asia – 1.1 Average Score
  Timor-Leste 1.8 3.0 4.0 8.9 17.7
  Indonesia 1.7 3.1 3.7 2.0 10.5
  Bangladesh 1.3 1.7 4.3 2.7 10.0
  Philippines - 6.2 5.1 6.3 17.6
  Mongolia - 3.1 3.6 9.7 16.4
  India 1.1 2.4 6.2 1.9 11.6
  Cambodia - 2.2 3.6 4.4 10.2
  Thailand 0.4 1.1 0.7 1.4 3.6
  Nepal 0.3 1.6 3.6 1.3 6.8
Africa – 2.2 Average Score
  South Africa 7.0 9.5 7.6 6.0 30.1
  Ghana - 5.5 2.1 7.8 15.4
  Madagascar - 4.3 4.6 5.9 14.8
  Cote d’Ivoire 2.2 3.1 3.1 6.9 15.3
  Mozambique - 5.2 4.7 4.4 14.3
  Kenya 2.0 6.4 4.1 8.0 20.5
  Benin - 4.6 2.1 7.2 13.9
  Senegal - 3.0 5.6 1.0 9.6
  Liberia - 8.4 1.5 6.4 16.3
  Burkina Faso 1.7 2.6 2.5 10.4 17.2
  Nigeria 1.5 5.0 1.7 6.7 14.9
  Rwanda 1.4 9.5 7.8 9.2 27.9
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REGION
COUNTRY
WEIGHTED SCORES TOTAL
SCORESECURITY EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL
  Mali 1.1 2.5 2.5 6.6 12.7
  Niger 0.9 - 3.6 - -
Middle East/North Africa – NA Average Score
  Algeria - 2.3 2.0 7.4 11.7
  Morocco - 3.0 2.6 3.8 9.4
  Jordan - 2.2 1.9 1.6 5.7
  Lebanon - 0.9 1.2 1.5 3.6
  Iraq - 0.8 2.3 0.5 3.6
  Yemen - 2.2 0.0 0.1 2.3
  Algeria - 2.3 2.0 7.4 11.7
  Tunisia - 4.4 3.4 - -
Global Average Score – 1.7
-  Unable to calculate score
6.7 GLASS WALLS:  HORIZONTAL REPRESENTATION AMONG 
 DECISION-MAKERS
There are numerous impediments that hinder women’s entrance into decision-
making positions across formal government.  From strong cultural preferences for 
male candidates to inherently structural gender biases built into institutions, the 
challenges that women must overcome to climb the professional scale are daunting. 
Rule describes these obstacles as “narrow gender roles, restrictive religious doctrines, 
unequal laws and education, discriminatory socioeconomic conditions, male-biased 
party leaders or other political elites and some voters, and ‘women unfriendly’ 
election systems.508  While earlier attempts to quantify the glass ceiling focused on 
the labor market,509  this same concept and language were also adopted early by 
academics to describe women’s lack of advancement in the political arena.510
The following tables highlight the horizontal distribution of women across the four 
sectors:  executive, legislative, judicial, and security.  A line has been drawn at the 
508  Rule, Wilma. “Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?” Contributions in Political Science 338 
(1994): 15-15.
509  Cotter, David A., Joan M. Hermsen, Seth Ovadia, and Reeve Vanneman. “The Glass Ceiling Effect.” Social Forces 
80, no. 2 (2001): 655-681.
510  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. Reynolds, Andrew. “Women in the Legislatures and Executives 
of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling.” World Politics 51, no. 4 (July 1, 1999): 547–72.
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31% - 35% mark to indicate the achievement of a critical mass of decision-makers in 
any one sector.   This is not to assume that 30% or 35% of women is sufficient, but 
rather to demonstrate how women are faring against the typical global benchmark 
of women’s representation.
Eastern Europe/Eurasia
For the sample countries selected within this region, Tier 2 and Tier 3 in the judiciary 
were the only two tiers – out of all 60 measured across the varied geographic zones – 
to achieve this threshold.  Tier 3 in the judiciary for the five Eastern Europe/Eurasia 
countries was the single area to surpass the 35% measure.  The trend emerging is 
robust women’s representation in the judiciary.  While women have strong access to 
the judicial sector, and moderate access to the executive and legislative, the decision-
making positions of: 1) mayor, 2) political party leader, and 3) senior-level security 
officers remain almost completely closed, with scores that only surpass those found 
in the Middle East/North Africa.  Table 44 highlights the average percentage 
of women by domain and tier level in the sample countries selected for Eastern 
Europe/Eurasia.
TABLE 44:  Eastern Europe/Eurasia – Horizontal Distribution
Percentage
Of Women
Executive Legislative Judiciary Security
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X X X
5-10 X X
11-15
16-20 X X
21-25 X X
26-30 X
31-35 X
36-40
41-45 X
46-50
51 +
AVERAGE 15.9 21.2 4.0 4.4 21.0 17.6 26.4 32.0 41.4 3.7 8.5 8.9
234
Chapter 6 Mapping the Diamond Index in 40 Countries
Latin America/Caribbean     
While no domain approaches the 30% mark, there are also few tiers where women 
have little representation (0% to 5% range).  The Latin American/Caribbean sample 
countries appear to be making some progress across all four sectors.  This includes 
modest gains in one of the most difficult measures:  political party leadership 
(legislative, Tier 1).  In this measure the regional average is second only to Asia. 
Also worth noting is the low intake of women in the judiciary lower courts (Tier 3). 
The percentage of women (23.7%) is approximately 4% lower than the 40-country 
average and all regions except Asia.  So while overall women seem to be making 
the greatest gains in the judicial sector, smaller-than-average percentages of women 
in the lowest courts may dampen future levels of representation in higher courts. 
Table 45 highlights the average percentage of women by domain and tier level in the 
sample countries selected for Latin America/Caribbean.
TABLE 45:  Latin America/Caribbean – Horizontal Distribution 
Percentage 
of Women
Executive Legislative Judiciary Security
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X
6-10 X X X X X
11-15
16-20 X X X X
21-25 X X
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51 +
AVERAGE 24.2 18.5 6.0 8.2 10.8 17.1 16.7 18.1 23.7 4.9 8.6 9.4
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Asia
While women are making representational headway within the legislative and judicial 
branches, the percentage of women gaining access to the judicial, Tier 3 (18.3%) is 
significantly below all other regions as well as below the 40-country average of 27.9%. 
The result is a flat line, with representation more or less equal across all levels of the 
judicial system.  Women seem to be faring well in the legislative branch, with strong 
scores in all three tiers.  The use of quotas may help explain robust representation 
in this sector.511  As with the other regions examined, women are significantly 
underrepresented in security across all tiers and are rarely present in the chain of police 
command.  Glass walls would seem to be firmly in place around the security sector in 
this region where Asia’s scores are among the lowest, rivaled only by countries in the 
Middle East/North Africa.  Table 46 highlights the average percentage of women by 
domain and tier level in the sample countries selected for Asia.
TABLE 46:  Asia – Horizontal Distribution 
Percentage 
of Women
Executive Legislative Judiciary Security 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X X
6-10 X X
11-15 X X X
16-20 X X X X
21-25 X
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51 +
AVERAGE 11.1 12.7 6.7 11.1 18.7 21.7 15.2 18.9 18.3 2.8 5.0 7.5
511  Bangladesh reserved seats – Indonesia and Nepal legislated candidate quotas – Mongolia legislated quotas 
– Philippines and Thailand voluntary political party quotas – India has no national quotas – Cambodia and Timor-
Leste have no information available.
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Africa
No sector in Africa achieved a critical mass of decision-makers.  The judiciary is 
close, exhibiting high percentages of women across all three tiers.  This appears as 
the sector where women are making the most progress.  Looking at the executive 
and legislative branches, significant numbers of decision-makers are appearing, 
although not at the same level as the judiciary.  Even at the Tier 2 level, however, 
committee chairs (legislative) and senior executives (executive) are well represented 
and close to the 30% benchmark.  
Whether a result of political will or legal mandate, the sample of African countries were 
the only regional grouping to have all three security tiers exceed the 5% benchmark. 
This was due in large part to the higher-than-average scores witnessed across South 
African officer ranks.  In summary, women seem to be making strong gains in the judicial 
sector and steady gains in the executive and legislative branch.  Even in the difficult 
security sector, a number of African countries seem to be showing flexibility towards 
accommodating women decision-makers. Table 47 highlights the average percentage of 
women by domain and tier level in the sample countries selected for Africa.
TABLE 47:  Africa – Horizontal Distribution 
Percentage
of Women
Executive Legislative Judiciary Security
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X
6-10 X X X
11-15 X
16-20
21-25 X X X
26-30 X X X X
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
51 +
AVERAGE 23.8 25.7 11.7 4.7 27.9 22.6 26.6 27.5 26.6 7.7 8.3 10.8
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Middle East/North Africa
The judiciary emerges as the one sector where women are making solid gains 
in the Middle East/North Africa countries selected, although their presence is 
focused almost exclusively in the lowest (Tier 3) level, typically courts of appeal 
or courts of first instance.  Women are, however, also present in the executive and 
legislative domains.  Thus, the perception that women in the Middle East/North 
Africa are absent from formal government is not true for the countries selected, 
while recognizing that gains are modest.  In the security sector, however, women 
were strikingly absent.  Whether their lack of presence is due to societal barriers or 
missing data is hard to determine.  Despite all efforts – including sending a research 
team to Jordan and country expert to Tunisia – no data on the command structure 
of any police force was made available in any of the seven countries mapped in this 
region.  In summary, women in the seven countries selected for the Middle East/
North Africa region showed some noteworthy gains in the judicial sector and more 
modest gains in legislative representation.  The security sector appears barred to 
women, although the lack of data makes it difficult to draw conclusions.  Table 48 
highlights the average percentage of women by domain and tier level in the sample 
countries selected for the Middle East/North Africa.
TABLE 48:  Middle East/North Africa – Horizontal Distribution 
Percentage 
of Women
Executive Legislative Judiciary Security
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
0-5 X X X NA NA X
5-10 X X
11-15 X X
16-20 X
21-25
26-30 X
31-35
36-40
41-45
46-50
AVERAGE 9.0 13.4 1.4 1.6 12.5 17.2 5.1 3.8 26.1 NA NA 4.8
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6.8 GLASS CEILINGS:  VERTICAL REPRESENTATION AMONG 
 DECISION-MAKERS 
The Diamond Index also examines women’s access to decision-making positions 
vertically, offering an opportunity to compare women’s positional progress across 
a range of increasingly senior levels of government.  Because Tier 1 positions are 
defined as senior to Tier 2 which, in turn, are defined as senior to Tier 3, data collected 
over time would allow for the measurement of women’s representation through 
ascending levels of decision-makers across different sectors.  Were a glass ceiling to 
exist, one would expect to find decreasing percentages of women from Tier 3 to Tier 
2, and again from Tier 2 to Tier 1.  
Eastern Europe/Eurasia
Most notable among the countries selected from this region is the high judiciary 
percentages consistent across countries.  The average percentage of women’s 
representation in this sector exceeds all other regions.  Within the legislative branch 
we also see the percentage of women chairing committees (21.0%) exceeding the 
percentage of women holding seats (17.6%).  So women are not only being elected 
into legislatures, but also moving into committee leadership positions beyond their 
elected percentages.  Within the executive branch the outlier remains the number of 
women mayors of the 10 largest cities in the country.  Women are virtually absent 
from this tier of local government.  Table 49 highlights the average percentage of 
women across the three tiers in the sample countries selected for Eastern Europe/
Eurasia.
TABLE 49:  Eastern Europe/Eurasia – Vertical Distribution 
12 Data Points 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 Mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
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Judiciary
Highest Court X
Second Court X
Third Court X
Security
Sr.-Level Officers X
Mid-Level Officers X
Low-Level Officers X
Executive: 15.9-21.2-4.0  Legislative: 4.4-21.0.-17.6  Judiciary: 26.4-32.0-41.4  Security: 3.7-8.5-8.9
Latin America/Caribbean
Like other regional patterns seen, Latin America/Caribbean had few women 
represented in the mayoral arena (3 out of 50).  Unlike other regions, however, 
the percentage of women in executive ministerial positions exceeded Tier 2 senior 
executives.  Although the sample of countries was among the smallest by region (5 
countries), in every instance the percentage of ministers exceeded the percentage 
of senior executives.  While ministerial representation was among the highest, 
legislative representation was among the lowest.  Women are moving into party 
leadership positions to some extent, but their representation as committee chairs is 
significantly lower in relation to the percentage of women parliamentary members. 
For example, while women hold an average of 17.1% of the lower house seats, they 
head only 10.8% of the committees.  This is the largest gap between legislative Tier 
2 and Tier 3 percentages in all regions.  As women are gaining access to legislative 
bodies, it would appear that they are not making equal progress in accessing 
committee leadership in equal proportion.  Consistently low percentages of women 
in political party leadership, committee chairs, and percentages of parliamentarians 
resulted in the Latin America/Caribbean country average outscoring only the Middle 
East/North Africa in the legislative arena.  In the security sector, excellent access 
to data provided insights into what is happening with women’s representation at 
the highest levels of the police, including figures that point to a potentially strong 
glass ceiling in place at the senior officer level. 512  Table 50 highlights the average 
512  The Latin American Network of Security and Defence (RESDAL) has produced the definitive book on the military 
for Latin America and the Caribbean.  While it does not include a breakdown of police statistics, the organization 
was able to easily collect the needed police data given their contacts in the security domain.  For an insightful look 
into the gender aspects of women and the military, refer to their excellent publication: “A Comparative Atlas of 
Defence in Latin America and Caribbean.” Latin American Network of Security and Defence, 2014. 
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percentage of women across the three tiers in the sample countries selected for Latin 
America/Caribbean.
TABLE 50:  Latin America/Caribbean – Vertical Distribution 
12 Data Points 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 Mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
Judiciary
Highest Court X
Second Court X
Third Court X
Security
Sr.-Level officers X
Mid-Level officers X
Low-Level officers X
Executive: 24.2-18.5-6.0  Legislative: 8.2-10.8-17.1  Judiciary: 16.7-18.1-23.7  Security: 4.9-8.6-9.4
Asia
On average, with the exception of the legislative branch, scores were low in the Asia 
countries selected from the region.  Here we see women leading political parties at 
higher percentages than other regions.  The number of women parliamentarians is 
also 2.4% above the 40-country average.  While a glass ceiling may appear to exist 
in the countries measured, it is not as apparent as in the other four geographical 
regions.  The differences in the percent of women serving in a Tier 1 verses a Tier 
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2 or a Tier 3 are not as wide, thus women are more evenly distributed among the 
varying three tiers.  Overall, however, lower percentages of women are entering 
the executive, judiciary, and security sectors at the Tier 3 level in relation to other 
regions measured.  The Asia model reflects fewer numbers of women more evenly 
distributed across decision-making positions, as compared to the other regions 
where the selected countries exhibited distinctive bulges of women clustered in the 
bottom Tier 3.  Table 51 highlights the average percentage of women across all three 
tiers in the sample countries selected for Asia.
TABLE 51:  Asia – Vertical Distribution 
12 Data Points 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 Mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
Judiciary
Highest Court X
Second Court X
Third Court X
Security 
Sr.-Level Officers X
Mid-Level Officers X
Low-Level Officers X
Executive: 11.1-12.7-6.7  Legislative: 11.1-18.7-21.7  Judiciary: 15.2-18.9-18.3  Security: 2.8-5.0-7.5
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Africa
Africa appears as the success story in terms of higher percentages of women across 
the political spectrum as well as scoring in the Diamond Index.  This is due, in part, to 
the cross-cutting high scores of South Africa and, with the exception of the security 
sector, Rwanda.  Yet many other countries across the continent are seeing significant 
jumps in women’s representation as well – Kenya, Mozambique, Ghana, and Liberia 
all scored well.  Despite significant percentages of women across all sectors, we see 
in Table 50 a possible glass ceiling effect, especially in the legislative arena.  In this 
sector we can see a 23.2% drop between Tier 1 and Tier 2.  While there are few women 
political party leaders, it would appear that women are being given opportunities 
through appointments in the executive and judiciary.  Within the judiciary women 
are also making steady gains at all levels.  There is only a 2.5% separation in women’s 
representation between Tier 1 and Tier 3 courts.  Higher-than-average levels of 
representation were consistently seen in high-prestige positions on constitutional, 
supreme, and high courts across the selection of countries from the African region. 
Women are also making more headway in the security sector, with no tier level at 
less than 7% representation.  Table 52 highlights the average percentage of women 
across the three tiers in the sample countries selected for Africa.
TABLE 52:  Africa – Vertical Distribution 
12 Data Points 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 Mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
Judiciary
Highest Court X
Second Court X
Third Courts X
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Security 
Sr.-Level Officers X
Mid-Level Officers X
Low-level Officers X
Executive: 23.8-25.7-11.7  Legislative: 4.7-27.9-22.6  Judiciary: 26.6-27.5-26.6  Security: 7.7-8.3-10.8
Middle East/North Africa
If Sub-Saharan Africa is the success story, countries from Northern Africa and the 
Middle East present the greatest set of challenges, both in terms of women entering 
into decision-making positions as well as access to information.  Political turmoil 
in the Middle East limited access to in-country travel as well as expertise normally 
available.  Of the seven countries selected, sufficient data was collected on six.  The 
status of women in the security sector remains almost completely unknown across 
the region.  Governments are unwilling to share the information and the team 
could find no experts or non-governmental organizations tracking data in this area. 
Along with little progress in the security sector, the legislative branch also appears 
to exhibit a glass ceiling, with a 15.6% drop in the percent of political-party leaders 
who are women to the percent of female rank-and-file members.  There are a several 
noteworthy areas in this region to report, however.  We see some progress in the 
upper echelons of the executive, with a number of women appointed to the position 
of senior executive (13.4%).  We can also see significant numbers of women in the 
lower courts of the judicial arena.  While few women serve on the higher courts, 
percentages in the lower courts (Tier 3) surpass those of countries sampled in Asia and 
Latin America.  Again, while Asia has fewer women more evenly distributed across 
varying levels of the judiciary, the Middle East/North Africa region distribution 
clusters women in the lower ranks, a pattern more reflective of the 40-country trend. 
Table 53 highlights the average percentage of women across the three tiers in the 
sample countries selected for the Middle East/North Africa.
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TABLE 53:  Middle East/North Africa – Vertical Distribution 
12 Data Points 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51 +
Executive
Ministers X
Senior Executives X
Top 10 mayors X
Legislative
Party Leaders X
Committee Chairs X
Legislators X
Judiciary
Highest Court X
Second Court X
Third Court X
Security 
Sr.-Level Officers NA
Mid-Level Officers NA
Low-level Officers X
Executive: 9.0-13.4-1.4   Legislative: 1.6-12.5-17.2   Judiciary: 5.1-3.8-26.1   Security: NA-NA-4.8
6.9 CONCLUSION 
The global average score of 13.6 – out of a possible maximum of 100 points – indicates 
that women’s representation in decision-making positions is less than one-sixth of 
men’s, resulting in restricted political access.  That is not to say that women are 
not making gains in specific government sectors or positions of decision-making 
authority.  In returning to the two sub-questions posed at the beginning of this 
chapter, some interesting highlights emerge.
1)  To what degree are women accessing decision-making positions horizontally across formal 
government and the security sector?
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In regard to horizontal or sectoral representation (glass walls), women seem to 
be making the most gains in the judicial sector.  Out of a maximum of 25 possible 
points, indicating only women in judicial decision-making positions, the 40-country 
average score was 5.1.  Across all regions, including the Middle East/North Africa, 
women are gaining access to magisterial and judicial positions from lower courts to 
higher courts.  
The second-highest sector for women’s representation was the executive branch. 
Here the Diamond Index overall average score was 3.8 (out of a possible maximum 
of 25).  While sample countries from Africa and Latin America/Caribbean scored 
well in this regard, achievements were tempered by the lack of representation in the 
countries selected from Asia and the Middle East/North Africa.  
The third-ranked sector among the four was the legislative branch with a 40-country 
average of 3.0 (out of a possible maximum of 25).  Countries representing Asia (3.9) 
and Africa (3.8) recorded the highest Diamond Index scores in this domain.  The 
significant representation of Asian women as heads of political parties resulted in 
its first-place showing.  Eastern Europe/Eurasia (2.9) along with Latin America/
Caribbean (2.6) scored close to one another in the mid-range.  The Middle East/
North Africa region scored lowest at 1.9.
2) To what degree are women accessing decision-making positions vertically across formal 
government and the security sector?
Looking at the judiciary from a vertical perspective (glass ceilings), steady gains are 
being made in the overall percentage of women occupying Tier 1 (17.1%) and Tier 
2 (19.9%).  The majority of positions measured, however, remain clustered in Tier 3 
(27.9%) decision-making positions.  In the seven countries representing the Middle 
East/North Africa region, significant numbers of women are entering the judiciary 
at the lower-court level.     
Within the executive sector, the lack of women mayors across all geographic zones 
was  most striking.  While the average percentage of ministers (16.8%) and senior 
executives (18.3%) was significant, the absence of women leaders among large urban 
centers (6%) was in direct contrast to gains made in the upper tiers of the executive.
In the legislative sector, women are making headway in gaining seats with a 
40-country average of 19.2%.  If women can access parliamentary seats, they also 
seem able to access committee chairs.  Female chairwomen seats, at 18.2%, reflected 
the general percentage of women members of parliament.  Women as political party 
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leaders appeared as a significant gap.  On average, women encumber 6% of the 
top party positions.  Asia is the only region with significantly higher scores in this 
category.
While representation of women across all three government branches lags 
significantly behind men, typically two out of the three tiers in each domain find 
women’s representation close to 20%.  The exceptions to this were women mayors, 
political party leaders, and all tiers of the security sector.  The sole exception to the 
security sector trend was South Africa, with a Diamond Index score of 7 (out of a 
possible maximum of 25) – approximately double the score of any other country. 
At each tier level women were well represented. This moved the average score for 
Africa’s 14 countries to 2.2.  All other regions scored below 2, with Asia scoring just 
above 1 point and no average score for the Middle East/North Africa countries due 
to a lack of data.  The 40-country average score of 1.7 points to thick glass walls and 
a glass ceiling surrounding the security sector.
From the methodology of the Diamond Index we can begin to see in more detail where 
women are represented in the political space horizontally across government as well 
as vertically within institutions.  This information, especially if collected over time, 
can provide greater nuance and understanding surrounding women’s descriptive 
representation in the political space and where they are accessing, or excluded from, 
decision-making positions.
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We can track their numbers, and the reversals. 
Simply by counting women, we can learn a great deal.513
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In attempting to construct a new gender composite indicator in the political domain, 
it quickly becomes clear that such an effort is a careful balancing act.  Global 
indicators need national data that can be captured by all governments and reported 
annually.  This is a difficult bar to meet in the political sector, and has traditionally 
been seen as a fairly limited exercise.  Regional indexes are more robust in what they 
aim to collect, moving beyond the percentage of women legislators and ministers 
to other sectors and often to the sub-national level.  For some regions, such as the 
European Union, more detailed data may be readily available.  In much of the Middle 
East, Asia, and Africa, however, gathering extensive data on the status of women’s 
descriptive representation in the political space may require on-the-ground analysis 
or in-country experts.  This more robust data collection effort can quickly escalate 
costs, require longer collection timeframes, reduce geographic reach, and limit the 
ability to publish results annually.    
The Diamond Index attempts to strike a middle ground.  It ambitiously strives 
to capture more varied political data, yet is realistic enough to understand the 
limitations of individual countries to collect this information on an annual basis. 
The Diamond Index begins by identifying 12 positions across government (executive, 
legislative, judicial, and security) and then weighting each according to their 
perceived decision-making authority.  These individuals, by virtue of their elected 
or appointed position within the formal system of government, have varying levels 
of authority and agency.  
Current gender equality indexes typically benchmark women’s progress against 
men’s in the domains of health, education, labor, and power.  The intent in 
513 Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
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developing the Diamond Index was to propose a more nuanced model for measuring 
women’s political access only.  Once the index was developed, the research then 
tested whether the data could be collected on a global scale while maintaining a 
focus on the quality of information gathered.  
The first part of this chapter focuses on the quality of the data, and a determination 
as to whether it can be collected sufficiently on a global scale.  This includes a re-
examination of the quality data framework upon which the Diamond Index was 
designed.514  The framework’s eight quality data criteria are applied across the 
information gathered in the 40 selected countries.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the findings emerging from the data in 
the 40 pilot countries.  In discussing the strengths of the Diamond Index, the depth 
and breadth of data holds the potential for identifying different trends and patterns 
that have not been fully explored through current gender indexes in use.  Some 
areas of interest include a closer examination of appointed versus elected positions 
across government; the location of women in relation to decision-making positions 
assigned increasing levels of authority; and the ability to compare one specific branch 
of government (or a mix of branches) across countries, regions, and the world.  This 
section is followed by a final discussion of the research value as well as limitations 
associated with the Diamond Index.  
7.2 EVALUATING THE QUALITY DATA FRAMEWORK
In Chapter 3 – For Good Measure, the Diamond Index Quality Data Framework was 
developed.  This framework contains eight criteria against which the quality of the 
data collected is judged:  1) relevance, 2) completeness, 3) comparability, 4) accuracy, 
5) timeliness, 6) cost effectiveness, 7) accessibility, and 8) granularity.  Data perceived 
to be of high quality is marked with the symbol +, medium-quality data ±, and low-
quality data by the – symbol.  In the following section, the data gathered across the 
12 decision-making positions is evaluated against each of the eight criteria and then 
categorized as being of high, medium, or low quality.      
514  See Chapter 3:  For Good Measure for further explanation of the Diamond Index Quality Data Framework and 
the selection of its eight criteria.
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7.2.1  Relevance
Relevance examines whether the data adequately captures the theoretical concept 
or ideas that it claims to be measuring.  In short, do the indicators selected measure 
what they say they are measuring?  Meeting this criteria can be challenging with 
a composite indicator, given attempts to often measure different domains or even 
concepts using the same instrument.515  In order to minimize this risk, I selected 
an equal number of horizontal and vertical measures of perceived equality – to the 
greatest extent possible on a global scale – in order to ensure consistency across 
each domain.  As a result, the index relies on the same type of indicator (a position) 
across all four domains, the same number of positions selected per domain (three), 
each chosen at approximately the same level of authority (ranked according to three 
tiers), and each weighted in the same manner (based on percentages of women). 516 
While not perfect, this focus on consistency in horizontal and vertical approach 
reinforces relevancy across all measures.
Executive:  Across tier 1 and tier 2, variations occur as to whether the official in 
a particular position focuses on developing policy, implementing policy, or a 
combination of both.  Within the tier 2 level there will also be differentiation in 
how individuals arrived at their position.  While ministers are appointed, senior 
executives will be a mix of political appointees and career civil servants.  Others 
may be perceived as apolitical, appointed for their technical or managerial strengths 
irrespective of political affiliation.  The commonality in these two cadres is their 
collective responsibility for ensuring executive branch policy is set and carried out, 
emanating from the highest positional levels of the ministerial structure.  Within the 
executive branch, data collected for Tier 1 – Ministers and Tier 2 – Senior Executives is 
perceived as highly relevant.
Relevancy concerns emerge around the data collected for Tier 3 – Mayor.  Ideally, this 
measure would have focused on women leaders at the first sub-national tier below 
the national level.  This would include more typically, for example, a state governor, 
regional commissioner, provincial leader, or district official.  This lack of available 
information, when paired with the inconsistency in measurement units, made it 
difficult to collect this level as a viable data point.  As a result, the commonality 
of mayoral positions at the sub-national level, and collectability of data among the 
largest urban centers, equated to mayoral positions being a reliable “second-best” 
– while still deemed a relevant measure – of women’s access to decision-making 
515  Nardo, Michela, Michaela Saisana, Andrea Saltelli, Anders Hoffman, and Enrico Giovannini. “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide.” OECD publishing, 2005.
516  A more in-depth narrative as to why the 12 positions were selected, including each indicator’s relevancy  as a 
measure, is discussed in Chapter 4 – Developing the Diamond Index.
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positions at the sub-national level.  For these reasons, the tier 3 data was given a rank 
of medium quality.
    
Legislative:  The relevancy of the Tier 1 – Political Party Leader data links to the 
role leadership can play as a determinant of party priorities.  Equally important, 
leadership can also take on a gatekeeper role that facilitates or blocks access to a 
variety of formal political positions.517  Tier 2 – Committee Chairs was also deemed 
a relevant measure given the increasing role parliamentary committees play as 
the organizing structure responsible for legislating and conducting government 
oversight.518  Given the decision-making authority inherent in each of these positions 
to determine party representation and policy direction, both tier 1 and tier 2 data 
was given a rank of high quality,
The intent of the Tier 3 – Legislative Members measure was to capture data at the sub-
national level.  Efforts to create a consistent definition of sub-national representation 
have not been successful to date, and there is currently no standardized collection 
of global data below the national level.  Given definitional inconsistencies and the 
lack of available data to gather, the first-choice of information collection at the sub-
national level was not considered realistic.  Unable to gather the most relevant 
measure, in keeping with the logical construction of the index, the decision was 
made to focus on members of parliament who do represent local constituencies 
at the sub-national level.  Legislative member data is consistently used as a valid 
indicator across global gender indexes, even as claims to what it actually measures 
– women’s empowerment, political power, voice, agency – remain open to debate. 
Given the role of legislators as representatives of sub-national constituencies, and 
wide academic acceptance of members of parliament as a measure of women in 
the political space, the Tier 3 – Legislative measure was considered relevant.  The 
preference for this tier, however, was data directly tied to a sub-national official.  For 
these reasons, a ranking of medium-data quality was given for tier 3.
Judicial:  There is little discussion in current global gender indexes, nor the 
literature underpinning the development of those tools, about women’s presence 
in the judiciary.  In attempting to capture women’s descriptive representation in 
formal government, however, it was important from a relevancy perspective that 
data from all three branches of government be collected.  Selecting judges from the 
most powerful courts was viewed as an accurate representation of women’s access 
to decision-making authority in the judicial branch.  While clerks and administrative 
517  Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. Gender and Party Politics. Sage Publications, 1993. Rahat, Gideon. 
“Candidate Selection:  The Choice before the Choice.” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 157–170.
518  The rationale underpinning the selection for each of the 12 positions is detailed in Chapter 4 – Developing the 
Diamond Index.
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staff may admittedly serve as gate-keepers, it is the judges themselves who have the 
formal authority to rule on cases.  The quality of the data measuring judges selected 
from the top three tiers of each country’s respective judicial structure was given a 
ranking of highly relevant.
Security:  The police sector is one piece of state security.  By focusing on this branch, 
the Diamond Index can only capture a single aspect of formal representation in the 
security domain.  Also, because collection efforts highlighted that police units 
appear more open to the presence of women than other security organizations, such 
as the military, the Diamond Index measure may be overvaluing women’s presence 
in this domain.  Given current data limitations, however, there is no simple solution 
for fully capturing women’s presence in the security arena.  As a result, in choosing 
to measure women in the police we are directed to where the most data is available. 
While data within the command structure of the national police force is considered 
adequate to capture the intent of measuring women leaders in the security sector, 
it does not comprise the full picture of women’s representation.  Based on the 
definitional narrowness of what constitutes women’s formal decision-making in the 
security domain, relevancy was scored as medium quality. Table 54 presents the 
final scoring for the 12 positions against the “relevance” quality data criteria.
TABLE 54:  Relevance Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY 
DATA CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
RELEVANCE + + ± + + + + + + ± ± ±
7.2.2  Completeness
This criteria examines whether the data selected provides sufficient breadth and 
depth of information.  The difficulty is compounded when attempting to do this 
for every country across the globe.  Do the indicators selected apply to the majority 
of countries?  Do the countries collect this type of data?  Often the data sought 
by researchers can not be found on a consistent basis, leading to the use of proxy 
indicators.  This in itself should not be deemed negative.  Concerns emerge, however, 
when “choices of convenience” are made: using the data at hand rather than the data 
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required.519  The Diamond Index is not immune to this tension.  It attempts to alleviate 
issues of completeness by carefully selecting a wider breadth and depth of measures 
across government, thereby spreading the risk that final results are over-reliant on 
a few proxy measures that may more strongly reflect availability (completeness) 
rather than relevance. 
 
The majority of the 40 countries selected for my research were low- or lower-middle 
income.520   No country was selected from the middle- or high-income range.  Most 
countries were considered partly free, with only 17.5% of the countries rated as free.521 
A number of those selected, in particular low-income countries, were perceived 
as data-scarce, with limited in-country expertise and resources available to state 
institutions responsible for data collection.  The premise was to test the viability of 
data collection in difficult pilot countries, with the expectation that if information 
could be gathered under these constrained economic and political conditions it 
would be feasible to gather the same information in more advanced economies and 
liberal democracies.522
Executive:  The ability to collect data using publically available information was 
consistently high, with tier 1 recording the collection of all indicators at 100%, tier 2 at 
87.5%, and tier 3 at 97.5%.  The selected positions were considered highly complete.
Legislative:  The ability to collect data using publically available information was 
the highest in this domain, with tier 1 and tier 3 gathering 100% of all indicators.  Tier 
2 was able to collect 95.0% of the data points.  The selected positions were considered 
highly complete.
Judicial:  The ability to collect data using publically available data was consistently 
high, with tier 1 recording the collection of indicators at 95.0% and tier 2 and tier 3 
collecting 87.5% of the data.  The selected positions were considered highly complete.
Security:  The security sector consistently experienced data collection problems 
across all three tiers.  While the national police appeared in most countries to have 
more information available than other elements of the security sector, it was by no 
means robust.  Public resources available produced results in less than half of the 
40 countries selected.  To attempt to reach higher percentages of data collection, 
519  Hawken, Angela, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Cross-National Indices with Gender-Differentiated Data: What Do 
They Measure? How Valid Are They?” Social Indicators Research, 2013, 1–38.
520  World Bank 2013 (http://data.worldbank.org/country).
521  Freedom House 2013 (http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013).
522  Chapter 5 – Gathering Data for the Diamond Index provides a more complete narrative describing and 
documenting all data collection efforts. 
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in-country experts were called upon with mixed success.  In a number of instances, 
countries admitted to having the data yet were unwilling to share it with researchers. 
Even with the help of local experts, the ability to collect complete data sets in the 
security area was limited to the following:  tier 1 at 55.0%, tier 2 at 52.5%, and tier 3 at 
82.5%.  Overall, the completeness criteria in the security sector was given a ranking 
of low data quality. Table 55 presents the final scoring for the 12 positions against the 
“completeness” quality data criteria.
TABLE 55:  Completeness Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
COMPLETENESS + + + + + + + + + – – –
7.2.3  Comparability
This criteria ensures that data definitions and concepts are consistent across countries 
and over time.  While comparability is always a concern, it assumes significant 
importance for those composite indicators attempting to measure on a global 
basis.  There are few political consistencies to be found across the world’s nearly 
200 countries.  For example, in identifying decision-makers, I selected identifiable 
positions common to the vast majority of countries.  Yet carefully examining any 
one of the 12 positions across a range of countries highlights that decision-making 
and responsibilities will vary according to the type of political system, constitutional 
framework, body of laws, and cultural context.  So while the names of the positions 
may be consistent, we must acknowledge that inherent differences in roles – despite 
similarity in titles – will differ from country to country. 
Executive:  In several global gender indexes, data collected for Diamond Index Tier 
1 – Ministers and Tier 2 – Senior Executives has been combined into one indicator that 
is commonly accepted as a viable measure of women’s presence in the executive 
branch of government.523  Although the literature underpinning the development of 
these global indexes differs as to what this presence stands for, it is recognized that 
across countries these positions are comparable units.  The Diamond Index separates 
523  For example, this indicator is used by the World Economic Form’s Global Gender Gap Index and Social Watch’s 
Gender Equity Index.  It is produced annually by UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.
254
Chapter 7 Diamond Index Findings and Limitations
the ministerial positions from those executive positions directly under ministerial 
supervision to create two separate tiers of data.  Given the consistent use of this 
descriptive representational measure in established global indexes and by the United 
Nations, the data is considered highly comparable.
One concern in the executive branch surrounding comparability involves the Tier 3 – 
Mayor data.  While there are many commonalities in the position – for example, each 
mayor is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of a defined, generally legally 
recognized, geographic area524 – there are also many differences.  Mayors may be 
elected by local citizens, a council, or appointed by the central government.  They may 
wield enormous autonomy, including over resources, or they may have extremely 
limited decision-making powers.  In collecting data, it became clear that even when 
limiting mayoral selection to the 10 largest urban areas, the difference between 
cities remains significant.  In some instances cities outstripped the population and 
resources levels of entire countries.  The decision-making and authority of a mayor 
in these instances may be more akin to a national-level actor.  In less developed 
and smaller countries, the mayoral position presided over a municipal area that 
resembled a rural town.  These differences challenge the comparability of mayors 
across all spectrums of countries, thereby leading to a medium-quality data ranking.
Legislative:  Working backwards in the legislative branch, Tier 3 – Legislator is the 
most commonly used indicator in gender indexes to measure women’s descriptive 
representation in the political space.  This data has now been collected for several 
decades by the Inter-Parliamentary Union525 and is considered a comparable 
measure across legislative branches, acknowledging that parliaments themselves 
vary in their authorities.  Tier 3 data is considered highly comparable.
Regarding data for Tier 2 – Committee Chair, there is currently no systematic collection 
of this information in the legislative branch.  The literature, however, attests to the 
increasing importance of committees in addressing party conflict and achieving 
policy resolution.526  The head of the committee is recognized as having enhanced 
status and greater access to resources in their role.527  While committees will vary 
in their authorities across different political systems – and prestige of committees 
will themselves vary within the each legislative institution – the role of committee 
chairperson is considered highly comparable across political systems.
524  Teune, Henry. “Local Government and Democratic Political Development.” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science 540, no. 1 (1995): 11–23.
525  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Parliaments at a Glance,” 2017. 
526  Lawrence Longley, and Roger H. Davidson. “Parliamentary Committees: Changing Perspectives on Changing 
Institutions,” n.d. Accessed April 28, 2018. 
527  Kathlene, Lyn. “Position Power Versus Gender Power: Who Holds the Floor?” Gender Power, Leadership, and 
Governance, 1995, 167–94.
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Within the legislative branch the Tier 1 – Political Party Leader is open to comparability 
concerns.  Namely, all political parties with lower-house representation are considered 
viable for measurement.  So, for example, the Alliance for Transparency and Change 
party, with one leader in Tanzania’s national assembly, is given the same weight as 
the leader of the Party of the Revolution with approximately 270 seats.528  While their 
duties as party leaders may be similar, their influence in the national assembly can 
not be considered fully comparable.  For this reason, a ranking of medium-quality 
data was given.   
Judicial:  Judicial systems are varied across the globe in a number of ways.  While 
some follow the common law tradition, others are based on civil law.  Making 
comparisons more difficult, however, is how different countries physically structure 
their court systems and the attendant level of authority at each level.  This becomes 
especially problematic at the tier 3 level in the judicial branch.  In some countries 
this may still be a national level court while in others this tier is devolved to the sub-
national level.  So a third tier may include a small number of elite judicial decision-
makers on the national stage; in other instances this level could comprise dozens 
or hundreds of lower-level magistrates.  There is no easy fix to the comparability of 
judicial systems at this level.  The comparability and consistency is in its location at 
the third tier of court within each country’s judicial framework.  These comparability 
concerns resulted in a judicial tier 3 medium-quality data ranking. 
Security:  Data included the police force with national jurisdiction.  For smaller and 
developing countries, this was typically clear as the state relied on one national police 
force.  In larger, more populated and diverse countries, this narrow criteria was at 
times problematic, considering the number of overlapping responsibilities between 
different types of security forces.  Within any  respective national police force, 
however, the ability to compare officer rankings within that selected structure was 
surprisingly similar.  While some forces may have several additional classifications 
of officer, for most of the 40 countries the police hierarchy of command varies little. 
So while the positions themselves were highly comparable, the nature of the differing 
forces resulted in an overall medium-quality data ranking.  Table 56 presents the 
final scoring for the 12 positions against the “comparability” quality data criteria.
528  www.parliament.go.tz/mps-list
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TABLE 56:  Comparability Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
COMPARABILITY + + ± ± + + + ± ± ± ± ±
7.2.4 Accuracy
The criteria of accuracy partners closely with completeness.  While noteworthy that 
data can be gathered successfully and completely, it is also necessary to determine if 
the information was accurate, limited in its bias, and if any data gaps were identified. 
In terms of bias, because the Diamond Index is measuring descriptive representation in 
specific positions, the introduction of bias is limited.  Either a man or women (as self-
identified) holds the position; it is a simple binary choice.  Therefore, across the four 
domains, bias was not perceived as problematic.  Concerns about inaccuracies and 
data gaps were more closely examined given that composite indicators, in particular, 
rely on the generation of data from a variety of entities, including under-resourced 
national statistical offices.  Part of the intention behind the Diamond Index was to test 
to what extent useful data could be collected without relying or requesting formal 
government participation.  This was done, in particular, with a focus on countries 
where governments were unable or uninterested in gathering and sharing more 
expansive gender data in the political space.
Executive:  For tier 1 and tier 2, public information was available.  This included data 
from official government websites and multi-lateral agencies.   The data gathered for 
tier 3 (mayors) relied on a broader array of public sources.  Information for larger 
urban centers was easily gathered.  More remote and smaller cities did require the 
use of local media and Internet searches.  Once cities and mayors were identified, 
however, it was perceived as relatively easy to fact-check the information through 
insider knowledge and media reporting.  The data for the three selected positions 
within the executive domain was considered highly accurate.
Legislative:  Tier 1 and tier 3 data is provided through a combination of official 
government, multi-lateral, political party, and United States government websites. 
The ability to fact-check against multiple sources lends a high degree of confidence 
to the accuracy of the information.  The one area of concern in the legislative branch 
was tier 2 (committee chairs).  While data is publically available in most countries 
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on parliamentary committees and leadership, it is not always clear if the committees 
being cited are permanent or ad hoc in nature.  The goal of the Diamond Index 
was to include only permanent committees.  It is possible, however, that in some 
instances ad hoc committees were included.  There was no easily discernable way to 
distinguish ad hoc from permanent committees if the legislative branch itself did not 
make that distinction.  For this reason legislative tier 2 received a medium-quality 
data ranking in accuracy.
Judicial:  Data for the tier 1 and tier 2 judicial levels was most often found through 
official government websites.  These judges are typically few in number and maintain 
a high public profile.  Concerns around accuracy emerge with the judicial tier 3 
positions, especially when these courts are located at the sub-national level.  This 
level of regional or district judge or magistrate is typically not included on public 
government websites, and it can be difficult to verify the accuracy of data produced. 
While the information was often found, it relied on older reports, grey literature, 
assessments of the judiciary, or government reports.  In some instances, simply a 
long list of names was provided.  Using this mixture of information, it was difficult 
to confirm in any meaningful way the accuracy and currency of the data being 
provided – short of in-country expertise, confirmation from the judicial branch, or 
verification by an appropriate ministry.  For the variability in data provided at the 
tier 3 level – in particular for sub-national courts – a medium-quality data ranking 
was conferred for accuracy.
Security:  The data collected in the security sector was considered accurate when 
researchers were able to access the information.  Wider concerns around accuracy 
emerge, however, given the large data gaps.  In particular, approximately half of 
the countries were unable or unwilling to provide data detailing officers occupying 
the top and middle command structures of their national police force.  Given these 
significant data gaps, tier 1 and tier 2 were ranked low-quality data while tier 3 
(reporting in 82.5% of the countries) was allocated a medium-quality data score 
for accuracy.  Table 57 presents the final scoring of the 12 positions against the 
“accuracy” quality data criteria.
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TABLE 57:  Accuracy Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
Tier  
1
Tier  
2
Tier  
3
ACCURACY + + + + ± + + + ± – – ±
7.2.5  Timeliness
In order to construct the Diamond Index on a consistent annual basis, this criteria of 
the data quality framework is focused on the ability to collect information across a 
single-year timeframe.  One attribute of a typical composite indicator is its reliance 
on a multitude of sources for data.  This may leave the researcher dependent on a 
variety of publication dates that lack coherence when aggregated.  For example, 
one domain may use current data while a different domain relies on much older 
data.  If examining formal government, this can be problematic when new elections 
or incidents result in a dramatic reordering of the political space.  Having to wait 
another year or two to reflect these changes may not be optimal.  
Executive:  The public sources used to collect the data were consistently updated 
and reflected the reality of current positions.  One concern for the Diamond Index 
would be, however, attempting to collect this data in the immediate days or weeks 
following an election, in particular where there was significant change due to the 
reordering of political parties in power.  Time would be required for the new regime 
to take its position, conclude appointments, and update information for the public. 
With the caveat of this short timeframe immediately following national or mayoral 
elections, the selected positions were considered highly timely.
Legislative:  Official parliamentary websites, multi-lateral agencies, and United 
States government data bases provide timely data for all three tiers of the legislative 
branch.  Although the data is not always collected systematically in one place, 
multiple sources allow adequate information to be gathered in a timely manner. 
As noted with the executive, gathering data  immediately following parliamentary 
elections would be problematic.  A period of recalibration would be required to allow 
for parties to seat members and possibly reallocate committee leadership positions. 
With the caveat of this short timeframe immediately following parliamentary 
elections, the selected positions were considered highly timely.
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Judicial:  In general, judges selected for tier 1 positions tend to have long appointments 
and are less subject to the vagaries of political elections.  Data at this level was 
consistently available and updated in official judicial websites and verifiable through 
multiple sources.  Tier 1 data was ranked as high quality.  Timeliness issues emerge 
in the tier 2 category depending on the type of court.  For some countries, this court 
remains prominent at the national level and public information is available and 
updated regularly.  In other instances, this court may not have the national profile 
as the top-tier court, thus making information harder to find and verify its currency. 
This same situation is exacerbated at the tier 3 level; information is pulled from a 
variety of sources wherever it can be found.  Reports may be out of date.  New 
appointments are not consistently updated into a central registry.  At this level it 
becomes difficult to confirm the timing of the information provided, including when 
it was last updated to reflect on-the-ground realities. Given these challenges, tier 2 
was ranked medium-quality data and tier 3 was ranked low-quality data.
Security:  When information is provided, it is typically of high quality, including 
timeliness.  Weaknesses occur when researchers must dig for information from 
a range of sources.  As noted with the judiciary tier 3, reports may be old or the 
sources unclear about when the data being presented was collected.  This makes it 
difficult to ascertain the timeliness of the data and whether it reflects reality.  Given 
the large numbers present in the lower ranks of officers, and certain movement 
in and out of these positions, it is fairly certain that unless the ministry or police 
itself are providing the information, changes will have occurred.  These challenges 
result in all tiers within the security sector receiving a low-quality data ranking 
for timeliness.  Table 58 presents the final scoring for the 12 positions against the 
“timeliness” quality data criteria.
TABLE 58:  Timeliness Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
TIMELINESS + + + + + + + ± – – – –
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7.2.6  Cost Effectiveness
Cost effectiveness will have different connotations if you are the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation verses an individual student researcher.  What may be cost 
effective to one may be a “blue sky” exercise for another.  This criteria is meant 
to focus more attention on how data can be collected in a cost-effective manner – 
without the deep pockets of a foundation or international organization – that is 
sustainable and replicable on a regular basis.  For my purposes the intent was to 
create a measure that could realistically be collected by in-country stakeholders – 
whether a low-income or high-income country – by a government office, local non-
governmental organization, or small group of researchers.  
Executive:  Publicly available data provides affordable access to tier 1 and tier 2 
information.  Data from both levels was ranked as highly cost effective.  There is 
also a range of information on the largest cities in most countries.  Mayors and 
statistics are typically found in official government websites or through the media. 
Problems arise, however, with the lack of data on women in government beyond the 
prominent urban centers, particularly in lower-income countries.  Specific language 
skills, the triangulation of multiple data sources, and even in-country expertise 
may be required beyond the regional capitals.  This can quickly lead to significant 
human resource hours needed to chase down data on smaller cities in highly rural 
countries.  Because of the mixed nature of mayoral data availability at the tier 3 level, 
a medium-quality data ranking was given for cost effectiveness.     
Legislative:  Public data exists for all three tiers of the legislative branch, in 
particular for tier 1 and tier 3.  Tier 2 data (committee chairs) also exists to a great 
extent on official websites.  It is not, however, collected in any single format.  More 
time, therefore, is required to systematically collect and verify the data, but it can be 
achieved using only public data with no additional costs incurred beyond research 
hours.  The selected positions were considered highly cost effective.
Judicial:  Given the difficulties previously outlined in collecting quality data at the 
tier 3 level, it correlates that more human resources may be required to adequately 
gather information.  This remains, however, very country specific depending on 
where this court level sits.  If it remains at the national level, public information is 
more readily available at low cost.  Once this tier of court moves to the sub-national 
level, however, the number of judges increases substantially while at the same time 
the amount of public information decrease substantially.  In this case, triangulation, 
in-country verification, language skills, etc., may be all be required, increasing the 
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associated cost.  Because some countries require a greater resource investment, but 
not all, the judiciary tier 3 was ranked as medium-quality data.
Security:  It quickly became apparent that the entire project budget for this research 
could be quickly consumed trying to track down security data.  Strategic choices 
were then made as to where the best opportunity for gathering information could 
realistically materialize.  An intensive effort was then made in those countries.  Even 
allocating greater resources had a minimal return on the investment given the lack of 
public information, the low political will to share any information, and the mistrust 
by the security sector of “outsiders.”  It was soon apparent to the research team 
why so little information detailing women military and police officers exists for 
public consumption.  The ability to adequately gather information in this arena was 
beyond the resource scope – both financial and human – of this research effort.  The 
overall security score was ranked low quality data for cost effectiveness.  Table 59 
presents the final scoring of the 12 positions against the “cost effectiveness” quality 
data criteria.
TABLE 59:  Cost Effectiveness Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
COST 
EFFECTIVENESS + + ± + + + + + ± – – –
7.2.7  Accessibility
The Diamond Index was designed with access to public information and ease of use 
as foundational principles.  The ability to present data in a format that is simple 
to understand, access, and replicate by the general public, governments, or other 
interested stakeholders was foundational.  With a template created, the desire is to 
see others replicate the index according to their individual country needs and time 
frame.  For this reason, simple mathematical formulas and logical construction were 
designed with replicability in mind.
Executive:  Tier 1 and Tier 2 data was ranked of high quality given its public nature 
and ease of access.  The goal of replicability, however, fell short in tier 3.  For an 
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expert sitting in the country, the data is typically available.  On several occasions 
a quick call to the city council office from a citizen could confirm the name and 
sex of the mayor.  For those sitting outside the problematic country, however, this 
information is not always easy to find in data-scarce, conflict, or insecure states. 
While trying to replicate the information on an individual country-to-country basis 
is feasible, researchers attempting to consolidate the data on a regional or global 
scale will find challenges in a number of data-scarce countries.  As a result, tier 3 was 
ranked medium quality data.
Legislative:  As noted earlier, public data exists for all three tiers of the legislative 
branch, in particular, specific data bases for tier 1 and tier 3 indicators.  Tier 2 
data (committee chairs), however, does not have the same ease of access where 
information can be found in one location aggregated by an international organization 
or government.  A greater level of effort is required to systematically gather the 
data.  But, this can be achieved using only public data with a reasonable amount of 
time and effort.  Given the replicability and ease of understanding the information 
presented in the legislative branch, all three tiers were considered highly accessible.
Judicial:  While the tier 3 data may be simple to understand (magistrates at the third 
court level), accessibility and replicability vary widely.  As noted earlier, much of 
this depends on at which level – national or sub-national – the court is located.  If 
the court is situated nationally, data will typically be accessible and easy to replicate. 
For courts sitting at the sub-national level, in-country assistance or country expertise 
may be required to affirm the reliability of data.  This might include, for example, local 
language skills to read government documents or cultural expertise to determine 
the sex of individuals.  Based on these types of access and replicability constraints 
encountered in some countries, tier 3 was ranked medium quality data.
Security:  In keeping with the woes of security data, accessibility remains problematic 
across all three tiers.  Without in-country expertise or a trusted intermediary, security 
officials are often unwilling to share statistics on officer positions.  While information 
was obtained when the right mix of official and expert were paired, this approach 
can not be considered the appropriate level of accessibility for the Diamond Index 
purposes.  For these reasons, all three tiers of the security sector data were ranked 
of low quality.  Table 60 presents the final scoring of the 12 positions against the 
“accessibility” quality data criteria.
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TABLE 60:  Accessibility Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
ACCESSIBILITY + + ± + + + + + ± – – –
7.2.8  Granularity
The ability to disaggregate data into smaller units is considered an indispensable 
quality data criteria.  The purpose of the Diamond Index construction is to look 
at women’s descriptive representation among key decision-making positions 
in government.  Fundamental to the selection of indicators was the ability to 
disaggregate the data into smaller information units including, at a minimum, by 
sex.  Therefore, no position was selected, nor data collected, if the position was not 
able to be – at a minimum – disaggregated by male / female.
That is not to say that the data could not be disaggregated in other ways:  by age, religion, 
tribe, persons with disabilities, etc.  This was simply not my area of research focus. 
My concern was only granularity according to sex and all indicators selected for their 
ability to do so.  Therefore, all positions were ranked of high quality.  Table 61 presents 
the final scoring of the 12 positions against the “granularity” quality data criteria.
TABLE 61:  Granularity Quality Data Criteria
QUALITY DATA 
CRITERIA
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
Tier 
1
Tier 
2
Tier 
3
GRANULARITY + + + + + + + + + + + +
***
Table 62 combines the quantity (percentage) of the data collected with the eight 
quality data criteria rankings for each of the 12 positions.  For ease of reference, 
high quality data has been color coded as green, medium quality data as yellow, 
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and low quality data as red.  So, for example, 40 indicators out of a possible 40 were 
collected for Executive Tier 1 – Ministers.  This is indicated by 100%.  All data points 
were ranked as high quality, reflected in a green score for each of the eight criteria. 
At the opposite extreme, only 52.5% of the indicators were collected for the Security 
Tier 2 – Mid-Level Officers.  Of the eight quality data criteria, one received a ranking of 
high quality, two of medium quality, and five of low quality.  Based on this approach, 
both high quantity and quality data for the ministerial position can be collected on a 
global scale while data for mid-level security officers is unlikely to achieve either the 
quantity or quality envisioned for the Diamond Index.
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With a better understand of quality data concerns across the 12 measures, we return 
to the purpose of this research.  Specifically, the design and piloting of the Diamond 
Index attempts to answer the following research question:
Can quality data measuring women’s positions  
of formal political decision-making  
be collected on a global scale?
The overall quality of the data gathered across 12 indicators in 40 less-developed 
countries presents mixed findings.  Looking only at the positions selected for the 
executive, legislative, and tier 1 and 2 of the judiciary, the picture is positive.  Of 
the 64 rankings possible (8 positions x 8 criteria), a total of 56 (87.5%) were judged 
to be of high quality and 8 (12.5%) of medium quality.  None were ranked of low 
quality.  Across these 8 positions an average of 95.3% of all indicators were collected. 
Based on this 40-country pilot, there is a strong argument to be made that both the 
quality and quantity of information available for 8 of the 12 indicators is excellent 
and quality data can be collected on a global scale.  
The picture is not as rosy for the remaining 4 indicators:  the third tier in the judiciary 
and the security sector.  While the quantity of indicators remains high in the judiciary 
(87.5%), the quality of the data is more open to criticism given that four quality 
criteria received medium rankings and one received a low quality ranking.  While 
the information may be there for collection, it lacks the quality rigor seen across the 
other indicators.  
The security sector, however, is the weakest point in the Diamond Index.  It is here 
that the lowest quantity of indicators was collected (63% on average across all three 
tiers) and the greatest number of quality concerns emerge.  Of the 24 rankings, only 
the granularity criteria – the ability to differentiate by sex – was considered of high 
quality.  The remaining 21 rankings received either medium quality (7 total) or low 
quality (14 total).  This rather sobering look at women’s leadership in the security 
sector should not discourage us from using it or attempting to collect more of this 
information type, but rather should urge caution in how it is used, understanding 
that it lacks the same quality and quantity standards as the majority of the data 
contained in the Diamond Index.
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7.3 DIAMOND INDEX FINDINGS AND AREAS OF INTEREST 
Given the amount of information collected, there were a number of interesting 
findings that emerged once the data was organized, graphed, and mapped into the 
Diamond Index.  This section will highlight three areas of interest stemming from the 
research. 
7.3.1   Appointment Advantage 
Results of the Diamond Index consistently point to women gaining greater access 
to positions reliant on appointment as compared to positions achieved through an 
electoral process.  The constraints associated with women being elected into formal 
office have been well documented.  In the political arena, for example, parliamentary 
systems typically advantage women candidates over single-member districts or 
winner-take-all formats.529  Cultural biases can often limit women’s viability to the 
general public as a candidate.530  Lack of access to financial resources and negative 
media coverage can be restrictive factors.531  Political party gate-keepers may be 
a strong deterrent to a potentially successful candidacy.532  In short, the obstacles 
women face in gaining elected decision-making positions are daunting, even among 
long-standing democracies.
As women continue to face difficulties surmounting ballot-box constraints, the 
use of government appointment appears as a viable way to place more women in 
decision-making positions.  While global tracking of disaggregated, decision-making 
positions is limited, the appointment of women as ministers is one indicator where 
longitudinal data exists.  Since 2005 the International Parliamentary Union and UN 
Women have been collecting and publishing data on the percentages of women 
ministers and their area of appointment.  During the past decade, women’s share 
of ministerial appointments has risen from approximately 14.2% to 17.7%.533  This 
increase has occurred largely on a voluntary basis without the use of quotas.  Global 
529  Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative 
Analysis.” Social Forces 78, no. 1 (1999): 235–68.  Matland, Richard E., and Donley T. Studlar. “The Contagion of 
Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and 
Norway.” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 03 (1996): 707–33.
530 Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. “Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation.” Journal of Democracy 12, 
no. 3 (July 2001): 126–40. Charles, Maria. “Deciphering Sex Segregation Vertical and Horizontal Inequalities in Ten 
National Labor Markets.” Acta Sociologica 46, no. 4 (2003): 267–87.
531  Lianos, Beatriz, and Kristen Sample. “30 Years of Democracy: Riding the Wave?,” 2009. Hunt, Swanee. “Let 
Women Rule.” Foreign Affairs, June 2007.
532  Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. Gender and Party Politics. Sage Publications, 1993. Dahlerup, Drude, and 
Lenita Freidenvall. “Quotas as a ‘Fast Track’ to Equal Representation for Women: Why Scandinavia Is No Longer the 
Model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7, no. 1 (2005): 26–48. Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: 
Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
533  “Women in Politics: 2005.” Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2005. “Women in Politics: 2015.” Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, 2015. “The Full Participation Report: No Ceilings.” Clinton Foundation, Gates Foundation, The Economist 
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data does not exist for other appointed positions.  Table 63, based on my 40-country 
sample,  highlights the percentage of women within the executive, legislative, and 
judicial sectors organized by tier and determination as to whether the position is, in 
general, elected or appointed.   
TABLE 63:  Average Percentage of Women by Elected or Appointed Position
Decision-Making Position Percent Women Typical Selection Method
TIER 1
Judicial – Highest-Level Court Judges 18.0% Appointed
Executive – Ministers 16.8% Appointed
Legislative – Political Party Leaders 6.0% Elected
TIER 2
Judicial – Second-Level Court Judges 20.1% Appointed
Executive – Sub-Ministerial 18.3% Appointed
Legislative – Committee Chairs 18.2% Elected
TIER 3
Judicial – Third-Level Court Judges 27.2% Appointed
Legislative – Legislators 19.2% Elected
Executive – Mayors 10 Largest Cities 6.0% Elected
It is important to acknowledge that positions reliant on appointment or an election 
will vary across countries and political systems:  not every mayor is elected nor 
every judge appointed.  For the majority of high-level courts across the Diamond 
Index sample, however, judicial appointment is favored.  Likewise, while the type of 
election will vary for mayors – with some directly elected by the population while 
others are elected through a local body, such as a council – most mayors in the 40 
countries selected do not arrive at their position through appointment.  
Where we see delineation between elected and appointed begin to blur is around the 
use of legislative quotas (Tier 3 – Legislators).  In a number of the 40 countries examined 
in the sample, women gain their seats through a political party appointment process. 
In these instances, women may be directly “elected” by the party, irrespective of the 
popular vote.  Given the variety of ways women might come to encumber a legislative 
Intelligence Unit, World Policy Analysis Center, Maternal and Child Health Equity Research Program, March 2015. 
http://noceilings.org/report/report.pdf.
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seat – especially those deemed as “reserved” for women – it is acknowledged that 
classifying Tier 3 decision-makers as an “elected” official lacks nuance into how 
quotas might lead to women encumbering these positons.
In the Diamond Index 40-country sample, higher percentages of women were 
consistently appointed rather than elected across all three levels measured.  This 
is occurring even as the majority of focus on women’s political descriptive 
representation has been focused on decision-makers and advocacy for quota 
adoption to bolster women’s numbers in legislative bodies around the world.534 
Given the amount of attention the legislative branch has received, one might expect 
to see higher scores in this area than those found in other parts of government.  The 
Diamond Index, however, scored the legislative domain third, behind the judicial and 
executive domains but above the security sector.  Of the 37 countries registering 
judicial scores, only 9 countries (25%) tallied higher legislative scores.  Of the 39 
countries registering executive scores, only 12 countries (31%) had higher legislative 
scores.  In the majority of instances, the legislative branch (accessed through elected 
positions) finished behind those branches more reliant on women gaining decision-
making positions through appointment.  Table 64 highlights the 10 lowest-scoring 
countries in the legislative sector and their respective Diamond Index scores in the 
other three domains measured.
 
TABLE 64:  Lowest Diamond Index Scores in the Legislative Domain
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Legislative Executive Judicial Security
Yemen
Haiti
Thailand
Brazil
Lebanon
Liberia
Nigeria
Georgia
Bos-Herz
Nepal
534  Inter-Parliamentary Union. “Parliaments at a Glance,” 2017.  Krook, Mona Lena. Quotas for Women in Politics: 
Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide. Oxford University Press, 2010.
270
Chapter 7 Diamond Index Findings and Limitations
On average, the data from this small sample points to women’s high exclusion from 
the legislative domain.  This does not, however, seem to preclude women from 
the political space given consistently higher rates of access to appointed executive 
and judicial decision-making positions.  If we examine the African countries, for 
example, women in Nigeria and Liberia appear to be making significant inroads 
into appointed sectors, even as they fail to gain seats in the legislature.  It is also 
interesting to note the higher level of Brazilian women represented in the security 
sector, especially in light of a legislative score that is well below regional and overall 
averages.  At first glance it would appear that Brazilian women find the barriers 
to military leadership lower than that of an elected position in the legislature.  It 
seems clear from the examples of Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that women 
are accessing, in particular, the judicial branch of government as barriers appear in 
the legislative space.  From this research, based on the decision-making positions 
selected in the 40-country sample, it appears that women are able to access appointed 
positions in greater numbers than elected positions.  Even in countries where women 
are highly excluded from the legislative branch, this does not preclude them from 
participation in other sectors of government.
7.3.2  Gaining Ground in the Judiciary 
As measured by the Diamond Index sample, women seem to be making the largest 
gains in the judicial arena, with women appearing in significant percentages at all 
three levels measured, as seen in Table 65.  The 40-country average score was 3.8 on 
the Diamond Index (based on a maximum score of 25, with 12.5 approaching parity). 
In an effort to target decision-makers, the Diamond Index purposely included only 
the top three tiers of courts.  In most countries, courts of first instance – where one 
might expect to find the bulk of women – were excluded from the measurement.  
Of the 37 countries for which a score was calculated, 22 countries (59.4%) ranked 
the judicial score highest, outperforming the executive, legislative, and security 
sectors.  While past research in advanced industrialized countries has supported the 
notion that a tradition of women’s participation will more likely see women serving 
in courts,535 the Diamond Index indicates that women in less developed economies 
are also making significant inroads from the lowest to the highest courts, even 
in countries where women’s participation in political life has been limited.  This 
includes the Middle East/North Africa region, where women are making noticeable 
judicial gains, although predominately in the lower courts.
535  Thames, Frank C., and Margaret S. Williams. Contagious Representation: Women’s Political Representation in 
Democracies Around the World. NYU Press, 2012.
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TABLE 65:  Average Percentage of Women in the Diamond Index 40 Countries
Decision-Making Position Percent Women
JUDICIAL
Tier 1 – Highest-Level Court Judges 18.0
Tier 2 – Second-Level Court Judges 20.1
Tier 3 – Third-Level Court Judges 27.2
EXECUTIVE
Tier 1 – Ministers 16.8
Tier 2 – Sub-Ministers 18.3
Tier 3 – Mayors 6.0
LEGISLATIVE
Tier 1 – Party Leaders 6.0
Tier 2 – Committee Chairs 18.2
Tier 3 – Legislative Members 19.2
SECURITY
Tier 1 – Top-Level Commanders 4.8
Tier 2 – Mid-Level Commanders 7.6
Tier 3 – Lower-Level Commanders 8.3
In particular, high levels of inclusion were seen within the countries selected for 
the Eastern European/Eurasia region, followed by Africa.  In an interview with a 
Kenyan High Court judge she responded, when discussing the robust numbers of 
women in her country’s judiciary:  Many women prefer the regular hours, paycheck, 
and reliability of the work as a judge, especially if you are a woman with small children.536 
Conversely, stories were also related about the difficulty women find when trying 
to enter into private legal practice.  Interviewees articulated how cultural beliefs 
reinforce the notion that men are more suited to legal representation as women are 
not aggressive enough, thus unable to represent positions adequately in negotiations 
or the courtroom.537  Also important, in the Kenyan context, the 2010 constitution 
mandated compositional changes to the judiciary at the highest levels.538  So, for 
536  Interview conducted by the author with a Kenyan Appellate Court Judge in Nairobi, Kenya, June 2012.
537  Interview conducted by the author in Nairobi, Kenya, May 2014.
538  Chapter 4, Part II, 27(8): “In addition to the measures contemplated in clause (6), the Right to life. Equality and 
freedom from discrimination. The State shall take legislative and other measures to implement the principle that 
not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.”
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example, in this particular African country, one might argue that a combination of 
legal changes, cultural norms, and a more family-friendly environment are moving 
larger numbers of women into the judiciary.
The level of institutional prestige could also come into play when denying or allowing 
women’s entrance.539  This may be the case in Mongolia.  While women dominate 
the judicial sector, critics point out that this high percentage of representation 
is indicative of the profession’s low prestige.540  Along with Mongolia, Eastern 
European countries selected for the sample scored well in the judiciary.  Under 
communism ideology women were to be treated as equals to men, allowing for 
significant representation across the political spectrum.541  As a result, there may be 
a historical openness to seeing women occupy judicial roles in former communist 
countries.  A second narrative might argue that women never actually held real 
power in the Soviet Union, and following the fall of communism they were readily 
excluded from accessing powerful positions and moved into less benign roles, 
including the judiciary.542  There also exist perceptions in some cultures that women 
are less corrupt then men and, therefore, perhaps better suited to the courtroom 
demands of impartiality.543  
The reasons for women’s above-average representation in the judicial domain are 
varied and overlapping.  What remains noteworthy, however, is that women are 
appearing across all regions.  While some advocates have called for judicial quotas, 
similar to what we see in the legislative area,544 a snapshot of the 40 countries 
featured in the Diamond Index indicates that women are making greater headway 
in this branch of government than others, despite strong advocacy for, and virtual 
absence of, the use of quotas.  Why these gains are being made, however, deserves 
more attention.
7.3.3 The Security Sector Blind Spot
There is currently no systematic, global effort to benchmark women’s progress in 
the security sector, and the number of organizations working in this space remains 
539  Williams, Margaret S., and Frank C. Thames. “Women’s Representation on High Courts in Advanced Industrialized 
Countries.” Politics & Gender 4, no. 03 (2008): 451–71. Yoder, Janice D. “Rethinking Tokenism: Looking beyond 
Numbers.” Gender & Society 5, no. 2 (1991): 178–92.
540  “The Long Winding Road: Judicial Sector Reform in Mongolia.” International Judicial Monitor 2, no. 1 
(February 2007).
541  Paxton, Pamela, and Melanie M. Hughes. Women, Politics, and Power. Pine Forge Press, 2007.
542  Ibid.
543  Goetz, Anne Marie. “Political Cleaners: Women as the New Anti-Corruption Force?” Development and Change 
38, no. 1 (2007): 87–105.
544  Kenney, Sally J. “Critical Perspectives on Gender and Judging.” Politics & Gender 6 (2010): 433–41.
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limited.545  The UN does collect general statistics around women peacekeepers and 
negotiators, in line with Resolution 1325.  This snapshot of peacekeeper percentages, 
however, provides a limited understanding of internal state dynamics and how 
women are represented in their individual countries across the police, military, and 
internal security services.546  
UN gender experts have identified the security sector data as a missing gap, while 
also noting that some progress is being made.  For example, “indicators on police 
and judges are conceptually clear, with an agreed international definition, but not 
yet regularly produced by countries.”547  The United Nations office of Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) has been working on better data collection on police and judges. 
Currently, the country-level data identified for collection and reporting to the United 
Nations includes:  Tier II, indicator #46 – “Share of female police officers” and Tier II, 
indicator #47 – “Share of female judges.”548 
As measured by the Diamond Index sample, women seem to be making the least gains 
in the security arena.  The 40-country average score was 1.7 (based on a maximum 
score of 25, with 12.5 approaching parity).  The lowest percentage of women was 
seen in tier 1 Top-Level Officers (4.8%).  Of the 18 countries with scores captured 
across all four sectors, there were 2 instances (11.1%) in which the security score 
was able to outperform another sector.549  In most countries there are so few women 
within the command structure that the measure did not make a significant difference 
when all scores were compiled and aggregated.
Repeated anecdotal evidence among women highlighted the negative environment 
in which women officers are often asked to perform.  Verbal harassment, for example, 
was cited as a daily encounter for two of Kenya’s highest-ranking female police 
545  Globally, there are few organizations working at the intersection of gender and the security sector in a 
substantive way beyond individual country activities.  The first is the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF).  Phone calls and a meeting in Washington D.C. (November 2014) were held to understand 
the extent of DCAF’s work and available data.  A number of DCAF reports provided interesting insights and data 
on some of the selected countries.  The second organization is the Latin American Security and Defence Network 
(RESDAL) based out of Brazil.  This NGO publishes the Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America and Caribbean, 
a regional source of data that is considered by experts to be the best source of public information on the military. 
The United States Agency for International Development, through Management Systems International, provided a 
small grant to RESDAL in 2014 to use its extensive network to collect data on three countries – Mexico, Brazil, and 
Guatemala.  While other international organizations and governments have expressed interest in replicating the 
atlas in different regions, to date, due to lack of resources and personnel, REDSAL has limited its publication to only 
one region. 
546  “United Nations Women in Peacekeeping.” United Nations, 2017.
547  Presentation by UN Women Policy Advisor Julie Ballington at the USAID workshop “Women’s Leadership and 
Political Empowerment: Progress Review and Ways Forward, November 3-4, 2014, Washington D.C.
548  “UN Gender Statistics.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2016.
549  South Africa’s security sector outperformed its judicial score (7.0 as compared to 6.0); Brazil’s security sector 
outperformed its legislative sector (3.6 as compared to 0.8).
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officers.550  The lack of women in the security arena might also be due to women’s 
later arrival in this sector.  Promotion up the chain of command is often tied to years 
of service.  Whether a hostile work environment, women’s late arrival to this sector 
generally, or other constraints not yet understood, the Diamond Index points to strong 
“glass walls” erected around accessing security sector decision-making positions.
The Diamond Index also points to an interesting relationship between countries 
exhibiting the lowest percentages of women in decision-making positions and their 
concurrent high levels of insecurity.  While the Diamond Index did not attempt to 
examine women’s descriptive representation in relation to conflict, as the scores 
were calculated it became apparent that the lowest ranked countries in each region 
were tending towards those with ongoing or recent conflicts.  TABLE 66 lists the 
lowest-scoring country for each of the five regions.
TABLE 66:  Lowest-Scoring Country by Region
REGION COUNTRY COUNTRY
SCORE
REGIONAL 
AVERGE
Middle East/North Africa Yemen 2.3 6.7
Asia Thailand 3.6 12.0
Latin America/Caribbean Haiti 6.9 13.9
Africa Senegal 10.4 18.1
Eastern Europe/Eurasia Ukraine 10.8 16.0
At the time of writing, Yemen and Ukraine had active conflicts within their borders, 
Haiti was occupied by an international peace-keeping force as the country continued 
its struggle to form a fully functioning government, and Thailand was ruled by a 
military junta that seized power from a civilian government in May 2014.  Senegal 
appears to be the exception to the trend, although the second-lowest score in Africa, 
Mali, more closely fits the profile given persistence levels of tension and violence, 
despite the signed 2015 Peace Accord, and unresolved tribal conflict in the northern 
part of the country.551    
550  Interviews conducted by the author with Kenya’s former highest-ranking woman police officer and current 
second-highest ranked officer in Nairobi, Kenya, during June 2012.
551  Many of the African countries experiencing conflict at the time of data collection – Somalia, South Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, etc. – were purposely excluded from the index.  Reasons included one or 
more of the following:  1) ongoing instability and security risks, 2) political unrest that was quickly changing the 
governmental landscape, and 3) uncertainty about USAID’s continued programming or presence in the country, 
275
Diamond Index Findings and Limitations
What insights we can draw from this confluence of low-scoring Diamond Index 
countries and conflict is tenuous.  The perception that women are negotiators, peace-
makers, and more conflict adverse552 then men might be a significant factor.  Perhaps 
women act as a moderating force to more aggressive reactionary tendencies.  Their 
absence throughout the political system, therefore, allows for no dissenting voice or 
moderation.  Or, perhaps the lack of women as decision-makers is a proxy for wider 
societal exclusion of all populations from formal government, save the ruling elite, 
which meets challenges to its authority with suppression.  While it is impossible to 
draw conclusions, the neat alignment of low Diamond Index scores and predominance 
of conflict-ridden countries supports the existing literature that there is a positive 
relationship between higher levels of domestic gender equality and lower levels of 
intrastate armed conflicts.553  
Although concerns remain around the quality of the data gathered for the security 
domain in the Diamond Index sample, given the lacuna of information available in this 
area the data collected can still provide interesting insights.  Going forward, more 
detailed information about which positions women hold in the chain of command, 
whether they are commissioned or non-commissioned officers, predominant in 
logistical support, directing traffic, or leading combat troops can collectively ground-
truth reality and dispel perceptions about women’s relationship to the security sector 
domain.  As more police and militaries open their doors to women’s participation, 
it becomes increasingly important to understand the roles they are filling and how 
they are advancing through, or stagnating within, the wider system.  Commitments 
to increase women’s participation, codified in such international documents as the 
Beijing Platform for Action and Resolution 1325, require that better information be 
made available on a country, regional, and international basis.
thus ability to use findings from the Diamond Index.  More information about how countries were selected can be 
found in Chapter 5: Gathering Data for the Diamond Index.
552  Childs, Sarah. “A Feminised Style of Politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons.” The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations 6, no. 1 (2004): 3–19.  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: 
Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
553  Caprioli, Mary. “Gendered Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 51–68.  Caprioli, Mary. “Primed 
for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly 49, 
no. 2 (2005): 161–178.  Caprioli, Mary, and Mark A. Boyer. “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 45, no. 4 (2001): 503–518.  Melander, Erik. “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict.” 
International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 695–714.  Regan, Patrick M., and Aida Paskeviciute. “Women’s 
Access to Politics and Peaceful States.” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): 287–302.
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7.4 VALUE OF THE DIAMOND INDEX AND AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a variety of gender indexes in use that offer a holistic picture of women’s 
status in relation to men’s.  Most of these include a much broader range of variables 
examining health, education, labor, etc.  My research is interested specifically in a 
descriptive representational approach towards measuring women’s access to decision-making 
positions in formal government.  My goal was to create a more nuanced measure – 
focused solely on the political space – by identifying a cluster of senior decision-
making positions across government while recognizing, through a weighting 
process, that some positions have greater decision-making authority than others.
For researchers or practitioners interested in gauging women’s progress against a 
range of aspects affecting day-to-day life – health, education, leisure time, labor, 
etc. – the Diamond Index offers less value given its more narrow focus on the political 
space.  I specifically chose to concentrate on the political arena, however, given that 
this is the domain where women are the least represented.  While not attempting 
to intuit if more women leads to greater gender equality, the starting point of this 
research is to better understand the extent of women’s presence.
In that respect, the Diamond Index’s greater breadth and depth of information collected 
can increase our understanding of women’s political presence.  The data can, for 
example, be combined in different ways to spot patterns, trends, and interesting 
dynamics that more streamlined indexes are not capturing.  Because of the vertical 
and horizontal design of the composite indicator, patterns emerge in different places 
than other tools.  
7.4.1 Focus on Horizontal Distribution of Women across Formal Government 
The breadth of information the Diamond Index sample provides can be useful to 
examine the issue of horizontal walls in the political and security space.  For example, 
while women in Rwanda are making strong progress in the legislative branch of 
government, their almost complete exclusion from the security sector stands in 
striking contrast.  Conversely, across the 40 countries, Brazil exhibited the second-
highest security sector score while garnering the fourth-lowest legislative score. 
While this data can not answer why women appear underrepresented or shunted 
out of particular domains, it does allow for new patters to emerge and questions to 
be raised.
Horizontal comparisons can also be conducted from a regional perspective.  For 
example, the Diamond Index points to strong horizontal differentiation by region. 
In Asia, we see a clear pattern of legislative inclusion – even at the highest levels – 
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while judicial, executive, and security sectors exhibit strong exclusion.  In the Eastern 
Europe/Eurasia region, the judicial sector representation far outpaces all others, 
with scores approximately double any other domain.  In Latin America/Caribbean 
countries, the executive branch consistently demonstrated the highest scores.   
Why women appear to dominate one branch is open to interpretation.  Perhaps the 
perception that women are well represented in one area – essentially achieving their 
“fair share” – reduces pressure to appoint or elect women into another branch.  Or 
conversely, if women’s “fair share” of elected positions remains below international 
norms, does this exert societal or political pressure to appoint greater numbers of 
women to other decision-making positions when the election route fails to produce 
significant representation? 
This becomes a topic of special interest in those legislatures that seem impervious 
or exceedingly slow to change through traditional electoral processes.  While 
our understanding of women’s constraints to elected positions has been well 
documented, less understood is whether the political system makes allowances for 
women’s presence in other ways.  For example, if women find the legislative door 
firmly shut, are other doors opened, which ones, and under what conditions?  
Why women dominate in one particular domain across a region is not something the 
index can answer.  But, it can bring to light new patterns for future consideration. 
7.4.2 Focus on Vertical Distribution of Women across Formal Government 
Along with tracking women’s horizontal movements across formal government, the 
Diamond Index also collects women’s vertical positions.  This approach builds on the 
premise that different positions within government wield varying levels of access 
to decision-making authority.  Current literature points to the existence of a glass 
ceiling in the political arena.  As women attempt to encumber positions that hold 
greater authority, sometimes identified as greater power, constraints come into play, 
including both cultural and institutional.554  In recognizing that some government 
positions wield greater access to decision-making authority than others, it becomes 
important to identify which seats women occupy.  For example, would having 
smaller numbers of women in powerful positions, such as chairwomen of influential 
committees, be more desirable than having an overall larger percentage of women in 
the legislative body?  Is there any relation between the percentage of women leading 
political parties and societal measures of gender equality?
554  Borrelli, MaryAnne, and Janet M. Martin. The Other Elites: Women, Politics, and Power in the Executive Branch. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.
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There seems an inherent assumption that having women in lower levels of decision-
making positions is a positive, as over time they will ascend upwards to more 
senior positions wielding greater access to decision-making authority.  The Diamond 
Index countries exhibit significant “bulges” of women in tier 3, the lowest-level of 
measurement, in most regions.  Asia presents a slightly different picture, however, 
with overall numbers of women in formal government and security sectors on 
average quite low, yet having smaller percentage differences between the number of 
senior-, mid-, and lower-level decision-makers.  So while the overall result may be 
fewer women, those women in formal government seem to occupy positions at all 
levels rather than clustered into the lower tier.
This raises an interesting question as to the model of descriptive representation that 
might prove most favorable to positive gender change.  Is the preference to have 
lower numbers of women distributed more evenly throughout all ascending levels 
of leadership, such as appears in the Asia region, or are we more interested in having 
larger percentages of women in less prestigious positions on the assumption that 
they will ascend upwards given more time?   
The Diamond Index supports the research on the existence of a glass political ceiling. 
There appears a clear trend of fewer women at each progressively senior tier, with 
tier 1 defined as having greater decision-making authority than tier 2, and tier 2 as 
having greater decision-making authority than tier 3.  Because the index presents 
only one snapshot in time, however, it is difficult to draw conclusions.
Over time, data collected consistently could demonstrate whether women are 
encountering glass ceilings in particular sectors and decision-making tiers of 
authority. 
7.4.3 Delineate Appointed and Elected Positions across Formal Government 
The decision-making positions selected in the Diamond Index sample are a mix of both 
elected and appointed positions.  The Diamond Index data indicates that women are 
making greater headway in appointed as compared to elected seats, with generally 
higher scores in the executive and judicial appointed domains as compared to the 
elected legislative arena.  The premise of indexes heavily dependent on parliamentary 
percentages posits that without significant legislative branch representation, women 
will have limited political voice in the formal arena.  Is it possible, however, that 
more robust representation of women is shifting to other decision-making positions 
that are less measured?  Perhaps as women find the elected legislative door difficult 
to open, a doorway into politics through appointment is being opened.  Much of 
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the literature to date has focused on the legislative branch as a way to increase 
percentages of women in political positions.  
The Diamond Index data holds the possibility for better delineation, across a wider 
range of positions, between women accessing elected verses appointed positions.  
7.4.4 Expand Information in Less-Developed Regions and Countries  
One unexpected outcome of the Diamond Index was how well countries selected 
in the Sub-Saharan Africa region fared, outperforming the other four regions.  By 
sector, Africa was the top finisher in the executive (scoring 5.4) and security (2.2).555 
Africa finished second in the legislative arena (3.8, slightly behind Asia’s score of 
3.9) and second in the judiciary (6.6, behind Eastern Europe/Eurasia’s total of 7.7). 
So, while Asia and Eastern Europe/Eurasia were able to outperform Africa in one 
domain, Africa’s more consistent performance across all four domains resulted in 
a higher overall regional average.  The top three Diamond Index finishers were all 
African countries: South Africa, Rwanda, and Kenya.  
Across the sample of African countries, women are making greater gains in 
appointed positions within the executive and judicial sectors, although substantial 
numbers were also seen in the legislative area.  These leading scores are not to 
insinuate that all decision-making positions have made marked gains.  Like other 
countries measured, African women remained woefully underrepresented as heads 
of political parties, urban mayors, and police commanders.  Yet, in comparison to the 
other regions, the Diamond Index sample shows significant numbers of women across 
a broader array of positions.  The continent’s performance, based on the 14 countries 
selected, raises a number of interesting questions examining the conditions present 
in Africa that might lead to broad-based growth in women’s political access.
To date, African countries – especially more data-scarce states such as Mali, 
Madagascar, Liberia, Benin, Burkina Faso, etc. – have not received the same level 
of academic attention as countries in Western Europe, Scandinavia, and North 
America.  The same argument might plausibly be made for a number of Asian and 
Middle Eastern countries.  This is understandable given language, security, access, 
and financial barriers that often emerge to constrain research efforts in a range of 
less-developed countries.
555  Although Africa finished as the top performer, the paucity of women in the security command structure leaves 
little room for differentiation between countries.  Africa topped the list with a score of 2.2; the lowest scoring 
regions achieved 1.2. 
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The Diamond Index can help fill in some of the gaps regarding women’s descriptive 
representation in less-researched countries which may, in turn, provide for increased 
inclusion in global or regional comparisons and future research opportunities.
7.4.5 Ability to Mix and Match Data in Different Combinations
The data – collected across four domains and three vertical tiers – allows for a wider 
variety of mixing, matching, and comparing in the political space.  Interested parties 
can compare all four domains, any three domains, two, or only one.  For example, 
examining women’s judicial representation across the globe or in one specific 
region.  It is also possible to compare one, two, or three different tiers.  A researcher 
interested in sub-national representation, for example, may pull out data limited to 
tier 3 positions across countries.      
In examining the underrepresented security sector, what types of data patterns can we 
see emerge around the few counties making gains in this sector?  Of the six Diamond 
Index countries identified as “Not Free” according to Freedom House rankings,556 
women performed below the 40-country average in five of the six.  Three of these five 
registered among the 10 lowest-scoring countries overall.  While it was not the intent 
of this research to look at women’s representation in relation to democratic rankings, 
the index allows for this type of examination.  Do specific types of government 
(liberal, free, not-free, high-income, low-income, parliamentary, presidential, etc.) 
have higher or lower representation?  What does that representation look like across 
domains?
The ability to use the data to create a more nuanced picture of women’s political 
representation is one of the strongest attributes of the Diamond Index.  While in itself 
it can not explain differences across countries, it can help emerge more targeted 
questions about women’s senior-level descriptive representation in the political 
realm for future research efforts.      
7.4.6 Use as an Advocacy and Benchmarking Tool
One explicit goal of the Diamond Index was to simplify the process of gathering, 
weighting, and aggregating individual country information in a way that could 
be easily understood by development practitioners, government officials, non-
governmental organizations, and advocates.  Using publicly available data to the 
largest extent possible, the index attempts to strike a balance between academic rigor, 
data accessibility, and practical application.  For lay persons or government officials 
556  Freedom House. “Freedom in the World,” 2015.
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committed to gender empowerment, it is intuitive to understand the purpose of the 
model, its weighting system, and what it is trying to capture.  
The intent was also to ensure that the index could be developed at any time, 
according to the user’s needs, and updated accordingly.  This allows for any user 
to gather the information for benchmarking, advocacy, or policy on a time schedule 
that fits the intended purpose, rather than work around the publication dates of the 
international or multilateral organizations currently producing gender indexes.
Out of a possible 480 total data points (12 per country X 40 countries), the index was 
able to collect 416 (86.7%).  The majority of data gaps were in the security sector 
where 76 out of 120 data points were collected (63.3%).  Excluding the security 
domain, and looking only at the executive, legislative, and judicial, a total of 340 
data points were collected out of a possible 360 (94.4%).  As noted in the quality data 
criteria of “accessibility” discussed earlier in this chapter, 7 out of 12 indicators were 
considered highly accessible with data readily available to the general public.  Of the 
remaining five indicators, one was ranked of medium quality in terms of accessibility 
with the remaining four indicators (one judiciary and three security) considered as 
having low accessibility.  As a result, in particular given the current inaccessibility 
of security data, it does remain difficult for all parties to easily replicate the Diamond 
Index across all four domains.  While government staff would likely have access to 
information required, non-governmental organizations, donors, and advocates may 
find it difficult to collect security information – given the lack of public data access – 
in their capacity as outsiders.  
Leaving the security sector aside, however, there remains a breadth of data across 
the executive, legislative, and judiciary sectors that are easily collected by those 
outside government.557   While acknowledging that collecting this information on 
a global scale, across almost 200 countries, would require significant resources, the 
ability to gather country-specific data, or comparative data across a smaller regional 
grouping of countries, remains highly feasible using publicly available resources. 
This approach allows  development practitioners and advocates to apply the 
Diamond Index in a country or region of interest as part of a broader assessment, as 
a more narrow analysis of women’s political participation, or adopt it in different 
ways to better align with a specific country context.  
557 As a practical example, in August 2018 the USAID Tanzania Mission undertook the Diamond Index exercise to 
map the country.  A college intern was able to collect the required information within a one-week period using only 
public data and several hours of assistance from a Tanzanian national who helped differentiate names by sex and 
verify the identify of three mayors.  At the end of the one-week period, a 100% success rate had been achieved for 
8 of the 12 indicators.  More senior experts were then called in to tackle the security sector data. 
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Data collected through the Diamond Index, especially if collected consistently over 
time, could be used to benchmark progress in a country or region, applied as an 
advocacy tool for greater gender inclusion, or introduced as a planning instrument 
to help inform and develop future programming opportunities.  
The data gathered for this research represents the most recent figures available at 
the time of collection.  Despite the wide range of information captured across the 
40-country sample, it does represent only a single point in time, thus limiting its 
utility as an analytical or predictive tool.  Were the data collection effort to continue 
on a regular basis in the same countries, or be extended globally, the index holds 
the promise of providing a greater wealth of information as researchers continue 
efforts to build a more robust body of literature around the dynamic of women in 
the political public sphere.
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE DIAMOND INDEX
The Diamond Index was created in an effort to expand beyond the measurement 
efforts of current gender composite indicators.  These gender indicators, primarily 
using percentages of women in government institutions, make claims to measure 
women’s political power or empowerment.558  Because of the limitations surrounding 
such polysemic terms as empowerment and power,559 attempting to equate women’s 
numbers with such contested terms as power and empowerment is not without its 
detractors.560
  
Limitations also exist around the validity of using one composite indicator as a 
global measure.  In short, can one measurement tool be all things to all countries? 
Two well-known regional indexes were created, in fact, to counter what was seen as 
failings by established global indexes to provide relevant measures indicative of their 
challenges and status.  The EU Gender Equality Index, for example, was formulated 
to better capture the challenges faced by the majority of high-income EU member 
states.561  At the opposite extreme, the UN African Gender and Development Index was 
558  UNDP Gender Inequality Index (empowerment), World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Index 
(empowerment), Social Watch Gender Equity Index (empowerment), European Institute of Gender Equality Gender 
Equality Index (power), UN African Gender and Development Index (power).
559  Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View—The Original Text with Two Major New Chapters. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005.
560  This topic is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 - Measuring Women in the Political Domain: A Critical 
Appraisal.
561  European Institute for Gender Equality. “Gender Equality Index.” 2012. Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, 
Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender Equality Index.” Journal of European Social 
Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
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constructed as a benchmarking tool for African countries that, due to a lack of data, 
were consistently being left out of global indexes.562  
Like other gender composite indicators, my work in the political space also focuses 
on numbers according to sex: where women sit vis-à-vis men.  Percentages of women 
and specific positions held by women are tangible measures that are easy to target 
and trace.  Simple numbers, however, sideline the complex gender underpinnings of 
women’s role and place in society, and how that impacts substantive representation 
within the political system.  Generating data segregated by sex should not be the 
goal in itself, notes Meier and Celis, but rather how might that collected data be 
used in the future to create a more egalitarian society.563  As the academic credibility 
of a critical mass of women leading to substantive outcomes is called further into 
question, we should be wary of what story a headcount of women tells us.  Yet 
counting numbers of women remains an important starting point.  It is through the 
lens of representational percentages that we can see gains, losses, and view how 
women are holistically faring in the political system.  
The Diamond Index, like other indexes, remains tempered by the information available, 
even as it attempts to expand the data set.  While the index can provide more data 
on women’s descriptive representation in the political arena, as a measurement tool 
it also has a number of limitations.
7.5.1 Variations across Differing Political System 
  
The Diamond Index attempts to provide a useful measurement tool for all countries. 
In doing so, however, its application to diverse political systems may result in 
different  interpretations.  For example, should high numbers of women in a tightly 
controlled authoritarian system be viewed in the same light as high numbers of 
women in a liberal democracy?  Even within liberal democracies the variations 
between parliamentary and presidential systems can vary extensively, including 
where decision-making authority is situated.564  Whether authoritarian or liberal, the 
Diamond Index does not make allowances for different political contexts.  
Of the 40 countries chosen for the index, Freedom House rates six as “Not Free,” 
seven as “Free,” and the remaining 27 as “Partly Free.”  If we examine our two top 
finishers – South Africa (30.1) and Rwanda (27.9) – there are wide differences in 
562  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. “The African Gender and Development Index,” 2011.
563  Meier, Petra, and Karen Celis. “Sowing the Seeds of Its Own Failure: Implementing the Concept of Gender 
Mainstreaming.” Social Politics 18, no. 4 (2011): 469–89.
564  Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale 
University Press, 2012.
284
Chapter 7 Diamond Index Findings and Limitations
their political rankings with South Africa being judged “Free” and Rwanda at the 
opposite end of the spectrum with a “Not Free” classification.565  The 2015 Freedom 
in the World report further highlights Rwanda’s declining score in civil liberties “due 
to the narrowing space for expression and discussion of views that are critical of the 
government….”  So in the case of Rwanda, we have large percentages of women 
being appointed by one dominate party that is increasingly intolerant of dissent. 
Does an environment intolerant of dissent place a “double gag” on women in 
the public arena?  First, women may be hesitant to champion gender causes not 
supported by the male elite and second, they may be hesitant to speak out unless 
the party leadership sanctions their view.   In a “Not Free” environment should our 
expectations for women’s representation be the same?  While the questions around 
different polities are relevant, the Diamond Index does not make any distinction 
between parliamentarian or presidential, free or not free. The comparability of 
different political systems, using the limited data set currently available, remains 
a constraint and limitation for all gender composite indicators in use, including the 
Diamond Index.
7.5.2 Variations in Status of Selected Decision-Makers
The Diamond Index attempts to measure only senior decision-making positions 
that are comparable across all countries.  While these positions may be similar in 
name, the variations in their respective roles and responsibilities will differ not 
only according to the political system and where decision-making authority lies, 
but also according to the varied societal and cultural contexts.  For example, the 
high percentages of women we find in judicial courts in a number of countries may 
reflect lower levels of authority and economic remuneration associated with those 
positions.  Rather than making significant strides in gender equality among male 
judicial peers, it may be that women are filling less desirable jobs.  As described 
in the case of Mongolia, which garnered one of the highest-ranking judicial scores, 
the position of a Mongolian judge is perceived as having low social status and 
equivalent salary.566  Yet countries such as Mongolia are ranked directly against more 
respected judiciaries, such as South Africa’s.  The index does not factor in differences 
in decision-making positions that may be affected by cultural attitudes, economic 
status, or societal value accorded the decision-maker.  While all of these factors are 
acknowledged as important, they are not used to weight the value of any decision-
maker in any sector.
565  Ibid.
566  Author interview with International Republican Institute Mongolia Country Representative, Ulaanbaatar, 2016.
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7.5.3 Election or Appointed Distinctions
The Diamond Index also makes no distinction or judgment as to how women obtain 
a decision-making position.  If we use our two top finishers as examples again, 
Rwanda has 80 seats in its lower house, of which 30% (24 seats) are reserved for 
women.  To reach their record-high percentage of 63.8% women in the lower house, 
a total of 27 women were elected in their own right.   In South Africa the dominant 
party, the African National Congress, adopted a voluntary 50% quota for national 
elections in 2009.  Of the 400 seats in Parliament, all are directly elected.  The party, 
rather than the constitution or electoral law, ensures that women are elected.  So in 
the case of Rwanda we have 27 directly elected women and 24 quota seats, while in 
South Africa we see 166 directly elected women.  Does this matter?  If women are 
directly elected by their own constituency does that accord them more legitimacy 
and authority?  We see the same situation with mayors, with some women directly 
elected by the citizens while others are appointed from the central level.  The 
Diamond Index does not differentiate between an appointed, reserved, legislated, 
constitutional, or elected position and the value attached to that seat.  How a woman 
reaches a decision-making position is not factored into the score, only the fact that 
she holds it.  
7.5.4 As a Measurement Tool
Underpinning the Diamond Index measurement tool is an inherent assumption 
that when sufficient numbers of women occupy decision-making positions it will 
produce some type of positive gender change.  The empirical grounds underpinning 
this assumption remain mixed to date.  This index remains a measure of women’s 
political descriptive representation, albeit more refined than what has been used to 
date.  Because it is only one point in time it can not be used to demonstrate progress 
or regression.  Finally, it remains unable to measure how women will choose to use 
their political access: whether they will act on behalf of other women or that gender-
friendly policies, rules, and procedures will emerge from increased numbers.  In 
short, it cannot predict or measure substantive representation. 
7.6 CONCLUSION
The Diamond Index attempts to demonstrate how a new measurement tool can 
better capture women’s access to decision-making positions in the formal political 
space.  The design of the index, however, was only half of the solution when 
trying to improve understanding around women’s descriptive representation in 
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the political realm.  The best-designed efforts have little value if they are unable 
to gather the information required to create a compelling narrative.  The goal in 
mapping the Diamond Index in 40 different countries was to test the premise that not 
only could a more nuanced descriptive representational index be developed, but 
interested stakeholders, non-governmental organizations, advocates, and interested 
government could gather quality data reliably for their respective country.  The 
challenge was, therefore, to not only broaden and deepen the selection of indicators, 
but to also ensure that the quality of the data was sufficient. 
The Diamond Index proved that its collection approach was viable in three of the 
four selected domains.  Excluding the security domain, where the majority of gaps 
existed, 94.4% of the data points were collected.567  Much of this data – 9 of the 12 
indicators – was information not previously collected in a systematic way at the 
level of detail offered in the Diamond Index.  Equally important, the information was 
culled from a wide variety of countries, with 32 of the selected 40 countries classified 
as low income or lower-middle income, with many considered data-scarce.
An analysis was then undertaken regarding the quality of the data collected, 
acknowledging that it was not enough to simply find numbers of women.  All 
12 indicators were examined against the Diamond Index Data Quality Framework 
comprised of eight distinct criteria:  (1) relevance, (2) completeness, (3) comparability, 
(4) accuracy, (5) timeliness, (6) cost effectiveness, (7) accessibility, and (8) granularity. 
For each position, a data quality ranking was given: high, medium, or low.  This 
resulted in 96 distinct rankings.  For 8 of the 12 positions the data was, on average, 
ranked as high quality.  Judges occupying the third tier of courts in the judiciary 
was considered of medium quality, with criteria rankings mixed between high (3), 
medium (3), and low (2).  
The most problematic area for data collection and quality was seen in the security 
domain.  Of the 24 rankings across this sector (3 tiers X 8 criteria), a total of 3 were 
ranked high quality, 7 medium quality, and 14 low quality.  The lack of public 
data in the security domain, combined with the lack of political will among many 
governments to share this information, made it extremely difficult to accurately 
capture the status of women’s descriptive representation in any iteration of the 
security sector, be it military or police.  In conclusion, the Diamond Index offers the 
opportunity for accessing a greater breadth and depth of information on women’s 
political descriptive representation, yet falls short in providing the full picture 
567  As detailed in Chapter 4, the initial data collection efforts, using only publicly accessible data, achieved 9 out of 
9 indicators in the executive, legislative, and judicial branch for 25 out of 40 countries and 8 out of 9 indicators for 
30 of the 40 countries.  By using in-country experts, I was able to gather 9 out of 9 indicators in 29 countries and 8 
out of 9 indicators in 35 countries.
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envisioned given the lack and quality of data publically available in the security 
domain.
The second half of this chapter focused on three areas:  the findings emerging 
from the information collected across the 40 pilot countries; the value of this data, 
including possible areas for future research; and the limitations associated with the 
Diamond Index.  
The arrangement of the data – examined through both a horizontal and vertical lens 
– is perhaps the most valuable contribution of the index as it allows for merging 
information in different ways than previously seen.  If collected over time, and in 
combination with other research available, it allows for the further investigation of 
such important issues as, for example: (1) elected verses appointed positions, (2) 
women’s representation throughout the judiciary, and (3) links between insecurity 
and women’s political representation.  
As with other gender measurement tools, the Diamond Index also exhibits a number 
of limitations in what it can accomplish.  It can not differentiate between political 
systems or the varied authorities held by decision-makers across regime types.  The 
fact that more women encumber a specific position may not always signify gender 
gains but rather cultural constraints or acceptance.  While acknowledging that 
variations in authority and prestige exist among decision-makers, the Diamond Index 
makes no distinction.  Finally, because the data represents only a single point in 
time, it is impossible to conjuncture beyond the figures presented, thus limiting the 
index’s utility as an analytical tool given the absence of longitudinal data.
In striving to collect quality data across a range of indicators, the Diamond Index 
attempts to facilitate greater deliberation around women’s presence in the formal 
political space.  More complete information about where women are both present 
and lacking is a valuable contribution to our understanding of descriptive 
representation.  Given the lack of data in the political area to date, we should begin 
by collecting what is possible, while not perfect, in order to continue expanding 
collective knowledge in this field.
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Conclusion  
Every country deserves to have the best possible leader  
and that means that women have to be given  
a chance to compete. If they’re never allowed  
to compete…then the countries are robbing  
themselves of a great deal of talent.568
A burning passion, driving dedication, and a strong stomach for the unsavory are 
often required in elected politics across much of the world.  I had seen numerous 
instances of women harassed, threatened, beaten, and raped for daring to run for 
office.  And, in some instances, of women doing the beating themselves as they strive 
to survive in a toxic political environment.  Given the cultural and political barriers 
that often face women in the elected space, I wondered to what degree women were 
seeking other avenues for representation.  Were women finding more welcoming 
spaces in other institutions and, if so, at what level?  Where would one look for such 
data and would it be available, especially in less-developed countries?  And, if data 
were to be found and collected systematically, would it be considered of adequate 
quality to be taken seriously?  
The construction of the Diamond Index is my attempt to answer these questions. 
Fundamental to the creation of the index was the principle that it had to be easily 
understood, user-friendly, and replicable in any given country by interested 
stakeholders.  It seemed that a local non-governmental organization, or a small 
government office, shouldn’t be dependent on an index created by an international 
body to better understand how women in their own country were faring in the 
political space. 
While challenges emerged, the final version of the Diamond Index produced a more 
nuanced descriptive representational measure of women’s access to positions of 
568 Spoken by Madeleine K. Albright, the first woman to serve as the United States Secretary of State (January 1997 
to January 2001).
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decision-making authority across formal government in the 40 countries measured. 
Ultimately, over time, the Diamond Index could create a clearer picture of where 
women are falling behind, or failing to make inroads, horizontally across a wider 
band of the political spectrum and vertically within government institutions. 
With more detailed information on women’s presence it then becomes clearer for 
governments, donors, advocates, and stakeholders to determine if women are being 
excluded – either intentionally or unintentionally – from elected and appointed 
positions.
8.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
I began with a review of the literature on gender measurement in the political 
space.  This included an in-depth analysis of the existing global and regional gender 
indexes in use today, and the literature underpinning their development.  Using 
the existing literature and gender measurement indexes as a guide, I then selected 
a total of 12 positions with senior decision-making authority consistently found 
across government typologies.  Next, I developed a Data Quality Framework, 
against which data collected could be compared, followed by the Diamond Index tool 
itself.  Forty selected countries were then mapped across five regions to determine 
women’s descriptive representation in those positions.  The majority of countries 
were ranked as “lower income” or “lower-middle income.”569  Of the 40 countries, 
6 were categorized as “not free,” 27 as “partly free,” and 7 designated as “free.”570 
Because countries were not selected in a randomized fashion, it remains difficult to 
draw global conclusions given the lack of representation by developed democracies 
and economies.  
Data was collected for 86.7% of the indicators (416 out of a possible 480).  The 
legislative branch provided the highest success rate of indicator collection at 98.3% 
(118 out of a possible 120).  The executive branch was second-highest at 95.0% (114 
out of a possible 120).  The judicial domain was third in ease of collection, with 
90.0% of all indicators collected (108 out of a possible 120).  The security sector 
proved a difficult arena in which to find information, with 63.3% of the indicators 
collected (76 out of a possible 120).  The high percentage of indicators collected for 
the Diamond Index provides evidence that it is a viable tool for gathering additional 
data on women’s access to formal government decision-making positions.
569  Freedom House. “Freedom in the World,” 2013.
570  World Bank Group. World Development Indicators 2014. World Bank Publications, 2014.
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In looking at the quality of the data collected across the 12 positions, variations 
occurred.  Eight indicators received a “high-quality” data ranking, one indicator 
“medium-quality,” and three indicators “low-quality.”  Tier 3 in the judicial domain 
was the one indicator garnering a medium-quality data ranking.  Unlike the higher-
level courts, this stratum of legal professional does not figure prominently in 
academic research, index rankings, government websites, publications, or media. 
Depending on the country, judges may range from a few dozen to hundreds at 
the Tier 3 level.  In general, there seemed no perceived intent to hide this type of 
data.  Problems with data collection more often appeared to be caused by the lack 
of information assembled in one place in a format available for public consumption.
Topping the low-quality list were all three security sector indicators.  It proved to 
be the toughest domain for gathering information.  While face-to-face interviews 
conducted with officials in five case-study countries seemed to indicate that data 
was available, it was not readily shared.  This proved especially true for military 
data.571  Governments were more forthcoming with police statistics and, in general, 
better police information was available through public documents.  For example, of 
the 40 countries, full data sets on the police were collected for 20 countries (50%) in 
comparison to nine countries (23%) for the military.  There was no clear and consistent 
explanation given for government reluctance to share the percentage of women 
commanders in either the police or military.  Lack of trust towards “outsiders” – and 
concerns over how that information might be used – was described by the leading 
non-governmental organization in this field as a predominant rationale for non-
disclosure.572  The lack of women in the security sector, especially at the Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 levels, may also reinforce a government’s desire to maintain a close hold on 
information given that statistics glaringly reinforce perceptions that women have 
a nominal role to play in this field.  Finally, it may simply be that minimal public 
pressure exists to make this information available and, therefore, it is not available.  
The Diamond Index provides evidence that greater amounts of quality data on 
women’s representation exists across the executive, legislative, and judicial domains 
of formal government, and this information is available to the general public. 
This is not true of the security sector.  While the Diamond Index was able to paint 
a basic picture of women officers in the police, much more information must be 
571  In the initial data-collection sweep undertaken in the early days of the research project, data on military 
branches was also collected.  A full discussion of the security domain and gathering information in this sector is 
discussed in Chapter 5.
572  The most advanced work in this area has been undertaken by the Latin American Security and Defense Network 
(Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina - RESDAL) led by Marcela Donadio, RESDAL Executive Secretary, and 
Paz Tibiletti, President of the Executive Secretariat.  The process of how RESDAL collects its data was discussed in a 
meeting between the author, Donadio, and Tibiletti at USAID in Washington D.C., June 2014.
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made available by governments to unpack this under-documented area of women’s 
representation.
8.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The Diamond Index makes no attempt to examine differences among women in relation 
to religion, race, sexuality, economic status, age, etc.  While acknowledging that the 
intersection of these identities can further marginalize or privilege individuals, 
as well as generate more refined results,573 an examination beyond the sex of the 
individual in each decision-making position was not undertaken.  The Diamond 
Index  model does, however, allow for reflecting differing levels of granularity based 
on other characterizations that may be of interest to the researcher.
In addition, the index makes no attempt to account for cultural disparities within 
societies.  For example, the high percentages of women we find in some decision-
making roles may be attributed to society holding those positions in lower esteem 
and, therefore, allocated more often to women.  While cultural, political, and social 
differences are all recognized as factors that may influence attainment of specific 
positions, they were not considered in the design of the Diamond Index when weighting 
the value of any position in any domain.  The tool also makes no distinction as to how 
a woman obtains a position: whether she was elected in her own right, appointed, 
or achieved her place based on merit.  How a woman reaches a decision-making 
position is not factored into the score, only the fact that she holds it.
While the intent of the Diamond Index is to be used as a global measurement tool, the 
research effort included only 40 countries in total.  And, of those countries sampled, 
the majority are skewed towards less democratic and less developed nations, with 
approximately half classified by Freedom House as “partly free.”   The selection of 
countries was not randomized due to project constraints that dictated a minimum 
sub-set of countries be included in the research project and the desire to focus on 
more data-scarce environments.  Therefore, it is difficult to extrapolate regional 
or global generalizations based on the selection process and limited number of 
countries.  Researchers attempting to collect and consolidate data on a global scale 
will find challenges based on the sheer number of countries to be included as well as 
a sub-set of data-scarce countries that may require more localized attention.  
573  Celis, Karen, and Liza M. Mügge. “Whose Equality? Measuring Group Representation.” Politics 38, no. 2 (2018): 
197–213.
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Finally, the Diamond Index is a measure of women’s political descriptive 
representation.  It is unable to measure how any individual or collective group of 
women will choose to use that political access and whether they will act on behalf of 
other women.  Without longitudinal data, the index can not be used as a predictive 
measure of how women are advancing or declining in their access to the political 
space.  It is, as currently researched and presented, simply a snapshot in time of 
women’s state-of-play in the political space.  While other indexes draw correlations 
between increasing numbers linked to greater political power or empowerment, I 
have not attempted to do so.
8.3 ADDED VALUE OF THE RESEARCH
In turning to the value of this research, one of its strongest contributions lies in the 
design of the index and its stretch across government branches to better identify 
where women are represented. While acknowledging that higher percentages of 
women are important, the Diamond Index takes the additional step of recognizing 
that some positions wield greater decision-making authority than others and 
adjusting for that differentiation through a weighting system.  In this manner, the 
index can more precisely measure women’s location in relation to low-, medium-, 
and high-level decision-making positions horizontally across government as well 
as vertically within specific formal government institutions.  This arrangement of 
data – examined through both a horizontal and vertical lens – holds the potential for 
combining information in different ways to identify trends and patterns that have 
not been fully explored through current gender indexes.     
Second, the index offers a clearer alignment of descriptive representation along 
appointed and elected access lines.  This information collected over time – when 
combined with data on horizontal walls and vertical ceilings – begins to weave a 
much richer narrative.  With this information we can begin to delineate how women 
are accessing elected verses appointed positions, what level of position, in what 
types of regime, and under what conditions.  
The Diamond Index also made significant headway in collecting a broader array 
of data in a range of low-income and least-developed countries, several of which 
are excluded from global indexes.574  The inclusion of data across less-researched 
countries can lead to a more thorough understanding of women’s representational 
574  For example, a number of Diamond Index countries were exluded from the most recent survies of the Global 
Gender Gap Index (Niger and Iraq), Gender Equity Index (Timor-Leste), and the Africa Gender and Development 
Index (Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, and Rwanda).
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gains.  Authoritarianism and persistent one-party rule, ongoing insecurity, and 
tribal violence are all factors less accounted for in the current academic literature 
surrounding women’s descriptive representation.  Expanding our views to account 
for the many ways women are moving into the political arena is needed to not only 
challenge Western assumptions, but to ensure a more accurate picture of what is 
happening globally.  
Finally, one explicit goal of the Diamond Index was to create a tool that that could be 
replicated by any interested stakeholder or organization, be it a government, civil 
society organization, development practitioner, or even knowledgeable individual. 
Using publically available data to the greatest extent possible, the methodology 
for collecting, weighting, calculating, and aggregating the data is logical and 
straightforward in its application.  In essence, the Diamond Index attempts to strike a 
balance between academic rigor, data accessibility, and practical application.  
8.4 FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH AND PRACTITIONER USE
Numerous themes emerged from this research effort that beg additional attention. 
Faced with a limit to my personal stamina and financial resources, for now I have 
drawn a line under this academic undertaking.  Going forward, however, there 
are a number of areas that seem fruitful for future exploration.  With longitudinal 
data, for example, the Diamond Index could allow for greater vertical and horizontal 
observation detailing the movement of women across and within government sectors 
or, conversely, the lack of women’s movement.  In particular, because positions are 
weighted vertically within distinct branches of government, data over a sustained 
period of time would more clearly track women’s movement from positions of lower 
to higher decision-making authority.  While the Diamond Index can not account for 
why women are moving, it is a tool that can be used to better identify where glass 
walls and glass ceilings are appearing.
A second area of research concerns further work on differentiating elected and 
appointed representation of women.  The Diamond Index 40-country sample points 
to stronger gains being made in appointed positions, especially when barriers to 
elected positions seem particularly resilient.  As discussed previously, this supports 
the existing literature linked to the numerous hurdles associated with women gaining 
access to elected positions.  A useful addition to the literature and measurement 
effort would include a better delineation between elected and appointed positions, 
the levels at which women are accessing these positions, and under what conditions. 
For example, if one door is firmly shut for women, are others opened as a response? 
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Women’s representation in appointed and elected positions across time, regions, 
and types of government holds the possibility of bolstering an understudied area 
of research.
As noted throughout this research, data gaps are replete across the security sector 
and multiple challenges exist for collecting this information.  This is especially true 
for women’s presence within military branches and, in particular, within the chain 
of command.  With the information available, the Diamond Index 40-country sample 
highlighted a consistent pattern of low index scores being linked to those countries 
exhibiting the highest levels of insecurity.575  It seems likely – based on consistent 
terrorism threats, predicted upheaval from future climate change, and ongoing 
conflicts across multiple regions – that the issue of security will continue to assume 
primary importance in the day-to-day lives of millions.  This research highlighted 
the ongoing challenges of finding and tracking data on women’s leadership in 
the security sector.  How women are represented in decision-making roles, as 
these ongoing security concerns are tackled, appears as a gap in the global data 
and literature.  It remains, for all intents and purposes, a closed door to the general 
public.  Better data at all levels of the security domain are needed to map consistent 
patterns and draw more definitive conclusions.
Finally, one of the fundamental principles in designing the index was to create a tool 
that could realistically be replicated in a country lacking robust resources, data, or 
both.  This has the double benefit of individual countries taking ownership of their 
data while increasing information from less-accessible and researched countries. 
While Europe may have claimed all top 10 rankings for the percentage of women 
in parliament during the mid-1990s, today Sub-Saharan Africa holds four of those 
spots.576  In looking at the six commonly used gender indexes examined for this 
research, three have the principal author or organization based in Europe with a 
fourth headquartered in the United States.577  While the predominance of Western-
based indexes does not necessarily equate to other parts of the globe receiving 
less attention, we should be cognizant that much of the research to date in this 
field has focused on those countries with greater data accessibility.  This has the 
potential to result in Western bias towards other parts of the world, where violent 
conflict, political upheaval, newly written constitutions, and fast-track quotas have 
575  Caprioli, Mary. “Gendered Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 51–68. Melander, Erik. “Gender 
Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict.” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 695–714. Regan, Patrick 
M., and Aida Paskeviciute. “Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful States.” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 
(2003): 287–302.
576  “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015.” New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 2015.
577  The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, author of the African Gender and Development Index, is 
based in Ethiopia and intended to be a measure only for African countries.  Social Watch’s Gender Equity Index, with 
a secretariat located in Uruguay, is the one global index headquartered outside of Europe or the USA.  
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all upended the status quo on women’s political representation in an extremely 
condensed timeframe not seen in Western Europe, Scandinavian countries, or North 
America.  While the predominance of Western-based global indexes, research, and 
donor-based programming has helped us better understand how women are faring 
in the political space, adding more data from less-studied countries can present a 
more holistic picture of how women are gaining access to political power in varied 
ways across different regions.
8.4.1 Practitioner’s Tool
Although this research effort was focused on adding value to the academic literature 
on women’s political descriptive representation, it does offer potential value from 
a practical application standpoint.  Rather than await the annual publication of 
gender indexes that focus on a few global measures, stakeholders are empowered 
to replicate the Diamond Index in their own countries as part of a wider gender 
or political-economy analysis – or simply to better measure and track women’s 
representational progress.
The Diamond Index also adds value as an advocacy and benchmarking tool with 
which to hold government accountable.  Its detailed presentation of women’s 
descriptive representation allows for more targeted advocacy around specific 
branches of government or within institutions themselves.   For example, in one 
country we may see large numbers of women parliamentarians elected but a small 
percentage of women holding committee leadership positions.  Rather than arguing 
for more elected women, the point of advocacy may be to narrow the disparity in 
women committee chairs.  In instances where commitments are not being met, the 
index is an easily understood visualization of where the country is falling behind.  In 
instances where a country is exceeding expectations, the tool can be used to leverage 
greater awareness of gains being made to the local population or a wider global 
audience. 
My interest in developing the Diamond Index was to measure women’s political 
representation.  Others may find value, however, in redefining the tool as a 
measurement for an array of categories.  To better understand, for example, the 
representation of tribes, religions, persons with disabilities, or youth in decision-
making positions across government.  The index is easily adaptable for other 
purposes, although likely to continue presenting limitations for robust data collection 
throughout the security sector, irrespective of the themes being explored.
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8.5 FINAL NOTE
In striving to collect quality data across a range of indicators, the Diamond Index 
attempts to facilitate greater deliberation around women’s presence in the formal 
political space.   It is in this space where determinations of government resource 
allocation and policy prioritization are debated and determined.  These decisions 
on budget and policy impact the lives of every citizen in numerous ways:  health, 
education, security, employment, etc.  While there is no guarantee that women will 
effectively represent women’s interests if elected or appointed to office,578 the fact 
remains that gender gaps and inequalities affecting women exist in all countries 
– without exception.  This seems to indicate that male representation of women’s 
interests is currently inadequate.  
When developing a descriptive representational tool the inclination is to allow 
findings to bleed into the realm of substantive representation.  Putting women into 
office must, logic dictates, make some sort of difference that can be measured.  Yet 
we should not lose sight of the fact that understanding where women are present 
remains, in and of itself, a valuable source of information.  Numbers can be used 
to identify the progress of women’s inclusion at the individual country level and 
facilitate cross-country, regional, and global comparisons.  Numbers can measure 
progress and play a vital role in signaling policy shifts.579  Quantitative analysis using 
sex as a variable can also reveal discrimination and identify patterns of exclusion, 
including double standards and so-called neutral standards that disproportionately 
exclude women.580  Armed with this data, well-intentioned governments can use 
descriptive representational information to ensure that women are not excluded 
from elected and appointed roles, including influential decision-making positions.    
More than 35 years after the signing of CEDAW, and more than 20 years after Beijing, 
increasing women’s political presence remains stubbornly resistant to change.  Efforts 
to close the gap in the political domain, and “catch up” to men, have been slow to 
shift.  The data being used in the political space to measure women’s representation 
has also been slow to coalesce around globally accepted measures.  A small handful 
is deemed appropriate for collection across all countries and regions.  Perhaps we 
578  Lindberg, Staffan I. “Women’s Empowerment and Democratization: The Effects of Electoral Systems, 
Participation, and Experience in Africa.” Studies in Comparative International Development 39, no. 1 (2004): 28–53. 
Tremblay, Manon. “The Substantive Representation of Women and PR: Some Reflections on the Role of Surrogate 
Representation and Critical Mass.” Politics & Gender 2, no. 4 (2006): 502–11. Childs, Sarah. “The Complicated 
Relationship between Sex, Gender and the Substantive Representation of Women.” European Journal of Women’s 
Studies 13, no. 1 (2006): 7–21.
579  Plantenga, Janneke, Chantal Remery, Hugo Figueiredo, and Mark Smith. “Towards a European Union Gender 
Equality Index.” Journal of European Social Policy 19, no. 1 (2009): 19–33.
580  Kenney, Sally Jane. Gender and Justice: Why Women in the Judiciary Really Matter. Routledge, 2013.
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could be more complacent with this diminished set of global indicators if greater 
progress on political parity was being made.  Attempts to reach parity, however, lag 
so far behind in progress that the phrase “not in my lifetime” – at current rates of 
change – could also be applied to my young daughters.  
The slow uptick in percentages of women begs the question:  Are we looking at 
the right things?  Maybe parliamentarians and ministers are sufficient measures for 
capturing the full picture of what is happening with women in politics.  Or, perhaps 
a greater breadth and depth of indicators in the political domain would paint a 
different picture.  For example, could women be making headway in places where 
we simply aren’t looking?  Or conversely, if we cast a wider net across an array of 
high-level, decision-making positions will we see stagnation at every turn?  At the 
very least, a greater array of indicators focused on political access may help us better 
untangle women’s difficulty in significantly shifting the representational gap in this 
arena.
The Diamond Index, while far from perfect, is an attempt to bolster the quality and 
quantity of information available.  There are, unquestionably, gaps in the data 
collected and issues of quality, especially across the security sector.  That should 
not, however, discourage attempts to improve current measures or allow for 
complacency with the status quo.  “There were, are, and always will be shortcomings 
and limitations in datasets, and the costs of poor data must be traded-off against the 
opportunity costs of the effort required to improve the data.”581  While measurement 
findings are always open to interpretation – including those highlighted in the 
Diamond Index – the goal behind this effort is to better document the changes that 
are occurring around women’s political presence.  This, in turn, will constructively 
advance the debate.  That is not to say that women – if given full access to political 
decision-making positions – would create a new political order.  But, given that 
nowhere in the world have we seen women offered this opportunity, today we can 
only speculate about the changes that might occur. 
581  Herrera, Yoshiko M., and Devesh Kapur. “Improving Data Quality: Actors, Incentives, and Capabilities.” Political 
Analysis 15, no. 4 (2007): 365–386.
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Judiciary - 6.4
Security - NA
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Madagascar
Diamond Index Score = NA (14.8 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 4.6
Judiciary - 5.9
Security - NA
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Mali
Diamond Index Score = 12.7
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Mozambique
Diamond Index Score = NA (14.3 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 4.7
Judiciary - 4.4
Security - NA
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Niger
Diamond Index Score = NA
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Executive - NA
Legislative - 3.6
Judiciary - NA
Security - 0.9
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Nigeria
Diamond Index Score = 14.9
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Executive - 5.0
Legislative - 1.7
Judiciary - 6.7
Security - 1.5
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Rwanda
Diamond Index Score = 27.9
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Judiciary - 9.2
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Senegal 
Diamond Index Score = NA (9.6 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 5.6
Judiciary - 1.0
Security - NA
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South Africa
Diamond Index Score = 30.1
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Judiciary - 6.0
Security - 7.0
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Africa
Diamond Index Regional Average = 18.1
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Algeria
Diamond Index Score = NA (11.7 Minus Security)
0
2.5
5
7.5
10
12.5
Executive - 2.3
Legislative - 2.0
Judiciary - 7.4
Security - NA
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Iraq
Diamond Index Score = NA (3.6 Minus Security)
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Executive - 0.8
Legislative - 2.3
Judiciary - 0.5
Security - NA
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Jordan
Diamond Index Score = NA (5.7 Minus Security)
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Security - NA
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Lebanon
Diamond Index Score = NA (3.6 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 1.2
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Security - NA
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Morocco
Diamond Index Score = NA (9.4 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 2.6
Judiciary - 3.8
Security - NA
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Tunisia
Diamond Index Score = NA
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Executive - 4.4
Legislative - 3.4
Judiciary - NA
Security - NA
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Yemen
Diamond Index Score = NA (2.3 Minus Security)
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Legislative - 0.0
Judiciary - 0.1
Security - NA
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Middle East/North Africa
Diamond Index Regional Average = 6.7 (Minus Security)
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Global Average
Diamond Index Score = 13.6
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Legislative - 3.0
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348
Annex B
DIAMOND INDEX SCORECARDS
Eastern Europe and Eurasia
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ALBANIA = 18.5
Executive weighted score = 6.2
TIER 1 Ministers 30%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 29%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .30) + (2 × .29) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .246 × 100 = 24.6 ÷ 4 = 6.2
Legislative weighted score 4.4
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 43.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .0) + (2 × .43) + (1 × .2) ÷ 6 = .176 × 100 = 17.6  ÷ 4 = 4.4
Judicial weighted score = 5.9
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 23.5% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 27.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .222) + (2 × .235) + (1 × .271) ÷ 6 = .235 × 100 = 23.5 ÷ 4 = 5.9
Security weighted score = 2.0
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 7.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 11.0%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 6.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .07) + (2 × .11) + (1 × .06) ÷ 6  = .081 × 100 = 8.1 ÷ 4 = 2.0
6.2 (Executive) + 4.4 (Legislative) + 5.9 (Judicial) + 2.0 (Security) = 18.5
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BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA = 17.8
Executive weighted score = 2.6
TIER 1 Ministers 6.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 21.4%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .067) + (2 × .214) + (1 × .0) ÷ 6 = .105 × 100 = 10.5 ÷ 4 = 2.6
Legislative weighted score = 2.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 19.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 21.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .0) + (2 × .190) + (1 × .214) ÷ 6 = .099 × 100 = 9.9 ÷ 4 = 2.5
Judicial weighted score = 11.6
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 44.4%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 46.2% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 51.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .444) + (2 × .462) + (1 × .515) ÷ 6 = .462 × 100 =  46.2 ÷ 4 = 11.6
Security weighted score = 1.1
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 9.2%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 8.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .0) + (2 × .092) + (1 × .08) ÷ 6  = .044 × 100 =   4.4 ÷ 4 = 1.1
2.6 (Executive) +  2.5 (Legislative) +  11.6 (Judicial) + 1.1 (Security) = 17.8
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GEORGIA = 17.4
Executive weighted score = 5.0
TIER 1 Ministers 21.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 23.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .211) + (2 × .230) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  .199 × 100 =  19.9 ÷ 4 = 5.0
Legislative weighted score = 2.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 11.1%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 6.7%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 12.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .111) + (2 × .067) + (1 × .120) ÷ 6 = .098 × 100 = 9.8 ÷ 4 = 2.5
Judicial weighted score = 8.4
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 33.3%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 30.0% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 41.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .300) + (1 × .418) ÷ 6 = .336 × 100 =  33.6 ÷ 4 = 8.4
Security weighted score = 1.5
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.1%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 5.4%  women
TIER Lower-Level Officers 12.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .041) + (2 × .054) + (1 × .127) ÷ 6  = .597 × 100 =  5.97 ÷ 4 = 1.5
5.0 (Executive) + 2.5 (Legislative) + 8.4 (Judicial) + 1.5 (Security) = 17.4
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KYRGYZSTAN = NA 
Executive weighted score = 3.0
TIER 1 Ministers 15.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 12.5%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .158) + (2 × .125) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .121 X 100 = 12.1 ÷ 4 = 3.0
Legislative weighted score = 2.2
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 14.3%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 23.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .143) + (1 × .230) ÷ 6 = .086 × 100 = 8.6 ÷ 4 = 2.2
Judicial weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Constitutional Court (9 judges) NA%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court (25 judges) NA% women
TIER 3 Higher Court of Arbitration NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
3.0 (Executive) + 2.2 (Legislative) + NA (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
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UKRAINE = NA  (10.8 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 2.8
TIER 1 Ministers 5.9%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats (3 out of 15) 20.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .059) + (2 × .200) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  .113 × 100 =  11.3 ÷ 4 = 2.8
Legislative weighted score = 3.0
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 11.1%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 22.2%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 11.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .111) + (2 × .138) + (1 × .118) ÷ 6 = .121 × 100 = 12.1 ÷ 4 = 3.0
Judicial weighted score = 5.0
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 5.6%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 28.4% women
TIER 3 High Courts 45.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .056) + (2 × .284) + (1 × .450) ÷ 6 = .198 × 100 19.8 ÷ 4 = 5.0
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL: NA
2.8 (Executive) + 3.0 (Legislative) + 5.0 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
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Eastern Europe and Eurasia – Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Albania 6.2 4.4 5.9 2.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2.6 2.5 11.6 1.1
Georgia 5.0 2.5 8.4 1.5
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 2.2 - -
Ukraine 2.8 3.0 5.0 -
TOTALS 19.6 14.6 30.9 4.6
AVERAGE 3.9 2.9 7.7 1.5
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BRAZIL = 13.3
Executive weighted score = 4.5
TIER 1 Ministers 25.6%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 15.7%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .256) + (2 × .157) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .180 × 100 =  18.0 ÷ 4 = 4.5
Legislative weighted score = 0.8
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 5.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 9.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .0) + (2 × .05) + (1 × .090) ÷ 6 = .032 × 100 = 3.2 ÷ 4 = 0.8
Judicial weighted score = 4.4
TIER 1 Supreme Federal Court 18.2%  women
TIER 2 Superior Court 16.1% women
TIER 3 Federal District Court 18.6%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .182) + (2 × .161) + (1 × .186) ÷ 6 = .176 × 100 = 17.6 ÷ 4 = 4.4
Security weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 7.6%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 23.7%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 15.2%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .076) + (2 × .237) + (1 × .152) ÷ 6  = .142 × 100 =  14.2 ÷ 4 = 3.6
4.5 (Executive) + 0.8 (Legislative) + 4.4 (Judicial) + 3.6 (Security) = 13.3
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COLUMBIA = NA (15.9 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 6.8
TIER 1 Ministers 31.3%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 30.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .313) + (2 × .300) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  .273 × 100 =  27.3 ÷ 4 = 6.8
Legislative weighted score = 4.3
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 14.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 20.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 19.9%  women
Total:  (3 × .143) + (2 × .200) + (1 × .199) ÷ 6 = .171 × 100 = 17.1 ÷ 4 = 4.3
Judicial weighted score = 4.8
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 11.1%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court of Justice 26.1% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 29.0%  women
Total:  (3 × .111) + (2 × .261) + (1 × .290) ÷ 6 = .191 × 100 =  19.1 ÷ 4 = 4.8
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 7.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
6.8 (Executive) + 4.3 (Legislative) + 4.8 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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GUATEMALA = 17.0
Executive weighted score = 4.8
TIER 1 Ministers 26.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 17.4%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .267) + (2 × .174) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .192 × 100 = 19.2 ÷ 4 = 4.8
Legislative weighted score = 4.0
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 26.7%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 6.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 13.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .235) + (2 × .06) + (1 × .133) ÷ 6 = .160 × 100 = 16.0 ÷ 4 = 4.0
Judicial weighted score = 6.4
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 30.0%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 15.4% women
TIER 3 Appellate Courts 33.3%  women
Total:  (3 × .300) + (2 × .154) + (1 × .333) ÷ 6 = .257 × 100 =  25.7 ÷ 4 = 6.4
Security weighted score = 1.8
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 5.9%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 5.4%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 13.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .059) + (2 × .054) + (1 × .135) ÷ 6  = .070 × 100 =  7.0 ÷ 4 = 1.8
4.8 (Executive) + 4.0 (Legislative) + 6.4 (Judicial) + 1.8 (Security) = 17.0
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HAITI = 6.9
Executive weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Ministers 20.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 13.3%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .200) + (2 × .133) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .144 x 100 = 14.4 ÷ 4 = 3.6
Legislative weighted score = 0.2
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 0.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 5.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .053) ÷ 6 = .009 × 100 = .9 ÷ 4 = 0.2
Judicial weighted score = 2.9
TIER 1 Supreme Court 5.9%  women
TIER 2 Courts of Appeal 18.8% women
TIER 3 Courts of First Instance 13.5%  women
Total:  (3 × .059) + (2 × .188) + (1 × .135) ÷ 6 = .115 × 100 = 11.5 ÷ 4 = 2.9
Security weighted score = 0.2
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 0.5%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 0.9%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 0.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .005) + (2 × .009) + (1 × .009) ÷ 6  = .007 × 100 = 0.7 ÷ 4 = 0.2
3.6 (Executive) + 0.2 (Legislative) + 2.9 (Judicial) + 0.2 (Security) = 6.9
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MEXICO = 13.9
Executive weighted score = 4.4
TIER 1 Ministers 17.6%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 16.3%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .176) + (2 × .163) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6 = .176 x 100 = 17.6 ÷ 4 = 4.4
Legislative weighted score = 3.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 23.2%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 38.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .232) + (1 × .380) ÷ 6 = .141 × 100 = 14.1 ÷ 4 = 3.5
Judicial weighted score = 4.5
TIER 1 Supreme Court 18.2%  women
TIER 2 Federal Electoral Tribunal 14.3% women
TIER 3 Superior Courts 24.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .182) + (2 × .143) + (1 × 241) ÷ 6 = .179 × 100 = 17.9 ÷ 4 = 4.5
Security weighted score = 1.5
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 5.6%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 4.2%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 10.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .056) + (2 × .042) + (1 × .104) ÷ 6  = .059 × 100 = 5.9 ÷ 4 = 1.5
4.4 (Executive) + 3.5 (Legislative) +  4.5 (Judicial) + 1.5 (Security ) = 13.9
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Latin America and the Caribbean - Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Brazil 4.5 0.8 4.4 3.6
Columbia 6.8 4.3 4.8 -
Guatemala 4.8 4.0 6.4 1.8
Haiti 3.6 0.2 2.9 0.2
Mexico 4.4 3.5 4.5 1.5
TOTALS 24.1 12.8 23.0 7.1
AVERAGE 4.8 2.6 4.6 1.8
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BANGLADESH = 10.0
Executive weighted score = 1.7
TIER 1 Ministers 6.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 10.5%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .067) + (2 × .105) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  = .069 × 100 = 6.9 ÷ 4 = 1.7
Legislative weighted score = 4.3
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 20.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 12.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
Total:  (3 × .200) + (2 × .120) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6 = .173 × 100 = 17.3 ÷ 4 = 4.3
Judicial weighted score = 2.7
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 13%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 7.0% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 11.0%  women
Total:  (3 × .130) + (2 × .070) + (1 × .110) ÷ 6 = .107 × 10.7 =  10.7 ÷ 4 = 2.7
Security weighted score = 1.3
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 3.2%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 12.5%  women
TOTAL (3 × .040) + (2 × .032) + (1 × .125) ÷ 6  = .052 × 100 = 5.2 ÷ 4 = 1.3
1.7 (Executive) + 4.3 (Legislative) + 2.7 (Judicial) + 1.3 (Security) = 10.0
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CAMBODIA = NA (10.2 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 2.2
TIER 1 Ministers 4.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 18.7%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .047) + (2 × .187) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .086 × 100 = 8.6 ÷ 4 =  2.2
Legislative weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 33.3%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .333) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6 = .144 × 100 = 14.4 ÷ 4 = 3.6
Judicial weighted score = 4.4
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 13.3% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 11.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .222) + (2 × .133) + (1 × .111) ÷ 6 = .174 × 100 =  17.4 ÷ 4 = 4.4
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 4.9%  women
TOTAL:  NA
2.2 (Executive) + 3.6 (Legislative) + 4.4 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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INDIA = 11.6
Executive weighted score = 2.4
TIER 1 Ministers 9.3%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 4.5%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .093) + (2 × .045) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6  = .095 × 100 = 9.5 ÷ 4 = 2.4
Legislative weighted score = 6.2
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 33.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 18.0% women
TIER 3 Legislators 11.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .180) + (1 × .114) ÷ 6 = .246 × 100 =  24.6 ÷ 4 = 6.2
Judicial weighted score = 1.9*
TIER 1 Supreme Court 7.7%  women
TIER 2 High Court 7.3% women
TIER 3 Trial Court NA % of women
TOTAL:  (3 × .077) + (2 × .073) ÷ 5 = .075 × 100 = 7.5 ÷ 4 = 1.9
Security weighted score = 1.1
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.2%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 3.7%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 5.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .042) + (2 × .037) + (1 × .059) ÷ 6  = .043 × 100 = 4.3 ÷ 4 = 1.1
2.4 (Executive) + 6.2 (Legislative) + 1.9* (Judicial) + 1.1 (Security) = 11.6
*Weighted Tier 1 +Tier 2 only
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INDONESIA = 10.5
Executive weighted score = 3.1
TIER 1 Ministers 11.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 9.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .118) + (2 × .090) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6  =  .122 × 100 = 12.2 ÷ 4 = 3.1
Legislative weighted score = 3.7
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 11.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 18.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 18.6%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .110) + (2 × .180) + (1 × .186) ÷ 6 = .146 × 100 = 14.6 ÷ 4 = 3.7
Judicial weighted score = 2.0
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 11.1%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 0.0% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 15.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .111) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .154) ÷ 6 = .812 × 100 =  8.1 ÷ 4 = 2.0
Security weighted score = 1.7
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.6%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 11.7%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 3.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .046) + (2 × .117) + (1 × .033) ÷ 6  = .068 × 100 = 6.8 ÷ 4 = 1.7
3.1 (Executive) + 3.7 (Legislative) + 2.0 (Judicial) + 1.7 (Security) = 10.5
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MONGOLIA = NA (16.4 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 3.1*
TIER 1 Ministers 16.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats NA%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .167) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .000) ÷ 4  =  .125 × 100 = 12.5 ÷ 4 = 3.1
Legislative weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 20.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 5.9%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 14.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .200) + (2 × .059) + (1 × .149) ÷ 6 = .145 × 100 = 14.5 ÷ 4 = 3.6
Judiciary weighted score = 9.7
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 22.2%  women
TIER 2 High Court 48.0% women
TIER 3 Appellate Court 69.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .222) + (2 × .480) + (1 × .690) ÷ 6 = .387 × 100 = 38.6 ÷ 4 = 9.7
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
3.1* (Executive) + 3.6 (Legislative) + 9.7 (Judiciary) + NA (Security) = NA
*Weighted Tier 1 + Tier 3
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NEPAL = 7.1
Executive weighted score = 1.9
TIER 1 Ministers 15.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 0.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .150) + (2 × .000 ) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .075 × 100 = 7.5 ÷ 4 = 1.9
Legislative weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 3.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 23.5%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 29.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .033) + (2 × .235) + (1 × .295) ÷ 6 = .144 × 100 = 14.4 ÷ 4 = 3.6
Judicial weighted score = 1.3
TIER 1 Supreme Court 7.7%  women
TIER 2 Appellate Court 4.1% women
TIER 3 District Court 0.0% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .077) + (2 × .041) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .052 × 100 = 5.2 ÷ 4 = 1.3
Security weighted score = 0.3
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 0.4% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 0.3%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 5.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .004) + (2 × .003) + (1 × .058) ÷ 6 = .013 × 100 = 1.3 ÷ 4 = 0.3
1.9 (Executive) + 3.6 (Legislative) + 1.3 (Judicial) + 0.3 (Security) = 7.1
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PHILIPPINES = NA (17.6 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 6.2
TIER 1 Ministers 16.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 40.7%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .160) + (2 × .407 ) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6 = .249 × 100 = 24.9 ÷ 4 = 6.2
Legislative weighted score = 5.1
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 12.5%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 28.6%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 27.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .125) + (2 × .286) + (1 × .270) ÷ 6 = .203 × 100 = 20.3 ÷ 4 = 5.1
Judicial weighted score = 6.3
TIER 1 Supreme Court 20.0% women
TIER 2 Court of Appeals 34.8% women
TIER 3 Graft and Corruption Court 21.4% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .200) + (2 × .348) + (1 × .214) ÷ 6 = .252 × 100 = 25.2 ÷ 4 = 6.3
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 7.7%  women
TOTAL:  NA
6.2 (Executive) + 5.1 (Legislative) + 6.3 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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THAILAND = 3.6
Executive weighted score = 1.1
TIER 1 Ministers 8.3%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 0.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .083) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .042 × 100 = 4.2 ÷ 4 = 1.1
Legislative weighted score = 0.7
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 0.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 15.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .158) ÷ 6 = .026 × 100 = 2.6 ÷ 4 = 0.7
Judicial weighted score = 1.4
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court of Justice 16.7% women
TIER 3 Supreme Administrative Court 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .167) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .056 × 100 =  5.6 ÷ 4 = 1.4
Security weighted score = 0.4
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 1.7%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 5.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .017) + (1 × .058) ÷ 6 = .015 × 100 =  1.5 ÷ 4 = 0.4
1.1 (Executive) + 0.7 (Legislative) + 1.4  (Judicial) + 0.4 (Security) = 3.6
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TIMOR-LISTE = 17.7
Executive weighted score = 3.0
TIER 1 Ministers 11.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 18.4%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .118) + (2 × .184) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .120 × 100 = 12.0 ÷ 4 =3.00
Legislative weighted score = 4.0
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 28.6%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 38.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .286) + (1 × .385) ÷ 6 = .160 × 100 = 16.0 ÷ 4 = 4.00
Judicial weighted score = 8.9
TIER 1 Court of Appeal 33.3%  women
TIER 2 District Courts 38.7%  women
TIER 3* (No third tier of formal court) NA%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .387) + (1 × NA) ÷ 5 = .355 × 100 =  35.5 ÷ 4 = 8.88
Security weighted score = 1.8
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 3.4%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 9.5%   women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 14.4%   women
TOTAL:  (3 × .034) + (2 × .095) + (1 × .144) ÷ 6 = .073 × 100 = 7.3 ÷ 4 = 1.83
3.0 (Executive) + 4.0 (Legislative) + 8.9* (Judicial) + 1.8 (Security) = 17.7
*Weighted Tier 1 + Tier 2 only as there is no formal third tier of courts in the country
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Asia - Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIARY SECURITY
Bangladesh 1.7 4.3 2.7 1.3
Cambodia 2.2 3.6 4.4 -
India 2.4 6.2 1.9 1.1
Indonesia 3.1 3.7 2.0 1.7
Mongolia 3.1 3.6 9.7 -
Nepal 1.9 3.6 1.3 0.3
Philippines 6.2 5.1 6.3 -
Thailand 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.4
Timor-Leste 3.0 4.0 8.9 1.8
TOTALS 24.7 34.8 38.6 6.6
AVERAGE 2.7 3.9 4.3 1.1
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BENIN = NA (13.9 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 4.6
TIER 1 Ministers 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 22.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .222) + (2 × .220) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .184 × 100 =  18.4 ÷ 4 = 4.6
Legislative weighted score = 2.1*
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs NA%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 8.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .084) ÷ 4 = .084 × 100 = 8.4 ÷ 4 = 2.1
Judiciary weighted score = 7.2
TIER 1 Supreme Court 28.6%  women
TIER 2 Constitutional Court 22.2% women
TIER 3 High Court 42.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .286) + (2 × .222) + (1 × .429) ÷ 6 = .289 × 100 = 28.9 ÷ 4 = 7.2
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3** Lower-Level Officers 6.5%  women
TOTAL:  NA 
4.6 (Executive) + 2.1* (Legislative) + 7.2 (Judiciary) + NA (Security) = NA
* Weighted score of Tier 1 + Tier 3
** Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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BURKINA FASO = 17.2
Executive weighted score = 2.6*
TIER 1 Ministers 13.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats NA%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .138) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .000) ÷ 4 = .104 × 100 = 10.4 ÷ 4 = 2.6
Legislative weighted score = 2.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 20.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 18.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .200) + (1 × .189) ÷ 6 = .098 × 100 = 9.8 ÷ 4 = 2.5
Judicial weighted score = 10.4
TIER 1 Supreme Court 45.5%  women
TIER 2 Constitutional Council 42.9% women
TIER 3 Court of Appeals 27.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .455) + (2 × .429) + (1 × .278) ÷ 6 = .417 × 100 = 41.7 ÷ 4 = 10.4
Security weighted score = 1.7
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 8.9%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 3.8%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 5.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .089) + (2 × .038) + (1 × .050) ÷ 6 = .066 × 100 = 6.6 ÷ 4 = 1.7
2.6* (Executive) + 2.5 (Legislative) + 10.4 (Judicial) + 1.7 (Security) = 17.2
* Weighted score of Tier 1 + Tier 3
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COTE D’IVOIRE = 15.3
Executive weighted score = 3.1
TIER 1 Ministers 15.6%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 13.6%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .156) + (2 × .136) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .123 × 100 =   12.3 ÷ 4 = 3.1
Legislative weighted score = 3.1
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 33.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 9.2%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .330) + (1 × .092) ÷ 6 = .125 × 100 = 12.5 ÷ 4 = 3.1
Judicial weighted score = 6.9
TIER 1 Supreme Court 28.6%  women
TIER 2 Constitutional Court 28.6% women
TIER 3* Court of Appeals 23.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .286) + (2 × .286) + (1 × .234) ÷ 6 = .277 × 100 =   27.7 ÷ 4 = 6.9
Security weighted score = 2.2
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 6.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 11.6%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 11.1%  women **
TOTAL:  (3 × .060) + (2 × .116) + (1 × .111) ÷ 6 = .088 × 100 = 8.8 ÷ 4 = 2.2
3.1 (Executive) + 3.1 (Legislative) + 6.9* (Judicial) + 2.2 (Security) = 15.3
*Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the Judiciary
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GHANA = NA (15.4 Minus Security) 
Executive weighted score = 5.5
TIER 1 Ministers 22.5%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 22.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 5 largest cities* 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .225) + (2 × .220) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6 = .219 × 100 = 21.9 ÷ 4 = 5.5
Legislative weighted score = 2.1
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 8.7%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 6.7%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 10.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .087) + (2 × .067) + (1 × .109) ÷ 6 = .084 × 100 = 8.4 ÷ 4 = 2.1
Judicial weighted score = 7.8
TIER 1 Supreme Court 33.3%  women
TIER 2 Court of Appeal 32.0% women
TIER 3 High Court 25.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .320) + (1 × .250) ÷ 6 = .312 × 100 =   31.2 ÷ 4 = 7.8
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 13.8 %  women
TOTAL:  NA
5.5* (Executive) + 2.1 (Legislative) + 7.8 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
*Data available for top five cities only
** Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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KENYA = 20.5
Executive weighted score = 6.4
TIER 1 Ministers 33.3%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 26.9%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .269) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .256 × 100 = 25.6 ÷ 4 = 6.4
Legislative weighted score = 4.1
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 9.1%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 25.9%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 19.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .091) + (2 × .259) + (1 × .197) ÷ 6 = .165 × 100 = 16.5 ÷ 4 = 4.1
Judicial weighted score = 8.0
TIER 1 Supreme Court 28.6%  women
TIER 2 Court of Appeal 30.8% women
TIER 3 High Court 43.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .286) + (2 × .308) + (1 × .435) ÷ 6 = .318 × 100 =  31.8 ÷ 4 = 8.0
Security weighted score = 2.0
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 6.5%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 8.5%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 11.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .065) + (2 × .085) + (1 × .117) ÷ 6 = .080 × 100 =  8.0 ÷ 4 = 2.00
6.4 (Executive) + 4.1 (Legislative) + 8.0 (Judicial) + 2.0 (Security) = 20.5
376
LIBERIA = NA (16.3 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 8.4
TIER 1 Ministers 21.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 29.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors 80.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .211) + (2 × .290) + (1 × .800) ÷ 6  =  .336 × 100 =  33.6 ÷ 4 = 8.4
Legislative weighted score = 1.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 12.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 11.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .120) + (1 × .110) ÷ 6 = .058 × 100 = 5.8 ÷ 4 = 1.5
Judiciary weighted score = 6.4
TIER 1 Supreme Court 40.0%  women
TIER 2 Circuit Courts 14.3% women
TIER 3 Specialized Courts 5.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .400) + (2 × .143) + (1 × .053) ÷ 6 = .257 × 100 =  25.7 ÷ 4 = 6.4
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.3%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
8.4 (Executive) + 1.5 (Legislative) + 6.4 (Judiciary) + NA (Security Sector) = NA
377
Annex B: Diamond Index Scorecards
MADAGASCAR = NA (14.8 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 4.3
TIER 1 Ministers 19.4%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 17.9%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .194) + (2 × .179) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  .173 × 100 = 17.3 ÷ 4 = 4.3
Legislative weighted score = 4.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 8.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 32.3%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 20.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .083) + (2 × .323) + (1 × .205) ÷ 6 = .183 × 100 = 18.3 ÷ 4 = 4.6
Judicial weighted score = 5.9*
TIER 1 Constitutional High Court 33.3%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 9.1% women
TIER 3 Courts of Appeal NA%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .333) + (2 × .091) + (1 × .NA) ÷ 5 = .236 × 100 = 23.6 ÷ 4 = 5.9
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 12.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
4.3 (Executive) + 4.6 (Legislative) + 5.9* (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Weighted Tier 1 + Tier 2
** Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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MALI = 12.7
Executive weighted score = 3.1
TIER 1 Ministers 16.1%  women
TIER 2* Top Technocrats 13.3%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .161) + (2 × .133) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .125 × 100 =  12.5 ÷ 4 = 3.1
Legislative weighted score = 2.5
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 25.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 9.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .250) + (1 × .095) ÷ 6 = .099 × 100 = 9.9 ÷ 4 = 2.5
Judicial weighted score = 6.6
TIER 1 Supreme Court 17.1%  women
TIER 2 Constitutional Court 50.0% women
TIER 3 Appellate Courts 7.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .171) + (2 × .500) + (1 × .075) ÷ 6 = .265 × 100 =    26.5 ÷ 4 = 6.6
Security weighted score = 1.1
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 0.2%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 8.2%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 9.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .002) + (2 × .082) + (1 × .097) ÷ 6 = .045 × 100 =  4.5 ÷ 4 = 1.1
3.1* (Executive) + 2.5 (Legislative) + 6.6 (Judicial) + 1.1 (Security) = 12.7
*Tier 2 is the percent of women working in ministries that are not ministers
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MOZAMBIQUE = NA (14.3 Minus Security) 
Executive weighted score = 5.2
TIER 1 Ministers 28.6%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats (see notes below) 19.2%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .286) + (2 × .192) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6 = .207 × 100 = 20.7 ÷ 4 = 5.2
Legislative weighted score = 4.7
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 36.4%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 39.6%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .364) + (1 × .396) ÷ 6 = .187 × 100 = 18.7 ÷ 4 = 4.7
Judicial weighted score = 4.4*
TIER 1 Constitutional Council 16.7%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 18.8% women
TIER 3 Provincial Courts NA  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .167) + (2 × .188) + (1 × .NA) ÷ 5 = .175 × 100 = 17.5 ÷ 4 = 4.4
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
5.2 (Executive) + 4.7 (Legislative) + 4.4* (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
*Weighted score of Tier 1 + Tier 2
** Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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NIGER = NA
Executive weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Ministers 22.2%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats NA%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
Legislative weighted score = 3.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 36.4%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 13.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .364) + (1 × .133) ÷ 6 = .144 × 100 = 14.4 ÷ 4 = 3.6
Judicial weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Constitutional Council 14.3%  women
TIER 2 High Court of Justice NA% women
TIER 3 Court of Cassation NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
Security weighted score = 0.9
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 5.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 0.8%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 3.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .050) + (2 × .008) + (1 × .037) ÷ 6 = .034 × 100 =   3.4 ÷ 4 = 0.9
NA (Executive) + 3.6 (Legislative) + NA (Judicial) + 0.9 (Security) = NA
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NIGERIA = 14.9
Executive weighted score = 5.0
TIER 1 Ministers 25.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 22.6%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .250) + (2 × .226) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .200 × 100 =  20.0 ÷ 4 = 5.0
Legislative weighted score = 1.7
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 3.7%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 11.1%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 6.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .037) + (2 × .111) + (1 × .067) ÷ 6 = .067 × 100 = 6.7 ÷ 4 = 1.7
Judicial weighted score = 6.7
TIER 1 Supreme Court 25.0%  women
TIER 2 Court of Appeals 26.1% women
TIER 3 Federal High Courts 33.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .250) + (2 × .261) + (1 × .339) ÷ 6 = .269 × 100 =  26.9 ÷ 4 = 6.7
Security weighted score = 1.5
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 4.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 5.0%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 12.9%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .040) + (2 × .050) + (1 × .129) ÷ 6  = .058 × 100 =  5.8 ÷ 4 = 1.5
5.0 (Executive) + 1.7 (Legislative) + 6.7 (Judicial) + 1.5 (Security) = 14.9
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RWANDA = 27.9
Executive weighted score = 9.5
TIER 1 Ministers 40.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 47.4%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .400) + (2 × .474) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  . × 100 =   38.1 ÷ 4 = 9.5
Legislative weighted score = 7.8
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 14.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 40.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 63.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .143) + (2 × .400) + (1 × .638) ÷ 6 = .311 × 100 = 31.1 ÷ 4 = 7.8
Judicial weighted score = 9.2
TIER 1 Supreme Court 43.8%  women
TIER 2 High Courts 25.0% women
TIER 3 Intermediate Courts 39.4%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .438) + (2 × .250) + (1 × .394) ÷ 6 = .368 × 100 =  36.8 ÷ 4 = 9.2
Security weighted score = 1.4
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 8.0%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 0.6%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 8.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .080) + (2 × .006) + (1 × .087) ÷ 6  = .057 × 100 =  5.7 ÷ 4 = 1.4
9.5 (Executive) + 7.8 (Legislative) + 9.2 (Judicial) + 1.4 (Security) = 27.9
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SENEGAL = NA (9.6 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 3.0*
TIER 1 Ministers 16.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats NA%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .161) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .000) ÷ 4  =  .121 × 100 =   12.1 ÷ 4 = 3.0
Legislative weighted score = 5.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 45.5%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 42.7%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .455) + (1 × .427) ÷ 6 = .223 × 100 = 22.3 ÷ 4 = 5.6
Judicial weighted score = 1.0**
TIER 1 Constitutional Council 0%  women
TIER 2 Highest Court of Appeals NA% women
TIER 3 High Courts 15%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .150) ÷ 4 = .038 × 100 = 3.8 ÷ 4 = 1.0
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 5.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
3.0* (Executive) + 5.6 (Legislative) + 1.0** (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Weighted average of Tier 1 + Tier 3
** Weighted average of Tier 1 + Tier 3 (Tier 3 is the total percentage of women judges)
*** Tier 3 is the total percent of women in the police force
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SOUTH AFRICA = 30.1 
Executive weighted score = 9.5
TIER 1 Ministers 37.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 48.5%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 20.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .371) + (2 × .485) + (1 × .200) ÷ 6  =  .381 × 100 =   38.1 ÷ 4 = 9.5
Legislative weighted score = 7.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 21.4%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 37.8%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 41.5%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .214) + (2 × .378) + (1 × .415) ÷ 6 = .302 × 100 = 30.2 ÷ 4 = 7.6
Judicial weighted score = 6.0
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 18.2%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court of Appeals 30.4% women
TIER 3 High Courts 28.8%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .182) + (2 × .304) + (1 × .288) ÷ 6 = .240 × 100 =  24.0 ÷ 4 = 6.0
Security weighted score = 7.0
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers 26.6%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers 28.2%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 30.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .266) + (2 × .282) + (1 × .303) ÷ 6  = .278 × 100 =  27.8 ÷ 4 = 7.0
9.5 (Executive) + 7.6 (Legislative) + 6.0 (Judicial) + 7.0 (Security) = 30.1
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Africa - Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Benin 4.6 2.1 7.2 -
Burkina Faso 2.6 2.5 10.4 1.7
Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 3.1 6.9 2.2
Ghana 5.5 2.1 7.8 -
Kenya 6.4 4.1 8.0 2.0
Liberia 8.4 1.5 6.4 -
Madagascar 4.3 4.6 5.9 -
Mali 3.1 2.5 6.6 1.1
Mozambique 5.2 4.7 4.4 -
Niger - 3.6 - 0.9
Nigeria 5.0 1.7 6.7 1.5
Rwanda 9.5 7.8 9.2 1.4
Senegal 3.0 5.6 1.0 -
South Africa 9.5 7.6 6.0 7.0
TOTALS 70.2 53.5 86.5 17.8
AVERAGES 5.4 3.8 6.7 2.2
386
ALGERIA = NA (11.7 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 2.3*
TIER 1 Ministers 12.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats NA %  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .120) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .000) ÷ 4  =  .091 × 100 =  9.1 ÷ 4 = 2.3
Legislative weighted score = 2.0*
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs NA%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 31.6%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .316) ÷ 4 = .079 × 100 =  7.9 ÷ 4 = 2.0
Judicial weighted score = 7.4**
TIER 1 Constitutional Council 22.2% women
TIER 2 Supreme Court (150 judges total) NA%  women
TIER 3 Appellate Courts (Wilaya) 51.5%
TOTAL:  (3 × .222) + (2 × NA) + (1 × .51.5) ÷  4 = .295 × 100 =  29.5 ÷ 4 = 7.4
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 8.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
*2.3 (Executive) + *2.0 (Legislative) + **7.4 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
*Weighted Tier 1 + Tier 3 
**Weighted Tier 1 + Tier 3 is the overall percentage of women in the judiciary
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IRAQ = NA (3.6 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 0.8
TIER 1 Ministers 3.7%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 3.7 %  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .037) + (2 × .037) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .031 × 100 =  3.1 ÷ 4 = 0.8
Legislative weighted score = 2.3
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 15.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 25.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .150) + (1 × .253) ÷ 6 = .092 × 100 =  9.2 ÷ 4 = 2.3
Judicial weighted score = 0.5
TIER 1 Federal Supreme Court 0.0% women
TIER 2 Court of Cassation 0.0% women
TIER 2 Courts of Appeal 11.1% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .111) ÷ 6 = .018 × 100 =  1.8 ÷ 4 = .5
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
0.8 (Executive) + 2.3 (Legislative) + 0.5 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
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JORDAN = NA (5.7 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 2.2
TIER 1 Ministers 11.1%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 10.0%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .111) + (2 × .100) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .089 × 100 =  8.9 ÷ 4 = 2.2
Legislative weighted score = 1.9
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 4.6%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 10.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 12.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .046) + (2 × .100) + (1 × .120) ÷ 6 = .076 × 100 =  7.6 ÷ 4 = 1.9
Judicial weighted score = 1.6
TIER 1 Supreme Court (Cassation) 0.0% women
TIER 2 Courts of Appeal 3.0% women
TIER 3 Court of First Instance 32.0% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .030) + (1 × .320) ÷ 6 = .063 × 100 =  6.3 ÷ 4 = 1.6
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 7.0%  women
TOTAL:  NA
2.2 (Executive) + 1.9 (Legislative) + 1.6 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Tier 3 is the total percentage of women in the police force
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LEBANON = NA (3.6 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 0.9
TIER 1 Ministers 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 10.1%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .101) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .034 × 100 =  3.4 ÷ 4 = 0.9
Legislative weighted score = 1.2
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 12.5%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 3.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .125) + (1 × .031) ÷ 6 = .047 × 100 =  4.7 ÷ 4 = 1.2
Judicial weighted score = 1.5
TIER 1 Supreme Court (Cassation) 0.0% women
TIER 2 Constitutional Council 0.0% women
TIER 3 Civil – Criminal - Commercial Courts 36.5% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .365) ÷ 6 = .061 × 100 =  6.1 ÷ 4 = 1.5
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3* Lower-Level Officers 2.4%  women
TOTAL: NA
0.9 (Executive) + 1.2 (Legislative) + 1.5 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = 4.8
* Tier 3 is the total percentage of women in the police force
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MOROCCO = NA (9.4 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 3.0
TIER 1 Ministers 15.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 7.4%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 10.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .158) + (2 × .074) + (1 × .100) ÷ 6  =  .120 × 100 =  12.0 ÷ 4 = 3.0
Legislative weighted score = 2.6
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 6.3%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 12.5%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 17.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .063) + (2 × .125) + (1 × .170) ÷ 6 = .102 × 100 =  10.2 ÷ 4 = 2.6
Judicial weighted score = 3.8*
TIER 1 Constitutional Court 8.3%  women
TIER 2 Supreme Court 16.0%  women
TIER 3* Courts of Appeal 22.1%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .083) + (2 × .160) + (1 × .221) ÷ 6 = .152 × 100 =  15.2 ÷ 4 = 3.8
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
3.0 (Executive) + 2.6 (Legislative) + 3.8* (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
*The Tier 3 Judicial score is based on the overall percentage of women judges
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TUNISIA = NA
Executive weighted score = 4.4
TIER 1 Ministers 11.5%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 35.7%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .115) + (2 × .357) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .177 × 100 =  17.7 ÷ 4 = 4.4
Legislative weighted score = 3.4
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 25.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 31.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .250) + (1 × .313) ÷ 6 = .136 × 100 =  13.6 ÷ 4 = 3.4
Judicial weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Supreme Court (Cassation) NA%  women
TIER 2 Appeals Courts NA% women
TIER 3 Courts of First Instance 27.7%  women*
TOTAL:  Total percentage of women judges in all courts with no distinction made
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers NA%  women
TOTAL:  NA
4.4 (Executive) + 3.4 (Legislative) + NA (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
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YEMEN = NA (2.3 Minus Security)
Executive weighted score = 2.2
TIER 1 Ministers 8.8%  women
TIER 2 Top Technocrats 13.3%  women
TIER 3 Mayors of 10 largest cities 0.0%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .088) + (2 × .133) + (1 × .000) ÷ 6  =  .088 × 100 =  8.8 ÷ 4 = 2.2
Legislative weighted score = 0.0
TIER 1 Political Party Leaders 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Committee Chairs 0.0%  women
TIER 3 Legislators 0.3%  women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 × .000) + (1 × .003) ÷ 6  =  .001 × 100 =  0.1 ÷ 4 = 0.0
Judicial weighted score = 0.1
TIER 1 Supreme Court 0.0%  women
TIER 2 Appeals Court 0.0%  women
TIER 3 District Courts 2.1% women
TOTAL:  (3 × .000) + (2 ×.000) + (1 × .021) ÷ 6 = .004 × 100 =  0.4 ÷ 4 = 0.1
Security weighted score = NA
TIER 1 Top-Level Officers NA% women
TIER 2 Mid-Level Officers NA%  women
TIER 3 Lower-Level Officers 1.7%  women
TOTAL:  NA
2.2 (Executive) + 0.0 (Legislative) + 0.1 (Judicial) + NA (Security) = NA
* Tier 3 is the total percentage of women in the police force
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Middle East & North Africa – Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Algeria 2.3 2.0 7.4 -
Iraq 0.8 2.3 0.5 -
Jordan 2.2 1.9 1.6 -
Lebanon 0.9 1.2 1.5 -
Morocco 3.0 2.6 3.8 -
Tunisia 4.4 3.4 - -
Yemen 2.2 0.0 0.1 -
TOTALS 15.8 13.4 14.9 -
AVERAGES 2.3 1.9 2.5 -
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GLOBAL – Weighted Scores Averaged
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATIVE JUDICIAL SECURITY
Eastern Europe & Eurasia 3.9 2.9 7.7 1.5
Latin America & Caribbean 4.8 2.6 4.6 1.8
Asia 2.7 3.9 4.3 1.1
Africa 5.2 3.8 6.6 2.2
Middle East & North Africa 2.3 1.9 2.5 -
TOTALS 18.9 15.1 25.7 6.6
AVERAGES 3.8 3.0 5.1 1.7
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ADDENDUM ON VALORIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Research Relevance 
This research effort attempts to demonstrate how new measurement approaches can 
effectively capture increased data detailing women’s access to positions of formal 
political decision-making across differing regions and political systems.  The design 
of the tool (Diamond Index), and goal in mapping it in 40 countries – many of them 
recognized as “data scarce” – was to test the premise that not only could a more 
nuanced measurement approach be developed, but quality data could be reliably 
gathered on a global scale.  The challenge was, therefore, to not only broaden and 
deepen the selection of indicators, but to also ensure that:  1) indicators selected were 
similar across all political systems and regions, 2) the data was of high quality, and 
3) the data could be collected effectively on a global scale.  
The ability to include a wider array of data, including from less-researched 
countries, can help stakeholders gain a more thorough understanding of women’s 
formal political representation.  Fast-track quotas across the whole of government, 
years of authoritarianism, one-party rule, civil war, and tribal violence are factors 
less accounted for in the current academic and development literature surrounding 
women’s political descriptive representation.  Expanding our views to account for 
the many ways women are moving into the political arena is needed to not only 
challenge Western assumptions, but to ensure a more accurate reflection of what is 
happening globally.  With better data – in particular if gathered over time – interested 
parties can begin to weave a much richer narrative in relation to women’s presence 
in the political space. 
Research Target Groups 
As a democracy practitioner working for a development agency, the genesis of this 
academic undertaking grew out of frustration with the lack of available data on 
women in the political space.  An explicit goal of this research was to create a tool 
that that could be replicated by a variety of stakeholders, including governments, 
civil society organizations, and development practitioners.  Using publically 
available data to the greatest extent possible, the methodology for collecting, 
weighting, calculating, and aggregating the data was designed to be logical and 
straightforward in its application.  The intent in designing the index was to provide 
a tool that any group or individual could replicate according to their own need and 
timeframe. Rather than await the annual publication of gender indexes that focus on 
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a few global measures, stakeholders are empowered to replicate the tool in their own 
respective countries as part of a wider gender or political-economy analysis – or 
simply to better measure and track women’s representational progress.  In essence, 
the design of the Diamond Index measurement tool attempted to strike a balance 
between academic rigor, data accessibility, and practical application.
My particular interest in developing the Diamond Index was to measure women’s 
political representation.  Other groups may find value, however, in redefining the 
tool as a measurement for representing an array of categories:  tribes, religions, 
persons with disabilities, or youth in decision-making positions across government. 
The index is easily adaptable for descriptively measuring a variety of marginalized 
or targeted groups of interest. 
Research Innovation
This research builds off previous efforts undertaken by the United Nations, World 
Economic Forum, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Social 
Watch, and the European Institute of Gender Equality, among others.  Findings of the 
research demonstrated that a new measurement approach, aimed at expanding the 
available data on women political decision-makers, was viable.  This research project 
was able to collect 86.7% of all measures attempted.  Excluding the security domain, 
where the majority of gaps existed, the measurement index was able to gather 94.4% 
of the data points.  Much of this data – 9 of the 12 indicators – was new information 
previously not collected at the level of detail offered in this research.  Eight of the 12 
indicators were considered of high quality.  Equally important, the information was 
culled from a wide variety of countries.  The more traditional countries of study – 
including those based in Scandinavia, Western Europe, or most of North America 
– were not included.  As a result, a number of low-income countries excluded from 
other global indexes, many of them considered data-scarce and off the academic 
grid, were successfully included.
The design of the index reinforces the need to reach across all government branches 
from a horizontal perspective to better identify percentages of women.  While 
acknowledging that higher percentages of women are important, the measurement 
tool then takes the additional step of assigning differing decision-making authority to 
selected positions based on a weighting system.  This arrangement of data, examined 
through both a horizontal and vertical lens, holds the potential for combining data 
in different ways to identify trends and patterns that have not been fully examined 
through current gender indexes.  With this information academics, governments, 
practitioners, and advocates can begin to explore, for example, where women are 
414
Addendum on Valorization of the Dissertation
accessing elected verses appointed positions, what level of position, in what type of 
regime, and under what conditions.  
Another area of innovation is the amount of data collected on women leaders in 
the security sector.  To date, most information available represents overall numbers 
of women in an institution, such as the military or police.  By focusing on the 
leadership hierarchy within national police forces, the Diamond Index paints a more 
robust picture of potential influence women have in the chain of command.  Given 
the importance of this sector in the lives of women and children, it seems likely – 
based on predicted upheaval from future climate change, conflict across regions, 
and ongoing terrorism threats – that the issue of security will grow in importance. 
In particular, how women are represented in decision-making roles, and its relation 
to high levels of insecurity, remains understudied in the academic and development 
literature.  This research effort provides new data for this field of study.
Research Products
The Diamond Index also adds value as an advocacy and benchmarking tool with 
which to hold government accountable.  Its detailed presentation of women’s 
descriptive representation allows for more targeted advocacy around specific 
branches of government or within institutions themselves.   For example, in one 
country we may see large numbers of women parliamentarians elected but a small 
percentage of women holding committee leadership positions.  Rather than arguing 
for more elected women, the point of advocacy may be to narrow the disparity in 
women committee chairs.  In instances where commitments are not being met, the 
index is an easily understood visualization of where the country is falling behind.  In 
instances where a country is exceeding expectations, the tool can be used to leverage 
greater awareness of gains being made to the local population or a wider global 
audience.
The Diamond Index has been introduced and used by the United States Agency 
for International Development to better document women’s participation in the 
political space in select countries.  This analysis has been used to help design country 
strategies and program activities.  Several “spin-off” activities have also evolved 
from the original research work undertaken on the Diamond Index.  This includes a 
joint research project between the United Nations Development Program and the 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. 
Between September 2015 and November 2017, more than 70 graduate students 
logged over 7,000 person-hours to help UNDP collect, visualize, and analyze country-
level data on women’s leadership in public administration.  This information will be 
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used, in part, to support progress of the UN Sustainable Development Goals.  Efforts 
to expand the use of the Diamond Index as a measurement and analytical gender tool 
continue at the United States Agency for International Development.
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